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NATO TALK
around the BRANDENBURGER TOR
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NATO's FUTURE 2018

NATO
OTAN

Introduction

> "Together, we have achieved an unprecedented period of peace and security. And we are here today so that future generations can enjoy that same peace and security."
>
> Jens Stoltenberg 2018

This past summer, NATO has moved on to new headquarters. While its mission has not changed, some of the boxes unpacked are far from "*same same*" - but rather different. A whirlwind Summit in July brought along a new NATO training and capacity building mission in Iraq, and the Regional Hub for the South had been declared fully operational. At the same time, Allies doubling down on their commitment to NATO's core mission of territorial defense. The creation of a Joint Force Support and Enabling Command could enable Allies to solve the Gordian knot of military mobility in Europe and cooperation between the European Union and NATO continues to further develop – especially in critical domains such as Cyber Security. Last but not least, although still working towards settling its name dispute with Greece, the Republic of Macedonia might soon join the alliance at its 30th member – demonstrating that the open door policy is still alive and kicking when NATO itself turns 70 in April 2019.

All these operational gains continue to be, unfortunately, too often overshadowed by the challenge of 29 individual member states facing a set of highly complex and specific security and political issues themselves to agree on joint priorities and the right steps to be taken when implementing common goals. As indicated above and observed in the past months, NATO cannot bury its head in the sand if it remains committed to keeping its place at the heart of allies strategies to seek security and stability. It can, should, and has already started to – for instance by opening up the July Summit to the public and #NATOengages – engage in a wider discussion about the challenges ahead and the difficulties of reaching simple answers to some of the most complex questions of our time.

Next year, three decades will also have passed since the Berlin Wall fell. Hence, nearly a third of those one billion people, whose security is an essential priority for NATO, have little or no actual memory of the Cold War or political repression in Europe. Growing up in times of peace or distant wars, NATO's youth weren't familiar with vocabulary such as *deterrence* or *collective defense* until very recently, and only from history and political science classes. Moreover, economic uncertainties and high rates of youth unemployment limit popular support for increased defense spending and costly military missions especially among those, whose security might be at stake if the alliance fails to deliver on its promise to protect and defend its member states.

The Atlantic Treaty Association foresaw this issue in the early 90's and as a response, founded its youth division, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association or YATA in its respective 36 national associations. Since 1996, YATA has served as a leading international platform for young professionals in security and defense, working alongside our ATA seniors and fellow youth organizations to

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ensure that young professionals have a voice in the policy-making world and direct access to national and international officials.

With the generous support of the German Atlantic Association, the Federal Academy for Security Policy, and NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, YATA Germany holds this seminar for the fifth time this year, encouraging and deepening a transnational as well as the cross-generational debate on current security issues. It provides a platform for fruitful and enriching debates during the day and a forum for an exchange of ideas and mutual understanding, while bringing together more than 40 young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO as well as government officials from some 20 countries (NATO member and partner states). For this year's seminar, we have selected three core issues on NATO's current and mid-term agenda: safeguarding NATO's internal cohesion by adhering to the same values and principles of cooperation between allies as well as between governments and their respective societies, securing future capabilities through targeted and sustainable spending policies, and the further development of a NATO open and flexible enough to engage in effective and successful partnership beyond its own territory. All three of them share one essential feature: the necessity of NATO to broaden its scope, prioritizing threats, and developing measures to attain collective security in an era of such uncertainty.

When we invited the members of YATA Germany to design the seminar agenda, and their national and international fellows to comment on the questions they posed, many have stressed economic, legal, social, and even philosophical features of security. You will find their perspectives and policy recommendation in the collection of essays in this booklet. We are thankful for their contributions as well as for our brilliant speakers and chairs that take the time to enrich our discussions with their expertise, insights, and curiosity.

Since the very first steps of this project, we have experienced remarkable support by many NATO International Staff and member state officials, encouraging us to continuously push and lobby for those that will shape and secure the alliance of tomorrow and beyond. In the end, however, only when we succeed in turning support into structural change, we can make the alliance truly sustainable. Thank you all for participating so actively in this endeavor and your commitment to making young voices an audible and visible part of NATO's Future.

Sincerely,

Magdalena Kirchner

Spokeswoman

Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany

In the Eye of the Beholder?

How to maintain Alliance Cohesion in shifting international and state-society relations?

Among the key characteristics of an alliance is cohesion – signaling strength and decisiveness to others and a shared set of goals and values internally. While external threats can create a rally 'round the flag effect' and mobilize solidarity and resolve, they cannot permanently cover up intra-alliance dissent and conflict over other issues. Does NATO, to maintain credibility as an alliance, have to expand its scope to trade issues or domestic politics? Yet if, quite the opposite, NATO would limit itself to hard military questions – how to adjust to member states' ever changing security environment and how to maintain its position as a key tool of national security for most of them? This gets even more complicated due to the fact that state-society relations in MATO member states, high and upper middle income countries where elections matter and politicans pay significant attention to public opinion, are of key importance to foreign policy making. In some member states, parts of the population even view NATO as a relic from Cold War times, in others, the purpose and functions of the alliance are not known at all – not to mention a joint sense of transnational solidarity. What should NATO do to win hearts and mind of both politicians and the wider public on the one hand and successfully do the splits between cohesion and inclusiveness on the other?

Panelists

Ruxandra Popa has served as the NATO PA's Deputy Secretary General since 1 March 2011. Before that, she was the director of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security since joining the NATO PA in August 2005. At its meeting in Warsaw in May 2018, the NATO PA's Standing Committee elected Ms Popa to be the Assembly's next Secretary General starting on 1 January 2020 at the expiration of the mandate of the current Secretary General, David Hobbs. Ms Popa has lectured at several French universities and regularly publishes on international security matters. Prior to joining the NATO PA, she held research and policy positions with several international and European organisations and research institutions, including the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, the German Bundestag and the European Parliament. Ms. Popa earned a Masters in Public Administration from Sciences Po Paris and one in International Law from the Sorbonne. She also studied at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Ms Popa is a graduate of the 70th national session "Defence Policy" of the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN). Ruxandra Popa was born in Bucharest, Romania, and is a national of France. She is fluent in English, has a good command of German and Romanian, and a basic knowledge of Spanish and Italian.

Eric Povel Eric Povel has worked in the Hague and Brussels as lobby consultant for numerous public affairs consultancies, companies, NGO's and governmental bodies.In 1995, he was employed as the Netherlands Information Officer in the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. During NATO's enlargement process in the late 90s, he was also responsible for NATO information activities in new and candidate member states. After NATO's Kosovo air campaign in 1999, Eric Povel also became the media planner for NATO's yearly Crisis Management Exercise (CMX). As of 1 July 2006, he started working in the NATO Press and Media Section as a press officer to set up the Media Operations Centre (MOC) dealing with Afghanistan. As of January 2010, he dealt with all media aspects related to major NATO operations, missile defence and many other defence-related issues. As of July 2011, Eric Povel was the Strategic Communications Coordinator, heading the PDD StratCom Cell in support of the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, responsible for all operational and doctrinal StratCom issues at NATO HQ. Since October 2012, he holds the position of Program Officer in the Engagements Section of PDD dealing with Afghanistan. He also holds country responsibility for Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.

Dr. Torrey Taussig is a Nonresident Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution and Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow based in Berlin, Germany. She works on U.S. foreign policy, great power competition with Russia and China, and global trends of democracy and authoritarianism. Taussig received her doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and held postdoctoral fellowships at Brookings and at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Introduction and Moderation

Alexander Schröder *(@Alex_Schroeder)* was born in 1985 in Magdeburg and serves as public affairs officer at 1 German/Netherlands Corps, a rapid reaction corps of the NATO. Before that he served as public affairs officer of the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). As an officer in the german armed forces he studied from 2007 to 2011 successfully Political Science at the Helmut Schmidt University / University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg (HSU). Amongst other things he became a member of the Academic Senate, member of the Faculty Council Economic and Social Sciences, a spokesperson for the Student Convention and editor in chief of the student magazine "Univok". He was the founding chairman of the university group for security policy at HSU and co-editor of the anthology "German and European security and defense policy" (published in 2013). From November 2011 to November 2012 Alexander Schröder was Chairman of the Federal Association for Security Policy at Universities. Since May 2013 he heads YATA Germany's regional group Rhineland-Palatinate/Koblenz and is a member of the leadership team in the regional group of the German Atlantic Association (DAG). From March 2016 to October 2017 he was Vice Chairman of the Support Association for Security Policy at Universities (FSH e.V.) and since May 2017 he is the Chairman of the Europa-Union in Koblenz.

Fabian Temme is the founder of an emergency medical device company and did the clinical studies as ethical proposals and fundraising with a mechanical engineering background. He is a trained paramedic and has also some background as undertaker through his family company. He is a passionate father and plays golf, basketball and loves to sail ans snowboard. In his past he arranged events form international research conferences with the UCLA to concerts with artists like Ray Charles. He is an active member of many associations from the American Heart Association to the Wirtschaftsrat Deutschland

Young Leaders

NATO's solidarity – a source of power or weak point?
Filip Bryjka (@FilipBryjka)

NATO is the most persistent alliance in the history. The source of its stability and credibility is based on common interests, determination to fulfill Treaty's obligations, sharing responsibilities and contribution. These attributes made a way to maintain the Alliance in times of inside allied crises such as Suez (1956), Greek-Turkish dispute on Cyprus (1974), US bombings on Libya (1986) or intervention in Iraq (2003). Certainly, the solidarity and cohesion of NATO is its main power and the most effective tool of deterrence. Nevertheless, speaking unanimously within 29 member-states remains a challenge. Observing a contemporary dynamic of international politics, we can have an impression that another inside allied crisis is coming. The sources of this situation we can find in:

The rise of political populism and far-right movements across the Europe (often linked to Russian politics, diplomats, oligarchs and intelligence) – emphasizing national interests above the interests of trans-atlantic community, criticizing the US military presence in Europe, blocking "open-door policy", spreading anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian narrative, they try to undermine current Euro-Atlantic order and promote Eurasian alternative.

Conflicting interests in Syria – the US and Turkish support to opposite belligerents of this conflict lead allies towards proxy war what might cause break-up within the Alliance.

Different approach towards Russia – Turkish purchase of Russian S-400 disenable to have common anti-aircraft and anti-missile system. *Nord Stream 2* threatens energy security of Eastern European allies and its partners (Ukraine). Event thought it is not military related issue and it is often presented as a "business project", all allies have to understand that energy supplies is Russia's strategic instrument of political pressure. Therefore, it must be perceived as a tool of warfare.

The US pivot on Asia – increased US involvement in Asia-Pacific (combined with the American military effort across the globe) cause that Washington expect from its European allies higher defense spending. The same mechanism we could observed in the mid 50s after the Korean War, when the US increased its support for Far-East allies and expected more effort from Europe to assure its security. Objection to reaching 2% of GDP for defense spending cause tensions between certain allies, undermines NATO solidarity and makes Europe more dependent on the US support.

Furthermore, cleavages occurring on the matters mentioned above are fueled by Kremlin propaganda. Disinformation campaigns are aimed to influence political elites, military leadership, media and societies in accordance to Moscow's interests. Living in a information (cyber)society based on ICT, political-military structures seem to be much more vulnerable to hostile information

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campaigns (even comparing to "cold war"). The cyberspace gives adversaries a wide spectrum of methods and techniques which might be used to inspire or fuel inside allied disagreements. Adaptation towards "hybrid warfare toolbox" seems to be one of the key challenges for the Alliance.

Recommendations
- NATO must implement a new strategy developing "3C concept" to "360 approach". Common contribution to securing allies regardless of direction will definitely entrench NATO's solidarity and bolster its deterrence. The rules of in involvement should be specified and based on population, military capabilities, geographic location etc.
- The new strategy has to be adopted to "hybrid threats". Essentially, the Alliance has to send a distinct signal to its adversaries, that indirect form of aggression (by proxies, "little green man", PMCs) will be treated as a violation of international law and activate article 5.
- In terms of hostile Info Ops, it is recommended to create a network of StratCom Units based on NGOs, think-tanks and academia. Their tasks should be focused on countering disinformation as well as promoting NATO agenda and explaining a role of this institution.
- It is necessary to debate the idea of changing decision-making process in NATO. The risk of blocking the Alliance by one member-state render that 2/3 majority voting system could make NATO more effective and less vulnerable on subversion of "trouble makers". Moreover, the question is whether NAC should have political instruments (imposing sanctions, excluding from voting) to punish member-states' clearly disobeying NATO's policy.
- "Open door policy" must guarantee more security for NATO's partners. The cases of Georgia, Ukraine and Montenegro prove that Russia is intent to block enlargement by inspiring and "freezing" conflicts or organizing coups. To prevent such scenarios in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Macedonia, it is recommended to assure that NATO will provide them considerable military support in case of external interfering into their domestic affairs. Such message should indicate relevant deterrence aspect.

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NATO Needs a Foreign Policy Strategy

Erduan Musliji

NATO has been built on the premise of protecting itself from external threats, in other words, from values that would not be in compliance with the values signed under the Washington Treaty, namely, the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which seemed to be plausible for those countries after these inhumane years. Now, with the rising political and geopolitical changes and challenges, such as the rise of China, Russia, technology and internet, interests seem to change when it comes to nation states national policies towards other countries. Some as well assume that money and the economy are now of prior importance than defense spending and on these occasions, the alliance cohesion has been put to question. Some countries are more threatened than others due to their geographical location and there are countries that start asking themselves the question of why we should pay for others security while facing their own economic challenges. Different countries are setting their policy priorities differently, for example, for some is the economic situation in the country of primary importance then spending on defense and for others, defense and security is correlated to the economic situation in believing that, a country needs to be secure to foster economically. Due to these factors, interests may shift and for that, the alliance cohesion may not signal the strength and decisiveness it needs to. Just as seen before and as mentioned by several politicians that when it came to the question of sanctioning Russia, it was not of an easy step to do due to the different stances and policies countries have towards Russia. Another reason I would like to bring where nation states, within the alliance, have different stances is the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and the alleged land swap between these countries. NATO, through KFOR has taken the responsibility with its intervention in 1999 to establish a secure environment in Kosovo. After 10 Years of Kosovo Independence and with a few results on the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, peace has still not been achieved, instead, the opposite has occurred, such as more violence and the failure of integrating Serbian ethnic minorities into Kosovar society. While on the Serbian side, where ethnic Albanians live, minority rights have not been guaranteed but instead Serbian military forces have increased. Now, Presidents of both countries have come to speak about a possible land swap between Kosovo and Serbia, to solve the Serbian- Albanian issue once and for all, namely, in integrating South Serbia, where Albanians live, to Kosovo and in return to give Serbia some land in the North of Kosovo equivalent to that of which Kosovo has proposed. Of course, this cannot be done without the support of the Alliance and in this case, the Alliance Cohesion is very important due to the signals it gives elsewhere. The Alliance must be ready to show the world that it is in favor of dialogue and solutions and not just hold on status quos. In this regard, there are even more challenges awaiting to be solved and the wider public starts asking themselves of the need and purpose of the NATO alliance due to the many crisis not being solved such as the Western Balkans, the Georgia issue, the Moldova issue, the Kurdish issue, Yemen, the Ukraine issue, Africa and with globalization and the free movement of goods and capital, interests have become much more complex than they used to be. Markets and the economy run freely and if there may be security questions at stake, this does not hinder countries to invest

in different markets and or companies. For example, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are of an example that heavily invest in different European and American companies although having issues with their behavior in the Middle East, which at the same time challenges the alliance security in maintaining secure borders due to the refugee crisis. For all the above reasons, NATO needs to create its own Foreign Policy Strategy and needs to talk more of its success, such as the prevention of about 1million refugees in the Kosovo War by taking the necessary steps to intervene and prevent further atrocities. With this action, NATO and the alliance has come along to maintain cohesive and act together under the principles it has signed of and under the principles of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe.

My five recommendations are:

1) NATO needs to raise awareness of its success.

2) Nation states should not question the economic priority with defense priority. The Alliance goes beyond that.

3) In order to maintain Alliance Cohesion, NATO must not contradict itself with its values and interests in creating partnerships with countries that the wider society questions.

4) Long term Peace & Security should always be its aim and not just status quo.

5) Due to external threats and due to its fundamental creation, the Alliance should create its own foreign policy strategy.

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United We Stand, Divided We Fall: Alliance Cohesion as the Cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture

Elina Libek

Reflecting a Clausewitzian thought, it is often stated that the centre of gravity of any alliance is cohesion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is no exception here. Yet today, competing threat perceptions, divergent domestic pressures, and the barrage of criticism thrown from one side of the Atlantic to the other, leave the Allies question their unitedness and the overall strength of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In the midst of shifting international and state-society relations, it is more important now than ever to ask: How to maintain Alliance cohesion under those demanding circumstances? This short essay discusses some of the key challenges in

this regard and offers a set of policy recommendations on how to foster unity within the NATO Alliance.

Any meaningful consensus within the Alliance begins with a shared understanding of the international security environment. Although an absence of a generally acknowledged external threat to the Atlantic Alliance is very unlikely, the main risk currently lies in rapid multiplication of different threats and a lack of common perception. The often still presented as a binary choice between strengthening the eastern flank of NATO and tending to its southern neighbourhood arguably constitutes one the biggest points of friction in terms of Alliance management. In order to overcome this hurdle, it is crucial to fully implement the 360-degree perspective on deterrence and collective defence. The "360-approach" is not absent from the NATO-vocabulary, on the contrary, it has become quite a buzzword. However, it does currently lack depth. Where there is political will, there is a mismatch in terms of capabilities and effective command structure, and *vice versa*. It is important to move beyond the assuring narrative and continue to take measures to develop NATO's operational and structural capabilities to fit the challenges emanating from both, its East and South.

The disagreements among Allies are not only linked to external factors. Recent political developments have led to the resurfacing of architectural debates of Euro-Atlantic security as a whole. Long-standing divisions among member states in terms of strategic orientations, such as those favouring more autonomous Europe vs. those favouring close ties with the U.S., are as sharp as ever. While the European Union (EU) has become increasingly vocal about the ambition of strategic autonomy, American policymakers' feelings about these aspirations are mixed. Even if the idea of Europe taking more responsibility is supported, many see autonomous Europe as detrimental to the Transatlantic Alliance. The picture gets even more blurry when one adds the divergent meanings of "strategic autonomy" present among the EU member states themselves. This leads us to the slippery road of potential misunderstandings, duplication, and inefficiency. Therefore, it is crucial for the two organizations to work together in order to find a suitable outlet for the European pillar of defence and security, and reach a solid consensus on its functions.

Last but not least, it is important to look beyond the matters of security per se. The notion of a potential European disintegration in certain areas and the political turmoil experienced in the U.S. have left their mark in many policy fields, including that of collective defence. It is not hard to see how this type of political turbulence could result in strategic paralysis and risk challenging collective defence policies in favour of national solutions. This poses a threat to NATO cohesion and unity in states already under pressure from publics generally averse to increases in defence spending. While the Alliance cannot and should not dive into the matters of domestic policies, it must stand its ground. NATO needs to craft a strong and credible message underscoring the importance of the Alliance to their publics and more clearly defining the nature of the threats they face and the appropriate responses the Alliance can provide. In doing so, it is important to remain grounded in the values that brought NATO together in 1949.

Reflecting upon the discussion above, the following policy recommendations are made:

- Full implementation of the 360-degree approach on deterrence and collective defence, which entails further development of NATO's operational and structural capabilities to fit the current security environment.
- Working in cooperation with the EU in order to find a balance between different regional security initiatives, while assuring that a European pillar is conceived as a means to strengthen NATO, not as an alternative to it.
- Crafting a strong and clear public message underscoring the importance of the Alliance and the values it stands for.

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NATO's Capacity for Stabilizing US-Turkey Security Cooperation

Megan Gisclon (@megan_in_Turkey)

The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Turkey—member states with the two largest armies in NATO—plays a central role in overall alliance cohesion. When examining the current rift between the U.S. and Turkey, almost no analysis exists in which the two are not described firstly as "NATO allies"—as if NATO membership is the penultimate hinge keeping bilateral relations together. Thus, it is more than fitting that the recently passed U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515)—a key piece of defense legislation not only for the U.S. but also for the U.S. relationship with Turkey—calls out Turkey's wrongful detainment of U.S. citizens as not "consistent with the obligations of the Republic of Turkey under the North Atlantic Treaty, which commits North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to safeguard, 'the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law'" (section 1278)).[1]

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[1] The full text can be found here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text/enr.

However, as each state's membership with NATO encompasses more aspects of security cooperation than just shared values, the applied pressure to conform to NATO values should not only be referenced in cases of human rights issues but also operational capacity. In continuing to read the National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. draws upon an additional point (section 1282) regarding the U.S.-Turkey relationship: that is, Turkey's purchasing of Russian-made S–400 surface-to-air-missiles, which Ankara claims it will receive by 2019. Although this purchase is a violation of Turkey's NATO commitment—against the principle of weapons interoperability—there is nothing in this section of the Act that specifically cites defense cooperation through NATO. Rather, the Act calls for an assessment of Turkey's S–400 purchase to be prepared and its "potential effects on the United States-Turkey bilateral relationship."

While the U.S. conducts this assessment on U.S.-Turkey relations, it should widen this outlook toward a multilateral focus. Not only does Turkey house LANDCOM, AWACs, BMDs, and other high readiness defense capabilities that are important to the U.S. and NATO, but it is also situated in a strategic geography for the alliance, neighboring hot conflicts in Syria and Iraq (NATO is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS) as well as NATO operations in the Mediterranean and Afghanistan. Thus, NATO's multilateral initiatives should also be included in the assessment with equal importance, not looked down upon as the second (or third) fiddle among security actors. These multilateral initiatives are central to both bilateral relations and overall alliance cohesion.

Taking into account Turkey's domestic situation, as part of Turkey's push to become an independent global power operating on its own terms—what has commonly been seen as a push toward being more *yerli* (local) and *milli* (national)—Turkey has sought to bolster its defense sector. To this end, Turkey has agreed to begin joint manufacture of SAMP-T missiles with Italian/French firm Eurosam. In contrast to the S–400, this system is interoperable with other NATO member states and allows Turkey to access the technology behind it. Thus, both NATO and the U.S. should encourage likeminded partnerships with other NATO member states as Turkey expands its defense systems and rows with the U.S.

In addition to weapons cooperation, there is further potential for NATO's mission to overlap with bilateral U.S.-Turkey cooperation on the ground: joint patrols in Manbij. Ending the conflict in Syria and securing Turkey's southern border overlaps with NATO's commitments in the region since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. As part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO can act as a monitor between the two member states should disagreements arise. With ISIS nearly defeated in the region, NATO's efforts in the Coalition should be turned toward maintaining peace in Syria and cohesion among member states.

Policy Recommendations:
1. NATO should encourage the U.S. to allow Turkey to purchase F-35s, as Turkey has already paid into the program and training of Turkish officers is ongoing. Further debate of whether or not to allow Turkey to purchase combat equipment should be decided before Turkey is allowed to enter that program, not mid-way through it.

2. NATO and the U.S. should support Turkey's purchase of the Italian/French SAMP-T missile system as a means to both encourage interoperability and provide an alternative to Russian-made weapons. Turkey's use of interoperable weapons will benefit U.S.-Turkey-NATO defense cooperation.

3. NATO should continue to highlight areas in which the U.S. and Turkey are engaged in like-minded security cooperation rather than divergence. NATO's public diplomacy department should work toward this end.

4. As a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO should monitor efforts between the U.S. and Turkey to patrol Manbij if discrepancies arise.

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Finding the 'collective' in NATO's post-Cold War defense strategy – tackling issues of limited cohesion and democratic backsliding inside the NATO Alliance
Celina Huebner (@CelinaHuebner*)*

Through its membership, enlargement policy and by projecting stability beyond its boundaries, NATO prides itself to promote democratic values. The Washington Treaty lists democracy as one of the Alliance's founding principles and the Membership Action Plan, NATO's support program for states interested in joining the Alliance, outlines the democratic control over armed forces as a key selection criterion. Despite much talk about NATO as a 'value-based' organization, however, the Alliance has experienced democratic backsliding and a dramatic decline in its cohesion with regard to its collective decision-making and political will. Intra-alliance tensions blatantly escalated at this year's NATO Summit when world leaders openly argued about a lack of burden-sharing and strategic common will. Rather than strengthening the Alliance, the public confrontation demonstrated a fragmentation of its leadership, which drastically weakened the Alliance to the outside world and, crucially, send a signal of political division to its opponents.

Finding the 'collective' in NATO's defense strategy following the end of the Cold War seems to become ever more challenging. One reason responsible for the vanishing cohesion among Alliance members has been its leadership's too narrow focus on top-down decision-making and a missed

opportunity to assign more importance to building political support from the bottom. Increasing public support levels for NATO would not only strengthen the Alliance from the inside and prevent the erosion of core liberal values within its membership, but would essentially safeguard the Alliance's future, boost its deterrence capabilities, and strengthen its internal cohesion.

Until recently, the willingness to sustain Alliance commitment was by and large driven by the concerted decision-making of a political elite and less by widespread popular consent. As the cohesion of the former crumbles, the latter could serve as a remedy to bridge NATO's political stagnation and lack of cohesion in the interim. Engaging the public to rally support for NATO should not be seen as a burden, but as an opportunity to renew member states' commitment to the principles and values of the Washington Treaty at the organization's upcoming 70th anniversary.

While the Alliance is facing multiple challenges to its unity at different fronts – from Russian aggression, mass migration, and terrorism to Euroscepticism, the rise of political populism, and transatlantic tensions – the division between NATO members and the gradual deterioration of liberal democratic values pose by far the largest threats to the Alliance's future and the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The Alliance would be well positioned to use its convening power as an inter-governmental organization to step-up its efforts and become more outspoken about the crucial link that exists between the safeguarding of democratic values and hard security interests. For not only has it been less likely historically that liberal democracies experience both inter- or intra-state conflict, but because the democratic principle is the fundamental cornerstone of the international system which has brought us peace and stability for over seven decades.

The democratic decline and rise of populist movements are not just concerns pertaining to the political situations in Turkey, Hungary or Poland, but essentially a matter of worry in almost all NATO member states. To counter the democratic backsliding within its membership and address the lack of intra-alliance cohesion, NATO should opt for a dual strategy, which focuses on tackling member states' violations of the Washington Treaty's core principles and offsetting the democratic deficit that persists with regard to the lack of popular support for NATO-mandated missions and engagement.

Not only should NATO become more involved due to its self-sustaining interest in collective security and to discontinue further internal fragmentation, but because a lack of intra-alliance cohesion opens a door to others – including Russia – to further exacerbate this division and lobby for alternative security coalitions. If not acted upon, the lack of political cohesion and the erosion of its core democratic values are likely to, in the long-term, impair NATO's ability to act while making its deterrence obsolete. For NATO can only be strong to the outside, if united and strong to the inside.

Policy recommendations:

1. Rather than exclusively focus on external threats to its unity, NATO members should prioritize internal factors that have put the Alliance's cohesion under severe strain and have contributed to its political fragmentation. This includes, most crucially, the erosion of liberal democratic values.

2. In due allegiance to its founding principles and democratic values, NATO's leadership should assign more importance to building political support from the bottom and to engaging civil society while reducing its too narrow focus on top-down decision-making.

3. The Secretary General should inaugurate a governance committee to monitor and sanction violations to the Washington Treaty, paying particular attention to NATO's founding principles of democracy, individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law, which should be chaired by an Ombudsperson in charge of raising concerns of violations.

4. Member states should enhance popular awareness and support levels for NATO by increasing transparency on the Alliance's activities, through educational programs at school and university levels, and by stepping up information-sharing as part of a wider public outreach campaign.

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NATO engage!

Alina Toporas (@AlinaToporas)

What should NATO do to maintain the balance between cohesiveness and inclusiveness in terms of its mandate? This question is of particular relevance now, as most politicians in NATO Member States depend on popular support to get elected. In this context, considering that NATO is among the topics on the electoral agenda, it is important that NATO caters for the people as much as possible in order to 'win hearts and minds'.

This is not to say that NATO is unpopular among the Member States demographic. As a matter of fact, according to a Pew Research Center survey, the people within NATO countries have mostly positive views of the military alliance with a median 57% voicing these favorable views with only 27% disparaging the Alliance. However, considering current U.S. President Donald Trump's declarations of skepticism regarding the relevance of NATO, correlated with his voter support base expressing the same views (specifically the three-in-ten Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters having backed Trump in the primaries saying that being a member of NATO is bad for the U.S.), looking at public opinion on defense spending and NATO-related matters becomes one of the most important reasons for why NATO's reputation may suffer in the future. This essay will aim to present some of the pathways through which NATO can communicate better with its indirect contributors in order to be come a more humane and more inclusive alliance.

First of all, NATO should find a balance between delivering hard policy through soft means. By soft means, social media is the avenue to be considered. Here, we can talk about the weaponization of social media, starting from a model designed by academician Thomas Elkjer Nissen. Thus, NATO should look at social media as a soft diplomacy tool for hybrid warfare as this could open up a broad spectrum of possibilities used to monitor, collect and exploit intelligence collection; detect, prevent, secure and protect defense; facilitate, coordinate and synchronize command control; deny, disrupt and breach operations

Secondly, NATO also needs to accommodate the needs of smaller states or states which find themselves starting to break away from their traditional political and military structures. For instance, in the context of Brexit which could potentially lead to an independent Scotland, NATO would have to meet Scotland's needs for hard and soft security, alongside other political, economic and societal needs. Should NATO not be willing to bear the burden as a singular actor, it would have to help Scotland coordinate external shelter in multiple dimensions, that is involving the rest of the UK, the EU and potentially, the U.S. If the two provisions of security are not feasible, NATO would then have to look at 'softer kinds of shelter' for Scotland as the ones being offered to the Nordic states. Generally, in order to provide all Member States with the security cushion they so desperately need in the case of a sudden split from a bigger state, former provider of that security, NATO needs to look at all three options, namely provide full security, the 'softer' type or coordinate security engagement with other security providers on the global stage.

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Thirdly, NATO needs to completely overhaul its Strategic Communications framework to include three terms. The first term is **public diplomacy**. Public diplomacy is the 'civilian communications and outreach efforts and tools responsible for promoting awareness of and building understanding and support for NATO's policies, operations and activities, in the short, medium and long term, in complement to the national efforts of Allies (NATO Strategic Communication Policy). Adjacently, the second term to be included within the wider Strategic Communications Framework is **public affairs.** For NATO, this should mean the 'civilian engagement through the media to inform the public of NATO policies, operations and activities in a timely, accurate, responsive, and proactive manner'. Furthermore, **military public affairs** should also be included in order to cover the promotion of NATO military aims by raising awareness and understanding through media relations, internal and community relations. All three of the terms use communication to inform the public about NATO policies and operations to garner public understanding and support. Look at it as NATO's counteractive to Russia's disinformation campaigns.

Lastly and of equal paramount importance for delivering the perfect balance between inclusiveness and cohesion is including as many women as possible in the discussion and promotion of peace and security under the NATO umbrella. Gender diversity has still not reached the threshold it should have in national delegations and this is something that the general public in Member States can notice when engaging with media products on NATO in their respective states. Adjacently, this gender balance we should be striving for in national delegations is just as 'unbalanced' when looking at the extent of women's perspectives in policy documents. Therefore, more concrete measures should be developed in order to relate to the other half of the population made up of women.

Overall, in order for NATO to be more popular with the general public within Member States, it needs to disseminate more information via social media channels, it needs to cater for the security of smaller states without a security apparatus of their own, it needs to focus on creating an all-encompassing strategic communications framework to include multiple layers of audience engagement and it needs to include women in both practice and discourse.

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How NATO's further cohesion can contribute to your own country's stability

Leticia Benitez Fdez.-Baldor (@letibfbaldor)

We live in an era where the word `Defense´ has lost its *security* component. We relate it with military, military with threat, and threat with war in its past versions. Cyber-crime, cross-border terrorism and other hybrid warfare methods are just seen as issues that today, although they do not go un-noticed in the public opinion , are yet far from being considered as a de facto concern. International Organizations and states have worked so hard on making its citizens believe that no danger exists any more to the West, the winner, that we have got used to the discourse that Europe is safe and our welfare states eternal.

In other words, the uninterrupted prosperity experienced in Europe, which has been the most peaceful period of all times, makes the idea of continuing to defend our countries from one another unthinkable. Thus, safeguarding and strengthening the cohesion within NATO, a military interstate alliance, seems unnecessary.

This problem of underestimating the need of the alliance´s cohesion is one of the reasons that prevents the countries from working on it. By understanding why the unity should be kept, we can improve and ensure its maintenance. We must make citizens understand that when the bonds among NATO members are tied up, defense and international cooperation can be developed and then, our states become safer.

First of all, defense is necessary for maintaining a state´s independence and sovereignty. Obviously, the way war used to be conceived has shifted, but still if there is no security within a territory, there is no stability, no trade and economic progress or social welfare.
Far beyond, a country´s peace does not rely on itself. Today populist parties are trying to bring its individual responses up to their government´s table, but cooperating with our neighbors' security ensures our own stability and prosperity. Today more than ever, with the globalization phenome-non, that is, technology advances and fast-evolving communications, challenges have grown in complexity as they have made each country´s issue transcend national borders. Thus, conflicts have become a common threat for what we need collective defense. For that, an alliance is the perfect footing.

Besides, Cold War threats, which were NATO´s original purpose, are not the only problems NATO faces today due to the just mentioned globalization phenomenon. Another fact that pre-vents the alliance from a further cohesion is the lack of a new specific external adversary. That is why, member states should work hand in hand on finding out those concerns that rise above indi-vidual worries, so they can get afterwards to a group response that will be more effective. *Id est*, plural perspectives lead to a better one, and only then, a real cohesion will be possible.
Nevertheless, NATO should not forget its foundation basis and the common interests that gath-ered its member states in the first place. In fact, it should bring them back because those principles

are its core and intangible values that remain through time and thus, they must act as strong pillars of the organization cohesion in order to overcome hard times.

Moreover, the member states´ status and commitment to other areas must be taken into account, such as their domestic politics or their economic situation. NATO´s cohesion can not be hold on by just collaborating in the military branch. When these other more personal topics are taken into consideration in the decision-making process, member states might feel more valued and signifi-cant. So, even if NATO does not open its scope out of its military plan, it must at least consider its members and partners' current political situation and economic development. Counselling them will not only help to manage single issues happening inside national borders, but will also aid to boost the countries´ commitment and contribution to the alliance at the same time that it improves the public opinion and their relationship towards the organization.

For that, the recommendations for maintaining the alliance cohesion, its image and position are the following:

1. Enhance the Security education programs, getting into agreement with the European Union, so they can work together fostering activities that promote an international defense culture, that has to do with prosperity, freedom and human rights.

2. Clarify a specific external threat that appeals to all member states and NATO partners, finding and emphasizing new common values and principles that can maintain the alliance united.

3. Create a committee of experts of different nationalities which sur-veys each member state domestic politics situation, advising them how to manage their commitment with the Alliance, advocating for the benefit of both the member state and the Organization. This can lead to a more positive engagement and participation.

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
Keeping coherence – Focus on the essentials in times of crisis
Alexander Schröder (@Alex_Schroeder)

The most important characteristic of an alliance is to communicate strength externally and cohesion internally. Hereby political symbols play a prominent role. Despite strong threats at the Alliance's borders due to crises and wars, persistent terrorist threats and new challenges in cyberspace, conflicts have formed between NATO countries that can jeopardize the Alliance's cohesion in the long term.

Some examples are intended to clarify the situation: There is a dispute between the European NATO members and the US regarding the solution of the Syrian conflict, another line of conflict runs between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance. The US demands that most European members comply with NATO's two percent goal. Whether the two-percent goal is to be achieved, for example, is controversial in Germany. At the same time, the US President's willingness to defend his allies has also been in doubt. While EU member states want to pool their defense and defense efforts within NATO, the US are looking at this development rather suspiciously, although they demand greater commitment from the European Allies. There is also disagreement in dealing with Russia between the European states. Within Europe, the Eastern European states are facing current threats from Russia on the one hand, on the other hand, central and southern European countries want to end the existing sanctions as soon as possible for economic reasons. And new challenges, such as refugee flows, also present intra-European conflict lines between and within the member states of the European Union.

At present, the members of NATO seem politically in many cases more likely to move away from each other than to approach each other. But an alliance without inner unity, cannot hold together in the long run. Is NATO in danger as an alliance? Not today! The basis of NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty, which says in its preamble:

> „The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty"[2].

The democratic and constitutional principles mentioned in the preamble are described more by their fundamental nature than by their quality. For good reason: NATO serves the purpose of defending its member states, first and foremost their territorial integrity. For example, Greece and Turkey were not flawless democracies when they were admitted. Spain, too, was only at the

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[2] Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
(04th April 1949, last updated 09th April 2018).

beginning of its democratic development. The return to the defense value core of the Alliance should therefore be the beginning of a renewal.

Because the world of the Cold War is not existing anymore. Despite new challenges and threats, NATO cannot ignore the political developments and democratic changes of the last 30 years, but has to adapt to these developments. Otherwise, this institution runs the risk of no longer receiving the acceptance of the population of its member states in the long run. The sooner NATO responds, the easier. Already, because enemy propaganda willingly tries to increase any dissonance between the member states.

So, what is to be done? First of all, a common perception of threats and challenges in the member states has to be created. Here, NATO must focus more than before on a social dialogue, so that the concerns and fears of some member states are perceived in the societies of the other member states. Because the challenges of today and tomorrow do not only question borders, but the way of life of modern western societies. A common understanding of a challenge is the basis for joint action. And the joint action makes an alliance strong. So strong that no opponent wants to test the cohesion.

To this end, NATO should not only be a role model for democratic processes within its institution, but should also be preceding by intensifying civil and military exchanges. NATO should not interfere in the internal affairs of its member states, nevertheless, the Alliance should empower its members to become bright democratic examples. Others, outside the Alliance, will follow soon.

Ultimately, the value core of the Alliance must be made fit for the 21st century, to ensure long-term cohesion within NATO. It must also be decided again, which is in the foreground: The political alliance or the military defense alliance.

Policy Recommendations:

- Back to the basics of the North Atlantic Treaty
- Communicate the core values of the North Atlantic Treaty
- Promote and encourage democratic development within the member countries
- Encourage the member states to be a shining example of the alliances' core values
- Defining and develop evolutionary the core values, fitting to the 21th century

Troubled Finances: How Turkey's economic situation is making NATO weaker

Sinan Ekim (@sinan_ekim)

The developments between the U.S. and Turkey in August pushed Turkey's economy over the edge, plunging the Turkish lira to a series of record lows and raising fears of a debt crisis. How Turkey pulls itself out of this situation carries important implications for Turkey's security and defense relations, foremost for its relations with NATO. Turkey's Western allies certainly have the platforms through which they could extend economic assistance, but they have been reluctant to move forward. European public is opposed to any steps that could be framed as a "gift" to Turkey, understandably fed up with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's confrontational attitude and critical of the country's seemingly irreversible slide into authoritarianism. As a result, the pressing need to fix the country's finances may push Ankara to explore other options, which may drive a wedge between Turkey and NATO.

As things stand, Turkey has three options to choose from – a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); an EU-sponsored financial package; or reaching out to a combination of China, Russia and Qatar.

Conditioned on improvements to Turkey's democratic practices as well as fixing the structural problems in Turkey's economic management, an IMF loan would be effective in restoring investor confidence. Yet, it is unlikely. There were worries that the U.S. would effectively block an IMF loan as long as Pastor Andrew Brunson remained under house arrest. Although Brunson has now been released, a bailout is still unlikely, since Erdoğan continues to view the IMF as an instrument of American imperialism and will be wary of seeking its help.

If Erdoğan's trip to Germany at the end of September is a bellwether, then he would look favorably on some sort of financial assistance from the European Union (EU). This would help Turkey ride out a percentage of its debt, allow the financial environment to become more benign and economic growth to return. But since such a move would be extremely unpopular with the European public, this option, too, then dissolves away.

As a result, Erdoğan may be pushed into approaching Russia, China and Qatar for help. Granted, although their assistance will not carry the conditionalities that an IMF loan would, it would be substantial enough to ease Turkey's debt burden – which would calm the markets and allow the lira to regain some of its value.

Their assistance, however, would not bode well in terms of NATO-Turkey relations. Erdoğan has threatened NATO with closer cooperation with Russia before, in an attempt to demonstrate that Turkey could enter into alternative alignments, and did not have to withstand "unfair criticism." However, Russia is a feeble substitute, whose interests clashes with those of Turkey in multiple theatres of conflict; therefore, Turkey always re-evaluated before deepening relations. But this time

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around, if a Turkey-Russia rapprochement becomes "solidified" through an economic link, Turkey may be forced into complying with Russia's demands, which will likely pull it into an anti-NATO orbit.

Should this happen, Turkey would almost certainly have to forge ahead with its plans to purchase and deploy Russian S-400 missile defense systems, which could collect sensitive data on F-35s, the U.S. new flagship stealth fighter jet. Furthermore, should Turkey minimize the degree of its involvement in areas, in which NATO and Russia's interests collide, and effectively stop contributing to NATO missions, this would produce serious consequences for the member states' national security.

So, how should the NATO countries deal with Turkey's economic predicament, so that it does not evolve into a wider and a deeper security problem?

1. Non-EU NATO countries should at the very least nudge the EU to offer economic incentives to Turkey – if not in the form a lumpsum, then in short- and long-term investments and joint projects. Thereafter, they should see whether they could become junior partners in such an arrangement.
2. Allies should also listen to Turkey's concerns. Instead of occasional, special trips between heads of state, there needs to be more interactions across multiple levels of government and exchanges between lower-level officials, including military personnel. This will also allow members to communicate any criticism in private rather than in public, and create a picture of allied solidarity.
3. It remains to be seen whether the block on arms sales to Turkey by the U.S. Senate – which was going to be in place until Brunson has been released – will remain in effect. But NATO is more than the U.S. Other allies should step up and provide weapons.
4. Turkey is a troubled ally, with which NATO still needs to collaborate. In the absence of any mechanism to punish Turkey for its transgressions, NATO needs to accept that its relations with Turkey will be transactional and leverage Turkey's troops and resources to its benefit.

Sinan Ekim is a junior fellow at the Rome-based Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), and a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics. His research explores the security and defense implications of Turkey's economic developments; the evolution of Turkish foreign policy towards its Western partners; and the rise of conservatism in Turkish national identity. Sinan was formerly a senior research assistant at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

How to spend 2 per cent?

Which capabilities does NATO need in the Future & how can we get them?

NATO member states have committed to spending two percent of their GDP on defense. Defense expenditures (and capabilities) have eroded over more than two decades in many NATO countries. Publics became accustomed to flat defense budgets. Procurement processes became bureaucratic and risk-averse. Defense industries experienced a long-lasting period of consolidation. With growing security concerns at NATO's Eastern flank and a demanding American president, all signs now point to more defense spending in Europe. Getting there is not as easy as it may seem. Which capabilities does NATO need most urgently? How to best coordinate among NATO countries on what to spend the fresh money? How can member states flip the switch to procure and develop new and more equipment? How to lift the burdens for procurement and R&D efforts?

Panelists

François Devoto is a French diplomat and currently serves as the First Secretary at the Embassy of France in Berlin. In this position, he is in charge of Foreign and Security Policy matters in the Politics Department. Prior to his Berlin assignment starting in August 2016, Mr. Devoto worked for four years as Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of France to NATO. Before his time in Brussels, Mr. Devoto was in charge of NATO-EU relations as well as NATO-Russia relations, and had been a Desk Officer for Bulgaria and Romania in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

Torben Schütz is an independent political advisor based in Berlin and is an associate fellow at the German Council of Foreign relations. His work focuses on military capabilities, primarily in Europe, military technology and innovation as well as defense industrial matters. He joined the DGAP as an Associate Fellow in December 2017. Between 2013 and 2016 he worked as a research assistant in the International Security Division at the German Institute for International Affairs and Security (SWP) in Berlin. He holds an MA from Leibniz University Hanover.

Giovanni Romani is the head of the Capability Delivery Section in the Defence Investment Division at the NATO HQ in Brussels. He was an active Navy duty officer for the Italian navy between 1985 and 2006 and specialized in telecommunications, combat operations, electronic warfare and intelligence. He served as combat operations, electronic warfare and intelligence officer in several Italian and U.S. ships, also taking part in the "Sharp Guard" and "Sharp Fence" operations in the former Yugoslavia. Throughout his time in the Navy, he held several positions including Maritime Military Assistant to SACEUR (Gen J. Ralston and Gen J. Jones) - SHAPE (2001-2005), Executive Officer (2nd in Command) of Italian Navy Destroyer Francesco Mimbelli (2005-2006) to mention but a few. He holds Maritime and Naval Science Bachelor's and Master's degrees from the University of Pisa and an International and Diplomatic Science Bachelor's degree from the University of Trieste. In addition to this, Mr. Romani also studied at the Naval War College of the Argentinean Navy in Buenos Aires where he attended a Command and Staff Officer Course and received a Naval University Master degree. He is fluent in Italian, English and Spanish and has working knowledge of French.

Introduction and Moderation

Cornelius Vogt is a project manager in the future space programs department of Airbus Defence and Space in Friedrichshafen, Germany. He is a frequent lecturer in space security policy and space strategy at the Command and Staff College of the German Armed Forces in Hamburg. He worked several years at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin and was recently a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC. He was a member of the "Young Leaders in Security Policy" of the Federal Academy for Security Policy and is a founding member of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany. Cornelius studied Political Science and Human Geography in Potsdam, Berlin, Los Angeles and Lille

Young Leaders

Bit by bit: Cybersecurity and disruptive innovations as driver for NATO's Future

Leonard Simon (@_LSimon)

Today, NATO faces two major problems: The first is the question of legitimacy and the second is internal division. Since the end of the Cold War, the former has been the subject of debates many times. It is problematic that the first leads directly to the second. Through an unclear mission, the reality of NATO fails because of the different and sometimes opposed interests of member states and all citizens involved. This division can be seen to a striking extent in the debate on the 2% target. Actually, the implementation of a target agreed on by all member states should be implemented quickly. The opposite is the case.

The core of the difficult mediation is the different perception of a dangerous situation. While NATO in itself is an intergovernmental institution, whose primary objective is the protection of national sovereignty, this nation-centered reference is only of secondary importance to many citizens and especially to the younger generation. Many in Western Europe can no longer comprehend the importance attached in some circles and countries to the conflict between Russia and the West. Securing NATO's eastern borders is undoubtedly important. However, many do not have the willingness to drastically increase spending for this protection alone. More important for the post-1990 generation is security in a global and virtual space. Although NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of conflict, it failed to work out decisive steps to deal with the problems fundamentally. NATO should respond more strongly to these needs and can develop a clear and strong mission.

Cyberspace is of geopolitical importance as well as of direct importance for each citizen. Unlike conventional military conflict, which affects a limited region, impacts of attacks on the digital infrastructure are boundless. Increased efforts by NATO states in the field of cyber security are therefore important not only for protection of the nation-state, but also for the Alliance as a whole. Cyberspace has shifted the perception of borders dramatically. While the analog mission of NATO is – with good reasons –concentrating towards Russia, Russia is not the only major power sharing a direct border in this new century. Although structure and effects are transboundary, political border in cyber space are existing. China, and several other realms of digital nations such as the so called "United Cyber Caliphate" shifting the threat scenario much closer to the Alliance than Russia will ever be. The new reality offers a major opportunity for NATO to update its mission from concentrating solely on Russia towards a holistic approach to a new threat environment. However, NATO and its members states are not prepared for this shift. A major challenge is the low level of knowledge of cyber affairs among decision makers. Statements are perfunctory and are missing a comprehensive appreciation. By many, cyber is still seen as a topic for geeks. Only Estonian leaders have so far exercised effective cyber policy making. The country has been the driving force to establish the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) based in Tallinn.

In combination with the CCD COE, the recently founded Cyber Operations Center, NATO is increasing its capacities, however, they are only a drop in the ocean. In a environment where private actors are already facing difficulties hiring cyber security experts, NATO and its members have even more troubles appointing skilled personnel. Regional Centers for Expertise and Operation should be created and established at the national level. Investing in those centers will train and educate staff members on all levels and will provide better understanding of cyber affairs.

As the expertise level is limited, the sense for state sponsored disruptive innovation in cyberspace lacking. Cyberspace is not a defined field of operation, but is subject to constant evolution. NATO will have to move forward to survive in a hostile environment. NATO must create agencies that promote new technologies. Existing "Innovation Hubs" have not yet reached the full capacity of their capabilities. The financial resources are still too scarce to develop serious disruptive technologies and to provide an incentive for industry to cooperate. A culture of experimenting and be more comfortable with making mistakes should be established.

Cyber offers the opportunity for NATO the re-define its mission as the major power protecting its members against analog and digital threats at the same time.

The following recommendations should be discussed within NATO and member states in order to come to a mutual agreement on the 2% objective and to strengthen the strategic mission of NATO:

1. NATO must increase the expertise on cyber affairs.
2. The Alliance should create Regional Centers of Excellence (RCE) to increase cyber security capabilities.
3. Spending on disruptive technologies to compete in a global environment must be increased.

Leonhard Simon works as Project Manager at the Munich Security Conference Foundation (MSC). He is responsible for organizing high-level conferences and meetings on international security issues such as European, Cyber or Energy Security. His expertise and experience in politics and political communication began, as a personal assistant for a Member of the Bavarian parliament and working for an event management agency. Mr. Simon served in various positions at the youth division of the Green party. He has been an honorary football referee for more than ten years. As a photographer, he has organised several exhibitions. Mr. Simon received his Master degree studying International Security in Barcelona and his Bachelor degree in international politics studying in Munich and Cork, Ireland.

Embracing comprehensive defence spending and moving past the 2% target

Zachary Wolfraim (@zachwol)

NATO's metrics for assessing defence contribution and capabilities solely measures inputs, specifically the 2% of GDP spent on defence, rather than outputs. This is detrimental to the future of NATO for two critical reasons. Firstly, this method of calculation primarily accounts for fighting conventional conflicts against traditional opponents and does not adequately address the risks posed by hybrid warfare, terrorism or other unconventional threats. Secondly, it also acts as a convenient narrative device to bludgeon NATO members into spending more on defence, without actually identifying areas of value added, effectiveness or capability.

Rather than increasing spending, the 2% target has encouraged creative accounting on the part of some countries in order to fulfill this input metric whilst not sufficiently addressing actual defence priorities. Allies such as the UK have fought to include expenditures such as pensions, healthcare and other military-adjacent activities as part of their defence budget in order to meet the 2% target. Moreover, there has been no clear correlation between defence spending with participation in NATO operations or willingness to undertake combat missions. A number of member states undertook substantial combat roles in Afghanistan despite never meeting the spending requirement. Similarly, both Canada and Germany currently serve as framework nations supporting NATO's ongoing deterrence mission in the Baltic States and neither meets, or has met, the 2% threshold.

Despite the endorsement of NATO's 2% target at the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO has maintained a consistent tempo of operations around the world, often leading to friction and criticism among members of the Alliance over spending and burden sharing. The 2008 financial crisis presented changing political and budgetary priorities and when coupled with a widespread belief that conventional, land based warfare in Europe was a thing of the past, European (and Canadian) NATO members have continually fallen short of this spending target. As such, an instrument aimed at ensuring equitable burden sharing between member states has instead been used to unfairly malign countries spending less than 2%.

Alternative approaches

Taking into account how conflict has evolved, NATO should re-examine the 2% target and ultimately phase it out by its 20th anniversary in favour of a more comprehensive set of metrics. Recognising the current political climate, this target may not be easy to discard completely, but rather, it may be possible to develop more comprehensive metrics to account for alternative forms of spending. This includes making metrics used to measure defence inputs more transparent as well as expanding the view of spending in the context of defence outputs (i.e. deployment, participation in exercises, contribution to NATO programmes etc).

Given recent Russian interventions in Eastern Europe the use of hybrid warfare has clearly been adopted as an alternative method of intervention. In a hybrid warfare environment, civil defence or domestic resilience programmes can prove invaluable in reinforcing institutions, safeguarding public stability and creating an environment for coordinated responses. These internal affairs

programmes often fall outside the purview of defence-related spending but offer a critical response to acts of aggression. As such, they should be examined and potentially folded into the wider definition of defence spending.

Similarly, alternatives such as development spending could be part of a widened metric, particularly where these programmes have a focus on developing national institutions, enhancing stability and preventing conflict. Countries such as Germany spending 0.8% of GDP on development would have their contributions recognised, rather than maligned for not spending more on conventional defence. Again, whilst not considered traditional defence spending, these types of programmes are critical in supporting NATO's values while also preventing future conflicts requiring conventional military intervention.

Policy Recommendations

1. Develop a transparent defence planning process within NATO to enable clear identification of defence outputs from member states

2. Develop and publish more comprehensive metrics to measure defence outputs

- Include spending on domestic resilience and civil defence to address hybrid warfare
- Elements of development spending should fall under the defence spending output metric as proactive conflict prevention
- Participation in NATO operations and regular contribution of forces should be taken into account

3. Publish more transparent metrics for measuring defence inputs

- Publication of these metrics both promotes cooperation among Allies to maximise contributions and avoid redundant capabilities

4. 2% goal should ultimately be phased out by 2022, 20 years after adoption, in favour of more comprehensive, transparent participation measures.

Dr. Zachary Wolfraim currently works in anti-money laundering in London. He completed his doctorate in 2016 at King's College London where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours in NATO operations. Zach has previously written articles on foreign policy narratives, Canadian foreign policy and NATO operations. Prior to his PhD study he worked as a consultant in NATO's crisis management policy section focusing on Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. He has also worked in commercial political risk analysis and taught at the undergraduate and graduate level as well as acting as programming director for Young Professionals in Foreign Policy's

London branch. Zach completed a Masters in International Relations at the London School of Economics and studied his undergraduate at the University of St Andrews and the University of Toronto.

Focus on inclusion and efficiency

Nikolett Biró

Upon examination of defence spending of European NATO members a growing trend can be outlined. It is often mentioned that the exceeding pressure from the US, in combination with the changing international security environment, seems to push the European allies to live up to their commitment of spending 2% of their GDP on defence. However, the intercontinential demand for higher European engagement was already present before the current trend of growth, as well as the uncertainty in the international security climate. Although their importance is unquestionable, these two pressures may not explain the full picture.

A meaningful aspect in the analysis of NATO member states governments' behaviour is their dual commitment to satisfy international and national expectations. Part of the reason behind the budget growth is that defence became a political priority. Legislators, as elected representatives, are primarily concerned with the distributional conflict between different areas within their national budget. Following this logic, the root of growth may lie within the perception of threat, as it is the main feature that can influence the preferences of societies for defence spending.

If we understand the budget growth as a reaction to the threat perception within society, then the goal of allocating a higher share for defence is necessarily to provide a viable response for said threat. More spending does not mean that the money is spent efficiently and on the needful things. The increase in available resources naturally leads to the question of how to use them in a productive way for collective defence.

As such, expecting allies to spend 2% of their GDP on defence may not be the correct measure for effort. Multidimensional challenges ask for a response in the same manner. An often-mentioned idea is that modern security challenges are complex and extend beyond simply military dimensions. International terrorism, cyber attacks, and intervention to domestic issues: a common key feature is that they directly affect the lives and behaviour of people. A higher level of inclusion of the public may be unavoidable in the future, as well as an extended definition of what counts as defence.

Measurement raises important methodological questions which influence comparability among members. A standardized measurement method is an essential part of moving forward, and motivating allies' to increase their budgets. Some budgetary lines do not contribute directly to security (an often mentioned example is military pension), and some expenses (such as infrastructural development) do not get included in the defence budget but are actively increasing countries' capabilities. The diversity in the composition of what is counted as defence expenditure in each country makes meaningful comparisons difficult.

However, composition of budgets matters. Many allies fail to achieve NATO guidelines on specific areas of budgets (e.g. the proportion of the budget spent on equipment) as well as the general guideline of 2%. Funds need to be used in a way so that money translates into effective defence, taking the current geopolitical and technological realities into account. Pushing for higher spending uncoordinatedly may result in building parallel systems when a more efficient use of resources may be possible.

Policy recommendations

1) *Regional cooperation & individual specialization*: As much as the size of funds matters, pushing individual members to increase spending may not ensure that the alliance is exploiting its resources in the most efficient way. The benefits of integration can exceed its costs because collective action can be organized towards more resource efficiency than building distinct systems. Creating partly joint regional structures also offers a way to introduce a higher level of specialization for countries. There is economic rationale in strengthening the comparative advantage of members by allowing them to enhance their best abilities.

2) *Research and development*: The alliance has to be responsive to the challenges of a new era where traditional military threats constitute only one part of a much bigger picture. Focusing on what the future of conflict will look like is essential for prevention and preparation. As technology becomes increasingly more important, devoting a bigger share of defence budgets to R&D is pivotal in order to keep up with the security challenges of tomorrow.

3) *Credibility and publicity:* External intervention in a state's internal issues is not as apparent as before. The active spread of misinformation is an easy path for outside actors to affect domestic outcomes for their benefit with a low risk. However, the complete avoidance of such intervention is unrealistic. NATO shall attempt to pose as a credible source of information and establish a more direct relationship with the public.

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The Defense - Portfolio

Pieter Brandt

Discussions about the NATO 2% spending agreement can leave the impression, the amount of money was more important than the projects it is spent on. Some statements suggest NATO would demand, every member state should buy armament for a total of 2% of its GDP every year, which is simply not the case. In fact, the investment guidelines of the alliance only refer to 20% of the total defense budget, i.e. 0.4% of the annual GDP.

Talking about investments, a comparison to the financial industry comes to mind. Several long-term studies of financial portfolios show that asset allocation is the single most important factor for any given investor's success. Different from what one might expect though, the choice of individual products does not seem to affect the results as much as the asset class, one chooses to invest in. Shortsighted as it might appear to compare security policies with investment strategies, it is certainly crucial to success to have and follow exactly that: an investment strategy.

Which are the key objectives of our investment? In finance these will usually be to maximize the yield as well as to minimize the risk at the same time, and similar categories can be applied to the world of investing in military equipment and technology: The yield is multilayered but might be condensed in the term "modernity". A modern and mature system or piece of equipment will provide the user with joy from handling it, the developers of the item with increase in knowledge and financial resources (coming not only from the one contract to build and provide the item, but even more significantly from the competitiveness resulting from research and development) and most importantly the group that relies on such a system with advantages over those, who don't. The risk on the other hand, thinking in terms of a "bear run" market situation, will be to lose the portfolios functionality when most desperately needed, i.e. having no operational systems at all.

Keeping up the financial metaphor, we should accept that usually more than one asset class, let alone product, is needed to benefit from progress while excluding a total loss as far as possible at the same time. Whereas the first category will show good returns in good times and bad returns in bad times, the second one should reliably provide us with good returns in bad times.

A famous saying amongst soldiers is "you go to war with the army you have, not the one you wish you had". Connecting this with the above mentioned, we want to reflect on the definition of good and bad times. Counterintuitive as it might be to even consider the term "good times" in the context of war, for now we want to agree on the following: "good times" in terms of this consideration, will be an engagement or task, that we are perfectly prepared for, because we had the time and resources to do so. "Bad times" on the other hand will serve as a picture for every kind of unpleasant surprise.

The good returns of modern systems in good times are obvious: tailored to the mission they will provide their environment with the above mentioned benefits and ensure the best possible results

from the task. Equally obvious however are the bad returns in bad times of the very same systems: they will simply not be available and therefore fail to provide any kind of support to the mission.

This little mind game shows that modern systems and equipment – as important as they are – must never be the only focus of armament investments. Instead, two mainstays are necessary to ensure the best possible returns in good and bad times. Multinational cooperations on future weapon systems mostly fulfill the criteria of "modernity". However, they are of little use in cases of abruptly occurring challenges, for their typically long-range timelines. What does that mean for the acquisition of armament and equipment? Since a "bull run" must not be missed, large projects with many participating nations do not only have a right to exist but in fact are a great option to utilize mutual potentials. Still, a "bear run" can hit us without a warning – but must never catch us off-guard. Thus, the purchasing of existing and proven systems is imperative.

Applied to the projects of future airborne assets, this could mean the following: we should tighten the phases of analyzing (e.g. heavy transport helicopters, UAVs, Tornado – replacement) for there generally is no such thing as a perfect solution. A good plan today usually exceeds a perfect one that doesn't even yet have a timeline. We should instantly start the procurement of market available systems, for the next challenge might be less than 15 years ahead of us. And we should boost the efforts of European developments in the field of air systems, for only buying from others will not put us in a favorable position.

Given the benefits a society can achieve and the risk it can diminish, we should be willing to invest 0.4% of our GDP in that portfolio.

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NATO as an M&A: use your synergy effects to effectively spend 2%

Verena Wingerter (@verenawingerter)

NATO states should consolidate their spending: many Europeans value social welfare over defence spending. Citizens fear a decrease in quality of living if the 2% spending goals are met. To overcome this, a transparent spending scheme and clear aims are necessary.

Most NATO member states do not fulfil the Alliance's spending goal of 2% and struggle to raise their proportions of spending to this minimum. However, too rapid increases are not expedient: the existing infrastructure is in several countries not sufficient to convert the additional money into the responding military forces. An option to retain the intended value is to cooperate transnationally. By collaborating, states could spend their money more focused and hence more effectively.

As in any M&A case in business, synergy effects are only realized by focusing and cooperating. When similar companies merge, they assess their core competences and their strengths and weaknesses. Then they merge divisions when they work in the same field. Administration, research division, marketing – all these fields are integrated while focusing on the strengths of each team. The same approach can be applied to NATO. Armed forces of different nation states are structured in similar ways: Army, air force and navy have their own distinct features, tasks, and requirements. To spend 2% effectively, it seems wise to cooperate transnationally as merged companies would do. Before any acquisition of material, it has to be assessed and controlled. It has to be guaranteed that the purchased materials are fit for the purpose. The purchases have to pass security checks and be sufficient for the needs of the forces. Every military branch, be it army, navy, or air force, has its own requirements and needs special expertise in assessing potential purchases. Furthermore, this technical expertise has to be combined with economic understanding and supported by the political will. Since most countries would try to spend the 2% on the different branches proportionally to foster their own army, they need experts from all three branches. Here synergy effects could improve the spending scheme: Instead of having own evaluation processes in each country, the evaluation should be consolidated according to the different operating branches. By creating transnational hubs, experts can assess in more depth the material, and problems could be eliminated. Since these problematic procurement cases are prominent in the public perception of the forces and judged as malinvestments, a better spending scheme could improve the public image and the acceptance of a higher defence budget.

Policy Recommendations:
- Create transnational Focus Hubs regarding the operating range (Maritime focus hub, Air force focus hub, army focus hub)
  - Hubs assess the demands of the national branches in terms of equipment
  - Knowing the needs, they examine offers of different suppliers and identify which offers do meet the requirements
  - The teams should consider technical as well as economic aspects of the offers

- Hubs recommend the best or the top offers to national governments, which should follow those recommendations
- Install a specialised NATO Cyber Focus Hub in cooperation with the existing cyber innovation hub of the German Bundeswehr and similar national institutions
- Focus Hubs should work in diverse teams
  - Experts from different NATO states should be equally involved in the focus hubs
  - Representation of states leads to a better consideration of national / regional demands
- Create transparent evaluation and recommendation methods
  - States will only spend money if their procurement demands are met and the criteria of the evaluation are transparent and clear
  - Diverse teams will help the acceptance of the proposed acquisitions to be more acceptable for the national state
- Liaison officers to connect the hubs and prevent different teams to work on the same issue

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NATO's 2% Challenge: How to Keep Promises and Stay Influential?
Donatas Rondomanskas (@DRondomanskas)

NATO members committed to eventually spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence, in solidarity with their partners in the Alliance. However, while the 2% goal is important, it is primarily a symbolic number. The real challenge is to reach 2% by using finances effectively. Therefore, the defence spending of NATO countries should take advantage of technological advances in the private sector, be demand-driven and in close coordination with their fellow allies and partners in the European Union (EU).

Nowadays, numerous technological advances in the private sector emerge faster than states can integrate them, entailing that "new" technological solutions probably become "old and outdated" before they are fully incorporated into a defence system. The reason for that is a need to test new technologies and to find their vulnerabilities before actually introducing them in the armed forces,

largely due to the high security and financial costs of a possible mistake. Therefore, NATO countries should focus more on collecting, adapting and – where necessary – improving the technologies rather than developing capabilities themselves. While larger R&T activities could remain under a state's jurisdiction, smaller tasks could be delegated to (and already existing innovations acquired from) the private sector. What would remain for NATO member states is to collect technological innovations and to integrate them like LEGO pieces into the larger NATO defence framework.

The spending in NATO countries as well as defence research should be demand-driven and take into account the vulnerabilities of defence capabilities, current and future challenges confronting NATO. While NATO faces many challenges, one of the most important aims of the Alliance should be to maintain the strong transatlantic bond. In the last couple of years, external powers have continuously worked to undermine trust in this very bond through the spreading of disinformation and attempting to influence elections in NATO member states. While good transatlantic relations should be supported through dialogue among the members of the Alliance, investment in the cyber domain could facilitate this conversation by excluding the unwanted external voices.

Another important aim of NATO is to increase the capabilities to readily react and defend its members. Such capabilities assure the effective deterrence of potential military adversaries, which nowadays most often refer to a counter reaction against to a possible conflict in the Baltics. With no plans to significantly increase the number of troops in the area, NATO members should improve capabilities to move troops faster and to establish secure logistical lines in times of crisis. It is essential to invest in sea monitoring technologies and defensive as well as offensive capabilities in the maritime domain. Of particular interest is the area in the Northern Atlantic, the so-called GIUK gap, which could serve as a choke point separating Europeans from their Northern American Allies coming to the Baltics. Accordingly, states in the Baltic Sea region should strengthen (or create) their air defence to at least partly neutralise Russian Anti-Access/Air Denial capabilities, which can inhibit NATO reactions in the region.

Finally, NATO members should closely coordinate their activities and strive to increase complementarity with EU initiatives on defence, including R&T, capability development and procurement. Due to different political procurement preferences, joint procurement occurs quite rarely. By jointly ordering and developing equipment in NATO as well as within the EU framework, nations could reduce the costs of particular capabilities and could easily increase interoperability among disparate militaries. Moreover, joint procurements also necessitate consistent joint planning in order to determine where and how capabilities would be used. This would also facilitate a better understanding of "who does what" in case of emergency.

Policy Recommendations:
- NATO countries should actively observe, collect and use new ideas from the private sector for defence research. Future R&T programmes should largely be for the integration of new ideas into an overall defence system of the Alliance.

- NATO member states' defence spending should be demand driven, taking into account the vulnerabilities in NATO's defence capabilities, as well as current and future challenges. Investment in cyber, air and sea capabilities could be of particular interest for NATO.
- NATO countries should closely coordinate their activities among themselves and increase the synergies with the EU, including R&T, capability development and procurement in order to save financial resources, increase interoperability and strengthen the understanding of task distribution among NATO militaries.

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Is the Southern Flank Right for Once? The Portuguese Approach to NATO's two Percent Rule

*A*ndré *Mendes (@tacoost)*

The approach that Portugal has taken on the 2% GDP defense budget constraint creates emphasis on the development of technology that is able to portray a double role. Therefore, focusing on defense requirements that are able to perform civic operations, such as combat to wildfires, medical evacuations, and being a support to scientific research programs.

The 2% Defense Expenditure Narrative
The NATO Wales Summit of 2014 established a pledge amongst its members to move towards an increase in defense expenditure to 2% of their GDP until 2024. The aforementioned pledges, accompanied by the shifts in the political and strategic landscape, have dwindled the confidence between the Alliance and the Oval Office, as the US interests keep on the rise, but its intentions to pursue global responsibilities tend to shrink and expect the remaining partners to fill that gap. Although the Trump administration has pushed the commitment for the "2% Narrative" as one of its flags when talking about foreign policy on US soil, the data concerning defense expenditure on NATO Europe countries and Canada between 2010 and 2017 shows that it began to rise in

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2015[3], as a reflex of the economic improvements felt in the European continent and the rebirth of the Russian "near-abroad" strategy.

Will The 2% Change How NATO Thinks?
Despite those improvements, the 2% focus continues. There is a need to comprehend that arbitrary measures over economic performances cannot depict the constitution of defense realities, much less to translate the burden sharing of capabilities and responsibilities, ensuring us as committed Alliance towards a common goal. Voices on either side of the Atlantic have begun to realize just that.

The threats that NATO members are currently facing no longer constitute just a question of hard or soft power. The hybrid terrorist movements, alongside the insurgency operations in Afghanistan and the refugee and migrants calamity that affect a great part of the European members, reaffirm the need to redefine the security identity and its priorities. Therefore, the development of a blind expenditure proposition without the backbone of a strategic orientation, detailing the objectives and capabilities in need, cannot provide an adequate response to the identified threats that NATO is facing. On that note, as listed on the 71st point of the 2018 Brussel's Summit Declaration, there is the need to develop coherent and complementary defense capacities, in an effort to avoid the unnecessary duplication of means.

The Portuguese Way: An Effort to Consciously Invest in Defense
Being a small country still recovering from the worldwide financial crisis, the Portuguese responsibilities as a NATO founding member can only be proportional to its resources. Due to the very limited number of acquirements for National Defense, the investments that come to light have to be able to perform a diverse role of activities, not only regarding warfare, but also possessing the capacities to be deployed in civic affairs, alongside the investments in science and industry.
Since the creation of the latest Strategic Concept for National Defense in 2013, Portugal has aimed to consolidate its role as a co-producer of international security. To pursue that objective, the modernization efforts were conducted to integrate the civic and military strategy, and act to reduce vulnerabilities.

Based on that effort, current prime-minister António Costa, announced an investment package aiming at the research of areas that can be used not only by civilian entities, but also by other countries, such as aeronautics and automated vehicles. On that hand, partnerships such as the recent multilateral cooperation agreement with 12 other NATO members, are a stepping stone. These events should reinforce the Portuguese paradigm to have one of the lowest percentages on equipment expenditure, due to financial constraints and policy, but also as a country that is aiming

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[3]*Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017)*. Available on:
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170629_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf (assessed on 6. Oct. 2018).

to develop highly qualified defense forces, potentiating its industry and research, and serving a multitude of purposes.

Recommendations
- Accentuate the GDP expenditure through investments in equipment that can be employed for both civic and military purposes;
- Investments on industry and scientific research that are able to potentiate, not only better armed forces, but also economic growth. Projects such as the military cargo plane that Portugal and Czech Republic are co-integrated, leading to the creation of hundreds of new positions in key industry sectors, alongside with new Portuguese Navy vessels which are also being produced in Portugal, surmount a policy regarding economic and industrial stimulus;
- Reinforce the investment cooperation in scientific research between the members of the Alliance, through multilateral agreements, such as the latest cooperation on unmanned maritime systems.

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Refocussing NATO: Back to Defence, but not Back to the Future

Lee David Turpin (@LD_Turpin)

In the analysis of alliance politics, it has been demonstrated that there are strong incentives for members to free-ride on defence. The 2% of GDP target sends a clear message to NATO allies, namely that many need to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets in order to keep the Alliance fit for the future.

As a rhetorical tool for fostering aspiration amongst NATO allies to increase spending on defence capability creation it serves a useful purpose. However, as an abstract device for objectively measuring the share of burden and risk that allies bear, it is at best incomplete and at worst counterproductive. An illustrative example of this is Greece, which has historically had little problem meeting the 2% of GDP target. However, in terms of force projection, Greece's defence capabilities are

severely limited. This point is further emphasised in the political will to deploy on operations, where Greece falls significantly behind much smaller allies' contributions.

Instead, NATO could place greater focus at a high political level on assessing the worth of allies' contributions through a more sophisticated metric. Whilst the key message remains the same, that some allies can and should do more to keep NATO in good health, emphasising Alliance credibility and political will could spotlight the issue of deployability. This may incorporate increased attention on both how defence budgets are spent and what allies offer to specific tasks and operations. A further benefit of this could be to sharpen the attention of allies on the procurement of specific forces, assets, facilities and capabilities that NATO has identified as needed through the Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

This raises the question of what NATO itself should be doing and where greater investments should be made. In the post-Cold War period, NATO's primary activity shifted from territorial defence against the Soviet threat to out-of-area operations. This accompanied US calls for European states to transform their armed forces to meet this new challenge. Now though, particularly following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, defence of the Eastern Flank is back on the core agenda. Despite this, commitment to out-of-area operations has not weakened, whilst US dissatisfaction with allies' contribution to the Alliance has increased if anything.
The danger here is whether NATO is attempting to accomplish too much. To reformulate the famous quote of former US Senator Richard G. Lugar, 'out-of-area risks putting NATO out of business'. Instead, NATO may consider refocusing on being a 'within-area' defence organisation. This would however entail an increased division of responsibilities with bodies that would need to step-in on the range of out-of-area crisis management tasks that NATO fulfils.

Indeed, it is possible to argue that such a process is occurring. NATO operations are already transforming from large-scale military intervention to capacity-building, but this raises questions on whether other institutional settings may be better suited for such training tasks. Meanwhile kinetic operations in Iraq, Syria and the Sahel are already taking place outside of NATO frameworks. Potentially the EU's CSDP could do more at the lower-end of the combat intensity spectrum and the EI2 may provide a framework at the higher-end in the future.

However, this does not entail NATO going 'back to the future' in territorial defence as it was formulated over the Cold War. As NATO has seen not only in Ukraine, modern defence requires preparedness for hybrid warfare. This in itself is not a territorial defence task, yet at the same time is essential to the credibility of NATO's wider deterrence role. Indeed, NATO has already agreed to establish a European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki and decided in 2017 to embrace cyber operations in Alliance military missions.

Nevertheless, more can to be done in terms of operationalisation. Whilst institutional progress on hybrid capabilities has been made, greater focus could be placed on how forces may be best

prepared for hybrid attacks. This could involve training enhanced forward presence troops and equipping them for the demands of 'hybridity'. Indeed, the risks of not doing so were recently made evident in Lithuania, where German NATO troops were targeted in this manner.

Policy Recommendations

- Drop or supplement discussion of the 2% of GDP Target for Defence Spending at the highest political levels – shift emphasis towards allies' usable capabilities and contributions towards NATO tasks and operations.
- Refocus NATO's role towards within-area defence and seek a greater division of out-of-area tasks with other bodies, where an institutional framework for cooperation remains desirable.
- In addition to top-down hybrid focussed initiatives NATO should develop capabilities on this from the bottom-up – this should involve integrating hybrid warfare training and equipment for deployed NATO forces.

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Missing the point: The two percent debate will not define the future capabilities of NATO.
Elsa Landry

Why the two percent debate is a false one:
Since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, the two percent target percent target has gained increased attention by the NATO states. The 2-percent issue was at the centre of the discussions in July 2018 at the NATO summit with many of the debates being about whether the 2% spending is a "good" criterion. This, however, does not advance the debate since money from the defence budget can be used in multiple ways: Hire more personal for the Ministry of Defence (MoD), buy television sets for the soldiers in their bases, refurbish MoD buildings, etc. But do these expenditures contribute to maintaining and developing NATO's operational warfighting capabilities? They don't.

Research and Innovation: the keywords for NATO's future

The real issue that needs to be debated is: *how* should defence budgets be spent? What are the priorities to maintain and improve NATO capacities?

The personnel available to the MoD as well as life conditions of soldiers are very important. Nevertheless, member states should also *think about* their *common future* as NATO. In a world where actors like China, Russia and India are massively developing their defence and security capacities and defence research is rapidly creating new technologies, what should the NATO members do? The aim is not to provoke an arms race or a defence research competition to develop the best warfare system in order to become better and stronger than the others. The target should be to have the best equipment available, including up to date technologies.

Research and innovation are the keywords that will help define the future of NATO. Member states must understand that good maintenance and seamless functioning of NATO depends on investments made in equipment modernization for their armed forces as well as spending on defence and security research. Research has never been so fruitful, developing new technologies so quickly. The military forces, too, should benefit from these technologies and advancements. Hence modernization of the equipment is essential. Current progress on Artificial Intelligence (AI), new forms of communication, robotics as well as the Internet of things are revolutionizing day to day life but should also be applied to the fields of security and defence. Member states should further focus on developments in the space area and the related technologies as space is getting more and more relevant in defence strategies.

What should be done:

a) Therefore, member states should all respect the criterion set in 2014: 20% of defence budget should be invest in equipment. This is central to achieve the modernization of armed forces. Member states should all publish during 2019 their strategy to meet this criterion until 2024, otherwise sanctions should be taken.

b) To achieve this, NATO should define the key technologies needed for future capabilities and how they can be developed. Those should focus on traditional equipment as tanks, bombers, nuclear warfare for states having it. But also technologies in new areas: drones, data analytics, sensors, behavioural analysis are also strategic for NATO defence.

Member states that have already made investments in these key areas or have a renowned industry in a specific area should take the lead of their respective domain. There is no need for every member state to invest in all areas.

c) Instead, cooperation in the development of one or several capabilities is required. That would increase the interoperability of the military forces of the alliance as well as increase trust between member state and lower the cost of research and development.

d) Cooperation with the EU in sharing knowledge should be continued and increased. EU-NATO bilateral research programmes could also be really interesting for both organisations.

Policy recommendations

1. Debating on the exact percentage is not fruitful. The discussion should rather focus on the capabilities that NATO needs to develop in the long term. Based on the requirements, member states should invest in developing one or several of these capabilities, taking into consideration predispositions or expert knowledge and industries of each member.

2. New capabilities should be highly-innovative to ensure the technical and operational capacities of NATO, which has to be leader in the development of modern defence systems.

3. To achieve this, member states should invest in (military and civil) defence and security after defining the key technologies for NATO.

4. As research and development is increasing in cost, member states should cooperate on these projects. Cooperation with the EU is encouraged, as 22 members of the EU are also part of the NATO.

5. The specific amount of money invested in research and development should be agreed upon all member states. Sanctions in case of non-compliance should also be provided for.

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Open Door or Neighbourhood Watch?

The Future of NATO's Partnerships with Non-Allies

In today's volatile international climate, NATO's partnerships have an in-creasingly crucial security role to play. Their effectiveness, consequences and further development is a question of only growing significance. NATO allies contribute much more than hard military power, they diversify and broaden NATO's political dialogues. As well as providing insight on issues, such as the regional contexts and political textures of challenges. Enabling NATO to realize its vision for the world, in regions where it cannot be pre-sent. But a partnership with NATO may also mean responsibilities for NATO and the risk of getting sucked into conflicts outside of its core region. Such possible could develop in the Middle East with heightened tensions be-tween Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel. There the question of NATO's respon-sibility to protect, may be nowhere as pressing as in Syria. A conflict of con-stantly shifting compositions, wedged between a NATO member and multi-ple NATO allies. With the outcome of the Syrian conflict still unknown but its stakes undeniably high, in what way should NATO support its affected al-lies of the Mediterranean Dialogue? So that they can thrive even in such adverse conditions.

Panelists.

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Introduction and Moderation

Patrick Senft is currently studying Security Studies in The Hague but also has a strong background in the natural science, thanks to having studied Physics at LMU Munich. Since 2017 he is working as a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research where, at the moment, he is studying two conflicts in South Asia. In that role he visited a conflict area and conducted research on the ground. Additionally, he has been an active member of YATA Germany and the Foreign Affairs Association. Complementing his interests in conflicts he has obtained substantial knowledge of all aspects relating to small arms and armed conflict and has applied that knowledge regularly in his everyday work.

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Young Leaders

NATO's Future Relationships with Non-Members: The Case For India As a Global Partner

Jaina Mehta (@jaina_mehta)

The future of NATO's partnerships is not as simple as 'open door' versus 'neighborhood watch.' This view presents an unconducive false dichotomy; adopting a practical approach for determining future non-member allies is better than an 'all-or-nothing' scenario. A suitable ally for the organization would be one that: 1) presents a geostrategic advantage for NATO, 2) holds similar values to current member states, 3) has previous, successful bilateral relations with NATO members, and 4) can provide a lasting, mutually beneficial relationship with the alliance. One nation that meets all these criteria is the emerging global power: India.

Geostrategic Advantage: Whilst every member state has been in the North Atlantic since formation in 1949, NATO has sought to develop 'contact countries' and 'global partners' around the world for many years. The global security environment in the 21st century means that challenges are no longer limited to singular areas of the world, and because of this NATO has increasingly become involved in areas outside of its traditional region. 'Global NATO' is a key strategic concept, developed during the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration; we can see a movement toward further geostrategic advantage through NATO's IPCPs with Australia and New Zealand, increasing the organizations reach in the Asia-Pacific region. India's key geostrategic position in South Asia could be an asset or the future of NATO. Whilst the organization has developed relations with other South Asian partners previously, they do not necessarily meet the other criteria essential for successful partnership.

Values: The relationships that NATO fosters with non-members must continue to be based upon shared values of democracy, human rights, and the promotion of peace through cooperation.

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'Global NATO' has itself been branded as a 'global alliance of democracies.' India is commonly regarded as the 'world's largest democracy,' and the beliefs espoused by the Indian government are ideologically similar to NATO member states. This is a fundamental benchmark of cooperation, as partnerships must be underlined by mutual values.

Successful NATO-Member Relations: India has successful relations with many NATO members, including Britain and Canada. Whilst India is not a U.S. Major Non-NATO Ally, the bilateral relationship between the two nations is strong. Earlier this year, the Trump Administration made India a NATO-level trade partner, making it the third Asian country (after Japan and South Korea) to get the Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1). This Washington-New Delhi agreement will allow civil space and defense technology to be sold between them, with an estimated economic value of more than $14B.

Mutually Beneficial: A NATO-India partnership has the potential to be beneficial for all parties involved. Not only is India in a geostrategic location and shares similar values with NATO members, but also holds a large percentage of the world's population, hosts technology-savvy businesses, is one of the fastest growing economies, and has nuclear capabilities. A global partnership with NATO would be beneficial to India as well, who could enjoy benefits such as: reciprocal training, loans of equipment and materials, and DoD cooperative research and development projects; all which are usually unobtainable by non-NATO countries. India may also gain credibility and respect on the global stage through this association.

Risks and Obstacles: All current and future relationships have risks attached to them, it is for this reason that all partnerships must be continuously reviewed. A consideration to reflect upon when deciding the extent of any partnership with India would be the reaction of regional actors such as Pakistan, who NATO already has a relationship with, and China, a competitor to India in many ways. Additionally, India has been displeased with NATO activity in Afghanistan, as it has caused regional instability. India's position in the non-aligned movement also presents a challenge, however, security issues in the modern era may make the nation, and its pragmatic, military-friendly Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, turn away from their prolonged Cold War position. Perhaps the biggest risk would be NATO's hesitation to move toward an Indian partnership before it is too late; recent bilateral meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin suggest that a relationship is being formed, but not with NATO.

Future Recommendations: Based on the four factors of ally suitability I outlined above, India could be an advantageous global partner for NATO, if other global conditions allow for the development of a partnership. In order to create this reality, there needs to be a dialogue between Brussels and New Delhi considering:
1. An understanding of similar goals and challenges;
2. An understanding of differing goals and challenges;
3. Minimum terms for mutual engagement;
4. Discussion of mutual, reciprocal benefits;

5.   An outline of a scheduled road-map to cooperation.

India is a prime candidate for NATO global partnership, and if these small steps can be taken, a future, mutually beneficial relationship could form.

 Jaina Mehta is an Erasmus Master's student, studying International Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies at the University of Glasgow, Dublin City University, and Charles University, Prague. She was awarded her Bachelor's degree in Global Security and Justice from the University of Virginia in 2017, and completed the International Security and Intelligence programme at the University of Cambridge in 2018. In addition to her academic pursuits, Jaina serves on the 2018-2020 Board of the European Chapter of the Erasmus Mundus Association. She is currently interning at the Institut pr o Politiku a Spolecnost in Prague, and helps manage The Security Distillery, a student-led think tank. In 2019 she will undertake a work placement at the United Nations in New York City.

NATO relationships with the Indian Peninsula (India-Pakistan)
Xhoana Dishica (@DishnicaXhoana)

NATO cooperates with a number of countries that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are called Major non-NATO ally (MNNA), a status that was created in 1989.

Pakistan is one of these countries to enjoy "Major non-NATO ally" status from 2004. Relations between the United States and Pakistan have been stronger after the operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border and the secret U.S. attack that killed Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden on Pakistani territory in 2011. However, relations began to change as both sides began to criticize each other. The United States government accused Pakistan of supporting members of the Afghan Taliban, and Pakistan claimed that the United States didn't control the security in the East of Afghanistan.

The United States could remove Pakistan status as a major non-NATO ally if Islamabad doesn't fight the Taliban and other extremist groups. Pakistan must follow a different approach, and NATO can provide support for Islamabad, and protect the citizens against the terrorist organizations. U.S. wants to see Pakistan taking final action against terrorism. The United States are ready to work with Pakistan for a resolution and to continue the conversations with the Pakistani government.

In the other hand the United States should begin negotiations with New Delhi to establish India as its primary partner in South Asia and to designate India as an MNNA. India and the U.S. have

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the same decision for the freedom of navigation and have a mutual interest in security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Terrorism in Pakistan originated with supporting the [Soviet–Afghan War](), but other causes, such as political, public education, ethnic diversity, and population have influenced too.

India is considered too big to be another partner country to the Atlantic Alliance.

America considers India as a major power. This is because in geostrategic and economic ways, both countries are opposed as allies and they cannot form a successful strategic partnership.

Both countries have different economic systems. India is a part of the BRICS, so New Delhi should leave the powerful group of five and Indians should believe that it would be better with the US.

- Pakistan should fight the Taliban and other extremist groups to maintain the "Major non-NATO ally" status.

- NATO can support the Pakistan and protect the citizens against the terrorist organizations and continue the conversations with the Pakistani government.

- To fight the terrorism, Pakistan should develop the public education.

- If India wants to be a Major non-NATO ally, the country should abandon the group of BRICS.
- The Indian Peninsula (India-Pakistan) relations in the future will improve with mutual interest with NATO if these two countries will continue the rapprochement with North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Xhoana Dishnica is an Albanian National that studied translation and interpretation at the University of Tirana and worked as a translator for a Press Agency, where she translated news from Agence France Press (AFP). She is fluent in French, English and Italian and in 2013 continued with her studies in Didactics of French in Bucharest and a year later started to study international relations in Hungary. She currently live in Budapest and works as a technical support analyst for Hewlett Packard. She is very interested in the politics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and for this reason is very happy to participate in YATA NATO's Future Seminar 2018.

O Brother, My Brother: The Importance of NATO Broadening Partnerships to Progress on Politically Pernicious Security Issues
Claire Wählen (@claire_wahlen)

Cyber, climate change, and a lack of women in security and leadership are among the greatest security threats of our era but are not universally perceived as such because of social political implications: NATO must encourage and foster now connections with non-traditional ally nations and institutions to approach these multifaceted challenges in new, innovative way because while none of them are new, they multiply in scope faster than our current system can respond.

Recently repopularized populist politics are challenging the international rules based order and are making long time allies hesitant participants, in particular on security issues of a more social nature: women in security and leadership and climate change being just two issues to be explored below. In order to navigate the upcoming tide of strained alliances amid continually evolving threats, NATO should make efforts to use its influence and experience to expand its role on issues of international security that some member nations may not support depending on their own political climates. As an established alliance comparable to the United Nations and European Union in sheer scope and experience, NATO should continue growing as a rule setting organization that uses its power to leverage grassroots organizations to tackle tangentially related security issues that individual nations may not have the political wills to pursue, rather than deferring to others who've traditionally led the process.

This isn't only the case for the United States under President Donald Trump but for several European nations which have in the past two years elected increasingly populist, right-wing governments with agendas that call for canceling commitments on human rights, climate change, and democratic institutions, from elections to a free press: all issues broadly agreed upon in principle as important, but which on account their political nature have too few entrenched protections. Membership in an alliance like NATO demands a certain level of consistency and was designed to do so without infringing on individual national autonomy, and so by expanding programs funded directly through NATO rather than relying on fluctuating financial commitments by the individual membership, long term projects can work without threat of political interference.

Recommendation: Expand funding directly to NATO for non-partisan work on policies of a more social nature (climate change, human rights, women in security) with proper oversight and protections from political agendas shifting with election results.

NATO's website lists only three international organizations as true partners: the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. While such large groups come with large mandates and memberships, they can often be removed from some of the more ground level efforts being done on some of these more social issues that have not necessarily fed directly to NATO's primarily directives. A more concerted effort to bridge this gap should be explored by developing a secondary, lower tier official partnership with organizations

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within NATO nations and at their periphery that address these issues. NATO works in almost every nation that constitutes the alliance but with which organizations or groups they partner with are not well documented, easily accessed by third parties, and the process for interested groups to request partnerships in tackling issues that NATO itself is not necessarily the principle actor on is murky at best. By keeping the power dynamic so one sided, potential partnerships on diverse and evolving issues go unfulfilled.

Recommendation: Expand partnerships beyond the current set of major partners by developing a second tier of official partnerships with grassroot groups within and around NATO allies nations, tackling the issues that are relevant to NATO's interests but do not necessarily fit within NATO's direct purview. Do this in a meaningful way: transparent and accessible data on existing partnerships with a clearer path for interested third-parties to become involved with NATO on as-of-yet priorities.

To bring this all together, I recommend a Special Representative nation explore the avenue for possible growth on this topic - specifically my own. Canada has largely focused on leadership roles on NATO missions abroad in Latvia and Iraq as just two examples but it's the current government's rhetoric at home that positions Canada as a strong candidate to lead this endeavor. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Foreign Policy minister Chrystia Freeland have long supported a feminist foreign policy - a practice that is ongoing but underway - and advocate for stronger measures on climate change. Critics can argue the liberal government has fallen short on these goals but given current efforts I believe Canada could be a suitable candidate for undertaking this international review. Canada's proximity to the United States is an additional credit to its qualification on this portfolio rather than a hindrance, as it opens channels of communication for whoever replaces President Trump as they navigate the tumultuous terrain left behind by their predecessor.

Recommendation: Have Canada task a Special Representative to explore the new reality of an expanding NATO sphere of influence on politically charged security issues.

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Is the door really open? The future with Non-allies

Mariam Bregadze

NATO's enlargement process and cooperation with Non-NATO countries promote stability, peace and maintains Europe united. NATO's "open door policy", which is based on Article 10, creates an opportunity for every country to become a member of the alliance if they fulfill all the requirements of the treaty. This founding principle became momentum in the countries to meet all the requirements and progress in order to join the alliance. The NATO summit in Brussels left a message of openness and willingness to help aspirant countries reach their membership. Especially for Ukraine and Georgia. But nor Brussels summit or past summits (Except for Montenegro's example) didn't make any new invitations.

There are three official candidates to join the alliance. Macedonia, that resolved its name issue and is expected to join the alliance soon, and Bosnia Herzegovina they both have a Membership Action Plan, also Georgia, which is named as "aspirant" country but stays without MAP. Each country more or less makes progress in modernization or military reforms. Some of them made a better effort than others. But to show that the door is really "open" NATO should show the allies that no one can Veto the process and the alliance is ready for another enlargement. The issue is relevant today due to the suspicion if the door really remains open for aspirant countries when some of them are waiting for membership since the summit in Bucharest, 2008. NATO's fixed enlargement process makes us think that Open door Policy must be restated.

Georgia's case is a good example of "open door" policy. The country was promised eventual membership at the summit in Bucharest. Georgia's main challenge to become a NATO member is a dispute over the lost territory. In 2008 20 percent of the country was occupied by Russia. The modernization and low democracy index were another big issue. The NATO-Georgia Commission supports the reforms for Euro-Atlantic aspiration. Georgia has transformed its military and supports NATO's security operations. The spending on modernization of defense systems was increased in the defense budget from 4% to 20%. The country became the largest per-capita troop contributor in the war in Afghanistan and the third largest in the Iraq war. In peacekeeping missions in Central African Republic and Balkans, Georgian troops joined NATO's troops. In terms of Democracy, the country made substantial progress and achieved stronger economic development.

Georgia-NATO close partnership involves a partnership on Black Sea security issues, NATO–Georgia Package, to which all Allies contribute, Annual National Program. The country became the only non-NATO ally to join NATO's rapid response team. Despite the cooperation and essential progress Georgia has not even received a Membership Action Plan-MAP, that stays necessary to join the alliance. The Brussels summit could be again the continuation of the politic that avoids confrontation with Russia. There were no concrete proposals on the table, nor for Georgia or for Ukraine. NATO supports Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and its aspiration. But in reality, Georgia's membership depends on not its own efforts,

but also on the other members and NATO's geopolitical interests. The Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed Russia being encircled by the west. The alliance should prove that no third country has a say or can veto the process. Enlargement in the Black Sea region, enhancing regional cohesion and promote countries increase military capabilities gives NATO a better chance to fight back to Russia's domination in the region.

Also what not all members are willing to receive the country in the alliance. As the United States President Donald Trump mentioned in the NATO summit in Brussels, the country has a chance to join NATO, but "not right now". German Chancellor Angela Merkel also underlined that she can't see "Georgia's prompt accession to NATO" and this is a position of Germany. And France which also has a close relationship with Russia.

NATO should realize that without concrete steps, the alliance gives weight to the Russian narrative and may delay the reforms in the aspirant countries.

Policy Recommendations

- NATO should reaffirm its "open door policy". The alliance should ensure unanimity of the members, that none of them has different geopolitical interests.
- NATO should redefine the politics towards Russia.
- NATO should help to black sea region countries to increase military capabilities and naval forces in order to balance Russia's domination of the region. NATO should include Georgia in all new initiatives related to the Black Sea.
- NATO should seek the U.S to improve relations with Ukraine and Georgia, herewith help Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina reach their membership after they fulfill all the requirements.
- NATO should have enlargement as a top priority for enhancing its stability and security. The alliance should deepen partnership with non-allies.

Mariam Bregadze, was born on December 4, 1997. She in her third year of studies towards a bachelor's in international relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. As a member of different organizations such as: "Young Diplomats' Club of Georgia", "Helping Hand", "YATA Georgia", she is an organizer of different projects and discussions. She is an active member of the model of the European Union and Georgian parliament. She speaks four languages: Italian, Spanish, Russian and Georgian. In June 2018 she completed a summer school course "Small States In The Changing World Order" which was offered by Talinn University. She was a volunteer in Spain, Murcia in July 2018. Currently, she is an intern at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.

Furthering NATO's cause in the Middle East and North African region

Patrick Senft

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO had to reinvent itself in order to adapt to the new era. This included the enhancement of its global outreach through a number of partnership programs. The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) was no exception and so NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) as a framework for partnerships with countries of the southern Mediterranean. Later, NATO also launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in order to enhance bilateral cooperation with Gulf states. Considering NATOs only increasing interest in the MENA region and the resulting need to further strengthen ties with NATO, neither MD nor ICI seems to be an adequate forum. This appears to be because of two factors. Firstly, even though the MD and the ICI aimed at creating a platform for political discussion and cooperation, there successes have been mostly based on Individual Partnerships and Cooperation Programs (IPCPs) falling within NATO's 28+1 format. Secondly, by grouping Israel together with Arab countries into the MD, NATO gives the impression of seeking to solve the Arab-Israel conflict. Which has hindered cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean partners.

In addition to these partnership frameworks, NATO also cooperates with some nations of the MENA region individually without having incorporated them into any existing framework. NATO has, for example, signed an IPCP with the Nation of Iraq, without Iraq being a member of any partnership framework.

I would like to argue that NATOs engagement with the MENA region is based on arrangements of an unsystematic nature, hindering NATO's engagement and therefore creating the need for the development of a comprehensive framework. This framework is not intended to supersede but to complement and combine with existing partnership programs towards the MENA region. In order to develop a functioning framework to enhance relations between NATO and Arab countries, the Alliance should draw lessons from Operation Unified Protector (OUP), which was conducted with the support of partners form the Arab League. OUP was a NATO operation conducted in 2011, enforcing two United Nations Security Council resolutions, implementing an arms embargo and a no-fly zone in order to protect Libyan civilians during the Libyan civil war. The major success of this operation was NATO's ability to mobilize regional support, for example Qatar and the UAE (both members of the ICI) contributed militarily to the operation, while Jordan (a member of the MD) provided technical support along with air assets. More importantly, the AL's support for the no-fly zone over Libya was applauded by the international community and NATO. Overall, the AL's position towards OUP reflects a significant change in its attitude to NATO. In the Libyan crisis the AL was seen to be engaging positively and cooperating actively with international partners in order to restore order and security in a changing region. The organization's efforts to reinvent itself as a major player in regional politics should be encouraged, and NATO should capitalize on the growing role of the AL. In order to achieve this, NATO should proceed as follows.

Policy recommendations.

- NATO should look for strategic partnership with the AL, and not see it simply as a source of legitimacy
    - Accordingly, the Alliance should be less ambitious in terms of "public diplomacy", and focus more on emphasizing the dynamics of its relations with the AL.
    - In this regard, NATO should propose the establishment of a Joint Committee/ Council with the AL. This body should meet regularly, allowing representatives from both organizations to address controversial issues boldly.
- Make use of existing frameworks. NATO should think not in terms of replacing its partnership frameworks, but of complementing them.
    - What is needed is a comprehensive framework that enhances multilateral cooperation between NATO and Arab countries under a 28+n format, as would be possible in the framework of cooperation with the AL.
    - Therefore, the Alliance should differentiate between two levels of cooperation with Arab countries: bilateral cooperation (achieved through MD and ICI), and multilateral cooperation (through the AL). While the two levels should remain distinct, they should work in synergy.
- NATO should make use of its educational institutions to function as a neutral ground for informal meetings with the AL, especially at a time when reciprocal visits between the two organizations may raise more questions than answers.
- NATO should think of developing its relations with the AL as a gradual process, starting with a build-up of political dialogue and then possibly aiming at logistic support and military cooperation.

In conclusion, NATO should not be imprisoned in its own frameworks, and should investigate alternative means of cooperation with the MENA region. Encouraging mutual collaboration within the AL and cooperation with NATO as one institution.

This Essay is based on: El-Kouedi, M. (2013). NATO and the Arab League: The importance of Being Earnest. *Research Paper, Research Division NATO Defense College, Rome*, 93

Price for paying (in)security: how much is it worth to spend the 2%?

Halley Tsugai

When dealing with the question of how to spend 2%, it is important that NATO takes a strategic approach that can enable a successful usage of the spending. The strategy should be used as a guidance to align capabilities to future needs. Examining NATO's current status, cybersecurity is arguably one of its top priorities and areas for grave improvement. First, the NATO's external environment, such as rising tensions with Russia and rapid technological developments, suggest new threats and opportunities. Second, comparing NATO's internal capabilities to the external threats/opportunities allow new insights on how to develop and maneuver within this unprecedented dynamic environment.

Let us first look at the external environment. In 2014, along sea, air and land, NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of warfare. This relatively new development can be understood as a response to rising Russian presence and threat. There have been traces of Russia attempting to hack into European critical infrastructure, such as energy plants and telecommunication networks. If Russia succeeds, this could lead to major chaos across Europe, and result in a large impact on NATO's reputation and trust from its citizens. Additionally, it may be portrayed as a defeat by Russia, creating further concerns.

How then do NATO's current capabilities compare to possible future needs? So far, NATO's *Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence* in Tallinn has been the main driver for NATO cyber capabilities. Tallinn has been active in education, research and development of cyber capabilities. As the center comprises of experts in cyber technology, strategy, operations, international law, and research, it holds great potential to test and incorporate advanced cyber capabilities. With growing Russian presence in cyberspace, it is crucial that NATO continues to push for cyber advancements.

As animosity between Russia shifts to a cyber domain, it is crucial for NATO to reprioritize its expenditures and increase the budget for cybersecurity. In 2017, NATO committed only $72 million to upgrade cyber defense systems, out of the total $900 billion defense budget. Though return on investment in defensive security measures are difficult to assess, costs of *insecurity* can be high. A study by Atlantic Council and University of Denver highlighted that by 2030, cyber *insecurity* may result in $90 trillion. Moreover, this is not a conversation of the future. Cyber attacks are already increasing in numbers and becoming more sophisticated, using Machine Learning technology. In 2016, the Secretary General's Annual Report stated NATO dealt with over 500 cyber attacks per month (60% more than the previous year). The following five areas are identified as crucial components for cyber resilience. Increase funding is thus recommended for short and longer term stability in cyberspace:

1. COOPERATION: Nations with sophisticated cyber technology are encouraged to share and partake in joint research projects with other NATO and ally nations. As cyberattacks tend to target loopholes in information sharing and exchange, "trusted networks" are key for stable

cyber resilience. Thus, increase funding and incentives for joint projects, and establishment of coherent information sharing systems within NATO are recommended.

2. RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: Research and development on cyber capabilities that incorporate Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence are utmost in need. Recent studies suggest that AI incorporated in cyber defense may also lead to better efficiency and lower cybersecurity costs in the long term.

3. INNOVATION: Technology other than AI, such as Swarm technology, should also be research and examined for applications in cyberspace. With hackers becoming more sophisticated everyday, creativity in cyber defense capabilities, and being one step ahead of attackers are crucial aspects of successful cyber resilience.

4. MAINTENANCE: Dealing with mutating malware and cyberspace's evolving threat landscape, constant assessment and maintenance of existing cyber capabilities and updates are recommended. Risk management, which incorporates advanced threat intelligence, can assist with prioritizing risks to effectively allocate resources and prepare for emergency situations.

5. PERSONNEL: Ensuring a highly skilled and trusting staff is arguably the most important aspect of a successful cybersecurity operation. Sufficient spending to recruit, retain and continuously train highly skilled personnel should be the main priority. Further, recruiting cybersecurity personnel who come from non-technical backgrounds but can assess the whole picture –understand and communicate both the technical and political implications - are highly in need.

Halley Tsugai is a master's student studying Security and Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. She has lived in Japan and the U.S. prior to coming to Denmark where she developed a passion for foreign policy and international relations. Currently her area of interested and expertise involves society and technology, such as emerging risk and opportunities with AI/ Machine Learning application, Big Data and Cybersecurity.

Overthrown the Cold War Image and Building A Peaceful Future in Syria

Emine Gülnihal Yolcu (@egulnihal)

Syrian civil war which has occurred a consequence of Arab uprisings started as a regional conflict and turned into international crisis and created migration flow from Syria to neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Today, migration is not just named as a societal issue but also economic, political and most importantly security issue. In this context, NATO is currently collaborating with Aegean coast countries and Frontex which is responsible for European border and European security in order to prevent human trafficking and establish the security.

Since 2011, the conflict had caused that 6.6 million people are displaced and more than 5.6 million people fled from the country to neighboring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. More than 500.000 people got killed during the war and more than 300.000 people risked their lives reaching Europe (Greece and Italy) by sea. Also, it is believed that 2.700 people have died or gone missing while crossing the Mediterranean Sea (Europe Situation, 2018).

Turkey is currently hosting more than 3 million people according to UNCHR (Syria Emergency, 2018) and it is one of three parties that joined peace talks to establish sovereign Syrian state together with Russia and Iran. Turkey is sharing her longest border with Syria and it is the most affected country from the civil war. It still continues adapting Syrians into daily life cooperating with UN-CHR, the EU and the other hosting states. In this case, Europe is sharing Turkey's concerns since Europe - mainly Germany- is also hosting refugees after Turkey.

For non-aligned states, NATO has still seen as a Cold War product threatening non-allied states and this perception prevents NATO seeing as more than military alliance. Especially, Kosovo crisis and Libyan operation were strictly criticized by Russia and these operations became major issue between NATO and Russia. Following recommendations aim that NATO can use its means for peaceful purposes and clear the image of Cold War from non-allied states' view.

Policy Recommendations
- NATO might not involve directly in Syrian crisis but it may assist Turkey in order to create peaceful environment in Syria. Because after the crisis, Syria will need help for reconstruction and Turkey as one of the mediators in these peace talks will be ready for the help. In this case, NATO has a greater chance to build a positive image consisting more than military alliance. NATO can push for the solution in Syrian crisis by supporting Turkey and make possible for Astana talks.
- Secondly, since NATO suspended NATO-Russia Council there is no official channel for the talks and between NATO and Russia. Russia as one of the biggest parts in Syrian conflict currently is cooperating with Turkey since jet crisis in 2015. It is impossible to avoid Russia and now Iran in this crisis. NATO has reservations on being part of conflict but when it comes

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to be part of conflict resolution, there is a greater opportunity that should be taken into consideration for NATO. Because Russia gained enormous credibility in international arena after its involvement in Syrian crisis since its annexation of Crimea. This is why it will be significant to engage with not the crisis itself but the solution.

- NATO accepts the status given by the international law to the "migrant" or "refugees". In this context, NATO can help states in that region to create a secure zone for refugees. The security & aids to the migrants in the secure zone should also belong to NATO troops which has neutral position in the war. Although some member states has a position and support certain groups, NATO can build a supranational identity as a protector of migrants with a humanitarian purpose.

Besides Turkey, European NATO-allied countries are also affected from crisis. Becoming part of solution to the crisis can improve will not just bring together NATO-allied states but also will increase the credibility of NATO itself among non-aligned states. NATO will have a chance to offer security for all unlike Russian claims on NATO's assertiveness towards non-aligned states.

We have now different conditions than the Cold War and NATO has also different and greater mission to take on. Because Syrian crisis revealed that states are vulnerable and they need each other to resistant to threats. ISIS became the most important example of the issue. In this context, NATO should take account to be part of solution to Syrian crisis, because Turkey as a NATO ally country shares its longest border with Syria. Now, it is time to build safe and reliable environment not just for alliance itself but also for non-aligned sates'. In the end, NATO will use its means for peaceful aims and eventually will not be using just its military means. NATO will be example of how to cooperate with non-allied countries in coherence.

Emine Gülnihal Yolcu is a master student in the International Relations program of Institute of Social Sciences in Kadir Has University, Turkey. She holds a BA in Political Science and International Relations from Marmara University, Turkey. Her study field is mainly Turkish foreign policy and Russian foreign policy. She is active member of YATA Turkey since 2018. During her BA, she worked at Center of Eurasian Research under International Relations Studies.

NATO's Open Door Policy: Enhancing Security or Inciting to Confrontation? NATO-Russia Enlargement Tensions

Adelá Vondrovicová (@AVondrovicova)

The NATO Brussels summit in July 2018 offered an opportunity for the alliance to send a clear signal that its "open door" policy remains firmly in place. The Allied leaders reaffirmed their support for the aspiring countries and reiterated the decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, especially in regard to potential membership aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. Since its foundation in 1949, NATO's membership has increased from 12 to 29 countries. Historically, the expansion of the Alliance has been a success story. It is desirable that NATO's door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of the membership, as provided for in the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.
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Enlargement has been a complementary component of NATO's post-Cold War transformation intended to shape the security environment in Europe, to promote stability and cooperation and enhance democratic and other reforms. These objectives, however, found a different interpretation among different partners. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's opposition to NATO's enlargement has been a consistent source of animosity in relations with the Alliance. Russia believes a promise was made 20 years ago that NATO would not expand eastward, and for that reason currently sees the enlargement as a provocation and a threat to its national security. Therefore, whatever approach to "open door" policy NATO choses, it will need to include a strategy towards Russia.

NATO therefore should:
1. **Keep its door open**, as it is the founding principle of the Washington treaty. Further enlargement of NATO might enhance security and stability for all, by encouraging democratic reforms, fostering patterns of cooperation, as well as contributing to an increased transparency of defense planning and military budgets and therefore reinforcing trust among states. Despite of the fact that a decision to discard the "open door" policy would probably ease tensions with Russia, it would, on the other hand, only undermine the credibility of NATO, signal weakness and bring additional security risks (as Russia could take tougher stances against Western security concerns).

2. **Maintain a long-term prospect of membership, while allowing for current strategic implications.** The long-term overall support to "open door" should be accompanied by considerations of the strategic and other implications that the enlargement might bring. Despite the seven successful rounds, further extension of NATO should be revisited based not only on normative criteria, but also on strategic benefits. NATO should ensure that new members contribute to NATO's core functions of defense & security and do not serve as factors of instability or deterioration of relations with other countries. NATO should think about partner's

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interpretation of the decisions taken. Therefore, it is not desirable to accept new countries such as Georgia and Ukraine in the near future, as they have unresolved territorial disputes. Such an undertaking would lead to decreased security for all and could weaken the Alliance. However, it is crucial to give them a clear prospect of future membership. The FYROM and Bosnia, as the other two aspiring members are not affected to such an extent with the strategic issue but have other more practical difficulties that prevent them from joining the alliance (currently still unresolved name issue in case of FYROM and immovable defence property issue in case of Bosnia).

3. ***Make the rationale behind its "open door" policy explicitly clear once again, especially to Russia.*** Based on the wording of the Washington treaty, the NATO's ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. The primary objective of the "open door" policy is the promotion of stability and cooperation and enhancement of security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. It is not intended as any kind of provocation. NATO should make every effort to find an understanding with Russia in this matter and improve relations in this way.

4. ***Try to avoid unintended escalation and (re)build trust towards Russia, particularly in the military sphere,*** as it is the necessary basis for any future rapprochement. On the other hand, pursuing a better NATO relationship with Russia cannot mean ignoring the importance of a stable and independent Ukraine. To improve relations with Russia, NATO should use the NATO-Russia Council fully, as it remains the key platform to address issues of common interest, in order to continue strategic discussions aimed at finding better mutual understanding. Furthermore, NATO should mitigate its rhetoric against Russia and allow it to get insights into the European security management (provide sufficient information about maneuvers and other military exercises), so as it does not feel threatened and confronted, which later on creates grounds for its aggressive action. NATO and Russia could also find other issues of common interest where they could refocus and build up their partnership.

Adéla Vondrovicová pursues a Master's degree in International Security at Sciences Po Paris with a particular focus on European Defence and Security. Currently, she is doing an internship at Political Affairs and Security Policy division, Multilateral Affairs section at NATO HQ in Brussels. She holds a bachelor's degree in Czech-German studies from the Charles University in Prague and a bachelor's degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from the University of Economics. She also studied at the University of Regensburg where she worked on her bachelor thesis dealing with the issue of dispute over the deployment of German armed forces in the First Gulf War. During her studies, Adela inter ned at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic or German Bundestag and worked for several think-tanks and NGOs in the field of international relations, security and human rights.

Black Sea Region

Olga Jakobia

Black Sea region is important region for the international security, it includes three NATO member states (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and as well NATO partnership countries(Ukraine, Georgia) Georgia aspires EU and NATO membership and tries to bring it's political and legal system into conformity with the values recognized by European community. Georgia attaches great importance to NATO's role in strengthening stability and security of the country. At the same time, the reforms carried out by the government of Georgia are in full compliance with the recommendations of the Alliance and significantly contribute to the development of democratic processes in the country. Moreover, Georgia aims at becoming not only the consumer of security but rather at playing an important role in strengthening common Euro-Atlantic security. Black Sea is an important transit route for energy resources. Occupied regions of Ukraine and Georgia offer favorable conditions for transnational organized crime and international terrorism. State-organized terrorist acts present a particular threat to Georgia. Considering Georgia's important transit role, there is a danger that the occupied territories could be used for illegal activities such as trafficking and trade in arms, components of weapons of mass destruction. Georgia strengthens border protection and customs control, actively cooperating with Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan on counterterrorism and fighting transnational organized crime. A significant terrorist threat for Georgia comes from the territories occupied by the Russian Federation .Borders are one of the first lines of defence against terrorism. For the South Caucasus lessons could be drawn for further consideration from the Ohrid experience, such as the importance of practical and pragmatic co-operation and a systemic approach through integrated border management. In this respect, a workshop with the Ohrid Partners (OSCE, EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe) could be useful in exploring the possibility of applying elements of this process to border management. Georgia as a significant contributor to Euro-Atlantic security and is actively involved in NATO-led operations. IPAPs were launched at the Prague Summit in November 2002. On 29 October 2004, Georgia became the first country to agree an IPAP with NATO. The military aggression by the Russian Federation could not alter Georgia's course toward democratic development and NATO integration. The creation of the NATO-Georgia Commission after the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 and the beginning of implementation of the Annual National Plan, as well as the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Georgia, gave new impetus to NATO-Georgia relations. Georgia believes that the participation of the Parliament of Georgia in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is particularly important. The NATO Allies acknowledges Georgia as one of the most interoperable partner among the NATO aspirant nations .Georgia since moved from this mechanism ,as we pursue our membership aspirations, through development of Annual National Programmes, within the Membership Action Plan process. The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) was established in September

2008 to serve as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia achieve its goal of membership into NATO.

Georgia as a significant contributor to Euro-Atlantic security is actively involved in NATO-led operations. In 1999-2008 the Georgian military forces were deployed in Kosovo. Georgia also participates in anti-terrorist operation Active Endeavour launched on the basis of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty immediately, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Georgia's contribution to NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan is of significant importance. Nowadays, Georgia is the second largest troop contributor to Afghanistan among the non-NATO states. Georgia is involved in broad range of security issues: crisis-management and peace-support operations, regional issues; arms control and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism; defense issues such as planning, budgeting, policy and strategy; civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation; nuclear safety; civil-military coordination of air traffic management; and scientific cooperation.

Recommendations:
1. Building new training center in the area of Black Sea for strengthening and exercising in the air missions, maritime and military capacities (it may demand new financial resources, but as Black Sea is important route for the energy resources and EU countries still depend on this/these resources, something more "visible" is essential, because every violent act, weather it will be annexation, occupation or terrorism is condemned by EU on diplomatic level), "more NATO "will be in the region, more predictable will be environment. It will encourage aspirant countries to continue reforms and capability development.
2. Establish cooperative continuous border control exercises/moves, sharing advanced border surveillance technology and knowledge among members and partners.
3. Creating working groups with EU on Nuclear Diplomacy (to have practical cooperation, to share actual knowledge and experience and to discuss future steps).

As a Black Sea and Southeast European country, Georgia is part of Europe: geographically, politically, and culturally; yet it was cut off from its natural course of development by historical cataclysms, for example: demolishing first democratic republic of Georgia in 1921 by red army or Russia's attack in 8th of August in 2008. Integration into NATO and the EU is Georgia's sovereign choice, one which will strengthen Georgia's security and ensure it's stable development, as well as it is contributor in the international security.

Olga Jakobia was born & raised in Tbilisi, Georgia. In the family of a colonel, where independence and development of her country was always a top issue since the breakdown of Soviet Union. She has a mother and one younger brother and studied at the Byron School of Tbilisi finishing the Liceum of Small Academy. She received a bachelor's degree in social and political sciences in 2008 at Tbilisi State University and a Master's degree in Social Psychology at Ilia State University. She

worked as a civil servant for more than 7 years but spent the last 7 years at the ministry on Internal Affairs of Georgia. She always strives for self-development which is an asset for her job and what she does. She loves making new friends with various background. During her studies, she was involved in expeditions whose main aim it was to create friendly bonds with ethnic minorities living in the South of Georgia.

Dinner Debate: Southbound!

NATO's Strategic Direction South – Hub and cooperative security in the Mediterranean

Initiated in early 2017, NATO recently established a forum for particularly connecting allies, partners and experts on challenges and opportunities for cooperation on NATO's Southern Flank. Especially as the Hub should sup-port NATO's leaders to further develop and improve the alliance's strategy for the south, cooperation and coordination with the European Union as another significant player in the Mediterranean remains key. How can we make sure to solve pressing issues by joining forces rather than adding complexity and duplicating efforts both in the security and the policy field?

Speakers.

Charlotte Brandsma works as senior program officer at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), an international think-tank in Brussels where she directs the Mediterranean Policy Program. She coordinates GMF's research and activities in the Mediterranean and Middle East and

travels frequently to the region to speak at seminars and provide briefings. Charlotte is an expert on MENA security and regional politics, including international and regional security partnerships in the Maghreb and Sahel, and EU-MENA relations. Charlotte is a 2017 Turkey Europe Future Fellow at the Mercator Stiftung in Berlin and member of the steering committee of the OSCE New-Med research network. She is a member of the board of "The Brussels Binder", an online database and off-line network of female policy experts in Brussels dedicated to improving gender equality in European policy debates.

LCDR Michael Nunziato, US Navy, graduated from Villanova University in Pennsylvania with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science. He is a Naval Flight Officer; a Top Gun graduate; holds a graduate certificate from Catholic University in International Affairs, and a Masters of Military Operational Art and Science Degree from Air Command and Staff College. Operationally, he flew the E-2C Hawkeye on four deployments and several detachments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and multiple international training exercises. LCDR Nunziato redesignated as a European Foreign Area Officer for the US Navy and assumed his current duties at Joint Forces Command Naples in January 2017. As a subject matter expert for military security cooperation and partnership, he stood up an implementation team for NATO Strategic Direction South (NSD-S) Hub. He is currently serving in a leadership role in the core team on that staff.

Introduction & Moderation

Dr. Magdalena Kirchner, *(@mag_kir)* is the Chief Operating Officer and a Senior Analyst at CONIAS Risk Intelligence, Mannheim and, since 2014 the Chairwoman of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany. A political scientist and conflict researcher by training, she specializes in transatlantic security and crisis management, Turkey, and the Levant. She has been a 2016/17 Mercator-IPC Fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center and is a Research Fellow at RAND Europe. Previously, she held research positions at the RAND Corporation in Arlington, VA, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies in Tel Aviv, as well as several think tanks in Ankara and the University of Heidelberg.

Seminar Agenda

Seminar Venue: Willy Brandt Haus, Wilhelmstraße 140, 10963 Berlin

Saturday, November 10

Arrival of Participants, please leave luggage at the Hotel

2:00 p.m.   **Welcoming Coffee and Opening Remarks**

2:30 p.m.   Working Group Sessions

7:00 p.m.   **Politics on Water – Berlin Boat Tour and Dinner**

Evening Spree Cruise

Sunday, November 11

9:00 a.m.   **In the Eye of the Beholder? How to maintain Alliance Cohesion in shifting international and state-society relations?**

Speakers:

Mr. Eric POVEL
Programm Officer Engagements Section, NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Ms. Ruxandra POPA
Deputy Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Dr. Torrey TAUSSIG
Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow & Non-Resident Fellow, Brookings Institution

Chairs: Fabian TEMME & Alexander SCHROEDER, YATA Germany

10:30 a.m.   Coffee Break

10:45 a.m.   **How to spend 2 per cent? Which capabilities does NATO need in the Future and how can we get them?**

Speakers:

François DEVOTO, First Secretary, Embassy of France to Germany

Torben SCHUETZ, Associate Fellow, Program Security, Defence, and Armaments, German Council on Foreign Relations

Giovanni ROMANI, Head Capability Delivery Section, Defence Investment Division, NATO

Chair: Cornelius VOGT, YATA Germany

12:15 p.m.	*Lunch*
1:30 p.m.	**Open Door or Neighborhood Watch? The Future of NATO's Partnerships with Non-Allies**
	Speakers:
	Dr. Maryam AL SHEIKH, Desk Officer for NATO-Iraq Relations, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq to Belgium
	Dr. Can KASAPOGLU, IPC Sabanci Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin
	Dr. Ulrich PILSTER, Policy Officer Iraq/Afghanistan, NATO Operations Division
	Chairs: Patrick SENFT & Adrian BUEHRING, YATA Germany
3:00 p.m.	Coffee Break
3:15 p.m.	**Working Group Discussion**
6:00 p.m.	**Presentation of the Recommendations / Wrap-Up**
7:30 p.m.	*Dinner Discussion*: **Southbound! The NATO Strategic Direction South – Hub and cooperative security in the Mediterranean**
	Venue: IBIS Kitchen Berlin, Anhalter Str. 4, 10963 Berlin
	Speakers:
	Charlotte BRANDSMA, German Marshall Fund of the United States
	Michael NUNZIATO, LCDR US NAVY, NATO Strategic Direction South Hub
	Chair: Dr. Magdalena KIRCHNER, YATA Germany

Monday, November 12

10:00 a.m	Leisure Time
02:00 p.m.	**Conference "NATO Talk around the Brandenburger Tor"**
	Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Reichstagufer 14, 10117 Berlin
	please take enough time for enhanced security control before the conference
08:00 p.m.	*Get together at Gaffelhaus, Dorotheenstraße 65, 10117 Berlin*

Tuesday, November 13

Departure of Participants

PARTNERSHIPS OPEN BUILDING STRATEGIC DESTABILIZATION OPERATIONS DEFENSE ARTICLE EXPECTED MISSIONS CORE RECENT STRONG CAPACITY ATTAINABLE TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BECOME KFOR DECISION MEANS PREVENTING MAKERS NEAR CONTAINING BALKANS RESILIENT MEMBERS POLICY ISSUE CRISIS TASKS SECURITY STRATEGIES ISSUES GOALS EXTENT CRISES CONTESTED DOMAIN FULFILL ENABLE REACHED DOMESTICALLY ALLIANCE'S RSM FUTURE ADDRESS LIMITS PART NATO INSTRUMENTS TRANSFORMATION SURE SITUATIONS MAINTAIN NUMEROUS