



NATO TALK  
*around the* BRANDENBURGER TOR  
BERLIN

## NATO'S FUTURE 2017

# NATO's Future in an Unprecedented World

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## Introduction

“NATO is founded on the bond between North America and Europe, and in good times and bad, that bond has been unbreakable.”

Jens Stoltenberg 2017



The past year was everything but a bad one for NATO. A new and modern Headquarters was opened and Montenegro joining the alliance was a positive signal towards further integration of the Western Balkans and underlines NATO's ongoing commitment to its traditional Open Door Policy. Only months after EU and NATO generating a new momentum in cooperative security prior to the Warsaw Summit, significant steps had been taken, especially in the field of countering hybrid warfare challenges. On the Eastern Flank, Operation Enhanced Forward Presence entered a crucial stage: New rotational deployments of four multinational combat battalions each to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underline allies' reassurance efforts. And yet, intra-alliance developments and uncertainties about reliability and leadership have overshadowed political and operational successes repeatedly.

Indeed, the transatlantic community has experienced a dramatic shift. Concerns range from the current state of the international order and the relations between those mandated by the UN Charter to safeguard it, to a wide set of non-state and transnational security challenges. In addition, Brexit, the failed coup attempt and its aftermath in Turkey and the Trump presidency accelerated trends suggesting that the transatlantic partnership and respective institutions can no longer be taken for granted as bridges over such troubled waters. Our bonds are unbreakable but partners on both sides of the Atlantic need to step up to make sure they will also hold us together.

Almost three decades after the Berlin Wall fell, nearly a third of those one billion people, whose security is an essential priority for NATO, have little or no actual memory of the Cold War or political repression in Europe. Growing up in times of peace or distant wars, NATO's youth weren't familiar with vocabulary such as deterrence or collective defense until very recently, and only from history and political science classes. Moreover, economic uncertainties and high rates of youth unemployment limit popular support for increased defense spending and costly military missions especially among those, whose security might be at stake if the alliance fails to deliver on its promise to protect and defend its member states.

The Atlantic Treaty Association foresaw this issue in the early 90's and as a response, founded its youth division, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association or YATA in its respective 36 national associations. Since 1996, YATA has served as a leading international platform for young professionals in security and defense, working alongside our ATA seniors and fellow youth organizations to ensure that young professionals have a voice in the policy-making world and direct access to national and international officials.

With the generous support of the German Atlantic Association, the Federal Academy for Security Policy, and NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, YATA Germany holds this seminar for the fourth time, encouraging and deepening a transnational as well as the cross-generational debate on current security issues. It provides a platform for fruitful and enriching debates during the day and a forum for an exchange of ideas and mutual understanding, while bringing together more than 40 young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO as well as government officials from some 20 countries (NATO member and partner states). For this year's seminar, we have selected three core issues on NATO's current and mid-term agenda: moving forward with EU-NATO cooperation and reflecting on trends in European defense policy, addressing the changing

security environment in the Black Sea Region covering both NATO's Eastern and Southern Flanks, and proactively preventing the disintegration of non-proliferation regimes. All three of them share one essential feature: the necessity of NATO to broaden its scope, prioritizing threats, and developing measures to attain collective security in an era of uncertainty.

When we invited the members of YATA Germany to design the seminar agenda, and their national and international fellows to comment on the questions they posed, many have stressed economic, legal, social, and even philosophical features of security. You will find their perspectives and policy recommendation in the collection of essays in this booklet. We are thankful for their contributions as well as for our brilliant speakers and chairs that take the time to enrich our discussions with their expertise, insights, and curiosity.

Since the very first steps of this project, we have experienced remarkable support by many NATO International Staff and member state officials, encouraging us to continuously push and lobby for those that will shape and secure the alliance of tomorrow and beyond. In the end, however, only when we succeed in turning support into structural change we can make the alliance truly sustainable. Thank you all for participating so actively in this endeavor and your commitment to making young voices an audible and visible part of NATO's future.

Sincerely,



Magdalena Kirchner

*Spokeswoman*

*Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany*

**Dr. Magdalena Kirchner**, (@mag\_kir) is an Istanbul-based political scientist and conflict researcher, specializing in transatlantic security and crisis management, Turkey and the Levant and Chairwoman of YATA Germany since 2014. She currently is a Mercator-IPC-Fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center and a research fellow at RAND Europe. Prior to that, she was a Transatlantic Fellow at the RAND Corporation in Arlington, VA and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. Previously, she was a senior project coordinator at the German Atlantic Association and held research positions at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin and other think tanks in Israel, Jordan and Turkey. Magdalena studied Political Science (International Relations) and History at the Universities of Heidelberg and Aarhus and holds a doctoral degree from the University of Heidelberg.

## More than words? The Future of EU-NATO Cooperation

The opening of the new Headquarters and ongoing allied commitments to Enhance Forward Presence underline the readiness of its members to resort to NATO as the key structure for defense and security policy. Despite this, differences within the alliance continue to distract while a wide number of challenges require decisive and cohesive action. Given the current political uncertainties, an extensive co-operation between NATO and the European Union will continue to gain in importance. To what extent will common efforts, like those envisioned in the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, contribute to a more effective response to major challenges like terrorism? How will an enhanced role of the EU in NATO's cooperative security strategies shape the alliance's future?

### Panelists



**Petr Chalupceky** is the Head of the NATO and Multilateral Affairs Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP) with NATO's International Staff. Before joining NATO, Petr was the Deputy Ambassador of the Czech Republic to NATO and held several positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. He served as the Deputy Director of the Security Policy Department and of the Cabinet of the Minister and in the Czech Embassy to the United States, Washington, DC. Petr holds a B.A. in Economics as

well as a M.A. in International Relations from the Charles University, Prague.



Prior to joining the EPSC as leader of the foreign policy team **Sylvia Hartleif** was for nine years senior advisor to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag and secretary of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. From 2001 to 2003 she served as legal advisor to the Bundestag's delegation in the Convention on the Future of Europe on which she has published articles and co-authored two books. Her earlier professional commitments include the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO, the World Bank and the European Commission. A graduate of Harvard Kennedy

School, USA, and the University of Passau, Germany, she is a member of the German Council on Foreign Relations and a Marshall Memorial Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.



**Dr. Niklas Helwig** (@NHelwig) is a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations and Security (TAPIR) currently based at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. In his work, he focuses on German and EU foreign and security policy, EU politics and EU-NATO relations. Previously, he was based at the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS Johns Hopkins University in DC and worked as Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. Niklas was also a Visiting Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. He researched and taught at the University of Cologne and the University of Edinburgh, from where he received a double Ph.D. ('co-tutelle'). Niklas was a Marie Curie Early Stage Researcher in the Initial Training Network on EU external action (EXACT). He wrote extensively for think tanks, online blogs and academic journals, including *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *The International Spectator*, *Huffington Post*, *EurActiv* and *War on the Rocks*.

## Introduction and Moderation



**Alexander Schröder** (@Alex\_Schroeder) was born in 1985 in Magdeburg and serves as public affairs officer of the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). After his compulsory military service, he pursued a career as an officer in the German armed forces and studied from 2007 to 2011 successfully Political Science at the Helmut Schmidt University / University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg (HSU). Amongst other things

he became a member of the Academic Senate, member of the Faculty Council Economic and Social Sciences, a spokesperson for the Student Convention and editor in chief of the student magazine "Univok". He was the founding chairman of the university group for security policy at HSU and co-editor of the anthology "German and European security and defense policy" (published in 2013). From November 2011 to November 2012 Alexander Schröder was Chairman of the Federal Association for Security Policy at Universities. Since May 2013 he heads YATA Germany's regional group Rhineland-Palatinate/Koblenz and is a member of the leadership team in the regional group of the German Atlantic Association (DAG). From March 2016 to October 2017 he was Vice Chairman of the Support Association for Security Policy at Universities (FSH e.V.) and since May 2017 he is the Chairman of the Europa-Union in Koblenz.



## Young Leaders

### *How much reality in their promises? The future for EU-NATO cooperation*

*Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters (@nmep20)*



The latest political events, such as the UK's decision to leave the EU, US President Trump's ambiguity over NATO, the relations of Western nations with Russia in light of the on-going Ukraine crisis, and, most recently, the tests of nuclear weapons by North Korea, lets one wonder what security and defense cooperation actually effectuates. While the year 2016 has highlighted another step forward in the relationship between the European Union and NATO by signing the Joint Declaration at the NATO Warsaw Summit on 8 July 2016, it yet remains to be seen what has been achieved and what is achievable in the near future. It has become evident that co-operation and coordination of security and defense efforts are inescapable. Now it is time to turn words into deeds.

#### *EU-NATO Joint Declaration: A new framework for cooperation*

In the Joint Declaration both organizations call for 'new impetus and new substance' to their relationship, thereby attempting to move towards it a truly "strategic partnership". Yet, it remains to be seen how the Joint Declaration will actually translate into outcomes. In the subsequent Implementation Plan published in December 2016, the EU and NATO agreed on seven areas of cooperation: hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security and defense, defense capabilities, defense industry and research, exercises, and defense and security capacity-building. These areas are based on 42 articles that propose joint actions for further cooperation. But, is the implementation of the 42 proposals feasible and will both organizations stick to their words? And, what is the benefit of closer cooperation anyway?

While it has become evident that cooperation in military crisis management operations remains one of the biggest challenges due to institutional as well as political obstacles – institutional incompatibility and the Cyprus issue to name a few – cooperation seems to be more realistic in other areas. Most prominently, cyber security and hybrid threats are areas of cooperation where progress is most likely. The establishment of the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki is an essential move towards strengthened cooperation and coordination. In addition, the efforts in the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy and the on-going operations in the Mediterranean Sea illustrate fruitful grounds to conduct joint naval operations. Both organizations should therefore seek to enhance cooperation in these areas to reap the rewards.

#### *Status quo vs. closer cooperation: What is the future for the EU-NATO relationship?*

Jolyon Howorth<sup>1</sup> envisaged three scenarios for the future of the EU-NATO relationship: (1) EU member states' return to total dependence on NATO, (2) implementation of the proposals and duplication of capabilities but still some EU dependence on NATO, or (3) the 'Europeanisation of NATO' as the EU becomes a 'strategically autonomous' actor. More important, however, is the question whether the relationship enters into another phase of stagnation, thereby resting on their laurels of their present achievements, or whether they will actually be able to implement the proposals. In order to meet their outlined ambitions, the following recommendations are made.

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<sup>1</sup> Howorth, Jolyon, 2017, EU-NATO Cooperation: the key to Europe's security future, *European Security*, 26 (3), 545-549.



### Policy Recommendations

- Commending the EU and NATO for their efforts is appropriate, yet, they need to stick to their ambitions as outlined in the Joint Declaration and the Implementation Plan. A pragmatic and realistic approach to cooperation is the only option.
- Cooperation should be focused on viable areas, such as cyber security, hybrid warfare and naval counter-terrorism efforts. Past experiences have shown that these are not only in the interests of both organizations, but also areas of successful cooperative efforts.
- More interactions of members of staff on all levels – institutional, strategic and operational – is required to ensure complementarity and accordance. These should occur within a set framework and on a regular basis.
- Both organizations should seek to find ways of joint coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis management operations. This also means that both organizations alongside their members need to overcome national disagreements and unilateral moves.
- Member states need to stop double-crossing with both organizations and agree on a clear division of labor in which both the EU and NATO play an equally important share.

Preferably, the EU-NATO relationship will move towards the third scenario: The EU gains the status of ‘strategically autonomous’ actor but limits its security and defense tasks to low intensity conflicts, while NATO put a greater emphasis on collective defense and the high intensity spectrum in crisis management. Subsequently, both divide their responsibilities in line with their capabilities and strengths. In an optimistic light of further enhancement of this strategic partnership, it is therefore hoped that the EU and NATO will finally translate words into deeds and stick to their promises.

**Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters** is a PhD Candidate and Assistant Lecturer at the University of Kent, Canterbury. Her research focuses on the relations between the European Union and international organizations in the areas of security, defense and military crisis management. In her research she analyses in particular the role of member states in the EU-NATO relationship. Prior to her PhD, she interned in the European Parliament and worked for a Berlin-based non-governmental organization in the field of peace and development.

*Two Schengens are better than one.  
Why the EU needs free movement of Armies*

*Sante Fiorellini (@Xantbias91)*



In the 2017 State of the Union speech, the current Commission President Jean Claude Juncker reserved a special mention to the progresses in the field of common defense. In particular, he mentioned that a new European Defense Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation would be implemented soon, leading to a European Defense Union (EDU) in 2025, with NATO's full approval.

The EDU is a puzzling concept: many seem keen on the idea (the latest being Macron), but what it would practically entail is quite nebulous. The problem behind the EDU project is that, while the name is certainly catchy, as remarked by Commissioner Moscovici, to actually put concrete ideas on the table would require a level of ambition the EU has not yet reached. Indeed, the European Parliament legislative train schedule regarding the EDU shows that there are delays and uncertainties along the way. In addition to that, it should not be forgotten that, in the Lisbon Treaty, there are already many unused tools in the field of the Common Security and Defense Policy, ranging from the EU Battlegroups to the solidarity clause, to the unexplored potential of the mutual defense clause of article 42.7 TEU, which show that some capabilities are already there, but not the political will. In his most optimistic thoughts, Juncker probably aims at an expanded EU Military Headquarter and at some form of permanent EU army under direct Commission's control to start the EDU: surely, the current state of affairs would suggest more caution.

As such, one of the easiest and concrete steps towards improved cooperation, and one that would also improve EU-NATO relations, is the implementation of free movements of armies (including both troops and equipment) across the EU borders.

In 2017, General Hodges, Commander of the NATO US forces in Europe, tried to move his forces from Bulgaria to Romania in order to partake in a military exercise in the Black Sea, he was flabbergasted by the bureaucratic ordeal he had to go through to move troops. In effect, being stopped at the border for passport control could make preparation for military exercises awkwardly long. While there are exceptional procedures to be followed in crisis scenarios (i.e. moving troops to required areas without seeking for approval), the incapacity to organize rapid exercises in peace time impairs the credibility of NATO's effectiveness as a whole: according to officials, moving troops from Germany to Poland requires a five-day notice.

Still, while General Hodges was presuming that such a freedom of movement already existed, there are obstacles for a Schengen-like agreement for armies. First, some EU member states are not in NATO, due to their variously declined neutrality or non-alignment (not to mention the Northern Cyprus issue). These member states would likely face internal protests, should they be forced to admit NATO troops within their borders. Furthermore, in Finland there is still a debate concerning the contested validity of a 1942 treaty with Russia, where, in a nutshell, Finland agrees to never host foreign troops in its territory in exchange for Russia's recognition of its sovereignty. Finally, free movements could face material obstacles in certain EU states where infrastructures are not ideal for the movement of heavy equipment, and these states would wish to suggest which itinerary to follow in their territories.

Taking these caveats in consideration, implementing free movement of NATO troops in Europe is the first step towards the fabled EDU – at least to teste the EU's political will.

### Policy Recommendations

- Given that there would be very few associated costs, the discussion could be tabled with no drawbacks at the first Council of the EU in Defense format, to obtain the necessary political green light to go on with the project.
- In order to avoid issues with non-NATO EU member states, this Schengen-like area should be mandatory only for those states that are parts of both organizations. Discussing NATO-related issues at a EU level could be perceived as paradoxical; however, on the other hand, it would give a strong signal of the good relations between the two entities.
- The proposal should be tabled also to put some pressure on Russia: General Hodges' complaint received significant attention on many media close to Moscow, such as RT and Sputnik. Predictably, the initiative was portrayed as a desire of the US to threaten Russia. Even if that is not necessarily the case, it would prove that the North Atlantic alliance is ready to fight back, especially in light of the recent Zapad exercise.
- Perhaps also due to the current US' administration, the mood in Europe is that the US is no longer the staunch ally it used to be. Implementing a policy that appeases NATO's commanders is also a way to reignite the relations between the two – truth be told, at this point in time EU needs NATO more than NATO needs the EU.

**Sante (Alessandro) Fiorellini** is mainly interested in security from a EU perspective, especially in relations with Eastern Europe and the Middle East. After a Master's degree in Law at LUISS Guido Carli University, he obtained a MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe. His previous experiences include internships at the Italian Ministry of Interior and at the Embassy of Italy to Israel. He is currently working for the European Council on Foreign Relations.

### *EU-NATO Relations: Towards Long Term Enhanced Cooperation within the framework of 2016 Declaration*

*Shajwan Imad (@Shajwaan)*



The 2016 Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic treaty Organization, in the Polish Capital, Warsaw, is a clear wording of the parties' urging need to come hand-in-hand and work collectively on concrete issues. These issues range from countering hybrid threats; operation cooperation including maritime issues; cyber security and defense; defense capabilities; defense industry and research; exercises; and defense and security capacity building. This shows an advance level of ambitiousness the two organizations are maintaining together. It is a commendable step as it includes enhanced staff-to-staff sharing of time critical information between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the relevant NATO counterpart including by exchanging the analysis of potential hybrid threats, as well as raising awareness by and for the two organizations on existing and planned resilience requirements for the benefit of member states and allies, and lessons and recommendations to be shared to the extent possible for both organizations.

While the two organizations existed within relatively similar borders, hold to a large extent the same ideals, they kept a fine line in achieving their goals, in which they have succeeded in attaining for half a century, since their creation, in economy, health, external relations and security, justice and migration, and foreign relations. This is a lesson that should be kept in mind while drafting and envisioning future plans for the coordinated work. It shouldn't be forgotten that

both, as they might share a vision of security and stability for the EU member states and NATO Allies, they still carry them out in their own respective approaches. The two entities do not replace each other, nor do they cancel the vitality of the individual work of each.

### Policy Recommendations

- Emphasize within the two organizations to member states and partners the importance of taking part in the joint Declaration, as it is a joint effort and requires the cumulative effort of all parties involved. From that comes the importance of each member to allocate the sufficient resources and energy to support their staffs in participating in exercises and various cooperation within the framework of the Declaration.
- Eliminate institutional and bureaucratic obstacles that exist within different levels of member states and partners, which slows down and ultimately hinders reaching the objectives of the Declaration.
- Support member states and partners in including the Declaration in their respective states political agenda. This would help reduce the gap that is created due to political differences and keep each member state within their outlined responsibilities. Education, raising awareness, and allocating the right resources are some of the few ways this can be achieved.
- With continuous follow-up, the 2016 Declaration can be a start for a long term cooperation rather than a short term. By ensuring the objectives met to have a wider and long lasting effects that ensure this policy is resilient to new challenges and threats and protect the sovereignty of each organization.
- Support the implementation of the 42 proposals for the Declaration while maintaining the sovereignty of the member states and partners as well as the two organizations. The Declaration should not be a pathway to diverge from the two separate missions of the member states within the two organizations.
- Coordination, enhanced Intel sharing, mutual and coordinated exercises are few of the important aspects where the two organizations must definitely work closer together in order to achieve the 2016 Declaration proposals. The EU-NATO relations can definitely benefit from closely studying the successes of their first half a century, granted the different times, security and political environments the two are existing within presently and in the future. While the threats might bring the two entities, and respective, member and allies together to fight common goals, while maintaining individual sovereignties within the framework of the two organizations' agendas, the ambition must not be a direct reason to blur the line and create further confusion within the European region regarding the exact work of the organizations and the responsibilities of each state within.

**Shajwan Imad** is currently in her final semester of MA degree in Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations at the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin in a joined program with Hochschule Furtwangen University. Her interest in international relations started when she participated in the Iraqi Young leaders Exchange Program (IYLEP) in 2008 in the United States. This encouraged her to earn a B.A. at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimania in International Studies and Economy. During these four years, she was an active member of the Model United Nations and Debate Club and was chosen to participate in the annual Zeytun exchange program at the University of Amsterdam. Upon graduation she worked with the United Nations Population Fund and the International Rescue Committee. In 2016 she participated in YATA COAJE in Madrid, Spain which kept her interested in staying active and participate in further events by YATA in Germany.

## *The Renaissance of the NATO-EU Capability Group: Streamlining Multinational Capability Development*

*Dominika Kunertova*



This policy brief outlines recommendations for more efficient and coherent NATO-EU cooperation in terms of capability development (CAPDEV). Given the complex nature of the security environment and the significant advantages of multinational solutions to capability shortfalls, this brief argues for further development of a bi-organizational mechanism that would streamline, instead of stovepipe, multinational CAPDEV projects. It calls for reviving the NATO-EU Capability Group and enhancing the role of NATO's Defense Investment Division (DI) and the EU's European Defense Agency (EDA) to create institutional channels that would facilitate and systematically coordinate CAPDEV projects. Adapting these procedures and practices in both the EU and NATO should result in better synchronization between their industry outreach (bottom-up industry to governments) and their national approach (top-down governments to industry).

### *Context*

The volatile security environment in Europe drives states to maintain a full spectrum of defense capabilities. Yet, shortfalls of NATO and EU Nations are increasingly beyond individual national efforts. Despite multiple memberships, each nation has only one set of assets. The poor state of security and defense cooperation within Europe and between Europe and North America has been a long-term problem in the transatlantic space. Highly fragmented European defense industry, combined with uncoordinated defense spending of European countries, creates massive inefficiencies and interoperability problems. Export control and technology transfer regimes, together with a large investment gap in defense capability and an increasing technology differential between Europe and the US, disconnects the North-American market from Europe.

The joint NATO-EU Declaration during the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit has set the basis for NATO-EU cooperation. Later that year, both organizations presented a 42-point program of cooperation that included enhanced CAPDEV cooperation. Furthermore, given the recent initiative for stronger European defense, the modalities of security and defense cooperation in the EU have been changing relatively quickly. Implementing its new Global Strategy, the EU has developed a new Defense Policy Plan, including a European Defense Fund initiative. Its Capability Development Plan has been under review in the EDA to provide a new set of EU priorities in spring 2018. On the NATO side, the Alliance is about to update TADIC, a cooperative industrial framework, and start a new NATO defense planning process (NDPP) cycle.

### *Critique of policy options*

Several obstacles in both NATO and the EU characterize the current state of play regarding multinational CAPDEV projects. (1) The role of CSDP/EDA/PESCO, the EU's level of ambition, and the long-term availability of common fund resources remain ambiguous. (2) EU's evolving defense structures run the risk of duplicating existing NATO ones. (3) National focus dominates the NDPP. (4) States firmly protect their national defense industries. (5) Arguably, there has been a poor track record of cooperative programs. (6) Governments and militaries are unwilling to compromise towards a single, common solution. (7) The potential of the NATO-EU Capability Group has been under-used since its creation in 2003.

This brief argues that NATO-EU cooperation should be strengthened collectively through a more efficient and coherent bi-organizational mechanism for multinational CAPDEV projects. Better

coordination between NATO and EU could lead to the adoption of a holistic approach to acquire superior defense capabilities, make better use of states' defense money, assure interoperability, and achieve greater burden-sharing. The viable way ahead is to go multinational early on in defense planning processes.

### Policy Recommendations

- Design a security framework for exchanging classified information (a precondition for any strengthened NATO-EU cooperation)
- Revive the NATO-EU Capability Group to
  - produce joint R&D studies to identify together long-term technology trends and provide advice for procurement of future military capabilities
  - coordinate priorities for the capability packages and the resulting multinational CAPDEV projects aiming at joint capability acquisition
  - develop a dialogue on quality management, standardization, and inclusion of NATO certifications into EU defense practices
- Tie the EU's CARD with NATO's NDPP in terms of defense spending and investment targets:
  - redesign the NDPP national surveys to institutionalize processes conducive to multinational CAPDEV projects
  - enhance the role of DI and EDA staff as Capability Area Facilitators
- Socialize industry representatives through NATO's DI and EU's EDA to promote cross-border and cross-organization awareness of defense procurement opportunities
- Create a mechanism for participation and access to common funds for EU non-NATO and NATO non-EU countries.

**Dominika Kunertova** is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Montreal, where she studies the problem of allied contributions and NATO burden-sharing during the early Cold War. Holding a Master's degree in International Relations from the Charles University and a B.A. in Political Science from the Comenius University, she specializes in security and defense transatlantic cooperation, NATO-EU relations, Strategic and Security Studies, and interpretive methods. She published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security.

### *EU-NATO cooperation: why, and in which fields, should there be more love in Brussels?*

*Oliver Mõru (@OliverMoru)*

The challenges confronting both the European Union and NATO today are severe and complex, including terrorism, refugee and migration crises, hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, and a Russia, which is undermining the post-World War II international order, by breaking international law, treaties and agreements. The importance of EU-NATO cooperation, based on shared values and interests, has become more critical than ever. After the UK decision to leave the EU and Donald Trump's election as the US president, the debate over security and defense matters has been revitalized within the EU.





There are numeral reasons why the two organizations should work together. Firstly, the EU needs NATO for military security, especially territorial defense. The EU is not able to take care of its members' territorial defense, nor is it planning any time soon to take over the task from NATO. Secondly, the membership of the two organizations is overlapping: there are 22 out of 28 EU member states at NATO. Neither NATO nor the EU has own military assets, but they depend on national capabilities. This means that enhancing one's capabilities enhances another's. Thirdly, warfare is more latent and hybrid in nature than ever before. NATO and the EU are unable to manage hybrid threats alone. Europe's internal problems – like the migration crisis, the rise of populist and Eurosceptic parties – are fundamental challenges not only for the EU but also for the West as a whole. NATO needs the EU's contribution in building more resilient society that is able to resist enemy's provocations and subverted activities. Fourthly, the security of trans-Atlantic community depends greatly on the security of its neighborhood. The EU has several "soft power" instruments in its toolbox that could be used to enhance and support the "hard power" tools at NATO's disposal.

Lately, the EU and NATO have come to an understanding that they need each other in order to provide security for their citizens and member states. In manifestation of that, in the last year, the leaders of the organizations signed a Joint Declaration and established a common set of proposals with an aim of giving new impetus and substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership. Moreover, EU-NATO cooperation has not remained only at declarative level. Thus far, practical cooperation has taken place mainly in maritime domain. In July 2016, NATO launched a maritime operation Sea Guardian, which supports some of EU Operation Sophia's activities in the Mediterranean Sea.

Only first steps have been taken, and much more could be done and achieved when EU and NATO would work more closely together.

### Policy Recommendations

- Hybrid threats - EU and NATO have to fully align their responses to the hybrid threats from the East and the South. For many of the responses (military, cyber, strategic communications) the EU and NATO will have to cooperate closely, while in areas of the sole competence of either of the two (e.g. NATO's nuclear weapons and missile defense; the EU's energy policy and association agreements) both organizations should consult and coordinate to synchronize timing and impact.
- Cyber security – NATO and the European Union face similar challenges in protecting their networks against the growing threat of cyber-attacks. Information exchange is crucial to cyber defense. Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense signed in 2016 is a right step forward. Trust must be now built between the two organizations in order to exchange information on cyber threats, to share best practices on technical procedures and configuration of networks.
- Planning and procurement – Improvement should take place on two levels. Firstly, the EU member states should coordinate its planning and procurement procedures. The Coordinated Annual Review of Defense (CARD) could be used for that end. Secondly, the EU and NATO should coordinate their activities. In regarding timelines and outcomes, the EU could coordinate its activities with NATO's Defense Planning Process. Moreover, the new EU efforts to develop European defense industry and research should also be channeled towards the shared goals to address capability shortfalls and strengthen the single set of forces serving both organizations.
- Developing mechanisms and procedures for sharing strategic and situational awareness – Informal intelligence sharing among the member states of the EU and NATO that takes place is a no substitute for well-organized and regular sharing of information. More author-




ities should be given to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre and measures taken to establish secure lines of communication among the two organizations.

- Training and exercise – common training and exercises should be held with a special focus on interoperability, connectivity and engagement.

**Oliver Mõru** is working at International Cooperation Department at Estonian Ministry of Defense. His job is mainly related with NATO partner countries, especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Prior to that, he was working on a project basis at International Center for Defense Studies, where he conducted research on security situation in the Arctic. In addition, he has worked as trainee at Estonian Washington Embassy. Oliver finished his bachelor's studies at University of Tartu and master's studies at the Sciences Po Paris (Paris School of International Affairs). He has also studied at the University of Glasgow in Scotland, and University of George Mason in the US.

### *More than words? The Future of EU-NATO Cooperation*

*Angela Shaka (@angela\_shaka)*



The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded after the end of the WWII, is a group of twenty nine countries from Europe and North America having as a *raison d'être* the protection of the people and territory of its members. Since then, many things have changed and today's challenges seem more vague and less accurate to determine. Threats like terrorism, piracy and cyber warfare know no borders. In its signed Treaty and particularly on the Article 5, it is well specified that If one NATO ally is attacked, then all NATO allies are attacked, signaling in this way the collective defense nature of the organization as well as its unity when facing a threat or an attack.<sup>2</sup>

Today, NATO works with over forty partner countries around the world, as well as organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, to spread stability and security. Today, NATO has deployed four multinational battle groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, with the aim not of provoking a conflict, but of preventing it. Its borders stretch from Norway to the Baltic states, Poland and, finally, down to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Therefore, the task of defending its members seems naturally difficult and a huge economic burden which lately has become one of the major issues to be discussed among its allies.

Though, the Cold War seems far away, we are not over with possible threats and enemies of peace and order. The annexation of Crimea by Putin's Russia, caught NATO on sleep and even though it shocked the international community, it wasn't enough to ignite a unanimous and strong response to Russia's aggressiveness. In 1967, then-Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel drafted a paper for NATO in which he implored all member states to improve their relations with Moscow. But he also noted that this could only work if the alliance was able to simultaneously demonstrate its military strength. Today, the paper is seen as a model for the kind of *détente* that

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<sup>2</sup> NATO member countries, NATO, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed: 1. Nov. 2017).

is currently necessary between the East and the West.<sup>3</sup> The main points to be discussed regarding the EU-NATO future relationship, should be focused mainly on the following.

### Policy Recommendations

- More dialogue and less tension regarding West and Russia relationship. Clearly, an open dialogue with Russia is what many in the EU today believe is the key of forging a new era between the two counterparts which will eventually minimize their chasm.
- Apart from relaunching a West and Russia cooperation, financing NATO's budget need also new approach. More defense in order to strengthen cooperation among its member countries and secure the Organization's efficiency when it comes to potential threats.
- It's more than obvious that NATO's role as a merely defense alliance is coming to an end, challenging the Organization into adopting a more political voice and attitude. Should that happen, the North Atlantic Treaty relationship with the EU, will enter a new phase of political framework, possibly in that of protecting common shared values rather than of simply defending borders.
- More cooperation on a European level, consequently means an open door to countries which wish to join NATO, thus enlargement of the East countries, including Ukraine, would be an inevitable step towards that policy.

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### *How to make sure that European Armed Forces won't remain a pious wish*

*Alexander Schröder (@Alex\_Schroeder)*



Common European Armed Forces are a distant future vision and will change NATO structures as well. On that way, the EU has to solve six major challenges.

The convergence of the EU in many policy fields doesn't stop in front of external security. For several years in German politics there is a call for common European Armed Forces. This construction remains a pious wish unless six major challenges have been met. And then, the challenges for NATO structures will begin.

Only a common security policy strategy based on common security policy interests could build the foundation for such a European army. Only if the purpose of the armed forces is based on the shared values and interests of all EU states, common armed forces can function and be successfully deployed. Individual and special interests, e.g. by the Dutch and French governments due to their overseas territories and their colonial past, must be taken into account.

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<sup>3</sup> Konstantin von Hammerstein, How Can NATO Best Address the Russian Threat?, SPIEGEL Online, 24 May 2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-can-nato-best-address-the-russian-threat-a-1148796.html> (accessed: 1. Nov. 2017).

European cooperation in the armament market is advanced as the existence of European companies like Airbus or KMW-Nexter demonstrate. But there is still a long way to go to achieve a common armament market that could prevent know-how for the equipment and equipment of the army from being distributed asymmetrically. Tendering guidelines are not uniform and in the field of procurement, national caveats are still present. In addition, there are no pan-European export guidelines for armament technology. As this counteracts European integration, a common armament market needs to be established first.

A common security policy strategy and a common armaments market are the prerequisites for a common European procurement policy that is still in its infancy. Its potential, however, can be used to increase efficiency and resource use through similar equipment.

A European army requires integrated units, which can hardly be achieved without a common language. Although already the selection of such a lingua franca seems to be a cultural challenge, this step might be necessary to enable soldiers as well as the administrative staff of such an army to work together effectively.

Beyond the language, there are more great challenges for the staff of European Armed Forces. Who would be willing to be deployed all over Europe as it would be required for members of the EU Army, serving in a foreign language? Looking at the personnel selection for the various armed forces in Europe, it is obvious that respective demands tend to be larger than smaller. This will likely be expressed in higher salaries, which will rather resemble the payment of EU officials than national salary levels.

The units of the joint forces will have to be fully integrated and the occupational hazards of serving in the military will be shared equally, independent of their country of origin. It is illusory that any country can pick and choose certain tasks, squad groups or partial forces. Germany, for instance, will not be able to specialize in logistics, medicine or communication, while Poland, Spain and Greece would provide the troops for the infantry.

Particularly the deployment of the European Armed Forces for missions abroad would no longer be the decision of individual countries. It would certainly be decided on a supranational level, being it through the EU Parliament, the EU Commission or the European Council. If the interests of the EU would be concerned, its security would also have to be defended by Estonian soldiers in the Caribbean.

The more unification will be achieved in a common security policy European voice will become stronger in NATO. The US will remain the most important NATO member state, but the weight of Europe will leave its mark on NATO's institutions and adjust NATO policy.

For all these reasons, a common European Army is likely to remain a project for a distant future. It is unlikely to save public funding with such a transformation and the efficiency gains won't exceed the expenditure for the human resources. However, it might certainly become a reality because the above-mentioned challenges are solvable. Until then, the EU should be committed to the already existing cooperation possibilities. The already started partial integration of military units like Germany and the Netherlands practice it is a good exercise, but also clearly shows the challenges ahead. Before an effective, fully integrated EU Army can become reality, the EU needs to solve the following challenges:

#### Policy Recommendations

- The EU needs a common security policy strategy based on common security policy interests and on the shared values and interests of all member states.
- The EU needs to be establish a common armament market including uniform tendering and export guidelines as well as a common European procurement policy

- EU member states should agree on a lingua franca for integrated units, develop specific recruiting and human resources strategies
- EU members should commit to fair burden and risk sharing for personnel and tasks and minimize national caveats

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### *Racing to the "Finnish" Line of EU-NATO Cooperation*

*Michelle Shevin-Coetzee*

Advocating greater cooperation between the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a perennial endeavor. With twenty-two (or soon to be twenty-one) shared members and complementary missions, there is much common ground. Yet despite an important commitment to develop a stronger relationship – embodied in a 2016 joint declaration – strategic direction remains difficult to translate into operational coordination. The recent establishment of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, however, not only provides an opportunity for the EU and NATO to make progress on one of the seven areas for greater collaboration identified in the joint declaration, but also serves as a unique impetus to enact reform. Member states should transform hybrid-focused Centers of Excellence from academic institutions to coordination hubs.

Established primarily between 2005 and 2015, Centers of Excellence receive accreditation by – not direct funding from – NATO and serve two primary purposes: to offer expertise and conduct educational and training opportunities for allied and partner, including EU member state, personnel. From Joint Air Power to Military Engineering, these Centers of Excellence cover a range of functional subjects, but are often times understaffed and underutilized. For the two that relate directly to hybrid threats, Estonia's Cooperative Cyber Defense and Latvia's Strategic Communications, the latter acts as the "coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims." Yet with approximately thirty staffers and a focus on conducting open-source research, a discrepancy exists between this robust mission statement and the resources and tools applied to support it.



Certainly, the two Centers of Excellence focused on hybrid threats support NATO, conducting important analysis and eliciting respect for their work. However, the enormity of the challenge – in the form of a resurgent Russia and persistent terrorism – requires NATO to utilize its resources more proactively. That includes incorporating the EU more seamlessly into the work of hybrid-focused Centers of Excellence and reorienting their missions to serve as coordination hubs. This would enable these centers to coordinate potential responses to hybrid challenges and then elevate outstanding areas of concern to senior NATO leaders to take decisions. To transform Centers of Excellence in this manner, EU and NATO member states should begin by shaping the new Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in three ways.

### Policy Recommendations

- First, host flagship, not ad hoc, tabletop exercises. Occurring twice a year, these routine events should focus on hybrid scenarios that could arise across Europe and include a wide range of participants from both EU and NATO countries. To prompt organizations that might not otherwise interact with each other, the Center should expand beyond the usual representatives from member states' Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to include participants from the Ministries of the Interior, Economic Affairs, and Energy, as well as the national police. Designating the Center as a convening space that brings together both EU and NATO communities will serve as an important asset to member states.
- Second, staff EU and NATO personnel. Although the Center should rely on a diverse mix of employees in terms of background and experience, it should include rotational staff from the EU and NATO. Both institutions should sponsor a one-year fellowship that enables one official from, say, the EU's East StratCom Task Force and one official from, for example, NATO's Defense Policy and Planning Division, to work at the Center's headquarters. Doing so would familiarize additional EU and NATO personnel with the Center's work and facilitate initiatives with Brussels.
- Third, establish rotating presidencies. With the Center located in Helsinki, Finland will always rightly exert the greatest influence over its ambitions and priorities. However, the Center's Steering Board, which consists of representatives from the twelve participating member states, should appoint one country per year to work alongside the designated director. A more direct voice in planning would provide member states with a forum to put forward their own initiatives and have a platform for executing national priorities that can link in tandem with other countries.

Taking these three steps will help the EU and NATO engage with each other's staff, coordinate potential responses, and, perhaps most importantly, be better equipped to confront challenges. Shaping the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats into a forward-leaning platform for both the EU and NATO can prompt member states into transforming the two remaining hybrid-focused Centers of Excellence in a similar manner.

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## *Keeping the momentum of a future-oriented NATO-EU cooperation*

*Jan Jakub Uziębło*



The increase in NATO-EU cooperation is real and tangible. While new areas of cooperation are being identified, there is a persistent risk of losing the present momentum if cooperation efforts are not sustained, adequately resourced and anchored in a long-term political vision of NATO-EU complementarity.

The Joint Declaration signed in 2016, was a turning point in NATO-EU relations. The subsequent set of 42 common proposals for its implementation in seven key areas has created a rare opportunity to formalize a synergetic dynamic of NATO-EU relations. At the same time, this effort remains constrained by complex institutional realities, a lack of resources, and red lines drawn by NATO Allies and EU Member States. As with most initiatives, cooperation fatigue seems inevitable, unless tangible deliverables are achieved.

A careful look at the 42 common proposals agreed in 2016 reveals that, with a few exceptions, they remain at the level of either seeking to align already on-going efforts and programs, or simply developing mutual inter-institutional understanding, through the sharing of key documents or staff-to-staff workshops. While new areas of cooperation will likely be agreed by respective NATO and EU Councils in December 2017, it is important to adopt a future-oriented approach to NATO-EU cooperation.

The Joint Declaration implementation process has produced a tangible culture change in both organizations. At all levels, staffs designated as points of contact for each of the 42 proposals, work together on their implementation. Additionally, a broader network of professional relationships has been created between NATO entities and their counterparts within the EEAS, the European Commission and the EDA.

As recently stated by the French President Macron, a common strategic culture is what is missing in Europe. This assessment can also be extrapolated to NATO-EU relations. On the organizational level, staffs require continued socialization and exposure to cooperation, allowing them to form a common understanding of NATO-EU strategic goals.

Ideally, within agreed areas, staffs should assume cooperation from the outset, unless otherwise indicated. Indeed, some agreed proposals already seek to foster such common assessments. This is best exemplified by common proposals on topics such as Cyber and Hybrid Threats. While important, these are but two out of many possible areas for complementary and forward-looking NATO and EU action.

In this respect, additional proposals in the fields of Partner capability building in the shared neighborhood, have the potential to yield the most concrete deliverables, contributing to both organizations' agendas of Projecting Stability and building Resilience in the European neighborhood.

On the other hand, while increased focus on Counter-Terrorism related proposals should be welcomed, allowing for better alignment of future NATO and EU action in this field, expectation management is warranted in this field.

A set of concrete deliverables should also be expected as a result of the implementation of the Parallel and Coordinated Exercises Concept. Lessons learned from exercises hold the potential to improve the capacity of both organizations to communicate and exchange information more effectively in a crisis. A review of the legacy Berlin Plus arrangements could, in turn, be consid-

ered as a necessary deliverable in a longer perspective, provided the political climate allows for opening this sensitive topic.

In order to fully leverage the potential of both organizations, comprehensive mappings of EU, NATO, Nations' and Partners' activities in all cooperation areas need to be carried out systematically and the information gathered disseminated effectively.

Finally, if tangible deliverables are to be achieved, NATO-EU cooperation needs to be adequately staffed and resourced at the level of ambition. Put simply, cooperation cannot be seen as budget-neutral. Increased coordination, mapping of activities and continuous cross-institutional learning are resource-intensive activities, albeit ones with a significant savings potential down the road.

### Policy Recommendations

- Provide additional resources dedicated to deepening NATO-EU cooperation in all endorsed areas, foster continuous inter-institutional learning and networks.
- Conduct standardized and systematic mappings of all NATO, EU, National and Partner activities in the shared neighborhood, with a view to better coordinate activities contributing to building resilience and projecting stability.
- Develop Counter-Terrorism cooperation, while managing expectations of what both organizations can achieve in this field.
- Draw on lessons learned from the implementation of the Parallel and Coordinated Exercises Concept and informal staff-to-staff interactions, to review the communication and information-sharing mechanisms in both organizations.

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### *EU-NATO cooperation in the Central Mediterranean: Keeping human traffickers out, the U.K. in and dirty deals down*

*Paul von Salisch*

After the West's failure to stabilize Libya after NATO's air attacks in 2011 and the subsequent fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi, it took a surge in refugees coming from the African continent via Libya to bring the country back on the European agenda.

Even if last year marked an increase in EU-NATO cooperation in the Central Mediterranean and refugee arrivals via this route have dramatically decreased, a sustainable solution needs a significantly different approach. A consistent strategy should include a re-adjustment of the way the EU and NATO cooperate in regards to Libya.





### *Achievements made since 2016*

Several steps in the right direction should be acknowledged. The UN-backed and EU-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) has successfully pushed back ISIL.

With regards to NATO, the Joint Force Command Naples has taken the function of a “hub” to take care of intelligence, counter-terrorism and defense capacity building activities in the Alliance’s South. A focused operation involving NATO’s Operation SEA GUARDIAN and the EU’s Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMED) / Operation Sophia was followed through in August to practice coordination.

At the Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU have agreed to coordinate and cooperate on information sharing and logistics. Moreover, Italy and the E.U. have realized plans to train and equip the Libyan coast guard.

Bilateral steps may have been partly useful. In late July, France under President Macron invited the main rivalling groups to talks in Paris. In September, Italy announced it will set up a logistical base to help Libya manage migration at its Southern border.

### *Deficiencies that need to be dealt with*

Ongoing problems in regards to Libya need to be addressed as well. After the 2011 air strikes, NATO has left Libya to the EU. France and the United Kingdom remain the only two countries that provide air reconnaissance to the EU’s Operation Sophia. A looming BREXIT made the U.K. navy annul its contributions to EUNAVFOR MED.

Whereas EUNAVFOR MED has been in place since 2015, an EU coordinated border patrolling mission between Libya and its Southern neighbors has not been established. This idea was introduced in early 2017, but pursued only by Italy.

Short-sighted focus on reducing the refugee influx has misled the EU and NATO to insufficiently demand the respect of human rights in Libya. As a result of cooperating with and paying militias to stop refugees from continuing their journey, inhumane detention camps have been set up. Security partnerships announced at NATO’s Warsaw Summit to be realized together with the EU have so far been neglected.

Failing to demand the respect of basic human rights from the Libyan Coast Guard has among others led to beatings of refugees during interceptions at sea. Bilateral deals between Italian authorities and militias resulted in the latter fighting each other and thereby further destabilized Libya. The set-up of 29 detention centers also known as Departments for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) makes it increasingly difficult for migrants to leave Libya. In a comparably despairing attempt, the EU is offering Niger and Chad money to host migrants and prevent them from continuing their journey towards the North.

A reallocation of resources has the potential to reanimate NATO-EU cooperation in the Central Mediterranean. While NATO could take over some tasks of EUNAVFOR MED and support the EU via air pictures, the EU would thereby be able to invest the freed resources into onshore efforts and enhance its efforts in Libya’s neighborhood.

### Policy Recommendations

- NATO should enhance the mandate of NATO’s Operation SEA GUARDIAN and SNMG2, by
  - allocating more vessels of EU Member States to active support of Operation SEA GUARDIAN;

- fully shifting the SNMG2's operational area from the Aegean Sea to the Central Mediterranean and leaving the Aegean Sea to FRONTEX,
  - ensuring that both SNMG2 and SEA GUARDIAN provide a detailed air-picture to EUNAVFOR MED, thereby allowing the EU to produce fast-tracked analyses,
  - continuing to help nearby boats in distress;
- The EU should adapt the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED, by
  - ensuring EUNAVFOR MED focuses on capability development and training of the Libyan coast guard,
  - allocating more personnel to the training of the Libyan coast guard;
- NATO should increase its support to the EU in the setup of hot spots in Chad and Niger, by
  - assisting in the provision of a detailed air picture,
  - providing and researching background information for the purpose of asylum seekers' security screening;
- The EU and NATO could improve conditions at immigration detention centers, by
  - avoiding and annulling deals with human traffickers and militias,
  - pressuring the GNA to improve the application of the Geneva Refugee Convention to ensure respect for the most basic human rights norms in the treatment of refugees and migrants;
- The EU and NATO should pressure cooperation partners in Libya to respect basic human rights, by
  - threatening the Libyan Ministry of Interior Affairs that financial support for the training of the Libyan Coast Guard will be cut if human rights abuses continue,
  - ensuring that financial support does not contribute to the breach of the Principle of Non-Refoulement.

Although NATO should not shift its primary focus towards controlling the waters close to the Libyan territorial waters, enhancing the role of NATO vessels in this area of the Central Mediterranean would ensure that the U.K. and U.S. remain active in the region and allow the EU to take on stabilizing tasks that better fit its capabilities. With NATO taking care of hard security issues, the EU can realize stabilizing measures in Libya including border control and training of the Libyan coast guard.

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## Troubled Waters? Security in the Black Sea

The Black Sea is of strategic importance to NATO and its partners in the region. It does not only constitute a large part of NATO's border but includes hot and frozen conflicts on Europe's doorstep as well as the build-up of military forces. Russia's support for secession movements is complicating regional security cooperation in the areas of maritime and energy security as well as countering illicit trade and organized crime. What are the prospects for strengthening regional security and de-escalating tension with Russia in the Black Sea region? Is it possible for NATO to develop a coherent strategy for the region, given the diverse interests of its members and partners surrounding the Black Sea?

### Panelists



**Pavel Anastasov** is currently working at the NATO HQ as a senior officer within the Policy and Programmes team of the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP). Since late 2014, he has been working on policy issues regarding the Black Sea Region (taskings and assessments of the security situation in the Black Sea region) and capacity building programmes for NATO partners (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan).

Prior to joining the NATO International Staff, he has a vast experience from the Bulgarian government. He has been a deputy-minister of Defense during the caretaker government of Bulgaria in 2014, responsible for the national coordination in preparation of the NATO Wales Summit. In the period 2012 to 2014, he has been advisor to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, heading the unit for Strategic Policies, Analysis and Foresight. Between 2009 and 2012, Mr. Anastasov has been a parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Regional Development. In the period 2008-2009, he has been a policy officer within the Security and Defense policy department of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, working on Black Sea and Western Balkans security policy issues.

Mr. Anastasov has a M.A. in Russian, Central European, East European and Eurasian Studies from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in University College London. There he has researched on topics of nationalism and national identity, management of power and ethno-political conflicts in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. He has a B.A. in Political Science from the Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski", with specialization in European Integration. He has attended leadership and executive courses within Harvard Kennedy School of Government and London School of Economics and Political Science.



Since 2015 **Arslan Deichsel** works in the Policy Division of the Federal Ministry of Defense as desk officer for security policy with post-soviet countries in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. Beforehand he has been with the NATO International Staff (PASP Russia & Ukraine Section) and the private foundation Mercator Program Center for International Affairs. He graduated in Leipzig with two diplomas, in political science and public administration, and is alumnus of the Egon Bahr Fellowship, the Carlo Schmid Program and the Bucerius Summer School.



**Dr. Hanna Shelest** (@UA\_Analytica) is Member of the Board at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Head of the Board of the NGO “Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation”. Prior to this, she had served for more than 10 years as a Senior Researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine, Odessa Branch. In 2014 Dr. Shelest served as a Visiting Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome. Previously she has experience in PR and lobbying for government and business, as well as teaching at Odessa National University. Her main research interests are conflicts resolution, security and cooperation, especially in the Wider Black Sea Region and the Middle East, foreign policy of Ukraine. She has more than 50 academic and more than 100 articles in media published worldwide. She is regular presenter at international conferences and

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## Introduction and Moderation



**Sebastian Feyock** (@SFeyock) has been a Program Officer with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in the research institute’s USA / Transatlantic Relations program since February 2012. Prior to joining DGAP, Sebastian worked as a research and project assistant for several foundations and institutions in Berlin. Sebastian regularly appears on national and international media, commenting on German and U.S. foreign and security policy. His research focusses on maritime security.

Since March of 2016, Sebastian is a member of the board of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) Germany. In April 2015 he was selected into the think tank “Young Professionals in Security Policy” of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS). From 2011 to 2014, he was a member of the board of the German Association for Peace and Conflict Studies (AFK). Sebastian is an alumnus of the Bucerius Summer School. He studied political science and philosophy in Greifswald and received his M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies from the Philipps-University Marburg.

## Young Leaders

### *NATO in Southeastern Europe – the forgotten flank?*

*Victoria Ariel Bittner (@victoriaarielb)*



NATO needs to update its approach to defending its members' territories and Crimea's occupation calls for greater attention to its southeastern flank. NATO's approach to the Black Sea region is mixed, at best, mirroring the varying priorities and approaches of the littoral states. Romania favors a balance between the Baltic and Black seas, and has taken the lead in the region in terms of calling for a greater presence and increased capabilities in the Black Sea, whereas Bulgaria and Turkey are generally more hands off, preferring not to provoke a military buildup in this theater. These two different approaches make taking decisive, cohesive action difficult.

NATO continues to strengthen its presence in several theaters, including the Baltic and Black seas. Yet, despite the fact that the Black Sea has experienced the expansive aggression of one non-NATO littoral state, it is held that NATO's presence in the Black Sea is defined by a "tailored", rather than the "enhanced" presence seen in the Baltic. The "tailored" presence allows for individual initiatives like NATO Sea Shield and Black Sea Harmony and reveals that NATO does not have a coherent Black Sea Strategy and regards this theater as one where individual nations must take initiative. This approach does not allow the alliance to credibly develop its southeastern defenses, leaving space for non-alliance members to achieve more aggressive postures than would otherwise have been possible.

Russia's proven aggression throughout the Black Sea region and the increasing cleavages in the alliance project the image of a lack of a unified and credible front in the southeast, which will perpetuate current conflicts there, and passively allow for their quiet expansion. A united front in the Black Sea is not only important in terms of the water itself, but because developments on its shores have wider implications for the several regions bordering it.

The opening of the Multinational Division Southeast with its Force Integration Units and Multinational framework brigade is a good step, but these actions will remain fragmented and short-reaching without a unified re-evaluation of the alliances goals in this theater. There still must be more regular and institutional formats for the littoral NATO and even Partnership for Peace countries to strengthen their familiarity with one another, and interoperability, to be able to deflect any threats and respond appropriately to any aggression. The alliance must find a way for all of its members to define it the same way, and rethink the goals of its partnership projects, so that it can address its shortcomings and find ways to move forward.

In order to move forward and revamp NATO's presence in its southeastern sphere, several steps should be taken. First of all, in view of the redefinition of NATO's approach to the Black Sea, the "tailored" presence, NATO's relationship with Russia must also be rethought and redefined. On the one hand, a military buildup due to mutual suspicions is an unwelcome development; yet, on the other hand, Russia has shown itself as an aggressor willing to utilize use of force rather than diplomacy, especially in the wider Black Sea Region, and therefore this theater can no longer be downplayed. In this vein, the format of the NATO-Russia Council should be re-examined, while it is suspended in times of heightened tension, which detracts from the purpose of the institution itself. There should always be channels for military-to-military relations between NATO and Russia. Thirdly, the Southeastern Command Center recently put into operability should continue to be reinforced and strengthened. The approach to this center and the Black Sea, emphasized by its difference from the Baltic theater, should be reconsidered. The Command Centers



should be brought up to an equal footing and allow for interoperability. Next, there should be a regular trilateral format for joint naval exercises of the three littoral countries. Although Romania leads a battlegroup in this theater, regular exercises necessitating the three countries participation should be instituted. Lastly, exercises familiarizing NATO forces with those of the PfP countries in the Black Sea Region should be instituted on a larger and more regular basis. Black Sea Harmony, the Turkish initiative, is a good start, but this should be taken on a larger scale.

### Policy Recommendations

- NATO's relationship with Russia must be rethought and redefined
- The format of the NATO-Russia Council should be re-examined
- The Southeastern Command Center recently put into operability should continue to be reinforced and strengthened
- The creation of a regular trilateral format for joint naval exercises of the three littoral countries
- Exercises familiarizing NATO forces with those of the PfP countries in the Black Sea Region should be instituted on a larger and more regular basis.

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### *Reflections: Black Sea - A Scenery or a factor?*

*Iliana Dimitrova (@IlianaDi7)*

A crossroad between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the Black Sea region is not only a geographical section of crises and conflicts, coming from its Eastern and Southern strategic direction, but also an external border of NATO and the EU. Known to produce more history than it can bear, the Black Sea region has been home to unresolved territorial “frozen” conflicts such as those within Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as well as between Armenia and Azerbaidzhan (Nagorno Karabakh). The Black Sea region is also an energy hub and a transit route for oil and gas, which makes it all the more important for the diversification of European energy supplies. That presents an opportunity for cooperation between the Black Sea littoral states to overcome their often divergent interests, recognize the protection of the critical energy infrastructure as a common interest and consider NATO's possible contribution to it.

Despite its geopolitical importance, until recently the Black Sea region has remained rather on the periphery of European consciousness. Only due to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian





Federation has the region regained its geostrategic significance. Since then, the Russian intervention has caused a tangible shift in the geopolitical balance of the Black Sea region and has led to an increased Russian presence in the Black Sea, with Russia now controlling the Crimean coastline and the adjacent waters facing NATO and EU maritime borders. Moscow started a massive deployment of heavy military equipment, including advanced air defense systems, fighters and bombers with both conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. Russia's actions had important repercussions on the regional cooperation in the Black Sea region as well. After the annexation of Crimea, the regional initiatives in the field of security have been marginalized. Formats such as BLACKSEAFOR, the Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea and the Black Sea Harmony have been cancelled.

All these developments imply serious changes in the military and political balance of powers in the Black Sea region in favor of Russia and have the potential to turn into a strategic challenge for NATO.

#### *NATO on the Black Sea geopolitical chessboard*

Although NATO has long described the Black Sea region as important for Euro-Atlantic security, it was not until the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw that NATO leaders started regarding the region not just as a mere stage for Russia's actions, but as a real factor shaping the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and pledged to increase NATO's presence in the region through the creation of the Tailored Forward Presence (TFP). Most recently, a new Multinational NATO South-East Brigade has been introduced, headquartered in Craiova (Romania), aimed at countering Russia's potential threat to the Black Sea region.

With NATO placing the Black Sea region higher on its agenda, the Alliance might consider the following recommendations in order to reignite regional cooperation and reverse negative trends.

#### Policy Recommendations

- The changed security environment in the Black Sea region necessitates reinforcing a balanced NATO's Tailored Forward Presence through enhanced assurance measures and the inclusion of the Black Sea security in NATO's adaptation measures. These measures, however, should be proportionate, so that any possible arms race and unnecessary escalation would be avoided.
- NATO should strike a balance between credible deterrence and constructive dialogue with Russia while maintaining solidarity and cohesion among allies. In addition to implementing the Readiness Action Plan, NATO should leave political communication channels with Russia open and encourage Moscow to engage in transparency and risk reduction with regard to military activities.
- NATO should develop a coherent NATO strategy highlighting the strategic importance of the Black Sea that would prevent the establishment of Russia's "buffer zone" in the Black Sea region. The idea could be incorporated in NATO's Maritime strategy and highlighted in the review of the NATO's Strategic Concept, reflecting the current security environment.
- In order to strengthen regional security, NATO shall adopt a comprehensive approach to the Black Sea region based on cooperation with key partners committed to the security in the region (EU and OSCE) and on an enhanced political dialogue with non-NATO Black Sea countries. The Alliance shall foster the practical military cooperation through enhanced training and exercises and make full use of NATO's partnership toolbox, including the Interoperability Platform, the Trust funds, the Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative and the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package.

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### *Power Politics, Balances and the Black Sea: Current Situation in the Black Sea from a Historical point of View*

*Emir Abbas Gürbüz (@yata\_turk)*



The Black Sea region always appeared as a chessboard between European powers and Russia. After Russia gained access into the Black Sea by defeating the Turkish Empire in the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), European powers changed their attitude towards Russia and tried to suppress Russia's further advancement in the region. This essay identifies the roots and the early period of the NATO-Russia rivalry in the Black Sea Region.

### *A Troubled Eurasian Lake: Black Sea*

The Black Sea lies in the middle of the Eurasian territory which is surrounded by states who suffer from frozen conflicts. Historically, the Black Sea was a significant body of commercial waters due to the connection with territories of the deep Russian steppes. Since the Black Sea was the first target for Russian imperial causes in order to influence the Southern seas, the surrounding states have always acted as a buffer zone during modern history. Over time, the role of the Crimean Khanate changed to be a buffer state against Russian advancement to the south.

After the decline of the Turkish Empire, Russia "liberated" Crimea and established an "Independent Crimean Khanate" whose fate was to be annexed by Russia. The annexation of Crimea in 1783, shocked the western powers about Russian expansion. Furthermore, in 1812 Russia annexed Bessarabia (today Moldova) and in 1828 became the vanguard for the establishment of a Greek State in Peloponnese.

The roots of the European Military Alliance in the Black Sea dates back to 1853 when Russia's aggressive policy towards the Turkish Empire led to another war between Russia and Turkey. The war later on named as Crimean War, was the first joint military operation between European Powers to stop the Russian aggression against the West. The tensions in the Black Sea increased after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Even during World War II, European democratic powers and Russia could not find a permanent ground to sustain an alliance. Under the light of the abovementioned developments, Russian expansionist policy surrounding the Black Sea, pushed European States for further co-operation with each other to keep Russia under control. With the

foundation of NATO, European countries formed a military alliance against a possible Soviet aggression. In that case, Black Sea became a chessboard between Eastern Bloc and NATO.

### *Current Political Situation*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Soviet dominated territories gained their independence. Especially the independence of Ukraine constituted a huge damage to the Russian hegemony in the Black Sea. Therefore, Russia did not hesitate to intervene into domestic politics of Black Sea littoral states such as Ukraine and Georgia. At the beginning Russia, manage to destabilize Georgia and encourage the region of Abkhazia to secede. After the de facto independence of Abkhazia, Russia built military and naval bases in Abkhazia in order to achieve more influence on the region.

Sometimes Russia, used “soft power” to increase its effect on the region like signing agreements with the Crimean Autonomous Republic and Ukraine to build a military base. Similarly, Russia’s influence in Gagauzia and Transnistria directly affects Moldova and Romania’s foreign policy. Although Bulgaria is a NATO member, Russia’s deep influence at Bulgarian internal politics is undeniable. In 2014, Russia encouraged an “independence referendum” in Crimea to “liberate” Crimea from Ukrainian Rule just as the Russian Empire did in 1774. Shortly after independence, “Free Crimea” was annexed by Russia. Furthermore, Russia intends to extend its effect by establishing a so called “Novorossiia Republic” with the use of proxy forces. Contrary to that Allied countries in the region pursues their own interests especially while determining the relations with Russia.

### *Military deployment in Black Sea*

As of 2017, Russia controls the most strategic harbors in the Northern Black Sea and extends his military force in the region. Contrary to Russia’s conventional and unconventional war to gain influence in the Black Sea region, NATO countries did not actively react to keep Russia under control. NATO partner countries like Ukraine and Georgia were left without active military support to fight back Russian proxies. In an article published in Izvestia on 21 February 2017, former commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet Admiral Igor Kasatonov stated that “Russia has all the necessary resources, both material and moral, to maintain supremacy on the Black Sea. Our fleet has enough force to oppose NATO force in the Black Sea.” According to military analysts, in case of a military conflict, NATO forces in the Black Sea need 48-72 hours until deployment while Russian forces need 24 hours to engage. Those statistics reveals the fact that NATO needs more organization and logistics around the Black Sea.

### *Outcome*

From the historical perspective, today’s situation in the Black Sea is quite similar with the date 1783 when Russia annexed Crimea and advanced through the southern seas. In 1853, European powers managed to unite and fight back against Russian growing dominance. Due to lack of co-operation and coordination, today NATO fails to prevent such advancement. Today, NATO neither established a Multinational Battalions like in the Baltic Sea nor co-operated in social-economic platforms in order to fight the Russian hybrid war against Europe. In the light of the historical facts mentioned above, NATO needs to be more integrated more active in every field of life in Black Sea Countries to prevent infringement to his own sphere of influence.

### Policy Recommendations

- NATO should establish a Multinational Black Sea Battalion composed of Marine and amphibious units which will increase political awareness and co-operation of the member countries in the Black Sea.
- NATO should encourage member Black Sea Countries to strengthen their Naval Forces and organization skills in order to fight back Russia's increasing naval domination in the Black Sea.
- NATO should assign Liaison officers to the ministries member countries who specialize on hybrid warfare in order to observe foreign interference.

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### *The Danger of Strategic Outreach: NATO-Russia's Cooperation or Confrontation in the Black Sea Region*

*Natia Gvenetadze*



The geographical location of the Black Sea region has always played a significant role placing it in the spotlight of the interests of great powers. The region is important for its place in the cross regional trade and transit of goods and energy resources. For this reason, the significance of the region often happens to be discussed in light of others' interests. This essay will assess the potential for future NATO–Russia clashes or cooperation in the Black Sea for broader regional and global security.

Evolving security environment of the Black Sea region became more complex after Russia's annexation of the Crimea and its heavy military presence there. The balance of power in the Black Sea region is changing in Russia's favor. Russia well understands the importance of the Black Sea for the projection of its ambitious interests and uses an aggressive approach to control the region and become the dominant actor. Russia sees NATO's expansion as a threat to its national security and will do anything not to allow NATO becoming dominant within the region. However, NATO is already present in the region, considering that three of the region's states are NATO members. Russia's considerable military superiority and its aggressive policy in the Region were perceived by NATO as an alarming threat for the Black Sea Region and as a challenge for the whole Euro-Atlantic security. At the 2016 Warsaw summit, the Alliance recognized the strategic importance of the Black Sea and the need to enhance cooperation among members and partners. It also well recognized that current developments in the region bring serious challenges to NATO credibility. Therefore, the Alliance should intensify its engagement with its member and partner states in the region to enhance Black Sea security.

The Black Sea region today lacks a comprehensive regional structure. Despite being under the umbrella of one organization, namely BSEC, these countries belong to different blocks and have different approaches. In fact, due to the differences among them, the attention of the states of the region has been directed more outside the region rather than on the region itself. There is a lack of regional cooperation as well and countries do not identify themselves as one regional block. Given the limited cooperation of the littoral states, the Black Sea regional security is un-

likely to become stable soon. This does not serve the interest of any of the regional states except possibly Russia. In the absence of NATO's full engagement, it is Russia who shapes the future of the region. The current status quo in the Black Sea region is in Russia's interest. Turkey, other littoral states and NATO shall find feasible solutions that can address their common concerns. The lack of an effective regional cooperation platform is tangible and highly palpable.

The way that the West and in specific NATO reacts to Russia will also be determinant for the future course of action by Russia. However, there is no comprehensive strategy to deal with the Black Sea region and counter Russia's aggressive policy. Despite recognizing the importance of maintaining maritime security in the Black Sea, the NATO has yet to develop a comprehensive maritime security strategy towards the region. The Alliance should also consider that its eastern members are weak to counter Russia's military superiority in the region. They do not possess sufficient capabilities to address Russia's assertiveness and need support from the leading NATO members to modernize their armed forces and naval capabilities. At the Warsaw Summit, the Allies also agreed that the enhancement of the defense capabilities of partner countries is within NATO's interests and directly serves to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security.

The Western and regional response to the Russia's revisionist adventures in the region is insufficient and considerably insignificant. In light of the Russian heavy militarization, the space for cooperation between the Western bloc and Russia in the Black Sea region is increasingly narrow. In the absence of a decisive move by NATO and its regional allies, Russia can be expected to further pursue its policy of intrusion and effectively tarnish Western influence over the region. The picture is hollow and the Black Sea region may occur to become the epicenter of NATO-Russia's rift.

#### Policy Recommendations

- Intensify NATO presence in the region: NATO should ensure that Open Door policy is still relevant and cannot be shattered by any other side, thus, it is imperative for the Alliance to promote more active engagement of NATO partner countries in ensuring security in the region by conducting joint training, exercises and operations.
- Promote Regional Cooperation and enhance regional cohesion: The Black Sea region today lacks a comprehensive regional structure. Therefore, the region needs to identify mutually beneficial interests and create a format of cooperation to defend their stance.
- Need to develop a comprehensive maritime security strategy towards the region: To elaborate a common security threat assessment is necessary for the region. It is essential to have a clearly set objectives and course of actions to be implemented towards the region.
- Develop capabilities of the Black Sea countries: The littoral states and leading NATO members must increase their defense spending, modernize their armed forces and naval capabilities, and cooperate more intensively to emplace effective deterrents and defenses.
- NATO-Russia dialogue: The dialogue between West and Russia is existential to avoid further escalation of the conflicts within the region and damage of the whole security architecture. Both NATO and Russia need to find the ways to stabilize the regional environment and cooperate in terms of the maritime security of the Black Sea.
- Turkey's position: Turkey will need to find a balance in its cooperation with Russia and NATO in the context of Black Sea security.

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### *Less lines or how to socialize nations over security?*

*Mher Hakobyan (@HakobyanMher)*



The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought a lot of uncertainties and ethnic violence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, changing the security environment in the region. Although the two major regional players, the European Union and Russia, spent a relatively friendly decade in 1990s, the geopolitical rivalry posed serious security threats in the 2000s. While some former Socialist countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltic states managed to make a geopolitical and security choice towards the West, some others such as Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia remained trapped between Russia and the EU. The intertwined development dynamics of the EU and NATO irritated Russia's imperialist aspirations and the latter adopted a hard-power strategy in dealing with post-Soviet states. The 2008 war in Georgia and the 2014 war in Ukraine and the presence of Russian troops in these countries are the most vivid examples of the EU's limited capacity of conflict resolution which increases the need for political dialogue and NATO's involvement in the settlement of the tensions.

A general analysis of the developments of EU-Russia geopolitical relations shows their uncooperative and even antagonistic nature mostly determined with the difference in their foreign policy tools and the decision-making process. The EU is usually portrayed as a normative foreign policy actor, while Russia consistently employs a realpolitik approach. This power imbalance has led to stagnation of relations and a seeming deadlock. Also, the EU, despite its diversity, is a fairly coherent foreign policy actor, while Russia is a deeply divided country with authoritarian rules. Among other reasons, the above two explain why the room for cooperation between the EU and Russia has become smaller and smaller over time resulting in punitive measures towards each other over the Ukraine crisis.

The Russia-NATO relations can be described as mutually excluding and more vulnerable due to the broader scope of clash of interests. The Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) failed to become a decent rival to NATO due to its weak organizational structure and unfair policy. However, it has created a ring of Russia's allies resisting NATO's involvement in post-Soviet area. The Black Sea region has been affected by this rivalry the most. Especially after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into NATO in 2004, the region has gained crucial significance. With Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania as full members of NATO and Ukraine and Georgia as aspiring countries on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand, the Black Sea is an explosive area which urgently needs de-escalation.

The current deadlock in West-Russia relations can, nevertheless, be overcome through a lengthy and demanding political dialogue. Considering the importance of Russian energy resources for many NATO and EU member states and the unavoidability of people-to-people contact between Russia and the Western countries, a cooperation platform is needed to ease tensions between the two sides.

Firstly, NATO, the EU and Russia might try to launch a dialogue over border control not just in conflict areas. For example, Russian-Estonian border is heavily guarded which limits potential contacts between the two countries while there is much room for cooperation. For this purpose,

a joint intergovernmental committee can be formed to observe the possibility of facilitating border control and allowing closer ties between societies. Based on these observations, in some areas the border control can be liberalized which will in turn have positive effects on economic and social exchange.

Secondly, the social learning mechanism should be taken seriously. The Russian citizens (especially the young people) are mostly excluded from socializing with European societies which creates further dividing lines. For political reasons, EU- and NATO-driven educational and vocational projects are usually designed for East European and South Caucasian citizens, while involving also Russians might slightly promote understanding between, for instance, Russian and Ukrainian or Russian and Georgian young people. After all, every conflict is settled through dialogue between ordinary people especially when it is constructed on cultural commonalities.

Lastly, inter-parliamentary cooperation between Russia, the EU and its member states can provide tools for easing strained relations between governments. Promoting inter-parliamentary groups to advocate the peace process in Ukraine and Georgia might make a difference in the long term.

After all, human rights should gain priority over every political agenda. Democracy has proved to be the most desirable form of government and its further spread will one day replace secessionism with peaceful division and expansion with cooperation. Socialization and democratization are most viable tools to bring relative harmony in politics.

#### Policy Recommendations

- Establish an intergovernmental committee between the EU and Russia to implement monitor borderline areas and liberalize border control where possible;
- Initiate more inclusive projects and communication opportunities for Russia and EU citizens, especially young people;
- Establish inter-parliamentary groups between Russia and the EU and/or its member states to observe peacebuilding opportunities in conflict areas (such as Ukraine and Georgia) and initiate legal solutions to political tensions.

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## *Facing the tensions in the Black Sea theatre: Integration, dialogue and deterrence*

*Julian Pawlak (@JPwlk)*



The invasion of Russian backed forces and the appropriation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, resulting in the illegal Annexation in 2014, caused not only a shock in the European security system, but constituted the beginning of a new era of Russian foreign policy and marked a change in the balance of power in the Black Sea theatre.

The strategic importance of the Russian occupation has different reasons: maintaining Sevastopol's ice-free harbor, combined with the ongoing modernization and rearmament of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), could lead to the domination of wide parts of the Black Sea. An efficient BSF is further used for increasing interventions in the Eastern Mediterranean, supported by the use of Cyprian harbors and the Russian support base in Tartus, Syria.

Besides upgrading the BSF, the militarization of Crimea proceeds rapidly: the Russian military's deployments of land and air forces increased more than twofold in their size within the last two years. The combination with naval forces results in a vast build-up of A2/AD capabilities not only in the Black Sea area: they are projected through the Baltic up to the Nordic region, covering literally NATO's entire eastern flank. Russian potential has been exemplified, e.g. by the Caspian Sea flotilla targeting objectives in Syria with ship-launched Kalibr Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) in 2015. Capabilities are emphasized by the possible deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea as well as the soon to be expected completion of the S-500 missile system. No wonder that neighboring states, especially those facing frozen conflicts at their borders respectively on their territories, fear hostile interventions in their countries and societies. The potential need of a NATO intervention would be impeded definitely by the listing above.

In reaction, NATO increased its maritime presence in the Black Sea, regarding its importance "for the Euro-Atlantic security". Since the Montreux convention plays an eminent role in the basins' hierarchy, the BSF can't be challenged in a serious way by any other than the littoral states' navies. Following that, only Turkey, since the collapse of the Soviet Union the dominating maritime actor in the Black Sea, has a navy capable enough to do so (even though the impact of the recent military coup on its military competence in this regard remains to be seen).

The dissension with European countries and the EU, which finally led to a (still ongoing) diplomatic crisis, should not affect the alliance's security and proper duties. This is repeatedly confirmed by Turkish officials and underlined by the latest involvement in NATO's black sea exercise, Sea Shield 2017. Unfortunately, even the NATO alliance has been galvanized by the announcement of the forthcoming S-400 missile defense deal, which is not only incompatible with NATO's integrated aerial defense, but also a significant political approach towards Russia.

### *Countering hybrid threats and destabilization*

Fostering the incorporation of the states in the EU Eastern Partnership program in regards of good governance, anti-corruption measures and energy security are important cornerstones, regional integration and the anchorage of minorities in the civil societies the necessary amendments to create civilian resilience in unstable regions. Through the involvement of the OECD, multilateral cooperation of governmental organizations, private industry and civil society should be promoted.

To fulfil a comprehensive approach, diplomatic talks and the dialogue with Russia certainly should continue – but it is useless without the military potential and proper deterrence behind it. The first deployment of an Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Deveselu, Romania, supported by the U.S., marked a good beginning – even its installation is not caused by Russian activities. Growing defense capabilities of regional NATO member states should be welcome and not seen as provocation. An expansion of the Aegis shield, to be able to defend short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SR- and MRBM), complemented by the rotation of an NATO Aegis vessel, e.g. in Romanian territorial waters, as an addition to NATO's Tailored Forward Presence on the ground, would show that local concerns are taken seriously. Increased presence of naval forces and coast guard vessels would additionally deter organized crime as well as illegal migration, which is on its rise in the region as well.

In a final step, the political and diplomatic conflict with Turkey has to calm down to guarantee a stable and secure situation, not only for the region, but for Europe at all. The Turkish leadership does not want to be infantilized by other governments - through their grown self-confidence they want to be accepted as a strong, equal power. The missile system deal has been made in defiance of the lack of admission by EU and NATO countries while following national interests. NATO member states still have the chance to create fair offers for implementable, commonly used systems to give Ankara the chance to review their decision – both parties should use that chance. Only with Turkey, as an important and strong NATO ally, a stable and secure Black Sea is possible.

#### Policy Recommendations

- Facilitate and promote regional development for the Black Sea's littoral states, not only in cases of economy and industry, but further in social education and elucidation, what commonly encourages resilience and stability in the region.
- Increase the diplomatic approach towards Russia, but enhance deterrence and defense capabilities as well, e.g. through the extension of land- and sea-based Aegis deployments, supplemented by routine visits and proper projection of NATO's naval power.
- Accept Turkey's role as a (supra-)regional power to interact on a same level, put occurred doubts about common defense and alliance commitments aside and stabilize, with Turkey as an essential partner, a secure Baltic Sea region.

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## *On the edge of a Russian lake: A turning point for Turkey's delicate East-West balance*

*Francisco Javier Rodríguez Martínez,*



Over the summer of 2016 twin statements were made by high ranking Turkish and Russian officials that accurately portrayed the shifting balance of power between their two countries in the Black Sea in the years prior. In May 2016, President Erdoğan made an impassionate plea for a bigger NATO presence in the Black Sea, recalling saying to Secretary General Stoltenberg that "your invisibility in the Black Sea turns it into a Russian lake, so to speak." Four months later, after the Caucasus-2016 exercises, Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Gerasimov stated the following: "a few years ago, the combat capabilities of the fleet were in stark contrast with those of the Turkish navy. Now it's different." Gerasimov was effectively announcing to the world that the entire Black Sea had become another Russian A2/AD bubble, for in his own words, "the Black Sea Fleet has demonstrated the capability to destroy a potential enemy's amphibious force on the way, starting from the ports of embarkation."

Relations between Turkey and Russia have traditionally been politically strained, seeing themselves aligned with opposing forces in a number of conflicts, but economically and commercially intense. For the most part, all of this has been enough for Turkey to want to straddle the fine line between east and west in the recent past even as Russia invaded Georgia and annexed Crimea.

Now, this dynamic has changed. The lack of European support against the PKK, the American support of the PYD, Gülen's exile in the US, the disagreements between Europe and Turkey over the refugee crisis, the removal of the Patriot batteries along the Syrian border by Germany and the US, and the personalist and authoritarian shift over the past few years in Ankara, exacerbated by last year's coup attempt, have all led to Erdoğan's increasing distrust of the west. Turkey is now cozying up to Russia in turn. Even after the fall out in November 2015 over the shot down Russian bomber, Turkey eventually apologized and relations were quickly restored in 2016.

Turkey is now seeking to emphasize its self-reliance before his western allies, and Russia has been more than happy to help. A defiant Turkey has purchased S-400 missile systems from Russia that are both incompatible with the NATO missile defense architecture and would in most likelihood provide little to no additional information of use about the Russian system to the Alliance. There have been threats to rescind American access to Incirlik base. And Turkey has moved on from asking for further NATO presence in the Black Sea last year to participating with Russia on joint naval exercises this May.

### Policy Recommendations

- Keep relaying to Ankara the concern that it should also be feeling over its reliance on Russian technology for its own defense. In trying to attain more autonomous capabilities, Turkey runs the risk of eventually finding itself having paid a large sum for outdated Russian defense systems (the S-500 is on the way) that would still not be interoperable with NATO systems, in benefit of no one. Even if Ankara was to signal with this move its intent to evade the spiral model, it would still not want to be caught right in the middle.
- NATO membership is still in the best interest of Turkey, whether it wants to admit it or not. Turkey's constant exercise of Eurasian balancing may by itself make the way it conducts politics seem schizoid at times, but inner political instability during the past year is now threatening its commitment to key NATO principles that, coincidentally, would make Turkey a more predictable ally and allay fears among its NATO partners. Publicly pressure

Turkey to reaffirm its commitment to NATO and its core values and principles, warning Ankara of the unsavory consequences that for all parties involved a full on eventual clash could have.

- Honey and vinegar. Compromise in both sides is eventually necessary. Condition the transfer of NATO technology and know-how in the future in a financially viable way for all parties to Turkey's renewed commitment. It's a better deal, economically and defensively, for Ankara to achieve its sought after defensive independence through the possession of regularly updated NATO technology than to do so through a private deal with Russia. Independence in today's world may be better achieved within schemes of interdependence than by remaining a completely non-aligned lone actor.
- Act now where the interests of Ankara and NATO as a whole overlap. Work together on establishing an A2/AD bubble covering the Turkish sector of the western Black Sea that will minimize the projection of offensive power but will act as a deterrent.
- Keep very closely studying Russia's rather effective efforts after November 2015 to reestablish relations with Turkey and drive a wedge between them and their western allies in order to better know how to counteract them in a future and how to best conduct relations with Turkey.

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### *How NATO Should Engage in the Black Sea Region*

*Felix F. Seidler*

Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Black Sea region has gained an importance for the Alliance, which it has not seen since the Cold War. However, since NATO is now neighboring the Black Sea not with one but three member states, the Alliance has to adjust its actions and policies accordingly.



In consequence, the Black Sea region has to receive higher importance on the North Atlantic Council's internal political agenda and working with partner countries, in particular Ukraine and Georgia, remains essential. With regard to military activities, NATO has to expand its presence in the Black Sea region mainly with naval and air forces, but land forces may also play a role on Alliance territory for re-assurance missions.

At sea, due to Russia's military build-up in Crimea, even NATO's naval presence needs to be increased to re-assure member states and demonstrate commitment to the region. Moreover, NATO allies need to help Bulgaria and Romania to build-up more capable navies. In addition, NATO members should increase support for the Ukrainian Navy and help Georgia to rebuild a capable coastal force.

Moreover, as far as the 21-day presence limit per warship of the Montreux Treaty allows, NATO should maintain a steady presence of its Maritime Groups in the Black Sea. However, as neigh-

boring countries, Bulgaria and Romania are not bound to this legal limit for their navies' presence. Hence, NATO member states should check for opportunities to support the navies of both countries, which yet have room for improvement in their inventories. Member states may consider to hand over already operated, but still capable warships, or provide weaponry or intelligence systems.

Although unlikely to become a member anytime soon, Ukraine a natural ally to NATO – not least pushed into this direction by Vladimir Putin's course on Crimea and eastern Ukraine. However, with Russia's seizure of Crimea, Ukraine lost a significant portion of its' surface fleet. Thus, similar to the approach for Romania and Bulgaria, NATO members should check for opportunities to support the Ukrainian Navy with military hardware and training.

The same applies to Georgia, which lost all of its relatively small fleet in 2008 in the war with Russia. Although a relatively small Georgian fleet will not match any Russian capability, it is in NATO members' interest that Georgia does its share to maritime security in the east of the Black Sea; for example to tackle organized crime.

Finally, due to the Bosphorus, Turkey has an indispensable key role for any NATO policy towards the Black Sea. However, relations between Turkey and many European countries worsened over recent years. Hence, NATO's policy makers should try to maintain NATO's function as bridge for Europe and the Western community to Turkey.

In the air, NATO has established the Southern Air Policing in Romania and Bulgaria. With respect to the security situation in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions as well as with regard to Russia's assertive engagement in the Middle East, NATO should maintain these activities, which should include AWACS and other surveillance flights as well.

On land, NATO's recent decision to establish Black Sea region land-force, like the forward presence in the Baltic, is a reasonable idea to strengthen alliance solidarity.

However, it should not get out of focus that the ultimate aim of all NATO engagement – political and military – is to preserve peace and grant stability and security. Therefore, and to avoid unintended incidents, the Alliance should, even though Russia's trustworthiness remains limited, continue to seek political and military-to-military dialogue with the Russian Federation.

Once Russia departs from its current assertive policies in that Baltic Eastern Ukraine, the Caucasus, Syria and elsewhere, and returns to a stance where cooperation and meaningful dialogue can produce effective outcomes, NATO may then shift military assets from the Black Sea region either back to the member states or to other theaters, where forces are needed. In any case, working on a prosperous, stable and secure region should be NATO's leitmotif for the Black Sea.

#### Policy Recommendations

- NATO should increase the presence of SNMG and SNMCMG.
- NATO should provide support to Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Georgia
- NATO should maintain its Southern Air Policing
- NATO should maintain the Black Sea region land-force
- NATO should seek political and military-to-military dialogue with Russia

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## *Strategic Flexibility or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Being Out of SHAPE*

*Michael Sheldon (@Michael1Sheldon)*



The Black Sea littoral environment is a precarious environment for NATO, ripe with opportunities and threats for the future of the alliance. While Russian presence and strength in the Black Sea is undeniable, this poses only a limited threat to the littoral member states, presupposing a universal observation of article 5 throughout NATO. As of right now, the most imminent danger to NATO in the Black Sea littoral area is that it should meet the same fate as has befallen the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This fate is one of an alliance which has shrunk to be little more than a basis for military exercises and cooperation, with states unwilling to commit to collective defense. Certainly, this is not an issue which can be remedied through the organizational abilities of NATO exclusively, but steps can be taken in this direction.

The purpose of our alliance is not to coerce our member states into submission or compliance, but to serve as a fellowship with a mutual trust that each state is committed to defending the sovereignty of the other. As such, in times of uncertainty about the commitment of regional powers, it is imperative that we look to an adaptive and flexible strategy in which NATO can maintain its credibility as both a military force and an alliance between like-minded states.

### *Projecting strategic flexibility and Stimulating Resolve through Honest Consensus*

A strategy of flexibility should contain both rearward and forward elements, as such including and encouraging willing forward elements but at the same time reinforcing the rear, should their commitment waver. In the event that an honest consensus on this topic could be reached, the need for flexibility would diminish, and a more concise strategy can be adopted. For the strength of the alliance moving forward, member states should review whether their national interests have reached the point where they have become irreconcilable with the intrinsic values of NATO as a transatlantic alliance. At this point it would be in the interest of all parties if these member states were to utilize article 13 and exit the alliance.

Along this line of reasoning of optimization, an honest discussion among littoral states regarding exactly where they stand with regards to meeting the expectations of the alliance would be valuable. Thus, the alliance can move towards realistically maximizing its own potential in the Black Sea region. Acknowledging that certain countries are weary of aggravating Russia in already trying times, a review of the necessity of forward operations in the Black Sea may be pertinent. This could ease tensions not only with Russia, but also within the alliance.

### *Securing the Rear*

Focusing a naval strategy around denial of the choke point in the Turkish Straits is strategically speaking the most desirable option for the alliance. Maritime security operations within the black sea would almost exclusively be for the benefit of littoral member states. A well formulated naval strategy does not exist in a vacuum, but revolves around the goals of states ashore, and dominance in the Black Sea has historically enjoyed little strategic value for NATO.

There are little compelling arguments that the Black Sea should grow in maritime importance. That being said, the security of the territorial waters of any NATO member state has not changed in importance either, nor will it for as long as the spirit of our alliance lives. Pivoting tailored forward presence (TFP) towards a defensive focus may be the way to go, and may even lend it credibility.



### *Favoring Regional Cooperation*

It would be in the interest of member states to strengthen regional security cooperation to the point where it becomes an inherent part of doctrine. Indeed, this would need to be done in a manner where it is beneficial to the member states in peacetime, but any such gains would be immeasurably valuable in wartime.

Since the end of the cold war, the trend in NATO Command and Control (C2) developments had been further centralization in a move to incorporate all forces in a system determined by service rather than region. In recalling BALTAP, an early cold war initiative tackling a similar strategic dilemma as the one we face today in the Baltic Sea, one may recognize potential for success.

At a time like this such an initiative may be pertinent, and would carry a value more than simply developing a common doctrine under a unified command. It strengthens regional security while lowering the need for spending big on defense, avoiding raising tensions with regional powers. A regional maritime and coastal defense group of this manner would allow for littoral states to maintain a difference in force capabilities while still presenting a credible defense. This joint command is designed to stand on its own just fine, but could benefit by cooperating and conducting exercises with Ukraine and Georgia in the more distant future.

### Policy Recommendations

- Introduce a perception of Tailored Forward Presence (TFP), aimed at providing a tangible presence in acceptable locations to the Black Sea littoral members.
- Scale down naval operations in the Black Sea, strengthen them in the Aegean and Mediterranean.
- Introduce a regional Black Sea littoral command, initially focusing on regional joint services cooperation, but with the intent of later incorporating regional partners.

**Michael J. Sheldon** is a research associate at the Danish Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, and a recent graduate from Malmo University with a BA in Peace and Conflict Studies. Michael has previously worked with a number of think tanks and government institutions internationally, on the topics of security in Eurasia, Hybrid vulnerabilities in Scandinavia and rebel institutions in Donbass.

## Towards the Renaissance of MAD and the Disintegration of the NPT? Nuclear Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century

History has given nuclear diplomacy a rough beating in the early 21st century: key instruments to stem the proliferation of nuclear armaments have been undermined or deadlocked, whilst nuclear saber-rattling threatens to destabilize NATO-Russia relations. Whilst force modernizations have been commenced on both sides of the Atlantic, Russia has been accused of lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use to compensate for NATO's conventional superiority and of declaring Poland a possible target for nuclear attack. Are we witnessing the renaissance of Mutually Assured Destruction in NATO-Russia relations and more generally: quo vadis nuclear order?

### Panelists



**William Alberque** is the Director of the Arms Control, Disarmament and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC) at NATO. He has worked on arms control, non-proliferation, and safeguards since 1994. He began as a safeguards analyst with the Department of Energy before his reassignment to the new Material Protection, Control, and Accounting team, tasked with improving the security of highly enriched uranium and plutonium across the former Soviet Union. He managed security upgrades at eight Russian facilities and supported Projects Sapphire and Auburn Endeavor in Kazakhstan and Georgia, respectively. He performed consulting with nuclear reactor operators on security and safeguards before joining the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in 2000. At DTRA, he worked in strategic planning and communication, as well as WMD consequence management, before focusing on conventional arms control and small arms and light weapons full-time. In January 2008, DTRA detailed him to the Pentagon as the Treaty Manager for conventional arms control. In January 2009, he moved to the Department of State to support preparations for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference before joining the Office of the Secretary of Defense for policy in October 2009. There, he directed European security and conventional arms control policy, supported U.S.-Russia defense relations and strategic stability talks, and managed policy on the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the IAEA Additional Protocol. He began serving as the Head of the Arms Control Coordination Section in NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division in August 2012. He has a Bachelor's degree from Washington and Lee University and studied public policy at Johns Hopkins University. He has written a number of articles on non-proliferation, including a historical study of the small arms light weapons problem in Africa.



**Wolfgang Martin Rudischhauser** is the Vice President, Federal Academy for Security Policy, Berlin. Between June 2014 and 2017, he served as the Director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre (WMDC) in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at NATO HQ, Brussels. From 2007 to 2014 he served in Brussels first with the Personal Representative of the HR for Non-proliferation and Disarmament at the EU Council Secretariat, then as a Counsellor for Middle East and Gulf Countries, Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Political Section of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the EU, and from May 2011 until June 2014 as the Chair of the Working Party on non-proliferation (CONOP) with the European External Action Service. After entering the German Foreign Ministry in 1988, he held postings i.a. in the Economic and Development

Cooperation Division, the German OECD Mission in Paris, the UN Economic Affairs Division, the German Consulate General Shanghai, P.R.C., the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN and the IAEA, Vienna as a Deputy Head of Mission and in Berlin as a Head of the IAEA Unit in the Division on non-proliferation and disarmament.

Mr. Rudischhauser holds a Masters Degree in Economics from the University of Göttingen, Germany and previously studied at the University of Paris IX, France and the University of Mainz, Germany.



**Cristina Varriale** (@varriale\_C) is a Research Analyst with RUSI's Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Team. She specialises in non-proliferation, deterrence policy and disarmament diplomacy. Prior to joining RUSI, she worked in nuclear policy and research with the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA) and the British American Security Information Council (BASIC). Cristina holds an MA in Non-proliferation and International Security from King's College London. She has also been a contributor at IHS Jane's, and is a regular contributor to the media including BBC World News and Sky News.

## Introduction and Moderation



**Maximilian Hoell** (@MaximilianHoell) is a PhD candidate at University College London and a co-chair of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany. In addition to global power shifts and hegemonic orders, his research interests include cyber as well as nuclear policy issues. Max has represented the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom at strategic defense briefings at NATO HQ and SHAPE, and was a delegate to the Nuclear Security Summit process (Nuclear Knowledge Summit 2014) and the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. A former research analyst at the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom, his professional experience further includes

stints at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission, and the German Federal Foreign Office. He previously studied at Yale University as a UCL-Yale Collaborative PhD Student Exchange Scholar, and earned a University Diploma in International Nuclear Law from the University of Montpellier, a Master's degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics as well as a Bachelor's degree in Modern Languages (French and Spanish) from the University of Oxford.

## Young Leaders

### *Going the European way: Nuclear diplomacy matched with real resolve*

*Imre Bartal*



The Strategic Concept of NATO (2010) sensibly reaffirms the necessity of maintaining a nuclear dimension to the alliance. This is as much a matter of preserving the strategic balance between NATO members and potential adversaries as it is of providing a credible mechanism of deterrence.

The vast majority of NATO members are located in Europe and a new, stable nuclear order must therefore also give primacy to the European interest. The prevention of a dramatic proliferation in nuclear weapons on the continent is a core aspect of this common interest. Nonetheless the amount of nuclear capacity in Europe must be at the level where it can provide effective deterrence.

Nuclear sharing is a core component of this deterrence because it provides forward presence for weapons systems as well as enhanced visibility. So far, only the United States has provided nuclear weapons to allies in this framework. If the European members are keen to enhance provisions for their own security, it would be a wise step to convince France to also share nuclear weaponry. President Sarkozy had already floated the idea of joint control between France and Germany in 2007, which was rejected at the time, on the basis that Germany is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If President Macron is also serious about creating a common European defense system, such a project would be an ideal stepping stone. The mood is shifting in Germany too. The election of President Trump will, according to Defense Minister von der Leyen, require European nations to assume a greater responsibility for their own defense. To keep the U.S. on side however, this sharing project should be conducted within the framework of NATO, rather than the European Union.

A perennial topic of contention between members of the alliance and Russia has been missile defense. Moscow fears that a European-wide anti-ballistic missile system would upset the balance of nuclear capabilities to the disadvantage of the Russian Federation. This concern has been repeatedly voiced as NATO pursued constructions of its Ballistic Missile Defense. NATO claims that the system is purely defensive, aims to counter the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles across the globe and counter threats specifically from the Middle East. The conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran has however eliminated the previously perceived major threat emanating from the region. If the alliance does not reassess its threats spectrum in light of this development, then it should consider relocating one of the sites to a more strategically suited location.

In strategic terms, there is already a valuable arms control arrangement in place between the U.S. and Russia, the START Treaty negotiated under the Obama and Medvedev presidencies, which limits the number of active nuclear warheads that can be deployed by either country. President Putin has indicated to President Trump that he keen on extending it. This proposal presents the U.S. with a good opportunity to re-engage with Russia even as the conflict in Ukraine remains unresolved and can be used to establish a climate of greater certainty in terms of nuclear proliferation. It must also be remembered that Russia has violated the INF Treaty in 2017 by deploying non-treaty conforming cruise missiles in European Russia. This provocation cannot go unanswered but a diplomatic response may be preferable to prevent a further spiral of tension.

Institutional dialogue also cannot remain neglected. The NATO-Russia Council, an already existing forum of exchange, could learn from the European Union and incorporate regular exchanges at the lower administrative levels in order to further institutionalize the existing relationship and build trust.

#### Policy Recommendations

- France should launch its own nuclear sharing initiative with allies in Europe (Germany and Poland are ideal candidates) in order to begin development of a European deterrence system. This should not affect the U.S. strategic presence on the continent, a tangible and vital aspect of American commitment to European security.
- The United States should agree to an extension of the START Treaty as proposed by the Russian Federation but emphasize that such an extension must be linked to the strict observance of the terms of the INF Treaty.
- NATO-Russia dialogue should be re-intensified by adding an institutional layer that allows for exchange between lower-level civilian and military officials who can meet more frequently and discuss issues to be re-submitted to national decision-makers (the COREPER of the EU serving as inspiration).
- The North Atlantic Council should decide on the relocation of the Polish site in the framework of the Ballistic Missile Defense system to a member state with a more appropriate strategic position with respect to the Middle East, such as Greece.

**Imre Bartal** was born in Hungary and my family moved to the United Kingdom 2004, where I completed my secondary education. After my first experience of politics during the 2010 British general election, I elected to study political science at university, having been accepted to study Politics with East European Studies at University College London. I gained my first insights into security studies and international relations in the framework of this program and I developed an active interest for both fields. I moved to Germany (Berlin) in 2016 in order to learn the language and pursue my Masters Studies. After my arrival I joined the German Atlantic Society in order to proactively involve myself in issues of security and defense politics while learning from top decision makers. As of this year I will be studying European Studies at the European University Viadrina in Brandenburg.



## *Get Rid of It! Why NATO Should Abandon Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe*

*Julia Berghofer*



The practice of nuclear sharing is not only outdated today, but could also have serious detrimental effects on the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

Core elements of the global regime of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament are currently under stress. It is not about challenges, it is about possible failures. With a view to arms control, the nerve-racking yet still unresolved dispute over alleged violations of the obligations as laid out by the Intermediate-range Forces treaty (INF) of 1987 could ultimately lead to the breakdown of one of the most crucial bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and Russia that still exist today. A withdrawal of one of the State Parties is looming on the horizon and would almost certainly have damaging effects on the fate of the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) which has been thoroughly negotiated by the Obama administration and will expire in 2021, unless both Russia and the U.S. agree on extending it for another four years. Indeed, this is highly unlikely given the fact that President Trump seemingly regards any binding legal agreement as favoring the opposite side.

The situation is no more promising in the field of non-proliferation and gets really frustrating if you look at nuclear disarmament. The so-called Iran Deal, once celebrated as a success of nuclear diplomacy and multilateral negotiation is now at a stake, despite of many observer hailing that Tehran is in perfect compliance with its obligations. The U.S. is less enthusiastic about the agreement and is obviously preparing to decertify the treaty in the near future. The last Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2015 was a failure due to State Parties' inability to adopt a consensus outcome document. Although nuclear disarmament is one of the key provisions of the NPT, anchored in Article VI, there is no tangible progress at the moment. The contrary is true: all nuclear weapon states are currently modernizing their arsenals. Some, like the U.S. and Russia, are increasing their military budgets excessively to engage in a new arms race that is – unlike in Cold War times – less about numbers but about qualitative advancement.

Modernization will not only take place in the U.S., China, Russia and South East Asia, but also in Europe. Five European countries host nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing concept: Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey. Figures from 2015 say that there are about 180 tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) deployed at six bases.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. is currently modernizing its entire nuclear weapons enterprise and started a life extension program (LEP) for its enduring nuclear warheads, which includes creating a new model of the B61 gravity bomb.<sup>5</sup> The new type, referred to as B61-12 is far more precise than its predecessors and is able to strike targets with a very low yield, thus reducing the radioactive fallout, but in that sense also giving an incentive to actually use the weapon. The B61-12 will be deployed in Europe around 2020.

It is more than obvious that these developments can be extremely harmful for the NPT process. The modernization program has been announced a necessary step to keep TNW in Europe safe and secure, but the new type resembles more what Hans M. Kristensen describes as “all-in-one

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<sup>4</sup> Hans M. Kristensen, Upgrades At US Nuclear Bases In Europe Acknowledge Security Risk, Federation of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/09/nuclear-insecurity/> (accessed: 1 November 2017).

<sup>5</sup> Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?, Arms Control Today, 1 May 2014, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014\\_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT) (accessed: 1 November 2017).



nuclear bomb on steroids”.<sup>6</sup> This will undermine NATO’s credibility, since the alliance declared in its Strategic Concept 2010 that it aims at reducing the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and plans to seek security “at the lowest possible level of forces”.<sup>7</sup> NATO’s contradictory attitude towards TNW undermines any efforts to seek détente with Russia and enhance transparency and confidence building. But NATO is not operating in a vacuum – U.S. modernization programs in Europe will have implications for the bilateral U.S.-Russian relations and might open the door for an overall arms race. U.S. nukes could still be interpreted as an ongoing commitment to European security, even more after president Trump’s infamous blast at NATO. But it can be more credibly enhanced through other measures like deeper cooperation with allies, information sharing and joint planning.

### Policy Recommendations

- Therefore, first of all NATO member states should seek for a different approach and get rid of nuclear weapons in Europe as part of a deal with Russia, including for example a reversal of the Russian announcement in 2008 to regard Poland as a possible target for a nuclear weapons attack. It is thereby of paramount importance to avoid a situation in which Russia interprets the withdrawal of TNW as an act of European weakness. Rather, it should be communicated as fulfilling the preconditions for further arms control agreements over sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
- Second, we should be aware of the possibility that any use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre is not plausible, thus not credible: which one of the host-countries’ aircrafts would be willing to deliver a nuclear weapon, given that they all would face threat of retaliation if they do? NATO should make a rational choice and shift its money from extremely expensive nuclear upgrades to its conventional forces. By enhancing conventional military capabilities, it should in particular take into account the security concerns of the Eastern European countries who are at the moment the strongest supporters of TNW in Europe because of their exposed geopolitical location. Another issue for NATO should be the re-invigorating of the NATO-Russia Council at the ministerial level, and in this framework to address nuclear arms reductions as well as missile defense and the fate of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. It is highly unlikely that the actual tense situation between the U.S. and Russia (at least in terms of arms control) and within the NPT will improve without any substantial initiative. From NATO side, progress starts with not mirroring Russia’s action and with not acting out of anxiety but long term strategic thinking.

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<sup>6</sup> Markus Becker Otfried Nassauer, US To Turn Old Bombs Into All-Purpose Weapons, SPIEGEL Online, 6 November 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/us-modernizing-its-nuclear-arsenal-despite-criticism-over-weapons-a-932188.html> (accessed: 1. November 2017).

<sup>7</sup> Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, 20. November 2010, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (accessed: 1. November 2017).

## *NATO and the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Implications for NATO*

*Erica Borg*



Since Donald Trump was inaugurated earlier this year as the head of state of the United States of America, there has been an increased spark in discourse over the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Association. As a leading contributor to the alliance, American uncertainty over the future of NATO is of particular concern, especially when coupled with the possibility of a binding international agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons. In addition to Russia, nuclear proliferation in Asia and the Middle East has necessitated that attention be drawn to nuclear deterrence measures on a global scale. In light of the recent United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the notable absence of NATO members participating in voting – with the exception of the Netherlands – the question of whether NATO will be rendered increasingly obsolete if there is no nuclear threat is one that commands an answer.

While the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is not presently in force, the current discourse from predominantly non-NATO members is that such a treaty is necessary in order to maintain global peace. It should be noted that the likelihood of this treaty being passed is slim, as is the case with all internationally binding agreements, the treaty is only effective for ratifying nations and would be of limited significance if those possessing nuclear capabilities do not participate. With nuclear sharing being a key component within NATO's nuclear deterrence policy, it is improbable that this treaty would be ratified by any NATO member. By extension, it is also improbable that the treaty would be ratified by any opponents of the alliance, particularly those in pursuit of or those with existing nuclear programs. Probability aside, discussing the implications of global nuclear disarmament is a notion worth exploring. With nuclear weapons constituting a core component of NATO capabilities, there is a possibility that nuclear disarmament within the organization would put members of the alliance at risk from rogue states who may defy binding international agreements, and continue to advance their nuclear procurement agendas. But in the case of a true global nuclear disarmament initiative where the dissolution of all nuclear programs and weapons is overseen and verified by reputable external agencies, NATO members would not be exempt from compliance provided these sovereign member states agree to such an initiative.

To ease the possible transition towards nuclear disarmament in the face of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, NATO may consider the following activities.

### Policy Recommendations

- Strengthen conventional warfare capabilities and technology, ensuring this is done well in advance of the implementation of an internationally binding agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons;
- Improve intelligence sharing between NATO members and partners to facilitate the exchange of information pertinent to the alliance;
- Encourage the participation of NATO members and partners in nuclear disarmament and prohibition dialogue, this includes developing a unified and cohesive response that is reflective of NATO's values, priorities, and responsibilities to its members.

In the case of an internationally binding agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons, NATO would likely not be deemed obsolete. The threats faced by opponents of the alliance come in many forms that are non-nuclear; targeted attacks such as cyber-warfare and terrorism threaten the global security landscape and nuclear warfare is unable to respond responsibly to these issues. Ultimately, NATO was founded on the principles of collective security using conventional war-

fare and its members are amongst the top military powers in the world. Through increased intelligence sharing, NATO could be a lead contributor to reconnaissance and counter-proliferation operations, this would reiterate NATO's role as a vital organization to international security. Though nuclear prohibition would present significant challenges to the alliance, improving adaptability and cooperation within the partnership is essential moving forward. By adopting and enforcing treaty compliance measures, NATO members and partners would be assured that other members are equally in line with international law. These policy recommendations ensure that NATO can evolve to address upcoming security threats undeterred by policies adverse to the organization.

Although unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons offers a glimpse at what the future of diplomacy might hold for nuclear programs. To minimize opportunities for which to be regarded as obsolete, it is critical that NATO adapt its capabilities and responses to evolving security threats and be an active participant in the global security dialogue. By fostering meaningful discourse and collaboration within the organization, NATO can rely on its members to represent the interests of the alliance whenever possible. Consequently, a strong and unified approach will ensure that NATO's interests are understood and reflected within international foreign policy.

**Erica Borg** is an undergraduate student currently studying Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, British Columbia. In 2017, she became a founding member of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association's Canadian chapter and now holds the Secretary General position in addition to her role as Vice-President of the British Columbia regional chapter. Erica has a strong interest in studying Transatlantic and NATO Foreign Affairs as well as furthering her knowledge of French, Maltese, and German. Additionally, Erica is the Director of Development for The Voice of Ituri, a Non-Governmental Organization committed to supporting freedom of information and humanitarian initiatives in Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo.

## *The Doomsday Clock is Ticking: Contemporary Global Nuclear Issues*

*Simeon Dukic (@simeondukic)*

In 2017 the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin for Atomic Scientists set the Doomsday Clock to two and a half minutes to midnight, the closest it has ever been since the US and Russia tested their first thermonuclear weapons in 1953. The Doomsday Clock, as the name suggests, is a forecasting tool that warns interested parties about how close we are to destroying our world with our own cataclysmic technologies. The potential use of nuclear weapons and their proliferation play a substantial role in the setting the clock; consequently with recent destabilizing developments in the past year it is obvious why the editors decided to move the time towards midnight. At the moment, the two main nuclear powers the US and Russia are at odds in multiple theaters such as Ukraine, Syria, and the borders of NATO and Russia, particularly in the Baltic States and Poland. As tensions between the parties increase combined with lack of any meaningful arms control negotiations escalation in the use of nuclear weapons is very probable. In addition to this dreadful situation, North Korea has conducted more underground nuclear test and has fired ballistic missiles over US allies in the region making things even worse. Moreover, the JCPOA which was signed by the P5 + Germany and Iran to curb the country's nuclear program is in danger of failing after US President Trump has repeatedly hinted that he will not certify Iran's nuclear activities as required by the treaty.



In order to prevent a doomsday scenario, current policies employed by NATO member states, and particularly the US, need to drastically change. As mentioned above, the hostility between the US and Russia has drastically increased in the past few years. Starting with the annexation of Crimea, further enlargement of NATO, the war in Syria, alleged violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and most recently the Russian involvement in US elections the two states have failed to meet and address nuclear and arms control issues. At the end of the Obama administration and currently Trump's administration these issues seem to be significantly influencing the inability of the two parties to make new progress on strategic stability. Nevertheless, arms control negotiations should not be held hostage to the issues mentioned above. The US needs to overlook disagreement with Russia on other topics and find a common language in this field. Regarding North Korea, it is an imperative that the US avoids a military solution because this will result in the death of thousands on the Korean peninsula and Japan. Currently the North Korean regime has the capability to devastate Seoul and significantly harm Japanese society. Thus, the US favoring a forceful approach that could be inferred from Trump's public announcements would have devastating consequences. Finally, it is essential that the JCPOA is preserved to prevent Iran from going nuclear in the near future. Although the deal is not perfect it is highly important that the US continues supporting it, facilitate inspections by the IAEA and help Iranian authorities in its implementation. If the deal fails Iran could relatively quickly become a nuclear state, which can cause further proliferation in the Middle East, specifically on the Arabian Peninsula.

### Policy Recommendations

- US authorities need to isolate arms control issues from its current fields of disagreement with Russia. Strategic security is key for global stability and progress in this field needs to be continuous.
- The US needs to realize that currently it is in a phase of deterrence with the DPRK. Thus, any military options will have negative effects on both sides. Hence, this policy brief stresses that a diplomatic solution is the only approach to peacefully solve this crisis. Although at the moment it seems that the DPRK is unlikely to enter into negotiations, it is important that the US and partners discontinue the rhetoric of escalation, and engage DPRK diplomats and international conferences and other events to set the ground for a diplomatic solution.
- In order to prevent further nuclear tests, the US should cooperate with China, DPRK's main ally, in order to compel the regime to stop, or at least slow its nuclear program. The sanctions imposed on the DPRK after its first nuclear test in 2006 have proved that they are by themselves insufficient. China needs to strengthen the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions and similarly as with coal cut down on trade and investment in crucial areas.
- International efforts should be made to strengthen the catching of shipments en route to the DPRK that carry dual use items which can be used in delivery systems and nuclear weapons.
- Identifying and countering markets where DPRK nuclear weapons/knowledge could be sold.
- NATO allies, especially the UK, France and Germany should lobby in the US and point out the benefits of the JCPOA in order for the US to certify Iran's obligations and foster the treaty. The treaty should not be dissolved as it brings various benefits to NATO member states. First, under the JCPOA, Iran is subject to the world's most robust verification regime. The organization has almost doubled its inspections since 2012 in Iran, which are some of the most intrusive the IAEA has ever conducted. Second, the agreement limits Iran's low-enriched uranium stockpile and reduces enrichment of uranium to numbers sufficient for civilian use for 15 years.

**Simeon Dukic** recently graduated from the Intelligence and International Security MA program at King's College London. In 2015 he graduated from Leiden University College in The Hague with a BA in Global Challenges (Magna Cum Laude), majoring in Global Justice, a combination of international law, and peace & conflict studies. During his undergraduate studies he spent one semester abroad at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver studying economics. He started researching nonproliferation and arms control issues while at KCL taking modules with the Centre for Science and Security Studies. He also interned and consulted at VERTIC, a charity which deals with verification and implementation of international agreements mostly related to weapons of mass destruction. He has published articles in the organization's Trust and Verify journal and had written two briefs on port state measures and conventional weapons.

## *Instead of creating peace, MAD is creating hostility*

*Martine Enge (@martineenge)*



Nuclear weapons constitute an inherent danger to the human species and the planet. More states are publicly developing their own nuclear program despite international sanction systems. This development is due to a consistent value of the weapons supposedly having an inherent deterring effect. Nuclear states have withheld this old military doctrine as their most important defense strategy, naturally making other states interested in adopting this effective defensive strategy. In a world with a growing number of nuclear states this creates a vicious circle, pushing more states to starting nuclear programs to deter each other, lowering the threshold and normalizing the idea. To stop this trend and to keep NATO citizens safe, the first step is pulling all US stationed nuclear weapons from Europe and then shift focus from nuclear power to a progressive norm and value producer.

### *There should be placed doubt on the stabilizing effects on US Nukes in Europe*

The nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany was a move made in the realm and aftermath of the cold war, to create a deterring effect and prevent any escalation of conflict with The Warsaw Pact states. The international climate has though changed profoundly; the ideological rivalry is no longer a fact. Many of the former members of the Warsaw-pact is now members of NATO, and the leader, Soviet imploded.

The weapons are today rather a hinder in the way of creating a trusting relations to states. Russia has for a long time demanded US withdrawal from Europe. If NATO takes the first step, it could hopefully lead to a bilateral agreement making Russia pull their nukes close to Noatos borders. Proving NATO-states commitment to the NPT. Even unilateral downscaling of nuclear weapons in the area would contribute to prevent conflict escalation. It would make the citizens of the alliance safer, lowering the tensions with neighbouring countries and taking away the inherent danger posed by the nukes themselves, concerning accidents and terrorism. The focus is solely on nuclear matters, NATO would still be a strong military alliance, it is currently superior to Russia with conventional weapons and can deter traditionally.

The best way to prevent further proliferation is to decrease amount and range of the weapons. If NATO signals that they evaluate the weapons as a necessity to their security it will be hard to argue and deny any other country to develop the cost-effective and deterrent weapon. The out-placing is a way around the non-proliferation agreement, and other nuclear countries might find it tempting to do use the same tactic to extend their power. Easing relationships would create a safe platform for countries to cooperate, creating trust giving up the threat of mutual assured destruction. NATO would both gain credibility among its inhabitants and create safety within its borders.

### *International Norms*

Doing nothing, is the same as participating. The nuclear debate is highly relevant, and it seems that the thought of a world free of nuclear powers is disappearing and the thought of having nuclear weapons as a part of national defense strategy is increasingly seen as legitimate, this trend will not end without a dynamic opposition.



### *Prospects*

After interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya NATO has different reputations in different regions, but also within NATO-states. If NATO wants to stay relevant and be perceived as a legitimate peace preserver and peace-builder devaluing nuclear weapons could strengthen the alliance internal and external legitimacy. It is important to differ nuclear- from conventional arsenals. Even though nuclear weapons create more fear and could have a bigger deterring effect it is not worth the risk, at least if the threat is a part of creating and withholding hostile relationship between states, creating unnecessary tension. The nuclear weapons are a hinder in the way to ease tense interstate relationships. It is the Northern and Eastern part of Europe that will pay the consequences of the opposite, therefore small NATO member-states must take responsibility to prohibit this increasing hostility with Russia. The power of norms must not be taken for granted, they are what states make them to be. Engineering a comprehensive system of norms against nuclear weapons will change the development of proliferation.

### Policy Recommendations

- Withdraw all US tactical nukes from Europe
- Make a public statement that the alliance is not a nuclear alliance
- Focus solely on traditional military cooperation
- Work active towards a nuclear free world
- Creating a clear distinction between individual member state nuclear policy and NATOS

**Martine Enge** is a student of International Studies with History, at Lillehammer University College in Norway. Her interests in international relations are many, but after having courses at Antwerp University about Arms Control and Proliferation simultaneously as nuclear weapons became more relevant in the political debate; her attention has been drawn towards security studies, peace and conflict. During her studies she has been a part of starting a student website where they publish academic- and informative articles about relevant topics that interest us within IR. This year she is lucky to be the political editor, which drives her to be updated on foreign affairs and she gets to exercise writing and critical thinking outside the school. Her interest in studying as well as working with IR is to find smart and progressive solutions to difficult tasks that occur in a world of almost two hundred states.

## *The Future of NPT: A New Approach is Needed*

*Artúr Hőnich*



In September 1945 the use of the first nuclear weapon created a new milestone in the history of warfare. The most destructive weapons yet have been playing a central role and presenting a great challenge to global security ever since with several countries possessing such capabilities. The fact that during the Cold War both opposing superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union were also nuclear powers projected the shadow of MAD over the world. Though this worst-case scenario prevented the direct clash between the USA and the USSR, the realization of the danger in the further spread of nuclear weapons resulted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) coming into effect in 1970. Regarding international treaties the NPT has the second highest number of parties as signatories with currently 190 countries (behind the UN Charter).

The NPT is built upon three pillars: non-proliferation outside the five recognized legitimate nuclear-weapon states (NWS: USA, Russia, UK, France, China), a pledge towards disarmament by the NWS and the acknowledgement of the right of all Parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy within international cooperation. Nonetheless, there are four non-signatory states (India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan) and also the DPRK who withdrew in 2003. The stance of these countries unambiguously signals that the issue remains highly relevant. Furthermore, the keyword regarding nuclear disarmament still seems to be “if” not “when”...

Although in the course of more than four decades only nine state parties were suspected or proven actually guilty of non-compliance, the actions of non-signatory states (the successful tests conducted by India and Pakistan and also the uncertainty regarding Israel and the DPRK) had not only a destructive psychological effect on the NPT but also created regional and global security threats.

Since some countries are convinced about the value of nuclear weapons as cornerstones in their national security this explains the failure in the progress of disarmament efforts and how at five of the nine NPT Review Conferences parties could not agree on a final document which is clearly damaging the authority of NPT.

### Policy Recommendations

- Endeavouring to implement and enforce NPT to the fullest extent possible in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council to detect unannounced nuclear activities and materials. Emphasizing on verification and transparency and to report, interrupt and counteract non-compliance immediately.
- Paying special attention to the Far East. Though it is widely believed that “proliferation begets proliferation”, disparity in conventional military power is the main driving force behind nuclear proliferation. It is less and less likely that a neighbouring state would acquire nuclear weapons which leaves conventional arms as the tools for extending military power and influence. And exactly this is what creates the threat calling for nuclear proliferation as a pursuit for deterrence (this was behind the nuclear programs of France, Israel, DPRK and Iran). In that sense the Far East is particularly affected because of China’s growing conventional military strength and also by the current escalation in the DPRK. It is essential not to let the civilian nuclear programs of Japan and South Korea evolve to military level.

- Creating meaningful and constructive dialogue between Russia and the United States which two countries own more than 90% of the estimated global nuclear warhead inventories for further bilateral reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
- The joint ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). If the USA as the country that conducted by far the most nuclear tests would propose the joint entry with China that might create a chain reaction. Regarding Pakistan and India the ball is in the latter's court since Pakistan has already announced that they were ready for a bilateral moratorium on nuclear non-testing. At the moment it seems that India's desire for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group could be the strongest incentive to sign the CTBT but China's entry would also make India's decision easier.
- In a world amongst emerging and diverse threats keeping containment stable and dividing deterrence to political and military components. It is essential in preventing unnecessary conflicts that the military can be confined to react only to real threats. Furthermore, addressing how the NPT can deal with non-state actors who pursue acquiring nuclear weapons.

All things considered, almost five decades passed since the NPT entered into force. The Treaty has to adapt to a new world order and to the latest challenges the international community is facing, meanwhile maintaining the confidence in the norms and core principles of the Treaty and honouring the commitments that were laid out with the aim of general and complete nuclear disarmament.

**Artúr Hőnich** is studying International Relations at Corvinus University Budapest, he is also a member at The College for Advanced Studies of Diplomacy in Practice and at Mathias Corvinus Collegium specializing in International Relations. He is currently working as a research intern at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences RECENS research group. In April 2017 he achieved the 1st place with his research paper at the XXXIII. National Scientific Students' Associations Conference (most prestigious and renowned academic research competition in Hungary) in the Department of Economic History. In September 2017 he was awarded with the Distinguished Scholarship of the Republic of Hungary for his academic excellence. He holds a Comprehensive Certificate in the EU Non-proliferation and Disarmament course. His interests cover defense policy, Transatlantic relations and EU-Russian relations.

## Changing Technology and the Power Balance

Benjamin Patterson



Next year, the United States Department of Defense will be releasing the SM-3 Block 11B anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) for use in the Aegis defense system. With a higher burnout rate than ever before, it is predicted to be the first of its kind to hold a reasonable possibility of intercepting and destroying a nuclear weapon in wartime (Butt and Postol, 14). Sergey Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, has already voiced concern over the capabilities of the Block 11B, because it has the potential to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent (Butt and Postol, 14). If this happens, the Russians and other powers may feel that they have no choice but to commit to greater conventional arms expansion and increasing aggression to defend themselves.

During the Cold War in particular, nuclear arms were one of the only things (along with NATO itself) that truly preserved peace (Quackenbush, 741). This holds to some extent today. North Korea for example is more rational than they may appear. They likely realize that a nuclear strike would invite destruction (Kang, 496-497). In response, they likely developed nuclear weapons exactly because they are a deterrent to war (Kang, 497).

Of course this is simplistic. The chance of miscalculation and human error severely limits our rationality. Nuclear weapons are not safe, nor a guarantee of peace (ie. Waltz). Its claim is only that they preserve the current balance, and that upsetting this balance unintentionally, even coercively, through introducing new technologies may have serious diplomatic and military consequences for NATO.

### *Technology Threats to the Power Balance: Anti-Ballistic Missiles*

Our current Anti-Ballistic missile systems have been proven to work in laboratory conditions. However, the problem that is faced by them is their ability to differentiate between a real nuke and a dummy missile, and their ability to catch a missile before it splits in to multiple warheads (Sessler et al. xxi).

Today, the amount of nuclear arms held by the Russians alone makes it extremely unlikely that several hundred ABM's would seriously impact Russia's deterrence capability. Smaller nuclear powers such as North Korea will likely need to be far more concerned about this technology.

However ABM technology is changing. The newest missiles will not be completely effective, but they are the first to pose a threat. The concern should be that ABM technology may begin to be mass-produced in a way that does not consider the danger to the balance of power with Russia. If they were produced too widely, or production numbers were not published, NATO runs the risk of triggering an arms race with an insecure Russian or Chinese state.

Of course, hypersonic missiles, which will be addressed next, may even render ABM's obsolete. The purpose of this brief is to communicate that the next few decades will see changes in technology that may fundamentally change deterrence. As NATO, we must act now to identify these threats and find diplomatic solutions that ensure they do not create a climate of insecurity.

### *Hypersonic missiles*

Anti-Ballistic Missiles are not the only potential danger in the future. Another example of technology that may emerge in the next several decades is hypersonic missiles. These missiles will be five times faster than current variants, and will not be picked up on radar as quickly as current ICBM's. They will also fly far lower, and be far more maneuverable (Speier et al. IV). Their

speed in delivering nukes means that they could create a scenario where nuclear options must be made without any time for second thought (Speier et al. xiii). This is because the window to retaliate would simply be too small. Essentially, it could force countries in to being far more aggressive than they are now because they will not be able to guarantee their nuclear, or even conventional, response (Speier et al. xiii). A Rand report estimates that, today, we have a decade to ensure that this technology does not proliferate beyond Russia, China and the United States (Speier et al. iii).

### *Policy Implications*

Upcoming shifts in technology, and the dangers they pose, must be identified and discussed diplomatically before they are being deployed. This is particularly true in an area such as nuclear deterrence where any technology shift carries with it a danger of upsetting a delicate balance.

However NATO should also work to ensure that technologies that are proven dangerous to nuclear deterrence are not implemented without diplomacy. To avoid doing so is to risk a world where states are forced in to being more aggressive because of insecurity.

### Policy Recommendations

- Technologies that threaten deterrence balance should be ranked in terms of the degree of their threat. It should also be determined whether NATO should publish those rankings or keep them internal.
- Begin to treat ABM systems as effective now, in order to avoid dangers later, by signing limitation treaties with both Russia and China on the number of ABM's that each country may possess.
- Create a treaty limiting the production of hypersonic systems for all countries, and banning their sale internationally.

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*Back to the Blink or merely seeing the other side of the nuclear barrel? Dealing with a reversal in Russian and US deterrence strategy.*

*Andrea Solli (@tacoost)*



NATO is a political nuclear alliance with its core capabilities being deterrence in the shape of conventional forces and strategic and tactical nuclear forces.

However, while NATO has a united nuclear deterrence, it is not equipped or fashioned for a united conventional and high technological deterrence. This however, can be seen in the case of the United States. The United States is the only member that currently has a complete high technological conventional capability. During the Cold War, the United States made up for a lack of conventional strength with their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal- however today there is a tremendous defense superiority in favor of the United States. In the case of Russia, the opposite seems to be true. With diminishing conventional strength and economy, a concentration on nuclear deterrence emerged. Though this is again changing, it has changed Russian rhetoric and defense realities. Russian and American deterrence are, for the NATO alliance, vital to understand and constantly adapt to, as it raises new questions and realities for NATO security.

A balance and deterrence based on strategic conventional weapons seems profitable and new technologies, with equal potential for devastation, might replace nuclear on both sides. It is certainly true for tactical nuclear weapons. At the time however, we see the US, with its massive high technological military, in the high grounds of conventional weapons. Whereas Russian strategy has been increasingly relying more on nuclear deterrence than was the case throughout the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was estimated at the time to hold a ten-to-one conventional advantage over NATO. Though this was an overestimation from the US, it led to a development of arrange of plans with nuclear components and limited nuclear war. Today the US has no need to compensate. This however is the current situation for Russia, and NATO and the US face a reverse nuclear barrel.

Other than needing a re-contextualizing of rhetoric, it has real consequences for the NATO alliance. This could either mean the bar is lower for the US to intervene, in the case of Article 5, with a play board more advantageous to limited conflict without breaching the nuclear taboo. Alternatively, it could also mean that the bar is higher for the US intervention in the face of nuclear repercussions and escalation by a Russia, which is increasingly relying on nuclear deterrence.

Either way, it could predict a future of more limited warfare and potentially the dismantling of the deterrence of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). For NATO, a reliance on nuclear deterrence, through both strategic and tactical arsenal, somewhat hinders the realistic use of Article 5. While one may predict an increase in armed conflict under deterrence by strategic conventional weapons, it might strengthen NATO as a convincing defense and deterrence alliance. However, it is important to note that whilst facing nuclear capabilities and limitations in technological and conventional deterrence, NATO will always need to be a nuclear alliance as well.

This means that in the face of increased Russian rhetoric and reliance on nuclear weapons, NATO will need to continue to evolve and maintain its nuclear arsenal. NATO needs to open debates about the future of its deterrence in this evolving climate, whilst keeping up nuclear capabilities and systems in the North Atlantic and addressing rising issues of, especially US reliance on high technological capabilities.



### *Critique of Policy Options*

Changing overarching realities of US-Russian nuclear capabilities and strategies is a core concern of NATO and its role as a deterrence alliance. It is something needed close attention and understanding to continue a maintained effective deterrence and defense.

### Policy Recommendations

- Contextualize the issue and response to Russian rhetoric
- Contextualize or re-contextualize the current Russia-US positions and abilities. Understanding that this is not a nuclear crisis but a swap in capabilities is key bringing NATO away from unnecessary and impractical Cold War remnants in strategic thinking and planning.
- Re-focus on North-Atlantic and High North Security issues
- With current tensions and rhetoric, NATO, as a nuclear alliance, has to continue being realistic about missile transit routes and the core of NATO's Nuclear Strategy. This means appropriate systems and focus on the Arctic and High North to support the necessary continuation in strategic nuclear weapons.
- Open debates on the future of NATO's deterrence
- Tactical nuclear weapons and structures in Europe face modernization. Is modernization of nuclear structures on European soil appropriate or is a re-focus on NATO's conventional deterrence next to strategic nuclear weapons more feasible?
- Address issues of relying on high technological and conventional deterrence
- No matter the course of NATO's adaptation to changing realities of US and Russian deterrence capabilities, there is a need to address issues of high technological reliance facing adversaries designed to counter western capabilities and others, which will eventually surpass US and NATO's sophistication.

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### *Nukes in the High North*

*Haakon Stensrud (@haakonstensrud)*

At first glance the High North is a quiet part of the world where the northern lights are stunning and the temperatures run cold. In recent years, however, the High North has seen a significant increase in military activity just a few miles from NATO borders. At the core of this increased activity is a renewed international focus on nuclear deterrence and Russia's desire to protect its nuclear assets at the Kola Peninsula.

The Peninsula, located just miles away from the borders of NATO member Norway, has the highest concentration of nuclear weapons, reactors and facilities in Russia and the number of nuclear reactors alone exceeds any other region of the world. This, in combination with the fact that the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet of warships and submarines are located in the region made it so that the Kola Peninsula had immense strategic value for Russia's nuclear second-strike capabilities against the West during the



Cold War. During this period, the first ever Russian nuclear submarine and the first Russian submarine to carry ballistic missiles belonged to the Northern Fleet and it was estimated that at least sixty per cent of Russia's nuclear capability was based at facilities on the Kola Peninsula (Herd & Moroney, 2003).

Fortunately, Russian relations to other Western nations in the High North improved considerably after the end of the Cold War and as a consequence the strategic importance of the peninsula diminished greatly in the 1990's and 2000's. During this period several positive and constructive diplomatic milestones were reached with Russia's neighbors in the High North, including several joint naval exercises between Norway and Russia dubbed "Exercise Pomor" as well as the resolution of a long-standing delimitation dispute regarding naval borders in the Barents Sea between the two nations in 2010 (Melgård, 2016).

However, in recent years several independent sources have reported a significant military build-up of Russian forces in the High North not seen since the end of the Cold War. This military build-up under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin includes among others re-opening abandoned military, air and radar bases on remote Arctic islands, an increase in stationed troops and the creation of a special forces grouping dedicated to operating in Arctic conditions (Osborn, 2017). But perhaps most worryingly is the reported increase and modernization of strategic nuclear warheads in the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet – the number of deployed nuclear warheads and launchers reportedly increased from 473 in 2013 to 528 in 2014 - suggesting that the long-lasting period of disarmament in the post-Cold War period is now being replaced by a period of rearmament in the High North (Nilsen, 2014).

It's hard not to view this development echoing Russia's recent moves in the Black Sea, and perhaps especially the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, there are several factors in play that differentiate the security situation for NATO in the High North from the one in the Black Sea. Perhaps most importantly is the fact that NATO nations in the High North historically have strived for and enjoyed good diplomatic relations with Russia, and still do – although relations do have become somewhat more strained in recent years. In addition, there are few, if any contentious issues that could trigger a direct armed confrontation with Russia in the High North (Friis, 2017).

In fact, Norwegian defense planners consider only one truly plausible scenario for Russian aggression towards NATO nations in the High North, and that is a worst-case scenario where the international climate becomes so dysfunctional and hostile that Russia sees an acute need to secure a defensive perimeter around their strategic nuclear assets on the Kola Peninsula. Furthermore, in this grim scenario, defense planners theorize that it is unlikely that such a perimeter will be secured through an invasion or annexation of NATO territory, but Russia will instead attempt to paralyze the region from afar through air supremacy and long-range missiles launched by the Northern Fleet (Friis, 2017).

All things considered though, such a bleak eventuality is highly unlikely and also depends on the international political climate as a whole, and will as such not necessarily be triggered by local issues in the High North.

Russia's recent military build-up and modernization of nuclear assets on the Kola Peninsula, then, is rather a tendency of a more unpredictable state of affairs in the world in general and not strictly limited to the High North in particular.

#### Policy Recommendations

- Maintain diplomatic relations with Russia regarding the High North: Maintaining diplomatic relations and frequent communication with Russia regarding the High North has been fruitful in the past and will be so in the future as well. Maintaining diplomatic relations

both bilaterally and multilaterally can contribute to additional pressure for Russia to abide by international laws and treaties as well as avoiding misunderstandings.

- Adapt a calm and measured approach to escalation control: Russia under the leadership of Putin has proven to be unpredictable, and can become even more unpredictable still. As such, NATO has to be able to respond to potential provocations and challenges from Russia in a calm and measured manner. Any rash or exaggerated displays of power by NATO nations may be exploited by Russia in order to justify escalation. NATO should aim for a policy of escalation control and avoid responding rashly to blatant provocations. Such provocations are already occurring, with submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet firing cruise missiles in exercises close to Norwegian waters in the Barents Sea and several submarine sightings also indicate that Russia might be entering Norwegian waters clandestinely.
- Increased defense spending and modernization: NATO should pressure nations in the High North to increase their defense expenditure to the established NATO goal of 2% of GDP so that they are able to credibly defend their own sovereignty. Regarding the High North, the Russian Northern Fleet is currently challenging the status quo with new submarine technology. As such, new Anti-Submarine Warfare-measures must be prioritized by NATO in order to effectively detect and deter this threat.
- Focus on developing a credible but non-provoking defense: Northern NATO nations need to carefully consider how they can establish a credible defense sector whilst also not appearing aggressive or offensive to Russia.
- Increase political pressure for arms control and non-proliferation: Increase global pressure for responsibility on nuclear-weapon states and realistic arms control, nuclear disarmament and commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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## Dinner: German Foreign Policy after the 2017 Elections



**Olaf Böhnke** (*@politixs*) is a Senior Advisor for Rasmussen Global and has more than 15 years of experience as a foreign and European policy expert with a research focus on European foreign policy and Germany's role in Europe.

Before joining Rasmussen Global, he was director of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). During this time, he established ECFR as one of the leading think tanks in Berlin. Prior to this, he worked as Director of the Middle East program of the Aspen Institute Germany and served in total for almost ten years as chief of staff and senior foreign policy advisor to several members of the German Bundestag. Recently, Mr. Böhnke was the founding Managing Director of the European Policy Unit at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) initiating a high-level dialogue with European decision makers on the need for a more coherent China policy of the EU. Mr. Böhnke is an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and a visiting professor for political sciences at the Free University of Berlin.

Olaf Böhnke holds an MA in Political Science, International Relations and Economics from Freie Universität Berlin, and speaks German and English.

## Townhall: The alliance we (hardly) know?

### NATO's role in German foreign and security policy

Germany's role in international security has gained increased attention in the public debate since the annexation of Crimea and the emergence of the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" in 2014. After being labelled NATO's "lost nation" or even a "strategic blackhole" by critics some years ago, Berlin has assumed a crucial role in NATO's new strategic posture, including as lead nation of one of NATO's multinational battalions on the Eastern flank.

Yet, when asked in a Europe-wide survey about their knowledge about NATO in March 2017, more than 70 percent of Germans answered to feel rather unfamiliar with the alliance and its work. It seems as if a stronger German engagement in NATO also requires a more proactive debate about the role and purpose of the alliance, especially - but certainly not only - among a younger generation. What does #WeAreNATO really mean?

The event is part of the Conference Series "NATO Talk around the Brandenburger Tor" and co-sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Association. It will be followed by a light reception.

### Panelists



of Heidelberg and Aarhus and holds a doctoral degree from the University of Heidelberg.

**Dr. Magdalena Kirchner**, (@mag\_kir) is an Istanbul-based political scientist and conflict researcher, specializing in transatlantic security and crisis management, Turkey and the Levant and Chairwoman of YATA Germany since 2014. She currently is a Mercator-IPC-Fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center and a research fellow at RAND Europe. Prior to that, she was a Transatlantic Fellow at the RAND Corporation in Arlington, VA and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. Previously, she was a senior project coordinator at the German Atlantic Association and held research positions at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin and other think tanks in Israel, Jordan and Turkey. Magdalena studied Political Science (International Relations) and History at the Universities



**Ambassador Dr. Hans-Dieter Lucas** (@GermanyNATO) is Germany's Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. Before assuming this position at NATO Headquarters in July 2015, he served for four years as Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. In this capacity he was Germany's chief negotiator in the E3+3 talks with Iran. From 2010 to 2011, he was Germany's Representative on the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in Brussels. Ambassador Lucas entered the German foreign service in 1985. He has been posted abroad at the German Embassy in Moscow and has headed the Press and Public Affairs Section at the German Embassy in Washington, D.C.





**Dr. Gerlinde Niehus** (@GerlindeNiehus) leads the Engagements Section within NATO's Public Diplomacy Division. As such, she oversees NATO's Public Diplomacy engagements with audiences in all NATO nations and NATO partners countries across the globe, be it people-to-people, via partners and networks, or by digital means. She started her professional life as a TV and radio editor for public broadcasters in Germany. She then moved to a German think tank, focusing on international relations and a growing range of education and training programs with partners in Central and Eastern Europe. This work brought her to the European Commission, where she inter alia developed a communications strategy for the Commission's DG Information Society.



**Ambassador Tomáš Valášek** (@valasekt) is the director of Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on security and defense, transatlantic relations, and Europe's Eastern neighborhood. Previously, Valášek served as the permanent representative of the Slovak Republic to NATO for nearly four years. Before that, he was president of the Central European Policy Institute in Bratislava (2012–2013), director of foreign policy and defense at the Centre for European Reform in London (2007–2012), and founder and director of the Brussels office of the World Security Institute (2002–2006). In 2006–2007, he served as acting political director and head of the security and defense policy division at the Slovak Ministry of Defense.

## Introduction and Moderation



**Dr. Tobias Bunde** (@TobiasBunde) is a postdoctoral researcher with the Hertie School's Centre for International Security (CISP) and also serves as Head of Policy and Analysis of the Munich Security Conference. His research focusses on German foreign and security policy, NATO, and European security and defense. Tobias is a member of the Young Security Experts of the Federal Academy for Security Policy and a non-resident fellow with the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS). In 2014, he was one of fifteen NATO Emerging Leaders who were tasked with providing recommendations to then-Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in the run-up to the NATO Wales Summit.



NATO TALK  
around the BRANDENBURGER TOR  
BERLIN

## Agenda

### NATO'S FUTURE IN AN UNPREDICTABLE WORLD

Venue: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government,  
Reichstagsufer 14, 10117 Berlin

#### Saturday, November 11

1:00 p.m. **Welcoming Coffee and Opening Remarks**

1:30 p.m. Joint Walk to the Pier

2:00 p.m. **Politics on Water – Berlin Boat Tour**

3:30 p.m. **Working Group Session**

7:00 p.m. **Dinner**

Venue: Kartoffelkeller, Albrechtstraße 14B, 10117 Berlin

#### Sunday, November 12

9:00 a.m. **More than words? The Future of EU-NATO Cooperation**

The opening of the new Headquarters and ongoing allied commitments to Enhance Forward Presence underline the readiness of its members to resort to NATO as the key structure for defense and security policy. Despite this, differences within the alliance continue to distract while a wide number of challenges require decisive and cohesive action. Given the current political uncertainties, an extensive cooperation between NATO and the European Union will continue to gain in importance. To what extent will common efforts, like those envisioned in the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, contribute to a more effective response to major challenges like terrorism? How will an enhanced role of the EU in NATO's cooperative security strategies shape the alliance's future?

Introduction and Moderation:

**Alexander Schröder**, YATA Germany

Speakers:

**Petr Chalupceky**, Head, NATO and Multilateral Affairs Section,  
NATO

**Dr. Niklas Helwig**, Transatlantic Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

**Sylvia Hartleif**, Leader Foreign Policy Team, European Political  
Strategy Centre, European Commission

10:30 a.m. **Coffee Break**

10:45 a.m. **Troubled Waters? Security in the Black Sea**



This event is co-sponsored  
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Treaty Organization

The Black Sea is of strategic importance to NATO and its partners in the region. It does not only constitute a large part of NATO's border but includes hot and frozen conflicts on Europe's doorstep as well as the build-up of military forces. Russia's support for secession movements is complicating regional security cooperation in the areas of maritime and energy security as well as countering illicit trade and organized crime. What are the prospects for strengthening regional security and de-escalating tension with Russia in the Black Sea region? Is it possible for NATO to develop a coherent strategy for the region, given the diverse interests of its members and partners surrounding the Black Sea?

Introduction and Moderation:

**Sebastian Feyock**, YATA Germany

Speakers:

**Pavel Anastasov**, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO

**Arslan Deichsel**, Desk Officer, Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin

**Dr. Hanna Shelest**, Co-Editor-in-chief, UA: Ukraine Analytica, Kiev

12:15 p.m.

**Lunch**

Venue: Restaurant "Die Eins", Wilhelmstraße 67A, 10117 Berlin

2:00 p.m.

**Towards the Renaissance of MAD and the Disintegration of the NPT? Nuclear Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century**

History has given nuclear diplomacy a rough beating in the early 21st century: key instruments to stem the proliferation of nuclear armaments have been undermined or deadlocked, whilst nuclear saber-rattling threatens to destabilize NATO-Russia relations. Whilst force modernizations have been commenced on both sides of the Atlantic, Russia has been accused of lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use to compensate for NATO's conventional superiority and of declaring Poland a possible target for nuclear attack. Are we witnessing the renaissance of Mutually Assured Destruction in NATO-Russia relations and more generally: quo vadis nuclear order?

Introduction and Moderation:

**Maximilian Hoell**, YATA Germany

Speakers:

**Wolfgang Rudischhauser**, Vice President, Federal Academy for Security Policy, Berlin

**Cristina Varriale**, Research Analyst, Non-Proliferation Programme, Royal United Services Institute, London

**William Alberque**, Director, Arms Control, Disarmament and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC), NATO

3:30 p.m.

**Coffee Break**

3:45 p.m.

**Working Group Discussion**

- 6:00 p.m. **Presentation of the Recommendations/ Wrap-Up**
- 7:30 p.m. **Conference Dinner: German Foreign Policy after the 2017 Elections**  
 Venue: Oranium Corner, Oranienburger Str. 33, 10117 Berlin  
**Guest: Olaf Böhnke**, Senior Advisor for Rasmussen Global  
**Moderator: Dr. Magdalena Kirchner**, YATA Germany

### Monday, November 13

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- 9:00 a.m. **Conference: NATO Talk around the Brandenburger Tor**  
 Venue: Hotel Adlon Kempinski, Unter den Linden 77, 10117 Berlin
- 7:00 p.m. **Townhall: The alliance we (hardly) know? NATO's role in German foreign and security policy**  
 Venue: Hertie School of Governance, Friedrichstraße 180, 10117 Berlin
- International security and Germany's role in securing it had gained increased traction in the public debate since the Ukraine-Crisis and the emergence of the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" in 2014. Yet, when asked in a Europe-wide survey about their knowledge about NATO in March 2017, more than 70 percent of Germans answered to feel rather unfamiliar with the alliance and its work. What is the role and purpose of NATO in German security policy in relation to other organizations, what are Berlin's positions and priorities – and how should they be debated with the wider public?
- Introduction and Moderation:  
**Dr. Tobias Bunde**, Research Fellow, Centre for International Security Policy, Hertie School of Governance
- Speakers:  
**Dr. Magdalena Kirchner**, Chairwoman of YATA Germany  
**Amb. Dr. Hans-Dieter Lucas**, Permanent Representative of Germany to NATO  
**Dr. Gerlinde Niehus**, Head of Engagements Section, NATO PDD  
**Amb. Tomáš Valášek**, Director of Carnegie Europe

### Tuesday, November 14

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Departure of Participants





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