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Berlin, November 9-12, 2019

CONTENTS

NATO AT 70: WHERE NEXT?
WELCOME TO NATO'S FUTURE (SEMINAR)!

"The alliance was born in the heydays of U.S. hegemony, and became the beating heart of the security of the liberal global order. That order is fast fading."

Nathalie Tocci,
Special Advisor of High Representative
of the EU Federica Mogherini

NATO turns 70 at a time of new security challenges, growing conflicts, profound global restructuring and falling multilateralism. The security experts and policy practitioners are united in their prospects: in these times of global change NATO has to fundamentally adapt in order to survive. However, which changes should be taken first? What threats must NATO prepare for in the upcoming years?

During their annual meeting in July 2019, YATA Germany members discussed these questions in order to independently choose, plan and prepare topics for the NATO's Future Seminar in Berlin in November 2019. Since 2007, the **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA)** has served as a leading platform for young professionals in security and defense, working alongside our ATA seniors and fellow youth organizations to ensure that young professionals have a voice in the policy-making world and direct access to national and international events.

YATA Germany holds the **NATO's Future Seminar** for the sixth time this year, encouraging and deepening the international as well as the cross-generational debate on current security issues. It provides a forum for an exchange of ideas and mutual understanding while bringing together more than 30 young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO as well as government officials from some 20 countries (NATO member and partner states). The more than 120 outstanding applications from more than 40 NATO and partner countries leave us motivated to continue our engagement in YATA Germany and to inform young leaders about the importance of NATO and the transatlantic partnership.

This year, the following three topics were selected for the seminar, all of which share one essential feature: the necessity of NATO to broaden its scope, to prioritize threats, and to develop measures to attain collective security in an era of such uncertainty:

- How should NATO react to the changing environment of social media communication?
- What should the cooperation between EU and NATO look like in the future?
- What is NATO's relationship with North Africa and the Mediterranean Region?

In this booklet, one can find the perspectives and policy recommendations of our seminar participants in the collection of their essays. Nathalie Tocci is right, the global liberal order is fading rapidly, and insecurity is increasing. In this environment, the work of youth organizations and young leaders to raise awareness of the importance of the transatlantic security partnership is essential.

However, our work would not be possible without the great and generous support of the German Atlantic Association (DAG), especially Kamala Jakubeit and Nicoletta Backhaus, as well as NATO's Public Diplomacy Division (PDD). I also would like to thank all our active YATA members who devote their time and energy for our work and our targets. We are thankful for their contributions as well as for our brilliant speakers and chairs who take the time to enrich our discussions with their expertise, insights, and curiosity. Thank you all for participating so actively in this endeavor and your commitment to making young voices an audible and visible part of "NATO's Future".

Sincerely,

Veronika Fucela
Chairwoman of Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany

SEMINAR AGENDA

Saturday, November 9
Seminar Venue: Willy Brandt Haus, Wilhelmstraße 140, 10963 Berlin

Arrival of Participants

2:00 p.m.	**Welcoming Coffee and Opening Remarks**
2:30 p.m.	**Working Group Session**
5:30 p.m.	*Walk to hotel ibis Potsdamer Platz, Anhalter Straße 4, 10963 Berlin*
6:15 p.m.	*Walk to restaurant*
6:30 p.m.	*Informal dinner @Löwenbräu (Leißzigerstraße 65, 10117 Berlin) (tbc)*
	Get together
	Social and cultural program – 30ᵗʰ anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall

Sunday, November 10
Seminar Venue: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Schumannstraße 8, 10117 Berlin

9:00 a.m.	**Opening remarks**
	Giorgio Franceschini, Head of Foreign and Security Policy Division, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

9:10 a.m.   **Boon and bane of social media in a changing communication environment. How should NATO (re)act?**

Whether a Tweet by Trump or a NATO Insta Story – political opinions and strategic information are available as easily and quickly as never before in the history of mankind. The boundaries between propaganda, lies and harsh reality are all too blurred. The exact assessment of what information is trustworthy in the context of security policy is of high relevance. Aggressive behavior or tactical maneuver, war or peace? These questions are answered with the right information. How this information is produced, used and received by the population is therefore vital to NATO's survival.

What is the most dangerous development in the information space today? For who and why? Who is profiting? Are we truly entering a post-truth era? If so, what are the most significant changes it will bring? How vulnerable is NATO and other multilateral institutions to foreign propaganda? Are NATO's existing mechanisms sufficient to counter fake campaigns, or is there a need to adapt existing processes? Does deterrence still work in times of social media? How could it work?

Speakers:

Linda Curika, Public Relations Officer, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
Tabea Wilke, founder and CEO of the cyber security company botswatch Technologies GmbH

Chairs: Leo SIMON & Alexander SCHRÖDER, YATA Germany

10:30 a.m. *Coffee Break*

10:45 a.m. **The concept of a European Army and NATO – Useful addition or undermining contradiction?**

The President of France calls for combined European Military Forces, a national minister of defense becomes President of the European Commission and the American President demands an increase of investments in defense from the European states. On a first glance all signs indicate the path towards a European Army. However the reality also looks like this: From a defense political oriented perspective Europe seems like a patchwork - national reservations impede even the smallest steps towards military integration and defense budgets are only slowly increased towards the set goals.

The discussion of a European strategic autonomy adds up another ingredient in this boiling pot of conflicts and triggers controversial reactions on both sides of the Atlantic. How shall NATO position itself in this kitchen of controversies? Would it be reasonable to contain the efforts towards European military integration before they really took off, to prevent parallel structures? Or do we have to support these movements, so that the European Union can prospectively speak with one voice in defense matters? And what are the political and legal measures that can be taken to implement the answers to these questions?

Speakers:

Eric Povel, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Officer for Germany
Erik R. Larsen, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Assistant Army Attaché
Dr. Georgios Kolliarakis, Advisor for Research Strategy*,* German Council for Foreign Policy, Berlin

Chairs: Pieter BRANDT & Maximilian KRETSCHMANN, YATA Germany

12:15 p.m. *Lunch*

1:30 p.m.	**Troubled Waters? NATO's relationship with North Africa and the Mediterranean Region**

NATO's Southern flank lies on the natural border of the Mediterranean Sea and poses a set of unique challenges to the alliance. The region calls for a policy response framework that reflects the heterogeneity and instability of its landscape. Libya and Syria are the examples, which have defined the insecurity of the region, yet few solutions have been proposed so far. NATO's interventions in both countries, with an aim to protect civilians from Gaddafi regime on the one hand and to contribute to the international coalition fighting ISIS on the other, have created a responsibility on NATO's part for the future of these societies. Indeed, it is in the interest of NATO member states to build on existing foundations and revisit the questions of priorities in this region. The migration flows triggered on land and sea by the failed states are a persistent challenge with direct domestic political consequences for European members of the alliance. The current situation poses several questions about NATO's ability to contribute to peace-building efforts

What are the options for lasting conflict resolution in the Mediterranean basin, and how can NATO contribute? What are the priorities of the alliance in the region? What are the possibilities for cooperation between the EU, as a major regional actor, and NATO? How should the policy response reflect the heterogeneity of the region?

Speakers:

Sebastian Feyock, former board member of YATA Germany
Paul Ritacco, President at CFS Compliance, former Chief of Staff for Republican Mike Fitzpatrick

Chairs: Imre BARTAL & Patrick SENFT, YATA Germany

3:00 p.m.	*Coffee Break*
3:30 p.m.	**Working Group Discussion**
6:00 p.m.	**Presentation of the Recommendations / Wrap-Up**
7:30 p.m.	***Food for Thought: British Perspective on the Future of NATO and Security Cooperation***
	Cooperation with the British Embassy in Berlin
	Representative of the British Government
	Networking Dinner

British Embassy
Berlin

Monday, November 11

Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Reichstagufer 14, 10117 Berlin

09:30 a.m.	**Conference NATO Talk around the Brandenburger Tor** **NATO at 70 – Not Time to Retire** *Press and Information Office of the Federal Government*
06:30 p.m.	**The East Heading West – The Case of Georgia's NATO Integration. What is Next?** *Literaturhaus Berlin: Kaminzimmer, Fasanenstraße 23, 10719 Berlin*

Twenty years ago, NATO's first eastward enlargement with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became a hallmark of its efforts to build a more peaceful and stable Europe. Since then, the discussion of NATO's eastward enlargement in its political subtext as well as its overall objective have been rekin-dled with every new Membership Action Plan (MAP). NATO has adopt-ed an 'open door' policy allow-ing accession of any European state capable of aiding NATO's cause. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008 the allies agreed that Georgia will become a NATO member, provided it meets all necessary requirements. This decision has since been reconfirmed at every successive NATO Summit.

Will there ever be an end to the 'open door' policy and hence (eastward) enlargement? What are lessons learned from recent years in terms of Rus-sian activities in Eastern Europe? What are the prospects for Georgia in terms of achieving its final goal of NATO membership in the near future?

The Embassy of Georgia to the Federal Republic of Germany and YATA Germany kindly invite you to discuss these and further questions during the event.

Speakers:

Davit Nardaia, Director NATO Integration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Dr. Henning Riecke, Head of Program, DGAP Transatlantic Relations
Rosaria Puglisi, Head of Office at NATO Liaison Office in Georgia

Moderation: Lisa JOHANN, YATA Germany

PANEL 1 | BOON & BANE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN A CHANGING COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT HOW SHOULD NATO (RE)ACT?

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Whether a Tweet by Trump or a NATO Insta Story – political opinions and strategic information are available as easily and quickly as never before in the history of mankind. The boundaries between propaganda, lies and harsh reality are all too blurred. The exact assessment of what information is trustworthy in the context of security policy is of high relevance. Aggressive behavior or tactical maneuver, war or peace? These questions are answered with the right information. How this information is produced, used and received by the population is therefore vital to NATO's survival.

What is the most dangerous development in the information space today? For who and why? Who is profiting? Are we truly entering a post-truth era? If so, what are the most significant changes it will bring? How vulnerable is NATO and other multilateral institutions to foreign propaganda? Are NATO's existing mechanisms sufficient to counter fake campaigns, or is there a need to adapt existing processes? Does deterrence still work in times of social media? How could it work?

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PANELISTS

Linda Curika
Public Relations Officer,
NATO Strategic
Communications Centre
of Excellence

Linda Curika has an MA in political science. She is a human rights and gender equality activist of Latvian origin and a board member of the Latvian Public Affairs Professionals Association. She is an active blogger and an observer of gender and minorities stereotypes in the media. She has worked as a lecturer at the Baltic International Academy and taken part in voluntary work projects. She has also held the position of Project Director in the Public Policy Center Providus in Riga. Currently, she works as a Public Relations Officer at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia.

Tabea Wilke
Founder and CEO of
botswatch Technologies
GmbH

Tabea Wilke is the founder and CEO of the cyber security company botswatch Technologies GmbH, finalist at SXSW Interactive Innovation Award "Privacy and Security" in 2018. With more than 10 years of experience in the technology sector and news industry both in the public and in the private sector, Wilke is passionate about unconventional approaches in data analytics and new solutions for cyber reconnaissance. She is a member of the Association for Computing and Machinery Special Interest Group Artificial Intelligence (ACM SIGAI) and member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IEEE's working group to develop a Standard for the Process of Identifying and Rating the Trustworthiness of News Sources. Boston Consulting Group and Manager Magazin named Wilke as one of the "Top 100 Female Manager in German Business 2018". Wilke holds a Bachelor's degree in Media and Communications and a Master's degree in International Relations.

INTRODUCTION AND MODERATION

**Leonhard Simon,
Germany**
Project Manager,
Munich Security
Conference Foundation

Leonhard Simon works as Project Manager at the Munich Security Conference Foundation (MSC). He is responsible for organizing high-level conferences and meetings on international security issues such as European, Cyber or Energy Security. His expertise and experience in politics and political communication began, as a personal assistant for a Member of the Bavarian parliament and working for an event management agency. Simon served in various positions at the youth division of the Green party. He has been an honorary football referee for more than ten years. As a photographer, he has organised several exhibitions. Simon received his Master's degree studying International Security in Barcelona and his Bachelor degree in international politics studying in Munich and Cork, Ireland.

**Alexander Schröder,
Germany**
Staff Officer, Editor of
the German Armed
Forces, Berlin

Alexander Schröder was born in 1985 in Magdeburg and serves as editor and staff officer at the Redaktion der Bundeswehr in Berlin. Bevor that he served as public affairs officer at 1 German/Netherlands Corps and at the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). He studied from 2007 to 2011 Political Science at the Helmut Schmidt University / University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg (HSU). Amongst other things he was editor in chief of the student magazine "Univok" and founding chairman of the university group for security policy at HSU. In 2013 he was co-editor of the anthology "German and European security and defense policy". From November 2011 to November 2012 Schröder was Chairman of the Federal Association for Security Policy at Universities. Since May 2013 he leads the regional group Rhineland-Palatinate/Koblenz of the YATA and chairs the Europa-Union in Koblenz since May 2017.

ESSAYS OF YOUNG LEADERS

BOON AND BANE OF SOCIAL MEDIA FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
by Alexander Schröder, Germany

Social media changed the political communication sustainably.

This also and especially applies to the debate of security policy and the public image of states, governments and institutions. What are the challenges of the ever-changing social media environment for the perception of NATO as an Alliance? Essentially, opposing political communications as well as counter-productive communication between own actors counteract the intended organizational communication.

As a defence alliance, deterrence is crucial for NATO. This has to be reflected in communication. In social media, this is both: Boon and bane. On the one hand, fast and direct communication offers the opportunity to transport own content und to strengthen the own narrative. On the other hand, unfavourable communication content also penetrates unfiltered.

The mechanisms of action for narratives between social media and other forms of communication differ, above all, in speed. Using social media narratives can be spread quickly and visually appealing among the target audience. However, the individual communicator can very quickly counteract the intended narrative of an organization. So, US President Trump's tweets are feared.

Even before elected, he openly questioned NATO. Something that still has an effect on today's security policy communication. Although NATO is undertaking numerous reassurance efforts since the beginning of the Crimea crisis, there is still the question how stable the Alliance really is. With his announcement on Twitter to withdraw US troops from Syria, Trump has contributed to the escalation on the Syrian-Turkish border. With uncertain results for cohesion within NATO.

Communication content in social media stays and reappear in the worst possible moment. Unfavourable communication content thus becomes a strategic communication risk.

Communication always has to be seen strategically. The best work in social media does nothing in the end without a credible narrative. This credibility can only exist, when the narrative is based on verifiable facts. In the short term, a credible narrative is not harmed by contrarian actions. For example: If NATO is acting as a strong, determined and cooperative alliance, then US President Trump can tweet without impact contrary to NATO's narrative. Through acting and presenting the intended narrative in various forms and in a variety of channels, the narrative becomes resilient. The better the value of the Alliance is anchored in the population, the less vulnerable the population becomes to adversarial propaganda. Nevertheless, in the long run action, narrative and communication must be congruent. A permanent contradiction or a permanent lack of congruence will have a negative impact on the perception of the Alliance. That is bad news for the deterrence.

The trend towards more individualized societies continues. Increasing numbers of communication channels and platforms must be expected, as well as further differentiation in media usage. The target groups will getting smaller and more individualized. The organizational advantage for planned media campaigns therefore increases. After all, the reaction to a media campaign must also be appropriate for the target group and channel. The anticipation performance in the communication departments of organizations must therefore be increased. Especially if they are already exposed to disinformation operations.

Special importance therefor attaches to political education. With it, the citizens learn as early as possible to assess and evaluate sources of information and to recognize disinformation and fake news. This creates resilience and provides time to counteract disinformation and fake news.

However, concrete measures by NATO and its member states remain indispensable in order to develop and strengthen their own capabilities to combat disinformation, adversarial propaganda and fake news.

Therefore, NATO and its member states should implement the following policy recommendations to strengthen their communicative resilience:

(1) Strengthening of political education in the member states,
(2) Honest and transparent presentation of own abilities,
(3) Unity of action, narrative and communication,
(4) Predictive adaption of personnel and material communication capacities and abilities.

Alexander Schröder was born in 1985 in Magdeburg and serves as editor and staff officer at the Redaktion der Bundeswehr in Berlin. Bevor that he served as public affairs officer at 1 German/Netherlands Corps and at the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). He studied from 2007 to 2011 Political Science at the Helmut Schmidt University / University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg (HSU). Amongst other things he was editor in chief of the student magazine "Univok" and founding chairman of the university group for security policy at HSU. In 2013 he was co-editor of the anthology "German and European security and defense policy". From November 2011 to November 2012 Schröder was Chairman of the Federal Association for Security Policy at Universities. Since May 2013 he leads the regional group Rhineland-Palatinate/Koblenz of the YATA and chairs the Europa-Union in Koblenz since May 2017.

Alexander Schröder, Germany
Staff Officer, Editor of the German Armed Forces, Berlin

THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF SOCIAL MEDIA: A TOOL FOR ENGAGEMENT AND NON-LINEAR WARFARE
by Megan Burnham, USA

(I) State of Affairs

Although once viewed with optimism as a platform with enormous potential to promote the spread of democracy, the manipulation of social media by adversaries to interfere in the domestic politics of other nations has changed its reputation for the worse. Social media, used as part of a broader cyber warfare effort, enables malicious actors to engage in social engineering, intelligence gathering, the spread of disinformation, and the spread of malware. The low cost of these technologies means that states seeking to disrupt the current balance of world power, such as Russia and China, can heavily invest in these methods with few downsides. NATO needs to take more proactive measures to capitalize on the benefits of social media and protect against its risks.

Although social media presents risks as a platform for cyber and information warfare, it also should be recognized as a useful tool for engagement with the public. NATO has already invested in social media in order to magnify its soft power capacities. The sense of continuous dialogue created by social media enables an unprecedented degree of political intimacy with the public. NATO uses these platforms to share content with the public that demonstrates its continued relevance and legitimacy in the post-Cold War era. Public diplomacy efforts alone, however, are not enough to combat the waves of increasing threats posed by adversaries' manipulation of social media.

Russia and other adversaries employ social media as part of their non-linear warfare efforts. Russia has created a sophisticated bot network that allows it to manipulate social media algorithms and push propaganda into the trending tab. Shares and retweets amplify false narratives, and thousands of unsuspecting users can be exposed to these messages before reactive measures are taken to combat them. Social media is also combed for open-source intelligence about operations and potential targets. Naive usage of social media can expose identified NATO personnel to the risk of catfishing or manipulation, threatening the integrity of NATO missions.

Most measures taken to combat the nefarious uses of social media are reactive, which do little to target the core of the problem. I identify five areas where NATO can take proactive measures to capitalize on the benefits of social media and protect against its risks: training and monitoring to reduce insider threats, creating educational programs to improve media literacy and responsible reporting, collaborating with industry and academia on information sharing and research and development, coordinating reactive measures among multiple parties, and facilitating a dialogue on enforceable norms of social media usage by states.

(II) Recommendations

(1) Reducing insider threats
Adversaries use social media to gather intelligence on operations and influence soldier behavior. NATO should

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work with the militaries of member-states to develop training, monitoring, and accountability programs to recognize and reduce insider threats caused by adversaries engaging in social engineering and intelligence gathering operations on social media.

(2) Improving media literacy and responsible reporting

Journalists and average citizens are flooded with a constant stream of information, but few people are equipped with the toolkit to critically navigate this stream. For journalists, NATO should develop workshops that teach ethical journalism practices and methods of evidence-based reporting. For average civilians, NATO's advocacy on media literacy should take a two-pronged approach: workshops at schools and universities and a social media campaign.

(3) Industry collaboration and information sharing

Disinformation affects all layers of society, making it imperative that NATO collaborates with other sectors to more effectively fight against misinformation. Information-sharing agreements should be made with social

media companies, and NATO should also invest in academic and private industry research on the development of methods to combat problems on social media, such as artificial intelligence programs to detect and delete deep fakes.

(4) Coordination of reactive measures

Disinformation needs to be disputed when it arises, but disputes and fact-checks often do not reach as large of an audience as an initial scandalous story or headline. Reactive measures to dispute fake narratives need to occur on a large, coordinated scale by multiple parties to increase truth's reach. NATO should work with state actors and other organizations in order to reach an agreement on how to coordinate fact-checking measures.

(5) Dialogue on cyber and social media norms

There has already been a push for a dialogue to establish enforceable norms of cyber behavior, but social media is notably left out of these conversations. NATO should advocate for a multi-party discussion on norms of social media usage by states.

Megan Burnham, USA
Graduate Student of Russian and Eastern European Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington

Megan Burnham is a graduate student at Indiana University's Russian and East European Institute. Her academic interests include hybrid and information warfare, Russian foreign policy, and Russia's cyber strategy. Her Master's thesis focuses on Russia's use of disinformation tactics to influence political discourse and practices in the Baltic states. Megan is the recipient of a National Security Education Program David L. Boren Fellowship, and she spent the previous year studying the Russian language and developing her thesis research in Latvia. She has been the recipient of multiple awards for her engagement in Russian studies, including three Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowships, a Department of State Title VIII Fellowship, and a Benjamin A. Gilman International Scholarship award. Megan has participated in numerous academic and professional events, including the Monterey Summer Symposium on Russia, the Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association's NATO-EU Roundtable and the Milton A. Wolf Seminar on Media and Diplomacy.

HOW CAN SOCIAL MEDIA BECOME A STRATEGIC TOOL FOR NATO IN ITS FIGHTS AGAINST HYBRID THREATS?
by Radu-Ion Gheorghe, Romania

The rapid technological development in the past decade has provided us with many new opportunities to communicate and connect with millions of people from all over the globe, thus changing the way we see the world, how we do work and do business or how we deal with a wide range of issues. Today, social media through multiple platforms is perhaps the first term that comes into

people's minds when thinking about online communications. It allows us to be more visible in the world or have easier access to information from the news in real time and to be able to distribute it online. Additionally, as we may have witnessed in recent years, social media has become an adequate environment for people to demand political change.

However, despite its many benefits, this type of development also has a side effect which has brought along with little or no cost new threats and risks that we have to deal with on a daily basis including the spread of false or misleading information, invasion of privacy and identi-

ty theft. According to the [Freedom of the Net 2018 report](#), produced by Freedom House, China is considered to be the world's most aggressive abuser of internet freedom, followed by Iran and Syria. This highlights the fact that while social media can destabilise authoritarian regime (e.g. as seen during the Arab Spring) it can also be used to undermine democracy.

Therefore, it can be argued that social media has become an essential warfare tool used by both state (e.g. Russia or China) and non-state actors (e.g. terrorist groups) to shape the opinion of millions of people across dozens of countries in order to promote their interests in various parts of the world. To do this, these actors rely on internet trolls (operated by humans) and bots (automated accounts) to spread propaganda and false content on social media.

Perhaps one of the most notable disinformation efforts are the Russian-led campaigns in several European countries, in particular those in which there is a large ethnic Russian community (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova), that uses social media platforms as one of its instruments to promote the Kremlin's agenda. In recent years, it can be observed that the spread of social media disinformation has played a key role around the time when major elections are set to take place in these countries.

Taking into account the aspects laid out above, NATO could develop policies and strategies around the following recommendations:

(1) Education should be prioritised when it comes to tackling hybrid threats. NATO should emphasize on the importance of this area as key

method to tackle these issues and to encourage member states to include in their national education programmes a strong focus on the development of fact-checking skills which will allow people to better distinguish accurate information from "fake news".

(2) A better coherence and coordination within NATO should be required in order to respond effectively not just to misinformation and false information disseminated on social media, but also to hybrid threats in general.

(3) More creative thinking and multilateral cooperation across NATO are needed in order to enhance the Alliance and its members states' response capabilities in the online sphere. This could also provide the member states with a good opportunity to exchange best practices in this field.

(4) Strategic communications should be an integral part of NATO and its member states strategy to counter hybrid threats in the digital space. The NATO StratCom COE can and should play a key role in this process.

(5) NATO and its member states should have a proactive approach when dealing with hybrid threats on social media, not just by merely responding, but by developing the means to anticipate events and issues and identifying the potential audience that is likely to be targeted by adversaries.

Radu-Ion Gheorghe, Romania
Communication & Research Intern, Finabel European Army Interoperability Centre, Brussels

Radu-Ion Gheorghe works as a Communication and Research Intern at Finabel - European Army Interoperability Centre. His responsibilities include media monitoring across a range of issues related to security and defence, social media coverage and visual content creation. Prior to joining Finabel, Radu-Ion Gheorghe gained his digital communications expertise interning at the European Parliament, European Partnership for Democracy and the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. He also volunteered with the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy - Brussels where his responsibilities increased from drafting a weekly newsletter and managing the branch section of the website to managing and coordinating the activities of the Communications and Marketing team. Radu-Ion Gheorghe holds a bachelor's degree in International Relations and European Studies from the West University of Timisoara (Romania) and a master's degree in International Conflict and Security from the University of Kent (United Kingdom).

FIGHT AGAINST DISINFORMATION: LESSONS TO NATO LEARNT FROM LITHUANIA
by Tomas Kazulėnas, Lithuania

Currently NATO is experiencing turbulence inside and is experiencing constant informational attacks. Disinformation is one of the main foreign and domestic threats at peace time. Within the EU, Lithuania is at the forefront of efforts to tackling face to face Russian disinformation and other forms of aggression and hostile influence. Hostile countries are putting effort to subvert Lithuanian population support for NATO, their resilience and belief in the pro-European ideas. The brunt of the hostile information coverage is aimed at Lithuanian military and the NATO troops stationed in the Baltic States. In order not to give in to these information attacks, it is highly important to understand the disinformation, its methods, goals and share best practices on how to counter disinformation.

As Lithuania is one of the EFP receiving countries, it is vital to have as much unbiased information toward the deployed NATO troops in Lithuania as possible. Disinformation towards EFP troops in Lithuania is very common, targeting to portray the troops as occupants, being unwelcome by the local population and transforming Lithuania to mere training grounds for foreign NATO troops. The list of hostile narratives is long and the disinformation attacks are constant. Lithuanian journalist community and the volunteers from "Lithuanian Elves" are doing a great job debunking the stories, but when the story reaches the media the damage is already done. Also, these stories are often targeted at ethnic minorities, who do not always follow Lithuanian media outlets. It is important to note that most of the surfacing disinformation, misinformation or fake news are not sophisticated.

Bot and troll activity is usually easy to spot and the information that is being presented, especially on the social media outlets, if you have the basic digital literacy skills. Most of the tools, methods and principles on how to check the information are publicly available and are easy to use. However, most people have very limited digital literacy skills. For example, every major NATO exercise in Lithuania is followed by a wave of disinformation and misinformation. Therefore, it is vital for NATO organization to react and to participate in the education process with the people willing to learn how to understand the information warfare in order to build resilience, especially, amongst the young generation.

Given its strategic location, Lithuania has been the target of Russian military intimidation and gathered a lot of practices how to counter disinformation. Lithuania have already learnt lessons on Russian disinformation, therefore these strategic points could be adopted in other countries as well.

There are a few suggestions for NATO and its members how to build awareness and resilience to disinformation:

(1) To use media channels to promote NATO, its values and core principles;

Due to current media's interest (especially in Eastern Europe's countries) in military matters and patriotic stance it would be very significant to focus on social media channels. As the young generation is the key to forming positive, fact-based opinions towards NATO's role in security, the aim could be to focus activities to engage with adolescents and high-school students.

(2) NATO should focus on the regions close to the Belarusian and Russian border;

The influence of Russian media has reached the highest level in this region. According to the latest research, citizens from these parts have the worst attitude towards NATO.

(3) To organize trainings to young people and increase knowledge, awareness and understanding of NATO and its longstanding role in safeguarding global security;

Last recommendation standing in the list, but clearly of undeniable importance is education. It is very important to present a view of NATO which connects with citizens on a personal level, sharing human stories and favoring innovative and non-traditional approaches. Moreover, it is useful to showcase NATO as an Alliance for the 21st century, relevant to all generations, but especially young people. The education is the least we can do and a great thing to begin a never-ending journey to demolishing fake news

It is important not only to educate people about the benefits of NATO and explain why we need to be a part of this organization, but it is equally important to educate a resilient information user. It would be very useful to initiate the regaining of resilience and civic conscious-ness, to build a media literacy and ability to operate in an environment full of propaganda messages and, final-ly, to turn the society into more responsible and self-reliant stake-holders in the democratic process and more experienced information consumers.

Tomas Kazulėnas, Lithuania
Executive Director, Institute of
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Executive director of the Institute of Democratic Politics (IDP) based in Vilnius, Lithua-nia; Co-Founder and Board member of Civic Resilience Initiative (CRI); former advisor to MP; former International Visiting Fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (Taiwan); Editor in chief of annual paper journal politika.lt; Almost 10 years closely working with international organizations in Europe, initiated a lot of international pro-jects focused on security, human rights and civil society; now specialising in media literacy, security and civic education. I am living part-time in Rome (Italy) and closely working with the organizations of security and civil society. I complement my theoreti-cal interest in democratization processes, human rights and civil society through con-crete activities and campaigns, ranging from difficult and dangerous field-trips to visit the Soviet concentration camp sites and graves of Lithuanian deportees in Siberia, to active role in organizing pro-Ukraine support rallies.

SOCIAL MEDIA – A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR ENGAGEMENT OR AN INHERENT SECURITY THREAT?
by Virág Kemecsei, Hungary

In the age of cyber warfare, organisation such as NATO are looking at social media as a novel form of security threat, especially when it comes to their personnel's engagement with these websites. The emerging influ-ence of targeted misinformation campaigns as well as the looming risk of secrets, locations and personal data being exposed or stolen all contribute to an inherent fear of this platform. However, could it be shaped into some-thing more positive? Do the benefits outweigh the cost?

When the first truly global social media platforms such as MySpace emerged over a decade ago, the possibili-ties of connectedness seemed endless. People had access to networks and information on a scale that was never before seen, and could exchange their opinions freely and unabridged in the cyberspace. The birth of websites such as Twitter definitely created a positive sense of empowerment in terms of everyone accessing the news around the world in real time. These sites, especially Facebook, became the perfect platforms for civilian participation as well as 'naming and shaming' socio-political conflicts and issues, even for organising protests and uprisings against authoritarian regimes, as could be seen during the events of the 'Arab Spring'. Social mobilisation of loosely affiliated social media

users and 'globalising' certain movements became key attributes of the new age of internet engagement.

On the other hand, cracks began to show early on in terms of the security implications of appearing in cyber-space. The unregulated nature of these websites means that information is easily manipulated and stolen, and the social media movements and news sources are easily disrupted by misinformation and 'data phishing' tactics, even employed by governments or political parties (the latter revealed irrefutably during the Cam-bridge Analytica scandal). NATO is being constantly challenged by this security risk, especially via the hu-man error of staff members. This was demonstrated in a recent secret security exercise conducted by NATO-affiliated researchers, who could nearly effortlessly manipulate soldiers into sharing their location or per-sonal data by simulating normal social media interac-tions.

What can NATO and its partners do to combat these challenges? It is undeniable that social media is and will remain the communication platform where we connect with each other in cyberspace; thus, any reaction has to be in accordance with accepting their existence. NATO's cyber security outlook of "building defences, enhancing resilience and developing capabilities" is a response that emulates preparedness, which is what I wish to build my suggestions on for the NATO's future development:

In terms of (1) "building defences", the **employment of yber security, data protection and IT experts** along

with establishing a strong IT infrastructure are part of the obvious key approaches that the organisation already employs. However, it is the responsibility of NATO to **not stifle civil liberties** by overregulating the usage of social media platforms, although a cautionary approach via the existence of a **fair social media policy and guidelines** is favourable. The fine line can be mitigated by employing **ethical officers along with social media experts.**

(2) "Enhancing resilience" can be accomplished via similar simulations to the one mentioned above as well as regular trainings. I wish to propose that an **expansion of these trainings** to the families of staff members, and perhaps even host such events to the public. Building awareness is key, and **engaging externals** can lead to a reputational boost.

This shows that even NATO can positively use these platforms after employing the necessary cautionary measures. Appearing on them can enhance **information management and trend-setting** in various topics, all while **shaping and monitoring engagement**

on their own pages and groups. In this sense, (3) "developing capabilities" means keeping up with the progress of modern communication, while creating a **reliable 'social media persona'** that the public can turn to for fact-checking when it comes to combating 'fake news' and misinformation. Obviously, NATO's presence is merely a drop in the ocean of social media pages, but educating and reaching even a few people can count.

Based on all of the above, I believe it is right to exercise caution when it comes to appearing on social media platforms, but their effect on empowering and engaging people in discussions about their own life and security is undeniable. NATO is also on the right path by showcasing itself and highlighting the 'empowerment effect', all while putting the necessary security measures in place. Because though social media has been decidedly a source for immense debate and has indeed created novel security risks in the past decade, but it is still the platform of endless possibilities and human connection that it once was believed to be – with one or two pinches of salt added.

Virág Kemescei, Hungary
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Virág Kemescei is a young professional with a fascination in intercultural communication, mediation as well as peacebuilding through empowering communities. She finished her BA in International Relations at the Corvinus University of Budapest in 2016, spending her Erasmus exchange semester at University College London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies in 2015. She graduated from the University of Amsterdam in 2017 with an MsC in Conflict Resolution & Governance, after which she received a scholarship to pursue Mandarin Studies in Taiwan. In the past year, Virág was a Blue Book trainee at the European Commission and is currently engaged with international organisations in order to broaden her professional scope. She applied to the NATO's Future Seminar because she is curious about the state of humanitarian protection and European security 30 years after the fall of the Berlin wall.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN HYBRID WARFARE
by Aleksandar Nacev, North Macedonia

Introduction

Psychological activities have constituted an integral part of armed combat since the birth of theory of warfare. In the preliminary phase, this line of thought was relatively primitive, consisting mainly of intimidation of the enemy army to force it to either surrender or escape without a confrontation. Recently we have witnessed how both states and non-state actors use hybrid approaches to pursue their political and military aims, skillfully combining military operations with cyber-attacks, diplomatic and/or economic pressure, and (dis)information campaigns. Over the past decade, social media has rapidly grown into one of the main channels of communication used today and is one of the most dynamically developing communication platforms. It has been subject to many significant changes, evolving from small, scattered, local community websites, to consolidated companies with global reach. Social media has also witnessed a leap into mobile technology, which has had a tremendous influence on human behavior, including social media usage patterns. A dramatic change took place in this information environment that can be called the weaponization of social media, which means transforming social networks into a field of hostile information activities carried out on target audiences in the gray zone between peace and war. Hence, it seems highly justifiable to call social media a battlefield on which an intense fight for hearts and minds is taking place. It is a battlefield where we can observe different military strategies and tactics, such as deception, disinformation, propaganda, threatening opponents, mobilization of supporters, and coordination of actions.

NATO and Social Media

NATO has taken some steps to incorporate the social media dimension into its activities, particularly when it comes to public outreach. At the same time, NATO has taken steps to ensure that social media will not become vulnerability in its functioning and several measures have been implemented. In 2014, SHAPE adopted a social media directive that identifies best practices for using social media to enhance NATO's engagement with key audiences during peacetime and military operations. Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO has stepped up its communication capabilities and strengthened its Public Diplomacy Division. In 2014, several Allied nations took a significant step when they established a NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia. The Centre has produced a series of leading-edge studies that indicate how NATO and its members can counter hostile and disruptive cyber activities. The NATO Science and Technology Organisation has also developed the Digital and Social Media Playbook, a continually-updated, information-environment assessment tool aimed at understanding the goals and methods used by adversaries in the information space.

Recommendations

Observation of the social media environment and the activities of "bad actors" are very helpful in the formulation of the following key recommendations:

- NATO should be present on social media with attractive, well-tailored content. It is a vital part of the information environment, and it should be considered as an obvious element of communication campaigns. Euro-Atlantic institutions should routinely revisit their social media policies, adjust the content and the format of their communications to the needs of mobile users (messages should be short, coherent, graphic, targeted and numerous), and incorporate social media aspects in training and exercises for their personnel.

- Advance key NATO narratives and develop attractive branding. When promoting the chosen narratives, consistency and credibility is needed. Academic research and think tanks specialising in online communications should be further supported in order to stay ahead of the curve.

- Immunize the public against psychological operations. It is vital to raise citizens' awareness of the influence activities used by our adversaries. Existing NATO capabilities such as NATO's Public Diplomacy Division should be provided with additional financial and technological capabilities as well as human resources to continue providing credible online responses as often as possible (even if matching the speed of fake news reporting might never be feasible).

- Since most social media tools are owned by private, multinational companies, cooperation with these companies needs to improve. Na-

tional measures to take down unlawful content are often ineffective because, in most cases, this content is hosted beyond national borders.

- Civil society is a powerful ally of democratic governments in fighting extremism and fake news. Support for grassroots initiatives such as Stopfake.org and the mobilization of credible local leaders as well as 'elves' (the volunteer hunters of "trolls") could give NATO the edge in the information space.

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BOON AND BANE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN A CHANGING COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT. HOW SHOULD NATO (RE)ACT?
by Albert Nerzetyan, Armenia

Developments in the field of information and telecommunications (ICTs) in the context of international security have been on the United Nations agenda since the Russian Federation first introduced a draft resolution in 1998. The prevailing notion of cybersecurity among the Western states, NATO members was that of 'computer security': detection, protection, and mitigation of risks focused on the information infrastructure. Dissimilar to the West, the Chinese and Russian delegation stressed the significance of information content to national security affairs. This underlying divergence about the basic terms (information security, cybersecurity) has played through the past two decades in international and local politics witnessed in diverse securitization levels of ICT protection and in fact, is traceable to the historical, cultural and social differences among Western, Russian and Chinese approaches to ICT governance and protection.

A cross-examination of Russia's and NATO countries' strategic documents reveals the differences in state approaches to ICTs and their effect on societies. While the national strategies of European countries and the U.S. opt to embrace the notion of 'computer security', the Russian Federation's 2000 and 2016 Information Security Doctrines have adopted a more far-reaching and all-inclusive definition. This all-encompassing perception of information security not only includes commonly accepted threats arising from the use of ICTs (malware, DDoS attacks, etc.) and physical information domain as well (confidential government hard copy documents) but more importantly, it includes and presumably assumes the state's role in spreading or fighting against propaganda. Furthermore, the Gerasimov Doctrine declares that non-military tactics (information weapons) are not supplementary to the use of force but rather the preferred way to win: they are, in fact, the actual war. Gerasimov also specifies that the objective is to achieve an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within an enemy state.

A case in point is the revelations around 2016 US U.S. presidential elections which have evoked a global conversation around fake news, political trolling, social media bots, and the consequent weaponization of information. Four U.S. intelligence agencies (the CIA, NSA, FBI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence) concluded with "high confidence" that Russia had tried

to interfere with the elections, which sparked controversy among decision-makers and left the U.S. bewildered, to a certain degree. How do you respond to a national security threat, which is neither addressed nor identified in national security or national cybersecurity strategies? Rand Waltzman, a senior information specialist at Rand Corporation, offered the concept of cognitive security for fighting information wars in his testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This paper believes that Barry Buzan's framework from People, States and Fear (1991) can be used to understand Russian and Chinese approaches to cyberspace. The framework focuses on two key aspects of nation states – power and social-political cohesion. Using this framework we can argue that states with weak power and weak social-political cohesion are highly vulnerable to most types of threats and states with high power and weak social-political cohesion are highly vulnerable to political threats. On the opposite side, states with strong power and strong social-political cohesion are relatively invulnerable to most types of threats and are less inclined to characterize issues as national security, ie securitize cyberspace. This framework helps to shed a light on the causes of securitization or politicization of information space by China and Russia.

Recommendations:

- NATO should seek to reach a common understanding with Russia and China regarding the basic terms such as information security/cybersecurity,

- NATO should seek to securitize information space as well, (as it is completely vulnerable during peacetime, PSYOPS capacities are not adequate),

- NATO should embrace the creation of special units for fighting social manipulation (similar to the Czech Republic with its hybrid warfare unit, and recently the UK),

- NATO should designate disinformation/social manipulation fighting units in peacetime.

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Albert Nerzetyan graduated from the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations at the University of Toronto in 2014. Upon graduation, he joined the Armenian army as a junior researcher at the National Defense Research University. In 2017, Albert completed a Master of Laws degree from the American University of Armenia. Over the past four years, he has worked at different government agencies and is currently lead cyber security policy specialist at the Office of the Security Council. His research interests include cybersecurity, cyber deterrence and cyberspace securitization.

THREE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOW TO TACKLE RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
by Agniete Pocyte, Lithuania

While social media provides opportunities to connect and share ideas, it simultaneously provides a platform for malign actors to polarise the current media environment, oftentimes by disseminating disinformation. For Eastern European countries and the Baltics, Russian tactics of information influence have been known for decades. However, Western European and North American countries first became aware of the effectiveness of widespread 'fake news' and strategic foreign influence in 2014 with Russia's annexation of Crimea. Today, Russian disinformation among the NATO member states is recognised as a rampant and growing problem. For the past decade, Russia has been engaging in disinformation campaigns alongside cyber attacks, forgeries, election meddling, and internet troll farms. In just the past few years, Russia attempted to orchestrate disinformation campaigns in France, the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Hungary among others.

Many disinformation experts believe NATO and the EU should step up its action against Russian subversion. Although the EU 'named and shamed' Russia as the primary hostile actor of disinformation, this occurred for the first time only in December 2018. Recent advancements in technology will only make this problem more difficult to counter and we should take proactive steps in doing so. Nevertheless, NATO is invested in strategic communications and countering the threats posed by Russian disinformation. While there are current initiatives taken to mitigate the problem, there is much more needed to be done, here I outline three recommendations.

(1) Support local initiatives which aim to counter disinformation.

Civil society organisations in NATO member and partner states which aim to preserve media integrity against disinformation operations should be financially and institutionally supported. Currently there are a number of local and national initiatives aimed with tackling disinformation, but they rely on outside sources of funding (e.g. Google, Nordic Council of Ministers). In Lithuania, a fact-checking initiative called 'Debunk.eu' uses a combination of AI and human fact-checkers to take down

common Russian narratives of disinformation and in the Czech Republic, Kremlin Watch focuses on exposing Russian influence through rigorous reporting. Local initiatives which tackle disinformation operations are arguably more trustworthy to the local population as they are people-driven rather than created and implemented from the top-down. NATO should take advantage of grassroots counter-disinformation capabilities, through funding or other organisational-level support to make sure these initiatives are thriving.

(2) Increase cooperation between NATO-level organisations and grassroots initiatives which aim to counter disinformation

While NATO's Stratcom Centre of Excellence (CoE) and the NATO-supported European CoE on Hybrid Threats are creating excellent analyses, there needs to be more cooperation with local on the ground initiatives. This leads me into my second recommendation, an increase in cooperation among organisations with similar aims and objectives. EU initiatives such as the Rapid Alert System aim to bring together country-level experts but there has not been much reported progress on the initiative. NATO member states should increase cooperation between their research centres and other organisations with local authorities and civil society organisations; this may occur through mutual projects, funding, or a partnership between specific divisions or experts. We are not able to adequately protect ourselves against disinformation if we are not communicating together and passing on information. While there has been some cooperation between high-level think tanks and research centres, we should also coordinate with smaller, country-specific initiatives which bring the expertise we otherwise would not have.

(3) Advocate for increased transparency in the way social media companies' algorithms rank and prioritise content.

While there is a multitude of recommendations that can be made with regard to social media companies (especially surrounding political ads), I will focus on the broad tendency of social media to prioritise extreme narratives. Disinformation is composed of two parts; the content/message and the platform. Currently, there is an over-emphasis on the content of disinformation when looking to tackling information influence. This includes initiatives such as Facebook's fact-checking service and the general social media practice of content removal.

The primary business objective of social media companies is to generate advertising revenue, therefore it is in their interest to keep a user engaged and active on their platform. To do so, the algorithms which control the presentation of content on social media are optimised to increase clicks and user-time on the site. Combining this activity with the human tendency for novel and exciting content, this tends to prioritise click-bait type stories, increasing the number of highly emotional and extreme content on a user's news feed. When malign actors are added into this media ecosystem they easily take ad-

vantage of the platform by disseminating highly reactive stories which are likely to be engaged with, and presented at the top of a user's newsfeed. Understanding how this system works, we should advocate social media companies to increase transparency of their platform to users. Akin to the current social media practice of placing a button next to sponsored content stating 'Why am I seeing this ad?', users should also know why specific content is prioritised over other content. This practice would provide much-needed transparency without interfering with the business model of the social media system.

Agniete Pocyte, Lithuania
Graduate Student of Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies

Having just finished the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies, Agniete Pocyte is currently exploring opportunities in the security sector. Her master's thesis focused on a lexicon-based emotion analysis of Russian disinformation tweets. During her studies, she worked with The European Values Think-Tank, Kremlin Watch Programme where she wrote a report on Lithuania's response to Russian disinformation. Her report identified 'lessons learned' and transferred this knowledge to other European countries who are struggling to find the right responses. She presented her research at the 2019 EU-US Young Leaders Forum in Brussels and continues to play an active role in the security community.

THE KREMLIN'S SPIDER WEB: SPOTTING DISINFORMATION, MALIGN INFLUENCE AND PROPAGANDA IN SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORK
by Nicolae Tîbrigan, Romania

Russian information warfare is a concern for European Countries, especially as they are using the local country political and economical profiles to grow their power of influence, but also, they are adapting to new information tools to spread propaganda and disinformation actions aimed to grow mistrust between local actors and towards international partners.

Moreover, the Russian propaganda machine is using local narratives as a fertile ground to cultivate confusion and conspiracy stories, to undermine the objective truth, to grow mistrust in Western values and solidarity, with the ultimate goal to weaken alliances between EU countries and between NATO allies. Therefore, there is a clear need for societies to react on actions that build social faults in public discourse and hate between different actors or side takers, weaknesses which are also

being used as a ground for growing extreme political ideologies and weakening democracy ecosystems.

Russia has shown its power on influencing international agenda through the interference in the Brexit referendum and the 2016 US elections, which included the promotion of misinformation through both fake social media accounts and state-sponsored media outlets such as RT and Sputnik. While we clearly assist on even closer risk, Kremlin's information aggression being strong in neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Moldova, or Hungary), Romanian state has not taken clear steps in protecting its citizens from this threat. In the last 2 years Romania has witnessed a drastic change of the public discourse driven by parties at power and their supportive media outlets.

We can see the impact of this action in The Global State of Democracy Indices, where for example we see that the trend in the Judicial Independence has decreased back to the level of 2001, cancelling the developments done in the last 20 years. The Russian propaganda machine is using this type of local narratives as a fertile ground to cultivate confusion and conspiracy stories, to

undermine the objective truth, to grow mistrust in Western values and solidarity, with the ultimate goal to weaken Romania's alliance with NATO and EU. The goal of Russian disinformation campaigns is to decrease support of the successor generations in Central and Eastern Europe for collective support offered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty, which, on a long term, risks to develop opposition movements regarding Romania's expenditures for defense and capabilities.

At present, there has been no (at least public) initiative by the Romanian government or its neighbouring states to propose a coordinated effort to combat national/regional misinformation. Among the identified regional/local problems we can highlight the following:

- The lack of national strategies undertaken by the governments of NATO's Eastern flank with the objective of studying, combating and preventing external misinformation campaigns (including social media);

- The precariousness of media literacy among the population of CEE which leads to a reduced ability to objectively judge the sources of information distributed through Social Media.

- The monetization model in Social Media and Google that encourages the proliferation of clickbait news and the Deepfake phenomenon.

In this context, I propose the following public policies to the international community as such, to national governments and parliaments from CEE region, to civil society (both national and international) and to NATO institutions.

For NATO Member States in CEE region:

- Creation of national centers to combat digital disinformation, which to document, research and act as early warning for citizens;

- Establishment of national contact points within Facebook and Google to ensure an effective collaboration to rapidly neutralize anti-NATO/anti-Western disinformation campaigns.

- Increase legislative action against the conscious spread of disinformation and information manipulation.

I also advise NATO to:

- Create a personalized road-map proposal for each member country, with an action plan that can be implemented by local entities in order to build resilience and contract on the Russian influence;

- Use NATO's programs (mostly education and research) to ensure better media literacy education and better research into information threats (CEE region, partner countries, etc.).

Therefore, it is even more important that international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, etc.), civil society, Social Media Platforms and multinationals join forces to counteract this risk and come up protection with mechanisms. It is time to come together as, scattered, fragmented and low-level actions will not have any effects on the high threat that the Kremlin's information war tools represent.

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CYBER SPACE FROM A FEMALE ANGLE
by Miranda Tkabladze, Georgia

Integrating gender perspective in social media is a question of democratic value, as it should be safe, accessible and inclusive for both men and women. In today's world, media plays critical role on how gender related social and cultural norms are perceived and evolve, as women's image in social media are heavily influenced by the latter norms. Social media can be a source to prevent gender discrimination if it stresses on gender-neutral portrayals of women and men. The inclusion of gender mainstreaming in social media will support building resilient and tolerant societies. On the other hand, social media became part of diplomacy and decision-making process as it has profound impact and influence on civil societies and perceptions of its citizens.

Social media tends to rotate along the spectrums, because it is a fact-based tool and not only. As social media plays important role due to its causes and reflections, it also undermines or supports the sentiments societies live in. Therefore, there is a need to somewhat scrutinize this sector, but the question is to what extent it is wise to ensure the respect of fundamental freedoms and to what extent are citizens making choices based on accurate information, rather than disinformation, hate speech and other types of informational bubble. These particular issues have become challenging to the states, as increasing number of negative and fake videos, trolls, as well as bots that are well-used by certain regimens to attack peace and security in specific regions of the world. Given the nature of online communication, social media, unlike to traditional media, is the fastest developing and information spreading, user-driven source; it has increasing impact on the public, mostly affecting women and marginalized groups, as they are easy target of hate speech, abuse, violation and etc.

Just recently, world has witnessed Kurdish female fighters, breaking gender stereotypes, resisting attacks and atrocities of ISIS as well as other intruders into their place of residence. Unfortunately, it is a fact that their Facebook page was shut down, due to "Security Measures". Nevertheless, these are vocal women, who stand for peace, security and tolerance; they fight for freedom and basic living rights as respectively owned and enjoyed by other citizens of various societies. As Facebook became one of the trusted information source for the developing societies, increasing women's participation, especially in military services, was not in hand of specific regimes, as it became a threat to strategic communication development. Women in peace and security in reality stand for peace and freedom; they fight for their rights, for their children's rights, for the rights of elderly and most vulnerable ones, as they really believe in this. As women tend to speak out more than men do, in certain regimes, vocal women are fated to violence and abuse.

As of 2007, NATO started to stress on importance of women's role in the military, peace and security services; diversity of both gender skills; it is highly on demand that it supports increasing women's role in social media as well. Women working in this field need support and to have the opportunity on equal access to social media as a platform to convey their messages to wider public, as women's participation in conflict issues will make positive impact.

Social media should not be used as an advertisement mirrors of social stereotypes. Moreover, it should be used as a mirror of social change, as women cannot be perceived as a sexiest ad in social media that damages women's dignity, behavior and leads to violence. As developing world tends to ignore women's role and importance, social media should be used as a tool to promote female leadership positions for a positive change. Indeed, women need to see and believe in themselves as an essential part of these processes, they must feel safe, especially during and after conflict processes and in social media as well. All gender sensitive information must be addressed properly and timely.

Recommendations:

- Live storytelling sessions can serve as a unique platform to break the stereotypes and enable women in the military to speak up on behalf of others who cannot speak for themselves.

- Through high-level negotiations, NATO should ensure to pursue cyber policies to promote equality between women and men in peace and security field.

- Media literacy and active citizenship trainings, led by women leaders of the field is paramount to promote diversity.

- Gender-sensitive media trainings is essential in a world of rapidly developing technologies to ensure proper coverage of gender focus.

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Miranda Tkabladze is Operations Manager at International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Georgia office. She studied at universities in Georgia, Germany, Poland, USA and Sweden and holds MA degree in International Affairs. Miranda has actively been involved in local, international and civil society fields in Georgia, as well as in the US Senate and Congress while studying in the USA. Since 2001, Miranda has been working for various international and state organizations. She is actively engaged in working with a great platform of decision makers, policy makers, and different stakeholders, to empower women on local and national level, among them ethnic minority women and women with disabilities. She is permanent member of the 1. Task Force on Women's Political Participation; 2. Gender Thematic Group (GTG). Miranda has participated in seminars, trainings and volunteered in various countries throughout Europe and USA, for instance the Philip Jessup Moot Court Competition, as an exchange student under Eurasian Undergraduate Exchange Program (UGRAD) or the 15th edition of the Academy of Young Diplomats by the European Academy of Diplomacy. In 2019, Miranda was selected as a fellow of Professional Fellows Program; she has expanded her work experience with American Constitution Society. In addition to her native Georgian, Miranda speaks English, Russian and German.

The concept of a EUROPEAN ARMY AND NATO – useful addition or undermining contradiction?

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The President of France calls for combined European Military Forces, a national minister of defense becomes President of the European Commission and the American President demands an increase of investments in defense from the European states. On a first glance all signs indicate the path towards a European Army. However the reality also looks like this: From a defense political oriented perspective Europe seems like a patchwork - national reservations impede even the smallest steps towards military integration and defense budgets are only slowly increased towards the set goals.

The discussion of a European strategic autonomy adds up another ingredient in this boiling pot of conflicts and triggers controversial reactions on both sides of the Atlantic. How shall NATO position itself in this kitchen of controversies? Would it be reasonable to contain the efforts towards European military integration before they really took off, to prevent parallel structures? Or do we have to support these movements, so that the European Union can prospectively speak with one voice in defense matters? And what are the political and legal measures that can be taken to implement the answers to these questions?

PANELISTS

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Eric Povel has worked in the Hague and Brussels as lobby consultant for numerous public affairs consultancies, companies, NGO's and governmental bodies. In 1995, he was employed as the Netherlands Information Officer in the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) at NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium. During NATO's enlargement process in the late 90s, he was also responsible for NATO information activities in new and candidate member states. After NATO's Kosovo air campaign in 1999, Povel also became the media planner for NATO's yearly Crisis Management Exercise (CMX). As of 1 July 2006, he started working in the NATO Press and Media Section as a press officer to set up the Media Operations Centre (MOC) dealing with Afghanistan. As of January 2010, he dealt with all media aspects related to major NATO operations, missile defence and many other defence-related issues. As of July 2011, Povel was the Strategic Communications Coordinator, heading the PDD StratCom Cell in support of the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, responsible for all operational and doctrinal StratCom issues at NATO HQ. Since October 2012, he holds the position of Program Officer in the Engagements Section of PDD dealing with Afghanistan. He also holds country responsibility for Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.

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INTRODUCTION AND MODERATION

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Pieter Brandt is a Captain in the German Air Force's technical branch. He studied aeronautical and spacecraft engineering in Munich and graduated as M.Sc. in 2012. He worked as a technical officer for fighter jets' maintenance / repair / overhaul in a tactical fighter wing before he was moved to the German Eurofighter procurement and development program office. He served a four-months tour as squadron commander in mission "Counter Daesh" in Jordan in 2018 and finished the staff officers training course at the German staff and command college in Hamburg in 2019. He is currently based at the federal armed forces university in Munich.
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ESSAYS OF YOUNG LEADERS

Responsibly Together: The EU, NATO and Strategic Autonomy
by Giovanni Baggio, Italy

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RESPONSIBLY TOGETHER: THE EU, NATO AND STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

by Giovanni Baggio, Italy
For bibliography see the back of booklet.

The hyper-activity in the field of defence and security that we are witnessing in the last years and the possible rethinking of U.S. engagement in Europe have questioned the future of European Defence. The problem is: how do we reconcile the legitimate requests for more cooperation in the defence field by the EU with the already existing structures and patterns of NATO? The answer to this question is not the creation of an integrated European Army, rather, it has to do with Europe (not necessarily the European Union), taking its own responsibilities, its fair share and its burden within the already existence structure, namely NATO.

A first important point to stress out is that European countries need to do more within NATO. The idea that Europe has to contribute more in terms of spending within the alliance is not a Trump's invention. Former American Secretary of Defense Gates, in 2011, stressed out this idea. Indeed, looking at numbers many important countries are under the 2% NATO guideline. The insistent call on European allies to do more in the defence field, together with the unpredictability of Trump's decision on foreign policy, have led many European leaders to think about the future of European defence. Many have read the proliferation of defence projects and initiative at EU and European level as the first, decisive step to proceed on the path towards the creation of a truly European Army.

However, there are many obstacles on the path to the creation of an European Army.

First, Europe lacks a unique, comprehensive strategic culture. Strategic cultures have to do with the vision on the role of war in human affairs, about the efficacy of the role of violence and about the strategic options which are more suitable in order to address threats. The EU, as an international organization sui generis, does not possess a unique strategic culture. Rather, every single state has its own culture in dealing with the use of violence in international politics, depending on their political culture, on their past experiences, and on their history.

Second, Europe is highly fragmented when it comes to military forces, capabilities and logistics, difficult to overcome in the short period. Moreover, around the 80% of defence procurement is carried out by each single state, and states still prefer to run their defence-industrial priorities on their own and not at the European level.

Third, it is always difficult to conceptualize "Europe". Are we talking about the European Union? Are we talking about the whole continent? What about the inclusion of the United Kingdom? When we talk about the European Army, we cannot be sure which are the boundaries of that concept.

Fourth, the EU lacks a truly European deterrent. NATO has functioned as a defensive alliance thanks to the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. Will France extend its Force de Frappe? Or will the Army possess its own bomb? Putting in danger one of the pillars of the continental security in the name of an integrated Army at the European level can work as a destabilising factor, if there is no alternative to the American deterrent.

Therefore, many are the difficulties ahead to see the creation of a truly Army at European Level. However, how can we reconcile the desire of Europeans to coordinate more on defence issues and the demands from the U.S. for a fairer share within NATO? The answer might be to follow the path of Strategic Autonomy. What does this mean in practical terms?

First of all, Strategic Autonomy is responsibility: taking a fairer share of the burden within NATO, meeting the pressing demands coming from Washington. The Transatlantic Bound and the American contribution to our security are too important to risk the U.S. disengagement from Europe; that is exactly why the EU as a whole has to strengthen these ties contributing with more force to the American efforts. According to this view, Strategic Autonomy (in terms of more investment and financial sustain) would allow Europe to act independently of American contribution on that areas which are, for geographical reasons and geopolitical interests, closer to the EU. Strengthening and investing on EU preparedness against hybrid warfare, cyber warfare and developing a comprehensive strategy on Artificial Intelligence would benefit the alliance as a whole. The European Defence Fund is, of course, a good starting point to address all these issues and to pay the European share within NATO stressing the idea of Autonomy.

The other important aspect of autonomy as greater responsibility has to do with the defencerelated industri-

al apparatus within the EU. Industrial autonomy in defence would mean a Europe capable to overcome the problem of duplication in the defence sector, creating a more integrated industrial apparatus. One of the greatest challenges in this sense is that EU countries are still reluctant to see a truly integration on the industrial side of defence, carrying out the great majority of their defence procurements and seeing defence industry as a national priority rather than a European one. In this sense, PESCO could be seen as key element in order to follow the path of a technological and industrial autonomy. The Permanent Structured Cooperation foresees a list of projects, and, among them, several deal with the strengthening of EU operational and industrial autonomy and on boosting the Research and Development of new military technologies.

However, European Strategic Autonomy not only means enhancing capabilities and the industrial apparatus, but it also means having clear foreign policy and defence objectives. Reaching autonomy in terms of capability, without having a clear path to follow would be meaningless. Today, the EU seems to be struggling in this field, with the major European countries which want to carry out their own foreign and security policies. Europe is doing great steps to bolster its defence sector, and the many initiatives in this field are the proof, but it still lacks a unified foreign policy that could hinder all the progresses made in the last years.

In conclusion, I believe that talking about a European Army today would be not only a contradiction with respect with the existent Atlantic Alliance, but also would mean talking about something that, at the present conditions, lacks the basic conditions to exist. However, it is true that the election of Donald Trump and the subsequent retrenchment of the U.S. from the global sphere, the American rebalancing toward Asia and the Russian hostility through new techniques of hybrid warfare, have all contributed to feel the need to do more on defence at the European level. But doing more at European level would be in line also with the American claims for a fairer share within the Alliance. Therefore, the idea of Strategic Autonomy is key in both enhancing EU capabilities and aspirations to "do more" in defence subjects, both in contributing with more strength and responsibility to the NATO's burden sharing.

Policy recommendations:

(1) The European Union and Member States should take steps in order their bolster the Strategic Autonomy not in opposition to NATO, but within it, in order to further and better contributing to the Burden Sharing;

(2) The EU and Member States should follow the path of a more integrated European Defence sector, buttressing the necessity of common defence procurement rather than national and the need of a stronger Research and Development in the defence sector; in this sense, the EU and Member States should continue to back the projects foreseen by PESCO and implementing them as soon as possible, in order to better contributing to the achievement of the a Strategic Autonomy complementary to NATO and not in contrast with it; PESCO, as a cooperative instrument, is not an opposition to NATO;

(3) NATO should reformulate the 2% guideline in order to commit EU states to reach a common target not as single contributors, rather as a collective entity.

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Giovanni Baggio is a Master's student in International Security Studies at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies of Pisa and the University of Trento. Currently, he is also working as trainee at the European People's Party Group in the European Parliament, in the service for Relations with National Parliaments. He was awarded with the Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Padua, and he spent one semester at SciencesPo Bordeaux. He worked as intern at the Political Office of the Embassy of Italy in Washington D.C., where he had the opportunity to monitor the celebration of the 70th anniversary of NATO. In addition, he has attended many seminars and conferences dealing with NATO and Transatlantic Security, as, for example, the Prague Security Studies Institute NATO Summer School, different YATA events, and two executive training seminars delivered by the European University Institute of Florence.

COOPERATION OF THE WILLING
THE CHANCES AND ROADBLOCKS OF EU-NATO COOPERATION
by Peer Klaus Braak, Germany

"Don't forget your great guns, which are the most respectable arguments of the rights of kings", Frederick II. of Prussia once supposedly summarized the relationship between military and political power. The arguably largest array of "big guns", the military power of NATO, is a perfect example for that. The alliance has been a highly successful tool for the United States and its allies to ensure the survival of their democratic and liberal values against any systemic rivals. But since new threats such as cyber warfare or deliberate disinformation can hardly be fought with artillery barrages, the tasks for NATO have expanded far beyond its traditional métier. Additionally, negative coverage on its internal divisions recently dominated the headlines. With a few European nations reluctant to pay a greater share of the financial burden whilst publicly fantasizing about a European Army on one side and U.S., occupied by waning domestic support for global leadership and the ascension of China, on the other, the immediate future for NATO appears to be rather grim.

Here again, wise words spoken by Frederick II. can be applied: "He who defends everything, defends nothing." Any actor should thus carefully evaluate how to best use his limited resources when countering threats because ubiquitous defense not feasible. Regarding the EU-NATO controversy this leads to a second question: Do both institutions need to defend everything in Europe by themselves or could they complement each other?

Since both share similar ideological values and strategic interests but generally resort to different means to pursue their goals, a cooperation between them appears to be the logical consequence. The High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, repeatedly stated that the primary goal of the EU's security policy is not to create a massive force of deterrence but to apply softer tools such as aiding post-conflict stabilization, offering economic assistance or institution building in instable countries in the its periphery. Worrisome developments in the EU's immediate vicinity make these efforts necessary and lighten the burden on NATO. Whilst the tradi-

tional military supremacy of NATO as the main argument of its members against foreign aggression should be maintained, cooperating with the EU's 'softer' security policy with special regards to non-military issues could take pressure of the struggling alliance and improve the security situation of both parties. The fewer sources of conflict on the borders of Europe, the more unlikely the necessity of military action.

Secretary General Stoltenberg and Mogherini advanced the EU-NATO cooperation over the last years, most notably to the EU-NATO declarations of 2016 and 2018. But many of the agreed steps to ensure better cooperation have yet been unimplemented. This was in part caused by the limited personnel resources of NATO. Besides an overdue expansion of NATO's financial resources for civilian personnel, the coordination between it and the EU could be boosted by establishing an exchange of staff-members. Such an exchange of knowledge could especially be useful in the areas of counterterrorism and cyberwarfare. Simultaneously, counter-productive promises of an "European army" only strain transatlantic ties and should be avoided. Considering that for example Germany does not have a sound strategy to fulfill neither its financial nor its military contributions to NATO, anger in Washington over the newly discovered interest in a 'EU-Army' is understandable.

However, using the enthusiasm in Berlin and Paris for increased military cooperation within the EU could also be profitable for NATO. The harmonization of military equipment and procurement through EU-initiatives such as the European Defense Fund could reduce the expensive inefficiencies and redundancies of the European defense markets. And NATO would indirectly benefit when its members cut costs on procurement. Furthermore, this would be a first step to close the widening technology-gap between the U.S. and many of its European partners. However, in this process the U.S.-access to the European market must be guaranteed on a basis of mutuality. Mechanisms that limit the intellectual property rights of U.S.-companies and thus Washington's say in the export of the developed arms should be avoided in the future.

Therefore, the shared interest of the two institutions combined with the potential of their cooperation speaks for further collaboration. At the same time, the possibility

of worsening relations between the global liberal orders' two most respectable arguments against threats from its systemic competitors would be a dream come true for countries looking to undermine the liberal hegemony.

Although neither the EU nor NATO have the resources and capabilities to defend Europe in every sector, together they can make sure nothing is being left undefended.

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Peer Klaus Braak is a recent graduate with a Bachelor of Arts in Governance and Public Policy as well as Media and Communication from the University of Passau. His fascination for the topic of transatlantic cooperation began when he spent a year as a fellow of the Congress-Bundestag-Exchange in the United States. As a volunteer for the American-Field-Service he made the facilitation of people-to-people contacts between the USA and Germany his hobby. He spent the summer of 2019 in Washington D.C., where he interned in the office of the German Ambassador. However, his interest in foreign affairs is not limited to the United States. In order to delve into the topic of international and religious terrorism, he spent a semester as an exchange-student in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and a summer an intern in the office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in The Republic of India.

THE FRAMEWORK NATIONS CONCEPT: A BLUEPRINT FOR NATO-EU DEFENSE COORDINATION
by Andrew Carroll, USA
*For bibliography see the back of booklet.

A European Army & NATO: Strategic Asset or Impediment?
Over the past year, the concept of a "European Army" has once again returned to prominence in European political discourse.[1] The current debate, spurred on in part by French President Emmanuel Macron's comments last November, forms a core component of broader calls for the development of "European strategic autonomy," especially amid the United Kingdom's (UK) vote to leave the European Union (EU), as well as United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump's repeated questioning of American commitment towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European security architecture.[2][3]

However, there are a number of concerns that a European army, presumably under the auspices of the EU, would be unnecessarily duplicative and harm NATO interoperability and effectiveness. While these are valid concerns, with a recent increase in defense cooperation programs both within and outside of the EU, on top of a renewed interest in defense burden sharing, a European army would be a benefit to NATO. At the same time, any such force must remain closely-tied to NATO, taking advantage of recent measures to ensure closer NATO-EU cooperation.[4] In this regard, Germany's Framework Nations Concept, or FNC, could provide a useful model for the development of a European army that addresses aforementioned concerns and retains operational effectiveness.

Questions of Structure:
Recently, a number of European leaders, including EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, have all called for the formation of a unified European military.[5][6] However, these pro-

[1] Dempsey, Judy, "Macron's Call for European Boots," Carnegie Europe *Strategic Europe*, November 13, 2018, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/77703?lang=en.

[2] Swan, Jonathan, "Scoop: Trump's Private NATO Thrashing Rattles Allies," *Axios*, June 28, 2018, https://www.axios.com/donald-trump-foreign-policy-europe-nato-allies-worried-bd1e143a-e73a-415b-b688-d18ab2d902e7.html.

[3] Brzozowski, Alexandra, "Europe Aims for Greater 'Strategic Autonomy' from the US on Defense," *Euractiv*, June 29, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-

security/news/europe-aims-for-greater-strategic-autonomy-from-us-on-defence/.

[4] "Relations with the European Union," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, August 12, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm.

[5] Sparrow, Andrew, "Jean-Claude Juncker Calls for EU Army," *The Guardian*, March 8, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-miltary.

posals have included a diverse spectrum of views regarding how a European army would actually be constituted.

Yet in an era of tighter budgets, greater European military cooperation is just what NATO needs to fulfill its commitment to collective defense and role as a guarantor of European security. Under the right structure, a European army can help states other than the U.S. play a greater role within NATO defense policy as well as integrate new, promising defense cooperation initiatives such as the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2). In this regard, Germany's Framework Nations Concept (FNC) provides an outstanding base to build upon existing structures and develop a European army that is able to effectively work with NATO while also integrating new EU defense programs.

Germany's FNC & Development of a European Army:

The FNC was proposed in 2013 as a means of addressing capability gaps in European NATO militaries and attaining an improved level of burden sharing among allies. A key feature of the FNC involves smaller states specializing in key, niche capabilities and organizing themselves around the military forces of a larger "framework" state.[7] At present, certain NATO members (including Romania, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands) have started to link forces at the brigade level with the German military.[8] The FNC thus provides a suitable model for the future development of a European army as it lays the groundwork for the level of military integration necessary at different levels of command to allow such a force to succeed operationally and politically. Moreover, because the FNC aligns capability goals with the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), it is ideally suited to coordinate defense policy efforts between NATO and the EU,

especially given recent efforts to establish an EU-level process similar to the NDPP such as the European Defense Agency's Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD).[9]

A potential shortfall in the FNC model can be found in its emphasis on long-term capability development, as opposed to short-term solutions.[10] Nevertheless, these concerns can be remedied in that flagship EU defense initiatives like PESCO already emulate core components of the FNC, with specific states leading investment through the development of key military capabilities. Furthermore, with ad-hoc European defense initiatives such as France's EI2, the European Air Transport Command, and the Movement Coordination Center for Europe seeking to provide for short-term modern warfighting capacity development and formation of a European common strategic culture in specific states, such institutions could prove extremely useful in developing new framework nations in a future European army organized under a FNC model.[11]

Policy Recommendations:

NATO should begin by progressively coordinating the agendas of the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU, as well as the NATO Military Committee and the EU Military Committee, to discuss the concept of a European army and its relationship to NATO. The Alliance should lead the way in proposing the adaptation of current FNC structures to expanding EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) programs, namely PESCO and the European Defense Fund (EDF).[12]

[6] Brunsden, Jim, "New German CDU Leader Calls for Creation of European Army," *Financial Times,* February 5, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/3f9319d6-2983-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8.

[7] Frisell, Eva Hagstrom and Emma Sjokvist, "Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defense Capabilities," Swedish Defense Research Agency, February, 2019, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4672--SE/.

[8] Braw, Elisabeth, "Germany is Quietly Building a European Army Under its Command," *Foreign Policy*, May 22, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/germany-is-quietly-building-a-european-army-under-its-command/.

[9] "Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD)," European Defense Agency, 2019, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card).

[10] Glatz, Rainer L. and Martin Zapfe "Ambitious Framework Nation: Germany in NATO," German Institute for International and Security Affairs *SWP Comments*, September 2017, https://www.swp-ber-lin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C35_glt_zapfe.pdf.

[11] Bel, Olivier-Rémy, "Can Macron's European Intervention Initiative Make the Europeans Battle-Ready?" *War on the Rocks*, October 2, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/can-macrons-european-intervention-initiative-make-the-europeans-battle-ready/.

[12] Besch, Sophia and Martin Quencez, "The Importance of Being Protectionist: A Long View of the European Defense Fund," *War on the Rocks*, June 13, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-importance-of-being-protectionist-a-long-view-of-the-european-defense-fund/.

These efforts should also focus on tailoring planning mechanisms like the NDPP and the EU's new CARD to coordinate the output of programs like PESCO to support FNC capability clusters. In order to ensure proper command unity, NATO and the EU should draw upon the Berlin Plus agreement as a means to determine when a European FNC-based force should be employed.13 This mechanism will allow the EU (and its non-NATO members) to draw upon such a force, while maintaining its links to NATO.

Conclusions:

If properly organized, a European army could significantly improve the readiness and capabilities of European NATO members, while also providing an avenue for the development of greater European strategic autonomy. In this context, the FNC originally proposed by Germany provides an ideal model for future force development. It offers a format to integrate current EU and non-EU defense programs and member-states with NATO goals, thereby strengthening Transatlantic bonds through fair burden sharing, while also empowering Europe as a global defense actor.

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[13] Williams, Nicholas, "NATO-EU Cooperation: Don't Forget Berlin Plus!" European Leadership Network, March 26, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/nato-eu-cooperation-dont-forget-berlin-plus/.

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STRATEGIC AUTONOMY RATHER THAN A EUROPEAN ARMY
by Friederike Delille, Germany
*For bibliography see the back of booklet.

There have been two major turmoils provoking the increase talk of a European army: The Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016 and the growing transatlantic tensions. Not only the doubt on reliability of the US engagement within NATO preoccupies Europe but also the US political orientation with a mixture of isolationism and the American attitude of adventurism in foreign policy influences directly or indirectly Europe says Arnaud Danjean, French Mep in the European Parliament (Danjean 2018: 15). The volatile European neighbourhood with raising conflicts also plays a role. Consequently, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) was published in 2016, providing a strategic vision for MS and mentioning for the first time explicitly strategic autonomy as an objective for the Union. This has been an important step in European strategic thinking and it is certainly seen as such in the US, where the security and defence establishment has almost unanimously condemned it as a move that will undermine NATO (Biscop 2019: 2). Yet, the EU insists on the multilateralism it is embedded in; Federica Mogehrini, as High Representative at that time, states in the EUGS's forward „For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand".

The EUGS raises the question if strategic autonomy is compatible with NATO or just a duplication of means? The debate for now has mostly focussed on the military dimension but the concept of strategic autonomy is much broader than only the military field, it contains political, operational and industrial autonomy. Military autonomy only makes sense in the framework of an autonomous foreign policy. "The day another state decides against a specific course of action because it reckons that Europe will oppose it and it doesn't want to risk Europe's ire, that is when the EU will be a true strategic actor" says Sven Biscop (Biscop 2019: 19). He explains, "Europe has to build the capacity and the will to act when our vital interests are at stake, according to a doctrine of minimal intervention and maximal diplomacy. We will know we have achieved strategic autonomy when our power projection capacity figures in the cost-benefit calculations of others". Dr. Jolyon Howorth defines strategic autonomy as 'the ability to act, preferably with other but when necessary alone' (Howorth 2019). Hence, the freedom from external control is one the key to strategic autonomy.

It would be far too easy to tell that all criticism about European strategic autonomy and the accusation of undermining NATO comes from the US side. Especially the MS remain divided on the concept of strategic autonomy. Some MS worry about a US withdrawal from European security and 28 MS have 28 different perceptions on security priorities. Especially the eastern MS due to their proximity to Russia and fear of Russian hybrid warfare reaffirm regularly their strong attachment to NATO. Also the words ‚European army' are highly discussed, even feared. They let us imagine some "soldiers in the same uniform fighting for the EU, marching under the EU flag" say Mauro and Jehin (2019: 2). Yet, an ‚army' is not resumed to a body of soldiers but includes everything that would allow the soldiers to act, namely: an appropriate budget, clear orders, effective

equipment as well as an industrial and technological base capable of producing and developing it (Mauro/Jehin 2019: 2). However, you want to call it, the "possession of an autonomous and integrated military capability to defend European interests, using hard power if necessary and required" is fundamental, articulate the two advocators.

When NATO was created, there was no intention of staying in Europe on the long term. As a response to the St. Malo Summit in 1998, at the semiannual NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her support to any measure that enhance European capabilities, but set out 3 standards for judgement: the 3 D's that are still on the agenda concerning latest European defence initiatives: no to de-linking, no de decoupling and no to discrimination (Hunter 2002: 33). In fact, there is a need of a balance, being autonomous does not mean keeping NATO out. Complementarity is the key word. Article 5 is NATO's raison d'être; the collective defence guarantee obviously is vital for Europe – but is it still for the US asks Joe Coelmont (Coelmont 2019b: 3). Joe Coelmont, former Brigadier General and now at the Egmont Institute, goes even a step further and shares the opinion that the US also need Europe. The US strategic focus has shifted on China, the only actor that could equal or even overtake the US in terms of power and threaten its predominance. Thus the US need the European partnership and NATO remains vital to both (Coelmont 2019: 3-4). A European Defence Union would alter the interrelationship between the EU's MS and NATO. It is unlikely that this would disadvantage transatlantic relationship as it is sometimes presented (Bartels 2017: 50). NATO and the EU are mutually reinforcing themselves by further joint defence efforts, which does not mean competition but rather mutual complementation aiming for security and stability (Bartels 2017: 50). As the European Treaties state it: „the policy of the EU shall be compatible with the CSDP established within NATO", this is an essential point to remember. Closer European defence cooperation will consequently also strengthen NATO and it is crucial for Europe to keep the US engaged in Europe. NATO is still seen as the essential pillar for the territorial defence of Europe deterring Russian aggression. Yet, it is very unlikely that NATO will get involved collectively, except in support roles, in Africa or the Middle-East, where the major European challenges involving terrorism, state failure, climate related natural disaster, resource conflicts and refugees displacement reside (Taylor 2017: 88). Given the grow-

ing complexity and interconnection of security and other policy fields, making use of both sides' strength and expertise, should be the objective rather than deploring differences and putting the blame on the respective other. International developments force Europe to take a stronger role and to split up with NATO the fields where each has its expertise in order to work and face together the future challenges. Not only the EU but what we use to call the „Western world" including NATO is facing a crisis; It is fundamental to keep unity and to work against further division pushed for by some rising populist movements all over Europe and the US.

The concept of European Army still far away from happening, the MS do not agree on what exactly is meant. Internal division is the main obstacle to fill the words with actions. For a common defence one must be very clear on the defence objectives and the effective planning; A common budget is vital, since ‚no money, no army' (Mauro/Jehin 2019: 3). For now it seems that the talk about European army is more of a catch all phrase than a realistic happening. NATO is today the only credible actor able to act and react quickly with hard defence. A European army as many imagine is still far away from now; but this year we assist the 70th anniversary of NATO, and the 20th anniversary of CSDP, so why not aim in the next 30 years to celebrate the European defence complementary to NATO? The window of opportunity for European defence it is there but it has to happen with NATO together. The cooperation does not need to be in a concurrent relation but base on the building up where the other one lacks, they must remain alongside with each their tasks says Coelmont (2019: 9).

Recommendations

NATO, as an alliance of liberal democracies, is losing its accuracy when one looks at the current developments in some of the members. Some members turn towards authoritarianism and away from democracy (e.g. Turkey). At this stage NATO needs to position itself clearly.

The diverse security priorities of the Aliiance's members and the diversity of modern threats, will increase the need for NATO to adapt a more integrated approach of security including cyber- and space security as well as dual-use items

NATO will have to closely cooperate with the EU concerning the initiatives like PESCO and EDF aiming to increase European capability development.

The issue of burden sharing and the 2% on GDP spending by 2024 need to be discussed with all Members, keeping in mind that it is not only about more spending but also more efficient spending, given that security and defence will be further connected to other policy fields.

The EU and NATO must reassess their respective interests and maintain a defined compatibility and complementarity especially concerning issues like dual-use items and cyber security.

Related to the recommendation above, NATO needs to work on internal disagreement in all aspects.

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NATO FUTURE STEPS IN CASE OF EUROPEAN ARMY

by Ana Jovanovska, North Macedonia
*For bibliography see the back of booklet.

Maintaining Armed Forces for the defense of one's own territory is one of the core principles of state sovereignty. This is one of the main reasons why the member states of the EU have not advanced integration of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as far as for other policies. The public opinion on this issue in a large majority of European countries: Most of Europe's citizens are clearly in favor of more integration and cooperation with respect to foreign and security policy.

According to Politico, there are challenges for cooperation on security and defense policy in Europe that are reflected in decisions and memorandums of understanding by defense ministers of EU member states as well as by heads of state and government with respect to an increased cooperation in this policy area.

Overall, the current state of CSDP can be summarized with Nugent (2010: 377): All security and defense activities of the EU are limited to the Petersberg Tasks, "traditional" defense is still a task of NATO or individual countries. EU only acts autonomously, if NATO refuses to get active. Decisions in this policy area are still made by the intergovernmental method which means that national

governments decide whether they participate or not and, if yes, how they participate. European institutions like the Commission or the Parliament are more or less irrelevant.

There is a multitude of reasons why the EU is not able to use its potential and to achieve a complete security and defense policy framework (Nugent 2010: 376ff.).

First, there are a large number of defense alliances and options that cause different national positions towards CSDP. While some EU members are neutral, the majority is part of NATO and seeks a close military cooperation with the United States. OSCE and Ad hoc coalitions, e.g., in the case of the Libya mission in 2011, are also important.

Second, issues of security and defense are closely connected with state sovereignty. There is a large variety of positions on this issue, but in the end no country is willing to fully give up authority over its military.

Third, there are huge differences with respect to the goals and means of CSDP. There are no EU interests, but only national interests. Especially the bigger states quite often prefer to act alone,e.g., like France in Operation Barkhane in the Sahel Region which started in August 2014.

Fourth, overall expenditures on defense seem to be comparatively high, but they are quite low with respect to overall economic performance of the EU members.

Accordingly, there are huge problems with equipment and available skills. Because of the lack of cooperation and coordination there is a huge level of inefficiency, duplicate equipment and skills which finally result in a multifaceted dependence on NATO (Giegerich 2012: 96ff.) and the United States.

On the other hand thanks to Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, European governments have realised that defence budgets can no longer be expendable lines in national budgets. In 2015–16, for the first time in decades, European defence budgets stopped their post-Cold War decline, and most are now on the increase. Even if Europe still falls short of the 2% defence-spending target – the average among European NATO members is 1.44% – it is now closing the US$102 billion gap. (In 2014, the gap was US$138bn.)

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies the European Union has started mobilising significant resources as well. Launched in early 2017, the European Defence Fund is set to reach €1.5bn in 2021, and the Commission hopes to leverage an additional €4bn in investments from member states, for a total of €5.5bn (around US$6.2bn).

In June last year EU High Representative Mogherini proposed the establishment of a European Peace Facility, a fund of potentially €10.5bn annually, which, if agreed, could be used as early as 2021 to cover some of the costs of the military operations led by European armed forces and even regional partners. Despite its name, this would be the first time that the EU has freed up funds to support military operations. This has long been France's wish after years of opposition by Germany, which has argued that the EU treaties forbid providing support to military activities and even capabilities, and a systematic veto from the UK, which perceived it to be in direct competition with NATO.

EU is fast becoming a real actor in defence where it used to be a marginal one: between 2021 and 2027, the EU aims to invest €13bn in defence research and development, and equipment, and €6.5bn for military mobility, to which one may add the off-budget €10.5bn fund for the European Peace Facility.

There were indications that a significant sea change in European attitudes toward shared defence was coming

with the signing of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreement by twenty-three of the twenty-eight European Union Member States was a watershed moment in European history and politics. Enshrined within PESCO are binding plans to develop joint rapid reaction forces, new state-of-the-art European drones and armoured vehicles, and the creation of centralised European military logistics and medical command centres among other shared projects, that might ultimately lay the foundation for a European army in all but name.

The next European Commission should prepare an EU-wide approach on strategic autonomy, by identifying what capacity and investment it needs to make in critical industries and domains to stay competitive globally. Large military institutions are often slow and cumbersome in response to military emergencies. It's recommendable to choose these smaller, agile initiatives that may dampen the dreams of an EU army because they actually fill capability gaps that are lacking within NATO. Partially integrating a country's armed forces with a few close allies can be an effective way to maximize defense capabilities without having to rebuild their army or undergo a costly process of standardizing weaponry like the JEF and PESCO.

Secondly, the integration of European defence should not just be vertical. Its strength will also lie in how horizontally integrated it is with other domains of European power, ranging from economic sanctions policy and cyber measures, to internal security policy.

Thirdly, European defence integration should go beyond pure security responses. Twenty-first century power will be largely determined by the capacity of a state or a group of states to control critical technologies and resources such as space, artificial intelligence or energy. Without some level of autonomy in these domains, Europe's dependence will become its strategic Achilles heel.

Having all in consideration, NATO should decrease its activities in the EU countries and focus to expand collaboration and influence in the Caucus and Western Balkan Region or other parts that are not part of the Union. Through a public diplomacy NATO should boost its political and economic influence and promote democratic values and economic cooperation throughout NSPA and NCI.

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THE CONCEPT OF A EUROPEAN ARMY AND NATO – USEFUL ADDITION OR UNDERMINING CONTRADICTION?
by Susanne Karbe, Germany

NATO has been the guarantor of Western security, including the security of the European Union, for the past decades. Given recent transatlantic tensions however, the question arises whether the EU should gain more independence from the USA in military matters. If this question is answered in the affirmative, a host of new questions arises: how would this independence be created? Through more defence cooperation among the European Member States or through an independent European army? What implications would such developments have for NATO and transatlantic cooperation in military affairs? Might a European army make NATO obsolete, or would it strengthen Western security? In this essay I will discuss this latter question, with a particularized conception of a European army. I will argue that a European army, incorporated into the structure of NATO, would not undermine the alliance and might even increase its flexibility and response capabilities by providing it with a large, harmonised military body.

Towards a European Army?
Military matters have traditionally been an area in which states are unwilling to delegate authority, due to the sensitive nature of the field. At the same time however, deeper cooperation in this area among European states seems vital if the EU is to gain military independence from the United States. While deeper cooperation in the defence sectors of the individual European states is a realistic possibility, the extent to which countries are willing to give up authority over their own militaries in order to contribute to or form a supranational army is questionable.

One idea that has been raised in German political circles is the creation of an independent supranational European army outside the structures of the individual national militaries. Under this view, a European army would be a separate military entity, with its own procurement mechanisms, its own budget, its own military capabilities. Such an army would circumvent the problem that states are unwilling to give up authority over their own militaries, while still increasing European military capabilities and independence. Moreover, joint European military action could still be taken even if one member opposed such action. Such an army would, of course, be much more expensive than the creation of a European army that is simply the agglomeration of national militaries, as it would require creating and maintaining an additional army instead of merging already existing ones. However, in the current political context in which states are wary of further integration and are still focused on maintaining control over issues sensitive to their national securities, this seems to be a realistic option. Whether such expenses are worthwhile requires a careful examination of the aims of the European Union. It requires defining what the European Union wants to be, how much military independence and capabilities it wants to have and how much it wants to be able to take joint military action outside of the territory of the Union. These are questions that are of incredible relevance and importance for any further discussion of the idea of a European army.

The Implications of a European army for NATO

A European army as described above has the potential to have serious implications for NATO. If such a European army simply co-existed beside NATO, it is likely that it would undermine the alliance. The reason for this is that a primary aim for the European army is or would be increased independence from the USA. This means that a European army is likely to develop into a major military power, with similar aims to those of NATO. Absent a clear definition and clear delineation of aims, objectives and areas of action, it is likely that the two alliances would undermine each other, or simply make the other obsolete.

A way to circumvent this issue would be to integrate a European army into the structure of NATO. In order to do this, the EU would have to become a Member State of NATO, alongside all of the individual Member States of the European Union. The EU would thus be a member of the alliance with its own military, just like any other member. In this scenario, a European army would be part of NATO itself, and thus contribute to the aims and objectives of the alliance whenever these overlap with its own. At the same time, the European army would be able to take action on its own in cases where EU interests diverge from US interests, and would bring greater EU independence in military affairs.

Besides preventing the creation of parallel structures and the danger of undermining NATO, an integration of a European army into the alliance could actually strengthen the alliance and transatlantic security. As a large, harmonised military entity with its own military budget and capabilities, a European army would increase the overall military capabilities of NATO. It could additionally increase the alliance's flexibility and capacity of action through increased European cooperation, as EU states would necessarily coordinate their military strategies more.

In the present political circumstances, whether a European army will be established at some point in the future remains uncertain. Irrespective of this uncertainty, more cooperation in military affairs among European Member States within the EU as well as between NATO and the EU is imperative. Firstly, regardless of whether or not a European army will indeed be created, greater cooperation would considerably increase the response capabilities of the alliance. Secondly, greater cooperation ex ante to the creation of a potential European army would decrease the likelihood of conflict between the two military entities should such an army emerge. NATO should thus put even more emphasis on increased cooperation with the EU in the future. Furthermore, NATO should assess whether the idea voiced in this essay in theoretical terms, namely the incorporation of the EU itself into NATO as a Member State in the case a European army as defined above emerges, could in fact be executed realistically.

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Doomed to Boost Insecurity: How the Non-existent EU Army Turned Friends and Foes Against Itself
by Alexandra Ostein, Russia

A newcomer to the office of the European Commission President, Germany's Ursula von der Leyen, started her voyage in the highest echelons of the European politics from pulling back from her vows: to set up a unified EU army. Advocating for the urgent need for Europe to take up its security fate as the German Defence Minister, von der Leyen-the-President endorsed the EU's subordinate alignment with NATO. Despite the EU's estimates that 68% of Europeans support the forming of the EU military forces. A victim of political trade-offs, the EU army ghost (be it still created in the future or not) is doomed to further destabilise the unstable political environment in and around the union.

Army established – EU concerns: juggling with two armed forces
EU's initial concerns on the need to set up its army emerged in 2014 and the subsequent military development around the region. Russia's increased presence in the Black and Baltic Seas received merely a vague military response from the NATO driving force, the US. As the US discontent with the EU financial obligations was much clearer, the EU administrative apparatus launched its wheels to compute all pros and cons of the political divergence from the NATO, but fallaciously transferred this question to the EU foreign policy department. The domestic in-field coordination, the origin of the potential military confrontation, fell by the wayside.

As a result, the costs of political boiling inside the EU are still missing from these calculations. Unlikely to withdraw from NATO, the EU will have to set up and maintain two separate but full-scale armies. Financial costs aside, the EU will have to face the political dilemma it was able to avoid for the last decades: who is the leading martial power among the EU member states with very imbalanced military capabilities. Germany, able to bear the costs for this military project, is out of the question. France, the only EU nuclear power (in case of UK's eventual withdrawal), could seem like a perfect match. Especially for the EU Eastern naval flank – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – concerned for its territorial integrity over a troubled nuclear-armed neighbour. A military idyll could easily collapse, once France

starts requesting the EU joint troops for their economically-driven military operations laying outside the EU area, for instance, in Afrika's Sahel region. Shift the power balance to the south-east, and the EU security agenda will be outweighed by the martial interest of V4 or Mediterranean coastal states, substantially different from the Brussels-centred Europe.

Army abandoned – NATO concerns: EU trustworthiness
Even with the abandoned plans to establish a separate army, the European Commission still goes forward with setting up a directorate-general tasked with the harmonisation of the EU weapons and defence sectors. While it could generate economic surplus for NATO by cutting EU's duplicate financial provisions, politically such military reorientation is likely to entail trust shortages among the members of the military alliance. Any EU state gaining influence inside the newly created martial structure would bet its status inside NATO, as well as the latter's goodwill to provide timely support in case of an emergency. As of the US, it hardly needs the second signal to conclude that the military cooperation that had survived even its identity crisis occurred with the end of the Cold War cracked pressured by hybrid warfare.

Russia's concerns: borderline military enlargement
With its radars tuned to receive military-related signals, the EU Eastern menace – Russia – got two messages favourable for its current policy: political divergence inside NATO and increase of the military capabilities in Europe. Both of these factors confirm (from the perspective of the country's authorities): Russia was right to start playing the security dilemma game well before others have commenced studying its rules. In addition to the military advancement Russia has managed to achieve within two decades of its army-related reforms, it is also advancing in the regions believed to be out of the country's influence for the next decades. One by one, the authorities of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, have indicated inclination to resume their foreign political relations with Russia despite costly pro-democratic campaigns conducted by the EU in the Eastern Partnership countries.

Policy development – EU: foreign policy consequences
By bragging prematurely with its military prospects, the EU created three main political problems to deal with in the future. First: the US and NATO's loss of trust that would likely stop tolerating the EU's underpayment to

the military alliance. Second: a clear signal sent to Russia on the necessity to further enhance its military capabilities in the European region. Third, a weakened position in a political battle over the hearts and minds of the EaP countries after the decade of the pro-democratic financial contributions to these states. Created or not, the European army already shrank the EU political influence in and around the region and will likely further destabilise the political environment.

NATO: policy recommendations
EU's abortive plans to set up its army gave NATO carte blanche on calling the EU member states for meeting the criteria of 2% GDP spending on defence. With a view not to impairing the countries' transatlantic relations with the US, NATO's approach to this task should be based on bilateral trade-offs: in exchange for the increased financial contributions, NATO could set up in Europe bi- and trilateral military brigades and grant senior positions in these new structures exclusively to Europeans. A particular task for NATO will be to maintain its occasional presence in the EaP countries, encouraging them to launch or continue their military reforms in line with the NATO standards.

Alexandra Ostein is a political and security analyst working externally at the London-based HIS Markit consulting company. She provides daily and long-term country risk analysis, forecast, and due diligence reports with the focus on political, operational, and security risks on Ukraine, Russia, and the South Caucasus. Alexandra is also a master's student at the Berlin-based Hertie School of Governance studying international security and international relations. Before moving to Germany, Alexandra worked as a political and economic TV journalist in her home country of Russia and in Ukraine, where she has conducted many research field trips, including to the government-controlled territories of the Donbass conflict zone.

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BOOSTING DEFENCE COOPERATION
by Camilla Ravagnan, Italy

In the last years, relevant and increasing steps consisting of concrete EU initiatives have been made forwards towards a European Union of security and defence. Across Europe it is agreed that hard power is now essential to the bloc's survival. In France, Emmanuel Macron has called for "a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for for action".

Since the creation of the EU founding fathers thought that Europe would be forever peaceful and globally respected with a common defence.

Thus, there have been many attempts to create a European army but they all failed, as the European Community of Defence in the 1950s.

Even if the logic of power and of geopolitics in the 1950s was different from the one of today, the intuition behind the Defence community is still valid.

Most Europeans want the EU to do more to boost security and defence. Having a European community of defence would mean to have a "strategic autonomy" for taking foreign decision. Federica Mogherini referred to this concept at Collège d'Europe in the beginning of October 2019 at the conference "Implementing the EU Global Strategy - challenges and opportunities ". The EU could indeed be able to take full responsibility for its security.

It is in EU interest to be military capable of acting autonomously if and when it is necessary.

In this regards, autonomy does not equal to acting unilaterally. A EU Community of Defence would strengthen the multilateral system through EU actions, accomplishing missions that are requested by their host countries or mandated by the United Nations.

Indeed, a EU army would not act unilaterally, but it would cooperate militarily with partners such as the UN and NATO as it already did in the past and does nowadays, but in a more efficient way.

The strategic autonomy looks more like a cooperative autonomy in these regards.

Military means are with no doubt still essential for shaping a global security environment that is conducive to peace and security in Europe. It is a common say that

what maintains Europe secure depends on security outside EU borders, so with a European Army the EU with its partners would be able to address both the issue on security outside and inside its borders.

Looking at the budget, probably the one of the European Union wouldn't really increase so much since we know that today the EU collectively with its member states spends the second largest amount on defence spending after the US. Building up EU defence is not about spending more, rather it is about spending more efficiently. The actual budget is deeply fragmented; according to the European Parliament, 26.4 billion euros are wasted every year. Indeed, having a common framework in the field would avoid doublings, overcapacity and barriers to procurement, and it would therefore increase efficiency.

Also, the military capability would allow to face current problematic issues. Military power could be used to dismantle businesses of human smugglers. In Operation Sophia, militaries saved lives and demonstrated that the UE can act fast when it wants to (the operation was launched in just two months).

As already mentioned an EU army would be necessary for political, security, but also economic reasons. An army is a feature that a supranational entity such as the UE has to have able in a multilateral world.
Last but not least, a European army could be a solution to overcome the growing skepticism in some European countries and to build consensus.

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It is important to notice that after the Global Strategy was adopted there has been more progress than ever on European Defence coordination but still a lot has to be done.
Some important and concrete steps towards an army have been made. The initiatives implemented provide more resources, stimulate efficiency, facilitate cooperation and support the development of capabilities. Some examples include the launching in December 2017 of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched, the creation of the First unified command Center for European military missions with the functions to invest, research, train militaries, and act together when necessary; and also, not last in order of importance the European Defence Fund was launched in 2017, for the first time indeed the EU budget is used to co-fund defence cooperation, providing both prac tical and financial incentives for collaborative research, joint development and acquisition of defence equipment and technology.

In conclusion, a European Army is important not just for EU citizens but for the whole world. Europe has to continue to be seen as a global security provider, an actor not fighting wars, but rather prevent them and stabilize countries after conflicts. To help healthy improvements in Europe, NATO should not perceive developments towards and European Army as an attack to the alliance but it should rather improve cooperation with the new military entity.

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Camilla Ravagnan is a Master's student, studying International Affairs at the Hertie School in Berlin. She was awarded her Bachelor's degree in Political Science from LUISS University in 2017, and her Master's degree in International Cooperation from the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) in 2019. At ISPI she also got a Diploma in European Affairs. In addition to her academic pursuits, Camilla Ravagnan serves on the YATA Milano's board and she is an Ambassador for Rome Model United Nations 2020. She has interned at the Asian Development Bank in 2017 and in 2020 she will do an internship at the Italian's Prime Minister's Office.

PANEL 3

TROUBLED WATERS?
NATO's RELATIONSHIP WITH
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERANNEAN

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NATO's Southern flank lies on the natural border of the Mediterranean Sea and poses a set of unique challenges to the alliance. The region calls for a policy response framework that reflects the heterogeneity and instability of its landscape. Libya and Syria are the examples, which have defined the insecurity of the region, yet few solutions have been proposed so far. NATO's interventions in both countries, with an aim to protect civilians from Gaddafi regime on the one hand and to contribute to the international coalition fighting ISIS on the other, have created a responsibility on NATO's part for the future of these societies. Indeed, it is in the interest of NATO member states to build on existing foundations and revisit the questions of priorities in this region. The migration flows triggered on land and sea by the failed states are a persistent challenge with direct domestic political consequences for European members of the alliance. The current situation poses several questions about NATO's ability to contribute to peace-building efforts.

What are the options for lasting conflict resolution in the Mediterranean basin, and how can NATO contribute? What are the priorities of the alliance in the region? What are the possibilities for cooperation between the EU, as a major regional actor, and NATO? How should the policy response reflect the heterogeneity of the region?

PANELISTS

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Sebastian has been working as a program officer with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) until 2018. As part of the institute's program on USA/Transatlantic Relations, Sebastian has focused his research on German and U.S. foreign and security policy, NATO and CSDP as well as maritime security. Between 2016 and 2018, Sebastian was a member of the board of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) Germany. He is an alumnus of the Bucerius Summer School on Global Governance (2017), the Manfred Wörner Seminar (2016) and the U.S. Department of State's International Visitor Leadership Program (2014). Furthermore he is a member of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the German Atlantic Association (DAG). Sebastian studied political sciences and peace and conflict studies and currently works for the Federal Foreign Office.

Paul Ritacco
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Paul Ritacco is the President of CFS Compliance and CFS Political, a campaign finance and consulting firm that specializes in providing a range of financial services for federal campaigns, political action committees (PACs), and party committees. Paul recently completed 23 years of government service, having been a Chief of Staff and a Senior Advisor to more than 30 members of the U.S. Congress, where he was responsible for foreign policy, Helsinki Commission issues, defense, financial services, campaign finance, and the budget among others. Paul is a double graduate of Georgetown University and the Georgetown University Law Center. Additionally, Paul studied economics in Georgetown University's program at SGPiS in Warsaw, Poland in 1989.
He also has extensive experience working with the U.S. military on issues throughout the Pacific and Atlantic theatres.

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INTRODUCTION AND MODERATION

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Imre Bartal was born in Hungary and grew up in the UK after his parents moved there when he was ten years old. After completing high school and college (UK), he went onto study Political Science with a focus on Eastern Europe at University College London. After an Erasmus year in Brandenburg, he decided to return to live in Berlin and is currently studying for an MA in European Studies at the European-University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) on the German-Polish border. His interest in security and defence issues stems from his fascination with the most fundamental and existential questions of political life. He is a member of the German Atlantic Association, the Young Transatlantic Initiative of Germany and winner of the Karl A. Lamers Peace Foundation Prize on the topic of NATO's future. His interests are mainly focused on European security, the NATO alliance and USA-Germany relations.

Patrick Senft, Germany
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Patrick Senft is currently studying Security Studies in The Hague but also has a strong background in the natural sciences, thanks to having studied Physics at LMU Munich. Since 2017 he has been working as a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research where he studied two conflicts in South Asia. In that role, he visited a conflict area and has conducted research on the ground. Additionally, he has been an active member of YATA Germany and the Foreign Affairs Association, in this capacity he has co-organized and attended events in Germany and abroad. Complementing his interests in conflicts, he is a certified Firearm Specialist and has applied that knowledge regularly in his work.

ESSAYS OF YOUNG LEADERS

Protecting Borders = Protecting Security? NATO's Unity in Disunity
by Michelle Busch, Germany

A Realist Approach for NATO vis-à-vis the Mediterranean Region
by Giordani Dimitrov, Bulgaria

Authoritarian Regimes Are Stable Until They Aren't
by Marcel Dirsus, Germany

Troubled Waters? NATO's Relationship with North Africa and the Mediterranean Region
by Gonçalo Ferreira, Portugal

NATO in North Africa: Threats to Security and NATO's Normative Framework
by Alexander Köhler, Germany

Crisis Afoot – NATO Amidst Turkey's Offensive in Northern Syria
by Marlies Murray, Germany and USA

Towards a Multilateral Threat-Solution: Solidarity and Cooperation
by Jessica Phung, France

PROTECTING BORDERS = PROTECTING SECURITY? NATO'S UNITY IN DISUNITY
by Michelle Busch, Germany

Due to the faster changing security environment of the 21st century, the NATO member states follow rather its own security interests than a common NATO policy. The growing number of nationalist parties in government suggest that Waltz' theory of rationalist and egoistic states is more applicable in today's world than states delegating power to institutions as liberal approaches describe. This is the main argument this paper will follow. To answer this question, this contribution focuses on the basic aspects of what makes an organization a stable entity and how this explains NATO's behaviour.

NATO, like every other military cooperation mechanism, is dependent on its members' capacity to defend the group. Therefore, to understand an institution's strength, understanding what makes its members strong and stable is key. For that, this paper builds on Jellinke's Trias which sets the basis for international law standards. He understands a state as a social construct within a given territory with a specific people who are governed by a state power (Jellinek, 1914). According to this definition, a state is only functioning if all three elements are sufficiently applied at the same time. However, looking at the high number of border disputes, which can be found on all continents, one could ask if this definition is still applicable. One classical example is the dispute between France and Italy concerning the nationality of certain peaks on the Mont Blanc. One would hardly acknowledge two of Europe's biggest states as non-functioning states. Therefore, this paper suggests, unsolved border disputes will not have a destabilizing effect on a state's own functioning as long as this particular border is shared with another stable country.

This paper therefore asks to what extent it is possible to apply this definition to institutions which are heavily dependent on its Member States' stability which in turn depends on stable borders, or in simple terms: To what extent do stable external borders contribute to an institution's stability?

Growing instability, disregard of human rights and abuse of political violence can spill over to neighbouring countries, as the Arab Spring is a clear example. The Mediterranean Sea is an external and rather hard border to protect of the Alliance. Therefore, it is not surprising that NATO took command of the military operation following the UN Security Resolution 1973 of March 2011 in order to re-stabilize Libya, or to say, its direct neighbourhood. However, not all members were equally supportive of this military operation.

Germany abstained in the UNSC vote because of domestic discussions and 14 other members did not participate in the military action at all[14]. What stands out, is that almost all Mediterranean countries did go along. Their self- interest in a stable neighbourhood is one among other sufficient but not necessary conditions for their operational activity. True, states taking part in this operation might have different reasons to do so, but protecting its external borders is becoming even more important.

The closure of ports in the Mediterranean region for refugees and migrants is only one but rather dramatic example. However, this is certainly not a NATO policy in itself but a sovereign decision. This verifies my initial argument that protecting its own domestic interests tops common goals of the Alliance. The high income of refugees over the Mediterranean, an open border, was seen as a destabilizing factor, which also explains the voting behaviour in favour of nationalist parties, namely in those countries that did participate in the military operation.

All in all, NATO was capable of going to Libya in the first place which supports my initial argument that the Member States do not always follow only the Alliance's goal of protecting itself from external threats. Rather it can be understood as an Alliance of different members' goals and interests of protecting themselves.

Recommendations
(1) **Allow more freedom to member states to achieve security goals**. Specialized member teams are more applicable to address new security threats (esp. cyber-attacks) in which only those states engage who are directly affected or have a big interest in. This way, the Alliance becomes more effective

(2) **Help member states protecting external borders to the South and North**. Security is not only about deterrence to the East but also

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[14] NATO states participating in Libya: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

helping states to monitor the Mediterranean or the Arctic.

(3) **Include internal disruptions and instability to its goals.** Those instabilities can occur in form of (sub)- nationalist movements (e.g. Catalonia/Brexit), economic or other domestic crises.

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A REALIST APPROACH FOR NATO VIS-À-VIS THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION
by Giordani Dimitrov, Bulgaria

Nearly a decade since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the region of North Africa and the Levant is in a dire political, economic, social and security situation. Many of the authoritarian regimes that held the region in an iron grip found themselves unable to answer the demands of their populations and were swept off by revolutions. Their toppling was much applauded by the international community, and many in the West believed it was the beginning of a path towards democratization. However, as the revolutions quickly developed into bloody civil wars and the countries became nests for terrorist insurgencies, an important fact was realised – the societal structure of the countries where the revolutions had transpired, was profoundly different from the structure of European societies, and the revolutions therefore wouldn't lead to the results that similar events led in Europe. Instead of a national identity for the majority of the population, you had a tribal and (ethno-)religious one; instead of a secular social discourse, you had highly religious societies, in which a secular political elite would simply not thrive; the economic system was oligarchic, unstable and highly dependent on the state, with a middle class too small to become the backbone of a democratic society. Of the three regional countries that were most affected by the Arab Spring – Egypt, Syria and Libya, only the first is in a stable state, much of that the work of its new authoritarian leader, General

el-Sisi. At the other end are Syria and Libya, which have almost completely lost their basic elements of statehood, either divided into tribal and ethnic territories or carved up into spheres of influence by foreign powers. The question now is what is to be done regarding this volatile region that is neighbouring NATO and, in its current state, represents an opportunity for the Alliance's adversaries to take strategic positions in their struggle for the remaking of the regional and global order.

The Mediterranean Sea is NATO's southern border, and everything that transpires in the region affects its security directly. Now that the Alliance is faced with the challenges of an ever more expanding Russian and Iranian military and political presence in the region, it has to act, in order to preserve the interests of its member-states. It can only achieve this through a unified and pragmatic approach, tailor-made security cooperation initiatives and an active diplomatic dialogue with the regimes that have been or will soon be established in the region. At this very moment, the Alliance is not acting in unison – France and Italy have different approaches to the Libyan conflict, while Turkey is pursuing its own strategy in Syria. It is extremely important for the success of any NATO undertaking in the region that the allies manage to reconcile and reach a compromise over their different interests. It is also clear now that, perhaps except Tunisia, the region will revert back to authoritarian rule and the fragile stability it provides. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad is now close to regaining control over almost all of the country's territory, while in Libya, the candidate with most chances to unify the country is Marshal Haftar, one

of the local warlords. While NATO should certainly encourage political dialogue between the various groups in those two countries, with the goal of getting the biggest possible concessions out of al-Assad and Haftar, it should also prepare itself for a future in which it will have to establish ties with those regimes, in order to stop them from becoming satellites of its adversaries. Here an important role will play NATO members' financial resources, which are asymmetrical to those of Russia or Iran and which would be badly needed by Syria and Libya once they start the process of rebuilding their countries. That financial help should be connected with a wider understanding for security cooperation so that those regimes become slowly integrated into NATO's net of partnerships with its southern neighbourhood. An example of the type of approach that NATO has to

adopt regarding Syria and Libya is the Cold War-relationship between the Western Bloc and the Iberian regimes of Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain. The West established a careful partnership with those countries, particularly in the military and security sphere, while not integrating them completely into the Euro-Atlantic structures until the peaceful evolution of those dictatorships into modern liberal democracies. This did not happen overnight – it took a careful management of the West's part, in order for those regimes to thaw and gradually liberalize, which eventually made them ripe for democratization. A similar development may one day take place in Syria and Libya, but for that to happen, the painful process of authoritarian rule must first be endured.

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AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ARE STABLE UNTIL THEY AREN'T
by Marcel Dirsus, Germany

Jimmy Carter called Iran a "sea of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world"[15] a year before the Islamic Revolution brought down the man he had described as respected and loved by his people.[16] In January 1989, Erich Honecker, the leader of the German "Democratic" Republic declared that the Wall would

stand for another 50 or 100 years.[17] In September of the same year, Germany's permanent representative to East Germany said "the state security service will continue to ensure that the atmosphere of upheaval does not develop into actual upheaval."[18] In hindsight, betting on the Shah or the Stasi sounds ridiculous. And yet, we're doing much the same by betting on the survival of oppressive regimes around the Mediterranean in the name of projecting stability.

NATO's first priority in the region is the direct defence of member states. After that, projecting stability is high on the list. The argument in favour of doing so is highly convincing, our method of doing so is not. Political sta-

[15] Weisman, S.R. (1981). *For America, A Painful Reawakening*. New York Times, 17 May

[16] Glass, A. (2018). *Carter lauds shah of Iran, Dec. 31, 1977*. Politico, 30 December. Accessed 15 October 2019. Available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/30/this-day-in-politics-december-31-1077103

[17] Zander, C. (2019). *Der Weg zum Mauerfall – eine Chronik*. ZDF, 19 August. Accessed 15 October 2019. Available at: https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/heute/chronik-mauerfall-100.html

[18] Sarotte, M.E. (2014). *The Collapse*. Basic Books: New York, p. 32-33

bility in the region brings a host of benefits. Stability is not synonymous with capacity, but stable states are more likely to be able to help us fight illegal migration or terrorism than states that are plagued by instability. They are more likely to be able to protect their borders, share valuable intelligence or prevent extremists from launching attacks on us from their soil.

For that reason, Western actors expend a significant amount of energy, political capital and money on cooperating with states around the Mediterranean regardless of the nature of their government. Members of the European Union and NATO aside, most of the countries around the Mediterranean are hybrid regimes or outright authoritarian. Israel is an obvious exception. Tunisia, which just held Presidential elections, is the only country that has emerged from the Arab Spring as a democracy. Despite the repression, the censorship and the violation of basic freedoms, individual member states and the alliance itself cooperate extensively with authoritarian regimes. There are common exercises, training, military aid, help with security sector reform and on and on. Ignoring obvious moral concerns, that's problematic for at least two reasons.

We might provide equipment and training to security forces in North Africa to help countries in the region protect their borders for our benefit, but the same weapons and skills can also be used by authoritarian regimes to cement their grip on power. We almost certainly prolong the survival of these regimes through our actions. More than that, we do so in a way that doesn't provide incentives to ruthless leaders to become more accountable to their population – just the opposite. The more confident you are that you can subdue dissent through force with little consequence, the less likely you are to respond to the demands of people in the street. That doesn't go unnoticed by the local population. After designating Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally in the summer of 2015, the US State Department released a statement saying that its designation "sends a strong signal of our support for Tunisia's decision to join the world's democracies."[19] The announcement was reportedly met with cynicism by Tunisians who hadn't forgotten that the United States and other Western nations have supported dictators in the region for dec-

ades.[20] It's all too easy to discard public opinion, but it always matters. In 2016, for example, the Tunisian government rejected a big NATO grant.[21] The decision wasn't entirely about public skepticism towards NATO, but it undoubtedly played a role.

Authoritarian regimes can look stable, but they are always at significant risk of being toppled. It's possible to govern against your own population, but it's difficult to do so for an extended period of time. Whether it's through coups or mass uprisings, most of the regimes we work with will collapse sooner rather than later. When that day comes, it might even be more difficult to pick up the pieces because we have extended their survival for years or even decades.

Given our interests in the region, some form of cooperation with strongmen and monarchs is a necessary evil. We don't need to revolutionise our approach, we need a careful recalibration of our policies to ensure that they advance long-term interests when the situation permits it. NATO should invest in qualitative and quantitative tools to understand regime instability. It should evaluate to what extent existing policies contribute to the survival of individual authoritarian regimes in the region. The alliance should determine whether that's an objective. In the cases in which it is not, NATO should attempt to find alternative ways to achieve its short-term goals around the Mediterranean. Resources are finite, more of them should be used to support democracies like Tunisia. It won't always be possible to advance our interests without prolonging misery for the people around us, but we should spend more energy, political capital and money on trying. It's the least we can do.

[19] Kirby, J. (2015). *Designation of Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally*. US Department of State, 10 July 2015. Accessed 15 October 2019. Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm

[20] Ghilès, F. (2018). *Tunisia's delicate balancing act with NATO*. Middle East Eye, 21 June 2018. Accessed 15 October 2019. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/tunisias-delicate-balancing-act-nato

[21] Profazio, U. (2018). *Tunisia's reluctant partnership with NATO*. IISS, 6 April 2018. Accessed 15 October 2019. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/04/tunisia-reluctant-partnership-nato

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TROUBLED WATERS? NATO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION
by Gonçalo Ferreira, Portugal

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 first and foremost to reinforce transatlantic links amongst democratic countries, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was still viewed as a non-priority region. Although some of the allies had recognized the importance of this region for NATO's security, it was only taken into account in bilateral relations. Only with NATO's Mediterranean approach, beginning with the membership of France and Italy, and later Greece and Turkey, can we start to observe an interest in this region by NATO allies. Yet, although a third of NATO's members had borders with the Mediterranean, they have so far failed to formulate a coherent and strong strategical vision for the MENA region, thus side-lining, once again, NATO's relevance for this region.

This lack of vision changed in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Gulf war, which highlighted the importance of this region for the alliance's security and NATO finally realized that the security in Europe was directly and indirectly affected by security in the Mediterranean, as addressed by the North Atlantic Council Communiqué of 1993.

Today, NATO's opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa derive largely from its partnerships with states who are more active there, being, primarily, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The recent alarm for this region is mostly due to the alliance's deep concern about the negative consequences of events in the re-

gion for the security of the Mediterranean. These include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil wars, failed states and rising terrorist organizations, which are putting the central front of the alliance's strategical interest on the southern front, thus putting the need for stability of the MENA region on top of NATO's agenda. Through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) programme for example, North African countries are already entering NATO's Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), aimed at strengthening their capacity to fight terrorism and improve security along their borders.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it best while summarising NATO's approach to the South in the following manner: "To protect our territory, we must be willing to project stability beyond our borders. If our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure". With respect to these remarks and looking ahead, I would propose three main policies for NATO's future engagement with the countries of this region:

- First, a firm offer should be made by NATO allies to assist countries in political transitions with defence and security sector reform. This includes defence planning and budgeting and encouraging "good security governance".

- Second, I suggest a further deepening of NATO's current partnerships in matters where it shares the same values and interests as other countries in the region, to tailor our cooperation even better to the specific concerns and requirements of partner countries. At the same time, any tailored programmes will need to continue to address not just the individual

needs of our partners, but also our common security challenges like countering proliferation, the fight against terrorism, and building maritime security.

- Third, and finally, there is a greater need for capacity building -- to help the countries of the region to better address their own security, but also to better participate in the international community's peacekeeping and crisis management operations – including those led by NATO

These recommendations could involve greater military-to-military cooperation, and more opportunities to take part in NATO training, exercises and education programmes. But it could also involve more structured cooperation between NATO and organisations like the African Union and the Arab League. NATO should certainly be open to exploring all those opportunities and we hope our Mediterranean partners are too.

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NATO IN NORTH AFRICA: THREATS TO SECURITY AND NATO'S NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
by Alexander Köhler, Germany

Transatlantic relationships have shifted and much of the basis of action, the agreement on fundamental rights and responsibilities, appears to be eroding. On top of changes in political culture and a declining consensus on human rights, all major challenges in global politics are at the same time interpreted as imminent security threats. Discussions on immigration to the European Union are either influenced by or born out of security concerns, whilst the biggest challenge of our time, climate change, is intrinsically linked to international security. Resource shortages and the movement of people due to rising sea levels will undoubtedly have consequences for security policy.

In North Africa, both NATO and the European Union are faced with a dilemma: how can one ensure effective security whilst upholding the self-proclaimed values of universal human rights? Does opportunism prevail over values, short-term gains over long-term calculations?

Security and moral obligations are not mutually exclusive. NATO member states, in general, respect and recognize basic human rights as the very foundation their nations are built on and have acted upon in the past.[22] The aforementioned challenges highlight that security remains paramount in an increasingly unstable world and security-policy makers must ask themselves the question whether the international framework remains one of self-help and egoism or if these have become insufficient determinants of action.

Hence, the problem does not necessarily lie in the question of which policy approach is to be taken, but which is much more substantial. The actual discussion should be concerned with whether there are moral obligations and responsibilities inherent in NATO's structures or if it is merely an institutional shell, which is then filled with the moral priorities and narratives of its member states. Does NATO, as in the case of the Kosovo war 'need to take up arms and use military force in support of a just

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[22] Henkin, L. (1999). Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention". American Journal of International Law, 93(4), 824-828. doi:10.2307/2555346

cause.'?23 Only when this question is answered can one move on to specific policy recommendations in the context of North Africa and the Mediterranean.

In the context of rising populism and the decline of multilateralism, NATO should see itself as a success story of interstate cooperation and take an active approach in upholding its values. It has always drawn on universal human rights in its justifications for action and intervention and has now the unique chance of establishing itself as a force thereof, instead of simply following the realist (and sometimes fatalist) approach some of its member states have resorted to. If NATO understands human rights as integral parts of its structure and institutional framework, authoritarian trends in global politics should not reflect in its outward behaviour but rather be identified as factors to be actively countered in its security policy.

Such a step comes with substantial responsibility and might seem like a commitment too high for an organization wanting to preserve the most fundamental of all national interests, security. However, in the long run, it can be expected to pay off. Establishing itself as a credible force fostering human rights and cooperation will give NATO legitimacy as conflicts get more complex and far-reaching.
In the context of NATO engagement in North Africa and the Mediterranean Region, following the self-understanding discussed above would mean that NATO should:

(1) Be highly sceptical and careful in its interaction with regimes and security forces on the North African coast. As recent developments have shown, supporting regimes which repeatedly commit human rights violations domestically for the sake of upholding superficial stability will have the reverse effect in the long run. Instead, the focus should be on supporting legitimate regimes in alignment with NATO values.

(2) Be outspoken and clear in its role as a champion of human rights as the underlying principle of security policy. It is unparalleled in its power and impact as a security organization and should not be afraid of standing its ground

in the face of an eroding liberal culture in many of its member states.

Recently, NATO has shown signs of following this direction. The invasion of Northern Syria by the Turkish military, which is not sanctioned by international law, has been condemned by NATO and its member states. Nils Schmid, foreign affairs spokesperson of the German social democrats, has confirmed that as Turkey is acting in violation of international law and the mutual defence clause does not apply.24 It remains to be seen whether NATO as a whole will follow this line of argument.

NATO needs to challenge and affirm its own self-understanding. It was born out of the idea of maintaining security in a world shaken by two world wars and has now the opportunity to become a positive force within the fight to maintain structures that foster security. Security policy in North Africa may constitute the first instance in which it can show its independent voice, a voice of reason and respect for basic rights.

23 Vershbow, A. (1999). 'Shared Values As Much Worth Defending As Territory. Speech at the Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany.

24 Schmid, N., & Büüsker, A. (2019). NATO und die Militäroffensive der Türkei - "Die Frage nach einem Bündnisfall stellt sich nicht." Retrieved 15 October 2019, from https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/nato-und-die-militaeroffensive-der-tuerkei-die-frage-nach.694.de.html?dram:article_id=460985

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CRISIS AFOOT – NATO AMIDST TURKEY'S OFFENSIVE IN NORTHERN SYRIA
by Marlies Murray, Germany and USA

With the United States (US) abandoning its former Kurdish ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) allying with the Assad-Regime and Turkish President Erdogan threatening to route a migration wave of 3.6 million refugees into Europe all within a few weeks, the world seems to be taking fast-paced steps into a new crisis. This crisis is about to reshape the Mediterranean Sea region. The Republic of Turkey is showing no sense of responsibility towards its fellow NATO member countries leaving little time for NATO to take action.

On October 6th US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops in Syria prompting Turkey to launch 'Operation Peace Spring', a defensive incursion operation into northern Syria to combat the SDF fighters. Turkey considers the SDF a terrorist organization that is supposedly linked to the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK). What Erdogan has characterized as a 32km 'safe zone' has, as of October 15th, caused the displacement of about 160,000 people and the death of dozens of civilians, according to the UN. Ultimately, Erdogan will drive the Kurdish forces from this safe zone thus providing an opportunity to return Syrian refugees back to Syrian territory. The SDF, now cooperating with the Assad-Regime, is struggling to ward off the Turkish assault, which may lead to a clash between Turkey and Syria. With US troops out of the region and no allies to back the SDF, Assad reclaims his former territory and along with his allies Russia and Iran fills the void of power. And as if things weren't problematic enough, it has also been confirmed that hundreds of detained Islamic State (IS) jihadists are escaping prison camps, allegedly freed by partisan forces supporting Turkey during its military operation. The US and several European nations are now responding with sanctions, tariffs and stopping arms sales to Turkey. These measures have so far not influenced Erdogan to change his course of action. In fact, it appears that US and European sanctions have only angered him more. Erdogan's initial reaction to the sanctions was to threaten to release the 3.6 million refugees hosted by Turkey into Europe, which is Erdogan's strong bargaining chip over the European Union (EU). A new migration wave of this size heading towards the EU will bring increased human trafficking and terrorist activity. Moreover, it will rekindle the chaos and disagreement amongst the EU countries in regard to shared responsibility in taking in people seeking refuge.

It is now up to NATO to responsibly position itself to affect an outcome in order to stabilize the situation. Possible ideas would be for NATO forces to serve as peacekeepers in the 'safe zone' to separate the combatants. This mission would help protect civilian life, reincarcerate IS terrorists that have fled and stabilize the conflicted border. In the case that Turkey should leave its alliance with NATO, NATO must consider new strategic alliances to fill the void. A possible partner could be a neighboring country with its presence in the region, as for instance Bulgaria, as it shares a common border with Turkey and could absorb the impact of bases that would be lost if Turkey left NATO. It is in immediate distance of the Bosporus, connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea Region. In addition, Bulgaria offers NATO a buffer region in the event of a Turkish-Russian alliance.

Foremost, considering that Turkey seems to feel no responsibility in considering its NATO members' perspective on this conflict, perhaps NATO should seek consequences for its member. Even if all other NATO members consider it suitable to revoke Turkey's membership from the organization, there would be no mechanism in NATO's founding 1949 Washington Treaty that would enable the organization to do so. But NATO could consider the option to put Turkey under pressure by taking a vote to suspend the member's voting privilege due to a clear violation of the organization's aims and interests. Additionally, NATO could henceforth reoffer Cyprus a membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, which is something Turkey would veto under any circumstance as a full voting member. The prospect of this action might make Turkey consider other alternatives to current policies and seek to guard its position within the NATO alliance.

In conclusion, Turkey remains a strategically important ally because of its geographical position in the region and its large army, second in size in NATO after the United States. NATO must clearly express its stance in this crisis and be consistent with Turkey in honoring its responsibility as a member of the organization. Keeping alliance-countries safe from terrorism, preventing human trafficking and establishing a peaceful resolution to the current crisis are NATO's priorities and mission in the Mediterranean Sea region. These objectives are increasingly put at stake by current events if no action is taken.

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Catarina Neves is a Portuguese master's candidate at KU Leuven. With a background in Languages, International Relations and Human Rights, Catarina has moved to Belgium to be closer to the heart of the European Union and to better understand its role as an external actor. Over the past few years, she has demonstrated great interest towards international cooperation, gender equality and education. From organizing political simulations to participating in political meetings as a youth activist, Catarina is trying to pave the way for non-partisan young voices to be heard in high-level decision-making processes. She has also been committed to several youth projects, such as Bringing Europeans Together Association (BETA) Portugal (which she co-founded and later presided); HeForShe Portugal (to which she served as an ambassador); and to her projects with the Council of Europe (as a Youth Delegate) and the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as a Civil Society representative).

TOWARDS A MULTILATERAL THREAT-SOLUTION: SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION
by Jessica Phung, France

The Mediterranean Sea has been challenged by its geopolitical situation, being the central route for Transport and commerce. Moreover, it is a nodal point with the Suez Canal and the straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, linking all the continents together. From the Bronze Age to Byzantine Empire and the Muslim conquests, the Mediterranean Sea has been at the epicenter of conflicts. Since 2015, the mass migration involving millions of people and thousands of deaths, going mainly from Syria and Libya to Europe, emphasizes the key role player of the Mediterranean Sea.

The Mediterranean region brings together nine European countries (Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, and Cyprus) while gathering the five North African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), and four Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey). As seen, all these countries have distinct cultural backgrounds as well as face different economic, political, and social inequalities. For these reasons, the disparities have added difficulty in promoting a general policy over the region's security. NATO's initiative to respond to North African issues and the Mediterranean region is lacking, as Chinese investments and power are increasing in Africa. How can NATO evolve and extend its outreach, as current threats differentiate from the Soviet Union external threat? Therefore, I suggest that NATO clarifies and redefines its common strategic goal. Then, partnerships with organizations, such as the European Union and the United Nations, enable short-term as well as a long-term security: threats need to be taken care of in surface as well as in depth.

I. NATO and its operations, fighting against terrorism: a new common strategic goal?

The original main purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to build an intergovernmental military alliance for a collective security due to the rising tensions with external threats such as the Soviet Union and the spread of communism.
I believe that as asymmetrical threats are growing and expanding, NATO has a duty to "deter, defend, disrupt, and protect" against terrorist activities. This controver-

sial claim comes as NATO is lacking a common vision and common cultures among NATO member states. Moreover, as many member states have been impacted directly (terrorist attacks) or indirectly (mass migration) by terrorist threats, NATO has a duty to secure its members.
NATO's first actions in the Mediterranean Sea were in response to the terrorist attacks in 2001. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO conducted for the first time an operation in direct application of the defense clause, called "operation active endeavor" in 2001. This operation main goals were to "deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist activity" (NATO, 2016). In relation to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treated, signed in 1949 by the member states, and following the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the members have the "right of individual or collective self-defense" to the "use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area". In other words, an armed attack to one member is an attack to all members. Therefore, NATO has the duty and the right to defend its members. For this reason, NATO defended and secured the Mediterranean trade route by tracking and controlling ships and rescuing civilians in the Mediterranean Sea. The operation was network-based, utilizing on-call units and rapid operations rather than deployed forces. NATO's maritime expertise helped deterring maritime terrorist activity, linked to criminal organized groups and the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. The operation reached its apogee when cooperating with non-members in 2004. From asking for identity and activity to inspecting documentation and the cargo, NATO forces hailed over 128,000 merchant vessels and caught 172 suspect ships (Global Security). Due to the success and the need for further security, the operation ended with the operation Sea Guardian in 2016. The Warsaw Summit of 2016 agreed to create a maritime operation, capable of a wide range of maritime security tasks: maritime situational awareness, counterterrorism at sea, and support to capacity-building.
Through the evolution of the Operation Active Endeavor, NATO has expanded from a military defense actions to a maritime security operation.

II. EU, an influential actor for a NATO presence in Africa

I believe that a partnership between the European Union and NATO could strengthen NATO's legitimacy on the African continent as well as expanding the military alliance to a multilateral presence in Africa.
Since 1994, there has been a dialogue between Mediterranean non-members and NATO. However, the African region has never been NATO's priority. NATO Mediterranean Dialogue included Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It aimed to build the security sector through train-the-trainaer programs, especially through the local collaboration with the African Peace Support Trainers association (APSTA). Contacts between NATO and the African Union have been limited: at the demand of the African Union, NATO supported and strengthened African Union's capacity in Sudan in 2005 with air transport and technical support, and strategic airlift, sealift, and expertise in the case of Somalia. In addition, in 2011, NATO's assistance in Libya brought negative aftereffects due to a lack of consultation of the African countries.
However, I believe that through a collaboration with the European Union, NATO would not only be able to tackle the issue of military security, but also to tackle economic disparities, social divisions, and political insecurity.
First of all, NATO needs to readapt its image as the threats are evolving. Asymmetrical threats and space warfare did not exist at the creation of NATO. For this reason, NATO must adjust as the demands and the needs have transformed. These menaces are opening the door to dissensions within NATO member states and between strategic infrastructure investing countries. Hence, the need for NATO to face these evolving threats. As a unified front with the EU, the NATO-EU cooperation could provide unified policy in order to foster the rule of law, liberty, and security. Secondly, economic disparities are a threat to the stability of North Africa and Mediterranean states. Indeed, there is a potential lead to political and social upheavals, which could lead to mass migration. We have seen for instance, in the case of Syria, the insecurity brought to the European Union, leading to populism, demonstrations, and a lack of confidence in NATO and the EU capabilities. Finally, NATO needs to reassure the member states' population about its actions. Education is key to trust and understanding. Therefore, it is crucial for NATO to promote its values, visions, and most importantly peace from external threats. Moreover, as NATO's collaboration with the Peace Support Trainers Association, NATO should exchange knowledge and teach ground troops, through military exercise programs, to reinforce democratic values as well as empower the population.

As said, NATO needs to adapt to today's demands and needs: NATO's values, however, will stay the same, being about collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Collaborating with the European Union, and possibly the United Nations, would increase NATO's strengths to be a complete and multilateral solution to these new threats: solidarity and cohesion are essential to preventing conflict and to peaceful resolutions. Collaborations of this level will definitely empower NATO on the international stage.

Jessica Phung, France
Undergraduate Student of International Relations, University of Washington, Seattle

Jessica Phung is an aspiring French diplomat, who speaks seven languages and has lived in more than seven different countries in the world. Her interests are in international relations, political science, and international security. While earning her bachelor's degree at the University of Washington, she got the opportunity to write multiple research papers in the fields of terrorism, crime and corruption, immigration, as well as strategies of war. Jessica wants to contribute to a dialogue on transatlantic security, especially regarding North African security and the region's relationship with NATO.

FURTHER CONTRIBUTORS

President Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) Germany

Veronika Fucela, Slovakia
Chairwoman,
Youth Atlantic Treaty
Association Germany

Veronika Fucela is the Chairwoman of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA Germany), which is fostering public dialogue on NATO and transatlantic relations among the younger generation in Germany. Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany, also a member of YATA International, is with 600 members the biggest German youth organisation empowering discussion on security and foreign policy matters. Professionally, Veronika is serving as a parliamentary staffer for an MP in the German Bundestag working on German foreign policy, specializing in Central and Eastern Europe. Previous to that, she was a Project Coordinator at the German Atlantic Association. Veronika holds two MAs in International Relations and Politics.

Organization and Coordination

Kamala Jakubeit, Germany
Program Coordinator,
Berlin Office, German
Atlantic Association

Kamala Jakubeit is a Project Coordinator at the German Atlantic Association's Berlin Office and board member of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany. She earned her Master's degree in European and International Relations from Linköping University, Sweden. Prior to that she studied Governance and Public Policy – Staatswissenschaften – at Passau University. In 2018 Kamala completed a five month internship in New York at the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations focusing on the developments regarding the Security Council, Germany's membership in the United Nations Security Council and in particular issues regarding Libya, Iraq, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Ukraine. During her studies, Kamala gained a considerable amount of practical experience during her six month stay in Ghana, her five months traineeship at the European Parliament, at the German Embassy Dublin, the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, and the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.

Social Media and Publications

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Advisor to MEP, European Parliament, Brussels

Katharina Osthoff holds a double major Bachelor's degree in Political Science and Sociology from the University of Münster, Gent University, and Heidelberg University. Additionally, she holds a Master's degree from Leiden University in International Relations specialising in security studies and global conflict. Her areas of interest center on the politics and culture of the Arab world, geopolitics, as well as political violence, particularly terrorism studies. After her internship at the Berlin office of the German Atlantic Association in 2017, she joined the team again in 2019 as a research assistant. Currently, she works as a policy adviser in Brussels at the European Parliament focusing on the foreign affairs committee as well as the delegation to Turkey and Central Asia.

Nicoletta Backhaus, Germany
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Nicoletta Backhaus holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science and English and American Studies from Freiburg University. She is currently earning her master's degree in International Security and Law, an interdisciplinary program from Southern Denmark University in Odense. Her work experience in the field of international and European politics is multi-faceted and includes internships with the Commissioner of the Protestant Church of Germany to the EU, the then Vice President of the European Parliament, Evelyne Gebhardt and three years of volunteer work for the Academic Association for Security Politics (Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen) on local and federal level. Nicoletta is currently interning at the German Atlantic Association's Berlin office.

Lisa Johann, Germany
Public Affairs, Canadian Embassy, Berlin

Lisa-Katharina Johann has been working at the Public Affairs Section at the Canadian Embassy in Berlin since 2017. Currently, she is coordinating Canada's Guest of Honour presence at the Frankfurt Book Fair 2020. Previously, she has gained valuable experience interning for the U.S. State Department in Frankfurt and Copenhagen, the German Foreign Office in New York, and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). She studied Peace and Conflict Studies at the Goethe University Frankfurt and Political Administration & American Studies at the University of Potsdam.

NATO Talk Conference 2019

NATO at 70 – No Time To Retire

Agenda November 11, 2019

The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government
Reichstagufer 14, 10117 Berlin
The event is simultaneously translated into German.

08:30 a.m.   *Registration of Participants*

09:30 - 9:45 a.m.   **Opening of the Conference**

Christian Schmidt MP
Former Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture
President of the German Atlantic Association
Ambassador Ekkehard Brose
President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy

09:45 - 11:00 a.m.   **Opening Discussion**

Ambassador Prof. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference
Ambassador Anne-Marie Descoôtes
Ambassador of France to the Federal Republic of Germany
Thomas Silberhorn
Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Defense
Dr. Claudia Major
Senior Associate Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin

Moderation:
Werner Sonne
Journalist and Author

11:00 - 12:45 p.m.   **Panel I: A New Transatlantic Bargain?**

Frank A. Rose
Senior Fellow for Security and Strategy, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Tomáš Valášek
Director, Carnegie Europe
Siemtje Möller MP
Deputy Spokesperson for Security and Defense Policy, SPD parliamentary group

Moderation:
Dr. Jana Puglierin
Head of Program, Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations

12:45 - 02:00 p.m.	*Lunch Break*

02:00 – 02:10 p.m. **Award Ceremony**

"Jürgen Bornemann NATO's Future-Preis"
Youth Atlantic Treaty Association GERMANY (YATA)

02:10 - 04:00 p.m. **Panel II: The Future of Europe?**

Ambassador Muriel Domenach
Permanent Representative of France to NATO
Lieutenant General Hans-Werner Wiermann
Director General, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters
Sir Adam Thomson
Director, European Leadership Network
Janusz Reiter
Former Polish Ambassador to Germany; Chairman of the Board and
Founder, Center for International Relations, Warsaw

Moderation:
Lieutenant General (ret) Heinrich Brauß
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning, NATO
(2013-2018); Senior Associate Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations

04:15 - 05:00 p.m. **Confident, Innovative, Reliable: A Future for NATO**
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer
Federal Minister of Defense

05:00 p.m. **Closing Remarks**

Ambassador Ekkehard Brose
President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy

PANEL DISCUSSION: THE EAST HEADING WEST - THE CASE OF GEORGIA'S NATO INTEGRATION

BOTSCHAFT VON GEORGIEN BERLIN

Twenty years ago, NATO's first eastward enlargement with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became a hallmark of its efforts to build a more peaceful and stable Europe. Since then, the discussion of NATO's eastward enlargement in its political subtext as well as its overall objective have been rekindled with every new Membership Action Plan (MAP). NATO has adopted an 'open door' policy allowing accession of any European state capable of aiding NATO's cause. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008 the allies agreed that Georgia will become a NATO member, provided it meets all necessary requirements. This decision has since been reconfirmed at every successive NATO Summit.

Will there ever be an end to the 'open door' policy and hence (eastward) enlargement? What are lessons learned from recent years in terms of Russian activities in Eastern Europe? What are the prospects for Georgia in terms of achieving its final goal of NATO membership in the near future?

The Embassy of Georgia to the Federal Republic of Germany and YATA Germany kindly invite you to discuss these and further questions during the event.

The East Heading West
The Case of Georgia's NATO Integration. What is Next?

11 November 2019, 6:30 p.m. (doors open at 6:00 p.m.)
Literaturhaus Berlin
Fasanenstraße 23, 10719 Berlin

Welcoming Remarks
Dr. Elguja Khokrishvili
Ambassador of Georgia to the Federal Republic of Germany

Discussion
Davit Nardaia
Director, NATO Integration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Rosaria Puglisi
Head of Office, NATO Liaison Office in Georgia
Dr. Henning Riecke
Head of Program, DGAP Transatlantic Relations

Chair
Lisa Johann
YATA Germany

Reception

If you would like to attend, please **RSVP to info@ata-dag.de** by **Thursday, November 07.**

The panel discussion will be the final event of the annual NATO's Future Seminar that will take place over the weekend. The 2019 Seminar is organized annually by Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA).

DIRECTIONS

Get on the bus TXL (S+U Hauptbahnhof)
from Busstop "Flughafen Tegel (Airport)
for 5 Stations
to **Hauptbahnhof Berlin.**

Then take the bus M41 (Sonnenallee/ Baumschulenstr.)
from Bustop Berlin Hauptbahnhof
for 4 Stations
to **"S Anhalter Bahnhof".**

Walk 180m to **IBIS Hotel Potsdamer Platz (Anhalter Str. 4, 10963 Berlin).**

Google Maps link:
https://goo.gl/maps/qRxCWBTFPzXRrkHy8

Get on the bus TXL (S+U Hauptbahnhof)
from Busstop "Flughafen Tegel (Airport)
for 5 Stations
to **Hauptbahnhof.**

Then take the bus M41 (Sonnenallee/ Baumschulenstr.)
from Bustop "**Hauptbahnhof Berlin**"
for 5 Stations
to **"Willy-Brandt-Haus".**

Walk 180m to **Willy-Brandt-Haus (Wilhelmstraße 140).**

Google Maps link:
https://goo.gl/maps/42sWDSSUrdMLhz9v8

SATURDAY: IBIS Hotel to **Willy-Brandt Haus** (Wilhelmstraße 140, 10963 Berlin)

You can either walk (850m).

or

Take the bus M41 (Sonnenallee/ Baumschulenstr.) from Bustop
"S Anhalter Bahnhof"
for 1 Station
to **"Willy-Brandt-Haus"**.

Walk 100m to **Willy-Brandt-Haus (Wilhelmstraße 140).**

Google Maps link:
https://goo.gl/maps/TPvZ5CYs581zwxbF6

SUNDAY: IBIS Hotel to **Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung** (Schumannstraße 8, 10117 Berlin)

Take the S1 (Frohnau or Oranienburg Bhf),
S2 (Bernau Bhf or Buch), S25 (Henningsdorf Bhf) or the S26
(Waidmannslust)
from the train station "S Anhalter Bahnhof"
for 3 Stations
to **"Bahnhof Berlin Friedrichstraße"**.

Cross the Spree (river) across the small bridge beneath the
tracks and take the Albrechtstraße all the way down to **Hein-
rich-Böll-Stiftung in Schumannstraße 8.**

Google Maps link:
https://goo.gl/maps/9HVFewpQHC1j1udcA

MONDAY: IBIS Hotel to **Bundespresseamt (NATO TALK)** (Reichstagufer 14, 10117 Berlin)

Take the S1 (Frohnau or Oranienburg Bhf),
S2 (Bernau Bhf or Buch), S25 (Henningsdorf Bhf) or the S26
(Waidmannslust)
from the train station "S Anhalter Bahnhof"
for 3 Stations
to **"Bahnhof Berlin Friedrichstraße".**

Walk on this side of the Spree to "**Presse- und**

Infomationsamt Besucherzentrum" in Reichstagsufer 14.

Google Maps link:
https://goo.gl/maps/N5wFKcYjcA3epr3k9

MONDAY: Bundespresseamt to **Literaturhaus** (Fasanenstraße 23, 10719 Berlin)

Take the S3 (Spandau Bhf), S5 (Westkreuz),
S7 (Potsdam Hbf) or S9 (Spandau Bhf)
from "Bahnhof Berlin Friedrichstraße"
for 5 Stations
to "**Savignyplatz**".

Walk 700m (via: Stadtbahnbogen, Grolmanstraße,
Uhlandstraße, Kurfürstendamm) to „**Literaturhaus Berlin" in**
Fasanenstraße 23.

Google Maps link:
https://goo.gl/maps/xjBCDG2jxf89DRcP7

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## NATO FUTURE STEPS IN CASE OF EUROPEAN ARMY
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