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November 14-16, 2020

WELCOME TO NATO'S FUTURE (SEMINAR)!

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the international cooperation between the transatlantic allies has become even more important. Transnational problems such as the repatriation of stranded tourists, coordination of the search for a vaccine and dealing with the consequences for the global economy can only be tackled by states working together.

The NATO allies are also cooperating closely to fight the virus. The broad experience that the Alliance has with crisis situations is an advantage in this situation. NATO forces have undertaken more than 100 operations to support NATO allies and partners by flying in urgently needed medical personnel, transporting patients, building field hospitals and carrying tonnes of protective equipment.

Corona pandemic has influenced all aspects of our lives. Even this seminar NATO's Future was planned to take place in Berlin in person obeyed by strict hygienic rules and at the end due to the current pandemic situation we will meet only in digital form.

In this booklet, one can find the perspectives and policy recommendations of our seminar participants in the collection of their essays.

Since 2007, the **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA)** has served as a leading platform for young professionals in security and defense, working alongside our ATA seniors and fellow youth organizations to ensure that young professionals have a voice in the policy-making world and direct access to national and international events.


YATA Germany holds the **NATO's Future Seminar** for the seventh time this year, encouraging and deepening the international as well as the cross-generational debate on current security issues. It provides a forum for an exchange of ideas and mutual understanding while bringing together more than 20 young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO as well as government officials from some 10 countries (NATO member and partner states). The more than 80 outstanding applications from more than 23 NATO and partner countries leave us motivated to continue our engagement in YATA Germany and to inform young leaders about the importance of NATO and the transatlantic partnership.

This year, the following three topics were selected for the seminar, all of which share one essential feature: the necessity of NATO to broaden its scope, to prioritize threats, and to develop measures to attain collective security in an era of such uncertainty:

- 1. Great Power Competition – How Does it Impact NATO?**
- 2. Towards an Outer Space Strategy – The NATO Perspective**
- 3. Security Policy: Strategy Change through Climate Change?**

Our seminar would not be possible without the great and generous support of the German Atlantic Association (DAG), especially Kamala Jakubeit, as well as NATO's Public Diplomacy Division (PDD). I also would like to thank all our active YATA members who devote their time and energy for our work and our targets. We are thankful for their contributions as well as for our brilliant speakers and chairs who take the time to enrich our discussions with their expertise, insights, and curiosity. Thank you all for participating so actively in this endeavor and your commitment to making young voices an audible and visible part of "NATO's Future".

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Veronika Fucela". The script is cursive and fluid, with the first name and last name clearly distinguishable.

Veronika Fucela

Chairwoman of Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany

NATO's Future 2020 – Digital Edition

Seminar Agenda

Saturday, November 14

10:30 a.m. **Welcome and Introduction**

11:15 a.m. **Strategic Thinking /Foresight Analysis: Methods and Tools I**

Sarah Bressan
Global Public Policy Institute

12:15 p.m. *Coffee Break*

12:30 p.m. **Strategic Thinking /Foresight Analysis: Methods and Tools II**

Dr. Georgios Kolliarakis
German Council on Foreign Relations

13:30 p.m. *Lunch*

02:30 p.m. **Group Working Session I**

03:30 p.m. *Coffee Break*

03:45 p.m. **Panel discussion I: Great Power Competition – How Does it Impact NATO**

Dave Johnson
Staff officer in the NATO International Staff Defence Policy and Planning Division

Sarah Pagung
Expert on Russia, Associate Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations

Anna Marti
Designated Head of the Global Innovation Hub of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Taipei

04:45 p.m. - *Informal Get Together*

06:00 p.m.

Sunday, November 15

10:30 a.m. **Panel discussion II: Towards an Outer Space Strategy -the NATO Perspective**

Sarah Tarry

Director of Defence Policy and Capabilities, NATO

Dominic Vogel

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Andrea Rotter

Head of Division Foreign and Security Policy, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung

11:30 a.m. *Coffee Break*

11:45 a.m. **Panel discussion III: Security Policy: Strategy Change Through Climate Change?**

Hannah Kurnoth

Climate diplomacy analyst, adelphi

Paul Glanville

Head of Global Sector Development DHL

Dr. Annika Vergin

German armed forces strategic foresight analyst

12:45 p.m. *Lunch*

02:00 p.m. **Group Working Session II**

03:00 p.m. *Coffee Break*

03.15 p.m. **Presentation of the Recommendations / Preparation for the Conference**

04:00 p.m.- **Wrap-up and Closing**

5:30 p.m.

Monday, November 16

NATO Talk Conference 2020

Moderated opening remarks Speaker
Christian Schmidt MP
Former Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture,
President of the German Atlantic Association

Ambassador Ekkehard Brose
President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy

Dipl.-Ing. Reinhard Müller
CEO of the EUREF-Campus

Moderator: **Julia Weigelt**, Journalist

NATO TALK Interview ***U.S. elections 2020 and the consequences for Europe***

Discussion **Peter Beyer MP**, The Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation

Dr. Sławomir Dębski, Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)

Dr. Daniela Schwarzer, Director, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Moderation: **Werner Sonne**

Panel 1 ***NATO I: Unity and cohesion –
NATO's most important political asset at risk?***

Input **Ivo H. Daalder**, President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Panel:
Discussion **Parliamentary State Secretary Thomas Silberhorn MP**, Federal Ministry of Defence

Étienne de Durand, Deputy for Defence Policy and Strategic Foresight, Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, Ministère des Armées, Paris

Ambassador Ali Kemal Aydin, The Embassy of Turkey in Berlin

Justyna Gotkowska, Programme coordinator, Regional Security Programme at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw

+ Q&A Moderation: **Dr. Claudia Major**, Senior Associate Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin

Discussion with young professionals **Ambassador Bettina Cadenbach**, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, NATO, Brussels
Moderation: **Veronika Fucela**, President of Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) Germany

Lunch

Keynote **Keynote:**
Former Federal Minister Joschka Fischer

+ Q&A **Ambassador Dr. Klaus Scharioth**

Panel 2 ***NATO II: NATurally TOgether***
– what the Alliance must achieve in the future

Discussion **Major general Jörg See**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels

Margarita Šešelgyte, Director at Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius

Dr. Tobias Lindner MP, Spokesperson for security policy, The Greens

Dr Jana Puglierin, Head of the Berlin Office and Senior Policy Fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations

Moderation: **Dr. Patrick Keller**, Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy

+Q&A

Closing Remarks

PAN | Great Power Competition -

EL 1 | How Does it Impact NATO?



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The fight for a position in the world ranking of most powerful nations has an impact on the agenda of international organizations, particularly for NATO, as well. The recent years were marked also by turbulent tweets over the Atlantic, never-ending talks on European strategic autonomy and the Brexit theater. While some observers talk about the “westlessness” defined as “a widespread feeling of uneasiness and restlessness in the face of increasing uncertainty about the enduring purpose of the West”, others emphasize that the new powers are prepared to overtake a leading position in the international affairs. In addition to that a lack of consensus between Europe and the US on the issue of national security has never been so perceptible as now and weakens the position of the West in the world merit. Moreover, we can observe more assertive Russia and China with rising ambitions for a position in the world order. While Russia has been a topic on NATO’s agenda for many years, China was defined as a strategic challenge at the NATO Leaders Meeting in London in 2019. What implications does this

development have for NATO? How should NATO continue to strengthen its response to great power competition? Which priorities should NATO set in order to face the new strategic challenges and the changing world order in the long run?

PANELISTS



Dave Johnson
Staff officer, NATO
International Staff Defence
Policy and Planning Division

Dave Johnson is a staff officer in the NATO International Staff Defence Policy and Planning Division. He previously served as an officer in the US Air Force, including in posts at SHAPE Headquarters, US Strategic Command, the US Defence Attaché Office Moscow, and the Pentagon. The views expressed are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.



Sarah Pagung
Associate fellow, German
Council on Foreign Relations
Alumni, NATO's Future 2015

Sarah Pagung has been an associate fellow at the Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations since February 2019. Her research focuses on Russian foreign and information policies and on Moldova. Until December 2018, Pagung worked as a program officer for the Robert Bosch Center, where she managed the discussion group on Russia and the Eastern Partnership as well as the joint project "A New Western Ostpolitik" with Johns Hopkins University. From 2013 to 2015, she worked on behalf of the Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg.

Pagung is currently working on a doctorate on the impact of Russian propaganda and information policy on Germany at the Freie Universität Berlin, where she studied political science. She is also an adjunct lecturer at the Freie Universität Berlin and serves as a seminar facilitator for various formats relating to European foreign policy and Eastern Europe. From 2012 to 2013, she worked in youth and adult education in Saint Petersburg on behalf of the European Voluntary Service's German-Russian exchange program.



Anna Marti
Designated Head of the
Global Innovation Hub of
the Friedrich Naumann
Foundation for Freedom

Anna Marti is the designated Head of the Global Innovation Hub of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Taipei. She studied International Cultural and Business Studies with a focus on Southeast Asia in Passau, and holds an M.A. in Politics and Society of East Asia from the University of Tübingen. During her studies Anna Marti spent a total of one year in Dalian and Shanghai, PR China. After working for giz and the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, she worked for the Foundation as a desk officer for Asia and most recently as Manager for the topics Global Innovation and Digital Transformation.

INTRODUCTION AND MODERATION



Mariam Kublashvili
Friedrich Naumann
Foundation for Freedom

Mariam works at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and organizes various events in the field of political education. She has a master's degree in political science / international relations from Heidelberg University and a bachelor's degree in political science and linguistics from Tbilisi State University, Georgia. She has been recognized several times for her excellent academic performance, including being the best Georgian student in Germany. In the field of foreign and security policy, she has given lectures at various educational activities in Georgia and Germany, moderated and organized several events. She is a member of the Forum for International Security Heidelberg (FiS), a multiplier in European policy and a member of YATA-Germany.



Julian Pawlak
Research Associate at the
Center for Maritime Strat-
egy & Security at the Insti-
tute for Security Policy at
Kiel University

Julian Pawlak is a Research Associate at the Center for Maritime Strategy & Security at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK). He is ISPK's project manager for the Baltic Sea Strategy Forum and focuses in his current research on strategy, security, and defence policy issues at Europe's Northern Flank and the Baltic Sea region. Julian is the editor of the forthcoming ISPK Seapower Series volume on Allied Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century (NOMOS: Baden-Baden, 2021) and frequently gives lectures and talks on security policy issues. Julian has studied political science and sociology in Osnabrück and Kraków, as well as international politics and international public law in Kiel.

NORTH ATLANTIC GREAT POWER ORGANIZATION

by Christian Westphal

The great power competition of our time has the potential to dramatically reshape the world order. NATO's survival and its ability to remain a safeguard for Western democracies will particularly depend on whether the United States of America and the European Union will belong to the twenty-first century's great powers.

Great power competition – the source of NATO

Great power competition always influenced NATO. It was the very reason for NATO's creation.

Once the smoke of World War II had faded, it became obvious that the rift running through the allied forces fighting fascism in Europe could no longer be bridged. Too irreconcilable were the social contracts and basic systems of government in the Western Allies' nations and their Eastern brother in arms, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). While America, the United Kingdom and France championed liberal values, individual liberties and free markets, the USSR represented an authoritarian system, bent on imposing its egalitarian creed with brute force onto its subordinates.

The ideological conflict between the West, with the liberal USA at its center and the East, represented by the USSR, gave rise to the formation of NATO.

The great competitor in the twenty-first century

At its creation, NATO's members pledged "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law", as the Treaty's preamble states. While for a mid-twentieth century defense alliance of primarily liberal Western states, this commitment meant fighting communism's violent expansion and keeping the USSR in check, today it must entail facing China.

Like the USSR in the past, the People's Republic of China stands for an ideology vastly different from that of NATO's members. It is anti-democratic and does not know any major individual freedoms.

Where China's role differs from that of the USSR a century ago, is that China's ideological opposition is accompanied not only by military but also even greater eco-

nomic might. The "Belt and Road Initiative", an infrastructure project of unparalleled magnitude, will leave China in control of most major commercial transportation hubs from Africa to South East Asia. The country has become an indispensable part of countless production chains and one of the most important global trading partners. Its technological advances give the new Eastern hegemon nearly unlimited opportunities to meddle with any nation's security and economy. With the opening of its first military base abroad in Djibouti in 2017, China signaled its readiness to assert its national interests with more than mere economic means.

NATO needs to be able to act as a safeguard against any potential violent expansion of this new great power in the East. But can it?

NATO – still a great power association?

NATO can only continue to be a credible defender of Western democracies, if it represents great powers whose combined might matches China's. Those great powers must be the USA and the EU.

The USA still is the world's greatest power in terms of economic and military might. Politically, however, America keeps losing clout. That is primarily due to its growing defiance of multilateralism. Not only did this cause a loss of trust in American commitments in general but it also gave rise to questions as to how reliable of an ally the US can be in international organizations. This needs to change. There needs to be a greater awareness of the fact that even the US cannot stop an aggressive China on its own.

The second Western great power in this century could be the EU, of which 21 countries are also members of NATO. If it will be, depends on whether it can translate the economic strength of its common market into a real political union that speaks with one voice on the international stage. Only with a unified foreign policy, the EU can react firmly and swiftly enough to remain a serious player in the great power competition. A more unified foreign policy would enable the EU to shoulder more military responsibilities and help it reach the two percent defense spending target.

What to do

While these challenges first and foremost need to be faced by the US and the EU themselves, NATO can play a role.

1. NATO could act as a greater forum for transatlantic dialogue and thus create more understanding of the importance of multilateralist approaches. It should have a bigger focus on the general transatlantic cooperation of its members that goes beyond traditional security and military policy. Essentially, NATO could act as the main political liaison forum between the US and the EU.
2. NATO should use all available avenues to foster greater unity among its EU members. One way to set appropriate incentives could be to structure the assignment of tasks to European countries that are members of the EU in a way that necessitates a coordinated EU approach.



Christian Westphal, Germany
Desk Officer at Ministry for Children, Family, Refugees and Integration of the State North Rhine-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Germany)

Christian studied law at the University of Münster where he focused on international and European law. During this time, he developed a particular interest in foreign relations, security policy and international organizations. From 2014 to 2015, he chaired the University of Münster Student Society on Security Policy (ASIUM), hosting lectures and seminars on foreign and security policy. After his graduation from law school in 2015, Christian gained practical experience in the fields of foreign and security policy while serving in Germany's Foreign Office (Department of International Organizations and Arms Control) and Germany's Permanent Mission to the United Nations (Security Council). Currently, Christian works for the government of the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia in the ministry responsible for migration affairs.

NATO's FUTURE 2030

BY RAPHAEL OIDTMANN, GERMANY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently facing an unprecedented plethora of simultaneously emerging challenges, pertaining to its legal-organizational fabric, its foundational political purpose, in brief: its very *raison d'être*.

In part as a result of the steady decline of U.S. leadership under the Trump administration, NATO has thus been confronted with mounting backlash in recent years. In that context, different modes of contestation towards the organization have become palpable, for example with a view to the repeatedly voiced criticism directed against certain NATO member states not meeting the targeted defence funding ratio of two per cent of their respective GDP or the announced withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany. Apart from these internal developments, however, NATO also has to respond to an increasing number of contingent future threats and challenges, including topics such as arms control and future weapon technology as well as a constantly altering geopolitical environment – for example with a view to the changing geophysical

conditions in the polar regions. For NATO, this intricate tension or inner-organizational push-back and external stressors is hence further exacerbated by disturbing and perilous developments in the Mediterranean, currently looking at a contingent military encounter between Greece and Turkey.

These destabilizing alterations have been further amplified by a deliberate turn of U.S. policy towards NATO, but also towards the European continent more broadly: shifting the focal point of American foreign policy towards other areas of the globe – thereby incrementally exposing Europe to adverse attacks – has thus opened up a strategic contingency increasingly exploited by the Russian Federation. Hence, ranging from the unlawful annexation of Crimea and the constant inflaming of its proxy war in Eastern Ukraine towards a growing willingness to engage in shows of force along Eastern Europe's flank – including repeated airspace violations over the Baltics or the intentional surfacing of nuclear submarines off the Scandinavian shorelines – it is apparent that Russia's increasingly aggressive power projection is no longer limited to distant war theatres, such as the Syrian Civil War or the conflict in the Caucasus Mountains, but has in fact arrived at Europe's doorstep.

This altered balance of power has become possible mainly due to a nascent power vacuum on the European continent caused by accretive U.S. disengagement. Instead, U.S. foreign policy has deliberately pursued its previously announced pivot towards Asia – a distinct realignment of its policy preferences abroad as already commenced by the Obama administration and primarily aimed at balancing the rise of the People's Republic of China, yet undertaken at the expense of European NATO member states. In particular, this novel strategy has included the strengthening of bilateral security alliances, an expansion of trade and investment efforts and an increase in American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, however, the risk of a new U.S.-Russian conflict has not vanished, yet been somewhat transferred onto novel turf, including the realm of cyber or alternative theatres, in which confrontation is effectively waged through proxies – as most recently reported in the case of a Russia-sponsored bounty programme aimed at killing American servicemembers through Taliban-linked militants in Afghanistan. Moreover, the increasingly dynamic Sino-Russian partnership, including with a view towards enhanced military cooperation, complements a highly complex and multilevel triangular constellation characterizing the relationship(s) between the three remaining superpowers, while also exposing three major ramifications for NATO and its future mission: firstly, that a lack of U.S. leadership – a fact possibly exacerbated by

the results of the US presidential election – has in fact weakened the organization and its supreme role as the leading multilateral framework safeguarding peace and security in the Northern hemisphere, so that a new leadership coalition is required, also with a view towards countering growing Russian interferences in Eastern Europe. Secondly, that the alliance will need to undergo a thorough and honest stocktaking, particularly in terms of its strategic objectives and operational capabilities for the coming decade, including a realistic assessment of any contingent future Eastern expansion of NATO. Thirdly, while somewhat dependent on the next incoming U.S. administration, that NATO as well as its European member states will need deliberate on how to become less dependent, particularly on U.S. military and weapon technology. Thus, as recently echoed by President Macron, Europe needs to become capable of maintaining and deploying military capabilities, also in the absence of substantial military and logistical U.S. support.

In a nutshell, the most pressing issue areas to be addressed by NATO in the upcoming decade can be spotlighted as to

- (1) establish a new leadership structure that
- (2) engages in a strategic stock-taking exercise in order to identify a (primarily) European need for (3) balanced capacity enhancement.



Raphael Oidtman, Germany
Research fellow and lecturer in international law at the Department of Law at the University of Mannheim

Raphael is a research fellow and lecturer in international law at the Department of Law at the University of Mannheim. After completing master's degrees in political science (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, 2012), comparative and international law (University of Mannheim & University of Adelaide, 2014) and international relations (University of Cambridge, 2017), respectively, he currently is an external PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt and an associate fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). In his most recent research, he has focussed on notions including the actorness of international criminal courts and tribunals, the implementation of jurisdiction in areas of limited statehood and the securitization of global health. His work has inter alia appeared in the Leiden Journal of International Law and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs.

MITIGATING GREAT POWER COMPETITION: WHY NATO NEEDS EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND A

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CHINA

BY GESINE WEBER, GERMANY

The conflict in the South Chinese Sea, a trade war between the US and China, international organisations as the chessboard for power politics: it is hard to deny that great power competition is back. As the competition between China and the US affects almost all realms of international security and global governance, it implies major challenges for NATO. Besides the increasingly active and confident China in international affairs and changes of the international order, a main challenge for NATO are the highly divergent perspectives on and priorities of its members. While the US is facing China in a systemic conflict for hegemony in several theatres of international affairs, some European states see China mostly as an economic competitor, whereas others dismiss this criticism and push for closer cooperation. This lack of unity, paired with pessimistic rhetorics describing NATO as “obsolete” (Trump) or “brain-dead” (Macron), complicates common action and raises the questions NATO’s credibility as an actor in international security. If NATO members maintain the status quo of mutual criticism and vague declarations without clear strategies, there is little hope that for a future of successful transatlantic cooperation.

To mitigate the impact of great power competition, NATO needs to reinvent itself without loosening transatlantic ties. Concretely, NATO should push for European strategic autonomy while developing a comprehensive and flexible approach to China, which includes both a positive agenda and a firm position in international security.

Placed in the heart of the complex institutional environment of European security, NATO is strongly affected by the choices of its members in other fora of European security and defence, first and foremost the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). As not all European NATO members are EU members and vice versa, the two institutions have often been considered concurrent structures; the US and EU member states (MS) with particularly strong transatlantic ties have expressed their concern about strengthening the CSDP, fearing that an independent EU defence policy could harm transatlantic

cooperation. The opposite is true: increasing the defence capacities under the CSDP will improve capabilities and operability among the participating states. The positive synergies resulting from this cooperation, both in the political and military field, will directly benefit NATO, as the respective capabilities could also be used for NATO missions and political coordination might become smoother thanks to learning from best practices. Accordingly, all NATO members should encourage stronger cooperation under the CSDP and support existing initiatives under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). However, cooperation of the EU MS must go beyond responses to current crisis and extend to the strategic thinking. The presidency of Trump has underlined the degree to which NATO action depends on the US’ willingness to engage, and the challenges European states face due to the lack of a clear European strategy. Yet, Europeans need to have responses to different scenarios of an exacerbating great power competition - because only this can allow NATO to formulate a coherent response as well. That is why the EU MS should commit to the goal of European strategic autonomy and actively contribute to its development.

Indeed, coherence is key to NATO’s success in harnessing the consequences of great power competition. Dealing with China is a multi-faceted challenge and therefore needs a multi-faceted strategy: instead of a “one size fits all” approach, the US and the Europeans need to assess the potential for cooperation among themselves and with China across different fields of security policy. Therefore, NATO should adopt a politically binding catalogue of mutual red lines for China policy, which contains possible actions of members that could not be accepted by the others due to undermining their security interests. Once these lines are set, the allies should find a positive agenda on China and identify flexible options for cooperation with China in global security governance, such as disarmament or non-proliferation, as this cooperation could significantly mitigate tensions in the international system. Beijing can be a highly cooperative partner when it comes to a broader understanding of international security including climate or development; here, flexibility is key and member states should also foster bilateral cooperation that respect NATO’s red lines. At the same time, NATO should have a firm stance on China in international security with regard to the principles and the law of the international order and develop a common response for scenarios where these principles are not respected.



Gesine Weber, Germany
Program Assistant at the Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the US and a PhD candidate at the Defence Studies Department at King's College London

Gesine is a Program Assistant at the Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the US and a PhD candidate at the Defence Studies Department at King's College London. Specialising in European security and geopolitics, she has worked as a consultant for the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Shanghai, an analyst for the Groupe d'Etudes Géopolitiques, and a policy advisor on security and defence in the German Bundestag. She also gained professional experience in diplomacy and with different media. Until August, Gesine studied Mandarin in Beijing and participated in a China programme for future leaders, funded by the German Academic Exchange Service. She holds a masters in European Affairs from SciencesPo and a masters in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin. Besides German, French, English and Chinese, she also speaks some Italian and Arabic and is keen on learning further languages.

GREAT POWER COMPETITION - HOW DOES IT IMPACT NATO?

by Altynay Suleimenova, Kazakhstan

We are entering the world with a multipolar power system. Relationship between great powers shapes global stability. NATO, as the world's most potent defence alliance, has to adapt to changes. This essay presents a current view of great power competition and possible strategies for NATO to implement.

The distribution of power capabilities determines the polarity of the international system. According to Waltz, "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" are defining characteristics of power capability. The Cold War era can be characterised as a bipolar system with two nation-states competing for world dominance: United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the collapse of the USSR, the US emerged as the only great power creating unipolarity in the world. The dominating power of the US was not challenged for two decades. Meanwhile, developing countries such as China, Russia, Brazil and India (BRIC) are playing an active role in international politics and building foundation for multipolarity in the world. The power distributed at least among three countries with exceptional capabilities introduces new uncertainties into the global system. They pose severe challenges for nation-states as well as international organisations. Emerging great powers strive to achieve regional dominance in their geographical location. This kind of global regionalism supports the multipolarity of the world order. The emergence of great powers drives the reorganisation of political and economic authority over global regions and markets. It can potentially lead to a fragmented political economy.

The US has been considered the leading country in the world economically, technologically, culturally, and in the military. The country with such power has as well power to insert its will on other countries. However, the US faced the loss of influence externally and issues internally. It allowed rising great powers to refill the space of previous solo hegemon. NATO has to redefine its strategy and mission in the face of changes. The core mission of NATO after World War II was to balance the rising power of the Soviet Union. It proved to be the key instrument in defending its members in the alliance. However, NATO's mission

has not ended after the collapse of the enemy. Enlargement of NATO and the creation of the European Union were the notable changes in the western world. NATO's role is shifting from military focus to its institutional role in the protection of the transatlantic community and the western values. NATO can redefine its focus from Soviet or Russian force to new threats to the transatlantic community. China, as one of the largest economic powers in the world, has been absent from NATO's public policy. Third, to the US and Russia, the Chinese military continues to grow. Moreover, recent actions of this year, China breaking international obligations of Hong Kong treaty with the UK is an alarming sign for peacekeeping. Without rule of law, it would be particularly challenging to facilitate international trade and cooperation. Absence of China from NATO's policy can be due to the involvement of international organizations in the foreign policy of the country. United Nations, World Trade Organization and G20 tend to set issues of the world with China. However, NATO, as the protector of the transatlantic community, has to evaluate emerging threats from China and remain the cornerstone of collective security.

Army centric view of Europe and the US should modernize in the face of emerging technologies and economic developments. Current technological advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing and other bring unprecedented change to the society. New technologies find military application, which can be used for protection as well as the conduct of warfare. Competition for power has spread out across the globe. Technology became accessible to not only governments but also private organizations. NATO's existing strategies in cyberdefence and against bioterrorism aim to prevent threats arising from modern technologies. Enlargement of NATO by including new members should apply to enlarging its defence mechanisms against new threats.

NATO's role is vital for keeping peace in the emerging threat environment. Balance of power is shifting towards rising great powers such as China, Russia, Brazil and India. Their regional economic and military dominance can lead to fragmentation of the world order. Therefore, NATO has to enlarge its focus from the Euro-Atlantic area to the rising powers beyond. On the other hand, advancements

in technologies find application in emerging threats. NATO, as a premiere security organization, should extend

its geographic defence to common interests of the alliance.



*Altynay Suleimenova,
Kazakhstan
Student, International Security
Management*

Altynay Suleimenova developed an early interest in international relations and interdisciplinary studies as she grew up in Central Asia, a crossroad of different cultures and influences. Due to this, she decided to move to Berlin to pursue her academic degree. She is interested in European politics, modern philosophy and arts. Recently she completed her graduation thesis on security issues of the second Payment Services Directive. Altynay is currently finishing her Master's degree in International Security Management and hopes to pursue her career in international organizations.

„GREAT POWER COMPETITION - HOW DOES IT IMPACT NATO?“

by Simon Schütz, Germany

In the 21st century the international system is not as predictable and stable as it used to be in the past. Looking at the major four international players – the United States, the European Union, China and Russia – competition has become the new constant.

Within this competition what is on stake is nothing less but the liberal international order, the survival of liberal societies. Even though the US and the European Union still dominate international institutions and their agendas as well as their rules, this very order is all but set in stone. Authoritarian powers, namely China and Russia, are trying to undermine the current international order and its institutions. They use every sign of weakness, every moment of disagreement within the current system, to accomplish their goals and increase their influence and dominance. Ultimately, they endanger the democratic and international order. Information wars or wolf warrior diplomacy are methods that should alert the NATO and must be met with joint responses.

Instead of focusing on this challenge, the current performance of NATO is relatively disenchanting: Every member state is so focused on its own (domestic) issues, its own world interests – losing sight of the big picture. In times of enormous and rapid changes in the areas of economics, politics or technology, societies are increasingly disoriented. Unfortunately, many governments are failing to address that sentiment in their societies, as well as the consequences of the rapid changes. This leaves room for a growing distrust of many people in institutions – national as well as international ones – and the values and norms they represent. This is a weak spot China and Russia have identified a while ago. With methods of hybrid warfare and corresponding information campaigns (as well as public diplomacy efforts) they try to polarize Western societies, create conspiracies that lower the trust in current political players and institutions and challenge the general perception of truth. It is not a war fought with weapons, but mainly an information warfare – with different approaches by China AND Russia. Russia has launched many sophisticated political/information campaigns aiming to polarize Western societies. Not only that they have been successfully with this method – its success comes slowly and happens subconsciously, which makes it even harder to measure. China tries to become a major power in economic and political ways, trying to penetrate economies, creating dependencies and thereby gaining a certain leverage. The debate around

the usage of Huawei is just one example of China trying to access critical infrastructure.

Those two different approaches need two different hybrid strategies to protect NATO member states from these challenges. One thing the Chinese and Russian approach have in common is the bigger focus on the civilian area. An area where NATO still has a lot of potential to grow. One concrete recommendation would be the establishment of civilian response capacities. More cooperation with the private sector is needed, taskforces being responsible for all kinds of critical infrastructure and more resilience need to be formed and there needs to be a constant conversation with experts concerning societal developments. If Russia and China go on to affect choices of Western governments – or push them to certain choices by influencing Western societies – the freedom of choice is on stake.

The NATO efforts should also be target oriented: Especially Eastern European countries need more support since they are most actively in the focus of Chinese and Russian disinformation and ‘diplomacy’ efforts or development investments. As China has two agendas – short-term (regional) and long term (international) – NATO has to consider to be more active and present in the Pacific area – maybe even by establishing a Indo-Pacific NATO. There are many countries which do share the values of the alliance and have a like-minded vision of the international liberal order. But with China as a (direct) neighbor it becomes harder for them to withstand and defend themselves from assaults of the big neighbor. NATO has to be on their side – if China succeeds to establish its world order more and more regionally, it will become way harder for the Western world to defend the liberal world order.

For all those challenges NATO needs its member states to realize what is on stake – and to have all of them aligned. This is only possible if governments don't lose the support of their societies when focusing more on defending our freedom. NATO has failed to provide a convincing communication strategy and narrative that would unite its member states and their societies facing this challenge. Only if the growing disunity and the lack of perspective can be stopped and if NATO succeeds to be one big and powerful player again, those big challenges can be mastered.



**Simon Schütz, Germany
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BILD Simon Schütz, Germany Editor at BILD Simon Schütz works as Responsible Editor at BILD, covering U.S. politics as well as domestic politics in Germany. In addition, he freelances for National Public Radio, where he writes mostly about current developments in Germany. Simon is an alumni of the Arthur Burns as well the RIAS journalism fellowship. Simon graduated from Freie Universität in Berlin, with an MA in Strategic Political Communication. He also studied at George Washington University in Washington, DC, where he primarily focused on public diplomacy and campaigning during elections. Simon holds a BA in Political Science and Media Science from the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz. He also studied in Bordeaux, France. During his time as a student, Simon worked as a research assistant for Dr. Andreas Nick, a member of the German Bundestag. During that time his main focus was foreign politics as well as digital developments.

GREAT POWER COMPETITION - HOW DOES IT IMPACT NATO?

by Freddie Whitlow, USA

There's little doubt that we are, indeed, in a nascent but growing age of great power competition. Still yet it's wholly unclear what that means for the future of NATO. With lagging military budgets, an increasingly disengaged United States, a more problematic NATO-partner in Turkey, and an increasingly aggressive China and Russia, these issues, amongst others, must be ironed out in order to form a cohesive 21st strategy for NATO.

Policy Recommendations:

- Besides the obvious need to increase military budgets in Europe, the arbitrary 2-percent figure is a useless metric if it's not connected to some bigger strategy for the security of the continent and beyond. For example, talking about budget increases trying to incentivize the public of Spain that the security of Estonia is in their interest will be a harder sell than the security of the Mediterranean. For this reason, the division of labor within NATO should be mostly regionalized under a bigger strategy, but not strictly limited to said regions. Small countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark have strong naval traditions and should emphasize the security of the Baltic theater with robust Navies. Of course, this is just one such example, and a cohesive strategy should play into their regional interests and collective strengths.
- Germany must start to lead from the front. This means, next to France & the UK, it must begin to act like one of the great European powers it is. This starts with two things in particular: a practical German military rearmament that can project power regionally (and globally if need be), and to form a cogent regional strategy for Europe (particularly Eastern Euro) as a real global player. This will be a difficult sell for a reticent German public; however, this is pivotal for the security and well-being of Europe's future. From that end it the argument for must be made decisively. There is no easy solution, but it must start with elected German leaders having the political will to bring it to the forefront. One such example, is CDU parliamentarian and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Norbert Röttgen. He has actively called for a stronger role for Germany within NATO, Europe, and the globe.
- The US must continue, in tandem with France, Germany, and the UK, to be the anchor of NATO both strategically and symbolically. However, it's quite clear that the US must shift the focus of its military might to countering potential Chinese aggression. America should renew its commitment to a US nuclear security umbrella against Russian nuclear provocations. US strategy should also still continue to have the capability to fight a two-front war beside its partners. With that in mind it's pivotal that the US retain a presence in Europe, particularly 10th SFG and the 173rd ABCT. Even if there are short-term American troop increases, it should be made clear that European states will transition into taking point on any broader continental strategy.
- Turkey must be given an ultimatum on its coercive actions that undermine NATO's mission. The undeniable fact is that there will be a price to pay either way, but the question is if Turkey is a greater liability in or out of NATO? Given how important Turkey is as a partner, the ultimatum should be suspension within the partnership and not being permanently kicked out if they decide to change course or if a new government comes into power.



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Freddie Whitlow is currently working as a Research Assistant at the Hertie Centre for International Security where he mainly assists with the “Understanding Assurance, Deterrence, and Potential Nuclear Escalation in Europe” project. He’s also a Master of International Affairs candidate at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. He previously served in the Coast Guard and worked as a Research and Faculty Assistant at Georgetown where he analysed NATO policy toward Russia and other related topics that focused on Europe. He’s also completed internships with the Finabel, the Kurdish Regional Government Representation to the United States, and the Cato Institute. His main topical interests are transatlanticism, security policy and grand strategy in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, the future of German foreign policy, nuclear security, and the West’s relations with the broader Kurdish regions.

PAN | Panel discussion II: Towards an Outer EL 2 | Space Strategy - the NATO Perspective



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In the course of the last seventy years, human exploration in outer space has transformed its role from an object of fascination and wonder into a strategic domain for both state and non-state actors. Each day, billions of people around the globe rely on space-based systems for critical infrastructure that includes banking, the internet and navigation. Space has also been a military domain since the early days, as intelligence satellites scoured for information about the respective sides' opponents from orbit. Today, space itself is becoming more and more weaponized. Concepts reminiscent of science-fiction literature, such as laser weapons, particle beams or armed satellites are increasingly becoming features of the present. In addition, as the "battlefield" in space is difficult to access for humans, a future conflict in this domain will be conducted with mostly automated or remote-controlled technologies. Therefore, cyberwarfare too is likely to play a crucial role in any conflict taking place in earth's orbit and beyond.

As a result, outer space has become an increasingly significant domain for security policy and military strategy. In December 2019, NATO officially recognized space as its fifth operational domain. Given the rapid development of technologies used in space, NATO's strategy for outer space will have to be re-formulated and adjusted on a regular basis. This leaves the alliance with various questions it will have to answer which include, but are not limited to, the following:

How can national approaches towards space be harmonized under the auspices of NATO?

How should NATO react to the weaponization of space in a time of deterioration for the rules-based international order?

Should NATO participate in efforts to set binding international norms in the domain of space?

How should the new domain of space be linked to article 5?

Should NATO align with other multi-national bodies to formulate its policy?

PANELISTS



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Sarah Tarry has been the Director of Defence Policy and Capabilities within the Defence Policy and Planning Division of NATO's International Staff since November 2018.

Prior to this she was the Head of the Operational Preparedness Section within NATO's Operations Division. Previously, she held a variety of positions in the Canadian Ministry of Defence, including as the Deputy Director for Peace-keeping Policy, and the Deputy Director of NATO Policy. Her most recent position prior to returning to Brussels was in Canada's Privy Council Office, where she worked in the Secretariat responsible for providing foreign and defence policy advice to Canada's Prime Minister. Between 2008 and 2012, Ms. Tarry served in the Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO and subsequently in the Defence Policy and Planning Division of the NATO International Staff.



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Dominic Vogel assumed the role of Visiting Fellow in SWP's International Security Division on 01 October 2020. His areas of expertise are German defence policy, military organisation/planning and technology developments. After joining the German Air Force in 2004 and completing his officer training, Dominic Vogel graduated in Political Sciences at the University of the German Armed Forces in Hamburg. He served the Air Force's Force Protection Corps in various leadership positions from platoon to company level, including one tour of duty as Operations Officer in NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In addition, he served in different staff positions in both personnel policy and organisation division of the German Air Force Headquarters. Dominic Vogel attended the General Staff Officers' Training Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, Hamburg in 2017. Additionally, he also graduated again from the University of the German Armed Forces in 2019.



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Andrea Rotter is Head of Division Foreign and Security Policy, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Munich, where she focuses on developments in both German and European security and defense policy as well as transatlantic security cooperation. Before joining HSS, Ms. Rotter worked as a research assistant for the research division The Americas of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. Prior to that she was an academic assistant and lecturer at the University of Regensburg. Ms. Rotter holds an MA in European-American Relations from the University of Regensburg and a Bachelor's Degree in International Cultural and Business Studies from the University of Passau and the University of Stirling, United Kingdom. In 2018, Andrea Rotter was a Fellow with the American-German Situation Room of the German Marshall Fund and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. Currently, she is a member of the Young Leaders in Security Policy, a three-year program of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, BAKS) and serves as a board member of WIIS Deutschland (Women in International Security Studies), heading the regional chapter in Munich.

INTRODUCTION AND MODERATION



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Leonhard Simon works as Digital Communications Manager at the Munich Security Conference (MSC). In this position he coordinates the production of all digital communication content including conducting interviews with high-level participants. Prior to this position, he was organizing high-level conferences and meetings on international security issues such as European, Cyber or Energy Security. He received his Master's degree studying International Security in Barcelona and his Bachelor degree in international politics studying in Munich and Cork, Ireland. Leo works also as freelance photographer. In July 2019, he was elected as a member of YATA Germany's executive board.



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Imre Bartal was born in Hungary and grew up in the UK after his parents moved there when he was ten years old. After completing high school and college (UK), he went onto study Political Science with a focus on Eastern Europe at University College London. After an Erasmus year in Brandenburg, he decided to return to live in Berlin and is currently studying for an MA in European Studies at the European-University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) on the German-Polish border. His interest in security and defence issues stems from his fascination with the most fundamental and existential questions of political life. He is a member of the German Atlantic Association, the Young Transatlantic Initiative of Germany and winner of the Karl A. Lamers Peace Foundation Prize on the topic of NATO's future. His interests are mainly focused on European security, the NATO alliance and USA-Germany relations.



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Peer Klaus Braak is a recent graduate with a Bachelor of Arts in Governance and Public Policy as well as Media and Communication from the University of Passau. His fascination for the topic of transatlantic cooperation began when he spent a year as a fellow of the Congress-Bundestag-Exchange in the United States. As a volunteer for the American-Field-Service he made the facilitation of people-to-people contacts between the USA and Germany his hobby. He spent the summer of 2019 in Washington D.C., where he interned in the office of the German Ambassador. However, his interest in foreign affairs is not limited to the United States. In order to delve into the topic of international and religious terrorism, he spent a semester as an exchange-student in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and a summer as an intern in the office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in The Republic of India.

NORMS STABILITY: NATO AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION ON SPACE AS A COLLECTIVE GOOD

by Dr. Cornelia A. Baci

Space will play a huge strategic role in the near future, as it becomes increasingly congested, contested, competed, but also a source of peace missions' efficiency and global resilience. NATO officially declaring space as its fifth operational domain at the 2019 High-Level Meeting in London should not come as a surprise. Through SATCOM projects, NATO has been operating in space since 1970 and it has launched a total of eight own satellites in the past¹. NATO shifted to commercial providers, as well as to SATCOM Post-2000 (NSP2K), which was implemented through a capability package provided by NATO members, and which provided capacity to NATO missions, for example, in Afghanistan.

The utility of a space policy for NATO operations is obvious. It could also contribute to re-animating multilateralism and international cooperation, especially to ensure the continuity of space as a collective good.

Space as a Collective Good: Non-Rival and Non-Exclusive

Space is a collective good² and it must remain so. Collective goods are non-rival and non-exclusive. To meet the attributes of a collective good, a space strategy needs to ensure that participation in space does not reduce the supply, and that participation of some actors does not induce negative marginal costs or exclude the participation of others, i.e. it remains democratic.

One normative problem that affects security in the space habitat is the issue of congestion, with currently more than 750,000 pieces of in-orbit debris, making in-space

collisions increasingly probable (the Kessler syndrome). As per October 2020 there were 2,787 active satellites in space³ used for civil, commercial, government and military purposes. The risk of collision is considerable. In 2009, the US communication satellite Iridium-33 collided with the abandoned Russian military satellite Kosmos-2251, generating 2,300 fragments⁴. A collision between two NASA satellites was narrowly averted in 2020. Debris management⁵ and risk assessment is one of the objectives of the US Space Policy Directive 2018. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has also developed a set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and standards. UNOOSA is advancing international cooperation for the peaceful use and exploration of space and harnessing space innovation for the pursuit of social and economic advantages. UNOOSA conducts the Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space and processes registrations for objects launched into space. Since 1967, 1,082 satellites (459 from the US, 193 from China and 30 from Russia/USSR) out of 9,869 objects launched into space⁶, were not registered with the UN.

Great Power Rivalry: „Space is the World's Newest Warfighting Domain”

Another risk that can be exacerbated by great power competition pertains to the intentions of the actors operating in space. The Outer Space Treaty bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, but there is no treaty explicitly prohibiting weapons and non-kinetic space warfare. There is no evidence of arms in space, but this year, the US and the UK provided evidence that Russia tested an in-orbit anti-satellite (ASAT) that could target space satellites. Satellites can fulfil dual civil-military functions, and

¹ These are currently derelict, although still in space. They can be tracked in real time here: <https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=NATO&t=country> (Accessed 10 October 2020).

² See Art. 1 of the Outer Space Treaty: "The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries".

³ See: <https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database>

⁴ The European Space Agency (2020). *About Space Debris*. https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/About_space_debris (Accessed 10 October 2020).

⁵ Larsen, P. B. (2018). Minimum International Norms For Managing Space Traffic, Space Debris, and Near Earth Object Impacts. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, 83 (4), pp. 741-85.

⁶ UNOOSA (2020). Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jsp?lf_id= (Accessed 10 October 2020).

theoretically, a meteorological satellite could also gather intelligence data⁷.

The potential for space rivalry was exacerbated under the Trump administration. The US President stated that „space is the world’s newest warfighting domain” and in 2019 he established the US Space Force to build a comprehensive military advantage and “American dominance in space”⁸. While the Pentagon reportedly works on hypersonic weapons, there are yet no concrete timeframes of extra-terrestrial military deployments⁹, and the 2020 Space Strategy outline does not refer to in-orbit arms placements. NATO has clearly stated that it will not deploy weapons in space. In the current wording, the Alliance’s scope for a space policy pertains to situational awareness and reliable access to space, with the main goal of optimising success of its missions and operations.

Recommendations for a Resilient NATO Space Strategy

First, NATO will need to define its level of ambition in space and to which risks it would want to respond. I.e. will the strategy be directed to deterrence (e.g. ballistic missile defence), peace missions, countering great power

competition, establishing an arms control regime for space, ability to implement collective defence (Article 5)¹⁰ and protecting allies’ assets in the outer space, or all of the above? Second, NATO’s future space policy could envisage the contribution to one of the existing activities of the UNOOSA or the European Space Agency (ESA), who is also working on an automated space collision prevention system. Third, early-warning of risks, e.g. cyber-threats, natural disasters and other security challenges constitute some areas where the Alliance could look for cooperative potential with the UN, EU and the US, but also with the UK, France, South Korea and Japan, who work on developing military space programmes. Fourth, multilateral cooperation should pertain to the following key domains: a) defining and establishing a set of norms in space; b) setting an investigation commission for tracking the means and purpose of space activities by all actors present in space; c) working with the International Court of Justice and relevant bodies on the criminalisation and punishment of activities infringing existing conventions¹¹; and d) building incentives for multi-stakeholder cooperation to ensure peaceful edges and guarantee the continuation of space as a collective good.

⁷ Paulauskas, K. (2020). Space: NATO’s latest frontier. *NATO Review*, 13 March.

⁸ The White House (2019). The Trump Administration Is Establishing the United States Space Command to Advance American Interests and Defend Our Nation. Washington, DC, 29 August. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/trump-administration-establishing-united-states-space-command-advance-american-interests-defend-nation/> (Accessed 09 October 2020).

⁹ Weisgerber, M. (2020). Boots on The Moon Are Going to Have to Wait, Space Force General Says. *Defence One*, 01

October. <https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/10/boots-moon-are-going-have-wait-space-force-general-says/168939/> (Accessed 09 October 2020).

¹⁰ This might be premised by a modification of Art. 6 of the NATO Charter.

¹¹ German Federal Foreign Office (2018). Space Law. Berlin, 31 August. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/internatrecht/einzelfragen/weltraumrecht/-/231384> (Accessed 10 October 2020).



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SPACE IS STRONG WITH THE ALLIES - MAKING NATO FIT FOR SPACE by Lisa Becker, Germany

It goes without saying that NATO in its seven decades of existence has demonstrated that it can adapt to a rapidly evolving security environment and emerging threats, whether it is by reaching out to new allies and partners or more recently by adding the outer space as its fifth operational domain. Space as such is not new to NATO; what we are witnessing today is a progressively congested and contested orbit. These trends impact the allies' security in space as much as they do on earth for space is an enabler for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) services across all operational domains. Yet, space assets are prone to disruptions and deliberate corruption. Malign activities and bold ambitions of Russia and China challenge the allies, who as of now retain command in space. With the ongoing shifts, however, the gap is closing fast.

The 2019 London Declaration articulates that space is of utmost importance for the allies. To ensure that the alliance remains at the forefront to respond to current and future challenges, NATO needs a comprehensive strategy for space.

It is the right moment to stress space in NATO's strategic deliberations: in the past years, developments in space technology progressed at a fast pace, with costs for satellites and launches decreasing and thus rendering it available to more state- and non-state players. By the same token, the services provided by space assets like remote control or imagery are becoming more sophisticated and widely used by NATO's partners but also challenges. Space is gaining in importance in military affairs both on a national level and within the alliance as a whole: the consolidation of space in the French and American armed forces, and Germany hosting NATO's Space Center at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, speak for themselves. Ultimately, the reflections made within the framework of #NATO2030 and prospects of a new Strategic Concept represent an opportunity to place space as a core component of what will be a larger transformation into an agile multi-domain alliance. NATO represents the ideal forum where allies can not only discuss these issues but continue doing what they do best - i.e. providing collective defense. If there were any doubts about the alliance's *raison d'être* then taking NATO to space is an unequivocal statement about the commitment to its core missions.

It is one thing to recognize space as a domain, but another to build up, integrate and defend the capabilities. This can range from the use of the allies' space assets in joint operations to the resort to collective self-defense laid down in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Addressing the plethora of threats in space, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, terrestrial or in-orbit, and how the alliance can act, react, interact and impact space will be a challenge to take up and bundle in said strategy.

For the allies, space is not uniquely a risk, but an opportunity to reassert itself as a resilient alliance across all operational domains. Seizing this momentum, NATO should incorporate the following recommendations for its space strategy:

- (1) Strengthening the allies' strategic advantage in space through capability build-up
NATO relies on its allies' space assets, mostly provided by the US. In order to distribute responsibilities, a space strategy needs to give clear strategic guidance on the desired long-term development of capabilities and burden-sharing. In concrete terms this means incentivizing the acquisition of space capabilities that will contribute to the alliance by setting a minimum target in relation to overall expenditures, including in-kind contributions (e.g. stationing radars for spatial situation awareness with allies that do not possess their own infrastructure).
- (2) Ensuring interoperability through standardization
To assure interoperability at all times, even in complex settings in remote areas, the full integration of the allies' military space assets should be achieved through further standardization. This means updating STANAGs to develop standardized collective capacities, as well as uniform understandings of threat levels to space-based infrastructure among others.
- (3) Integrating space in national and joint trainings
Going forward, it will be central to incorporate the topic of space security in the education of the allies' forces, e.g. exploring the junction between space-based technology and cyber threats. This starts with training programs in professional military education (PME) and is reiterated and applied in dedicated exercises and

simulations – both on national and multinational level.

(4) Enhancing space cooperation with partners

Lastly, while NATO member states possess significant capabilities, the allies can draw upon their network of partners, notably Japan and the

EU, not to mention the space industry, to leverage the existing expertise and technological advancements.



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Lisa Becker is a German national and graduate of the Sciences Po/MGIMO double degree program in International Security. She completed her undergraduate degree at Sciences Po and the University of Michigan, where she attended classes with USAF ROTC cadets. She previously interned at the Federal Ministry of Defense and the NATO Defense College, and was a Blue Book Trainee at the European Commission. Her research interests include Russian foreign policy, US-EU-Russia relations, European security, NATO, and space.

TOWARDS AN OUTER SPACE STRATEGY - THE NATO PERSPECTIVE

by Matthias Goedecking, Germany

Space-based systems have become deeply integrated in the world's economy and human well-being. They play essential roles in agriculture, navigation, weather forecasting, climate change monitoring, global communications and a plethora of other areas. They are also essential assets of many of the world's militaries, including NATO. They aid in the upholding of missile deterrence through Early Warning systems, support intelligence gathering, support navigation and enable worldwide communications, making them indispensable for both peacetime monitoring and the modern battlefield.

With the end of the Cold War, Space as a warfighting domain appeared to have faded from the agendas of most of the world's militaries. Technological advances throughout the last decade have put the issue back on the table. Two main developments have driven this renewed focus: The first development is space becoming more and more accessible to a growing number of actors. At the turn of the millennium, an estimated 769 active satellites were orbiting Earth. Today, this number has increased to almost 3000. As the costs of manufacturing, launching and maintaining satellites falls further, orbits will become more congested still.

Second, a growing dependence of many of the world's militaries on Outer Space results in new vulnerabilities. Space-based systems and their infrastructure are attractive and often mostly defenseless targets for potential adversaries. Over the past decade, a number of nations, most notably China, Russia and India, have shown an increased interest in enhancing their counterspace capabilities. Such capabilities include terrestrial activities such as cyberattacks on satellite command and control infrastructure, jamming or interfering with signals, and the development of Directed-Energy weapons. They also extend to activities in orbit, such as "rendezvous and proximity operations" (RPO) and kinetic attacks on satellites using Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT). Evidence for the continued development of such activities include the Russian test of its Nudol Anti-Ballistic Missile system for ASAT purposes earlier this year as well as recent Chinese RPO maneuvers.

While NATO itself does not currently operate its own systems in Space, it does rely on the Space capabilities of its members in its operations. Moreover, NATO owns and maintains terrestrial satellite communications anchor stations. Consequently, the 2016 NATO Joint Allied Doctrine for Air and Space Operations names three Space Operational Mission Areas in which NATO operates. First, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) refers to the continuous monitoring of the Space environment. Second, Space Force Enhancement encompasses all activities in Space that increase the effectiveness of military operations. Third, Space control refers to measures to "ensure unimpeded access to space capabilities while negating adversaries the ability to do the same". In 2019, NATO has officially expanded its list of operational domains (air, land, sea, and cyberspace) to include Outer Space.

Uncertainties about capabilities and resolve have long been considered the most important drivers of conflict. Many military space capabilities aim to reduce such uncertainties, like, for example, Early Warning systems and intelligence gathering systems. At the same time, they have given rise to new, potentially dangerous uncertainties that must be mitigated. On a technical level, the dual-use nature of most counterspace technologies complicates arms control and monitoring. Relatedly, identifying and attributing hostile conduct in space poses problems not dissimilar to those encountered in cyberspace. From a strategic viewpoint, the current collective defense framework under which NATO operates is insufficient in addressing counterspace activities. This leads to uncertainty about the resolve of the Alliance to respond to such threats. In order to fulfill its stated goals outlined in the Article 1 of the Atlantic Treaty, NATO must expand its understanding of collective defense to include Outer Space.

Policy Recommendations

- NATO should clearly signal that destructive attacks on systems in space of any of the Parties are considered an attack against them all and would trigger an Article 5 response and clearly communicate its resolve to engage in cross-domain deterrence. The current wording of Article 6 of the Atlantic Treaty is insufficient to address armed attacks on space-based systems and should be expanded to include objects in orbit.

- Effective deterrence is dependent upon clearly communicated declarations of intent and resolve. The 2019 NATO Space Doctrine should be declassified to enhance collective defense and to reduce uncertainties.
- NATO should expand its existing information sharing mechanisms and develop an integrated mechanism for Space Surveillance and SSA. In addition to lowering uncertainties about potential hostile actions in orbit, this would enhance deterrence by introducing SSA redundancies.
- Given the incalculable risks that kinetic ASAT weapons pose to a sustainable use of Space, NATO should lead by example and commit to not test kinetic ASAT weapons. It should avoid any suspicions that its members pursue their development. In the absence of adequate global legal frameworks, norms of conduct are crucial elements in regulating space-faring activities. NATO should seize the window of opportunity to help shape these norms.



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NATO SPACE POLICY

by Robert Horney, Germany

Space as a strategic domain has been important since the beginning of the Cold War, but especially the rapid expansion of the internet and assorted technologies has increased its significance. This paper provides recommendations how NATO can leverage its position to play a constructive and meaningful role to ensure competition in space remains peaceful.

Firstly, space is an arena of conventional warfare. So far no country has stationed weapons in space, which would likely result in an arms race. On the other hand, anti-satellite weapons have been developed by many developed countries (Preston, 2002). These could serve both offensive and defensive roles in a conflict. They can be used to target an adversary's communications and surveillance satellites or be used against potential space-deployed weapon systems.

Secondly, satellites have a range of communication and surveillance functions, on which modern militaries depend (Paulauskas, 2020). Navigation systems are both important for military as well as civilian purposes and form an inherent part of the global economy. The few major countries running the 4 main systems have the technical capabilities to limit the accuracy of or block access in certain regions to their systems. Additionally, they can try to interfere with another country's system. Surveillance satellites can increase trust through verification between countries and allow for better informed decision-making. Global communication systems allow for a more integrated form of warfare.

While space has mainly been an area of national competition, in recent years an increasing number of private actors have become active in the domain (Johnson, 2019). In space, the home countries remain responsible for their private actors, but compliance is difficult to monitor. This complicates the two aspects outlined above as their skills can be seen as a 'dual-use' technology not bound by clear rules. For example, powerful imagery technology can analyze activities on military installations and the information can be sold to the highest bidder.

National states and international organisations understand the challenges the unique nature of space pos-

sesses for their long-term military strategies. Some countries, notably the US, have formed separate 'Space Forces' responsible for a new domain of military competition. The US has warned that other actors aim at building space capabilities against US interests and has invested in advanced research (Department of Defense, 2020). Similarly, other states, both NATO allies and outsiders have developed both high-level strategies and on-the-ground expertise (French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 2019).

- NATO has also adapted a space policy in 2019 but kept its content secret (Kadomtsev, 2019). This undermines the value as an instrument of deterrence. It would therefore be advisable for NATO to publish a framework showcasing its commitment to article 5 in space, its plans to minimize conflict and key tasks for the member states. Like in cyberspace, NATO must clarify how it sees its role in any conflict pertaining to the domain (Silverstein, 2020).
- In order to leverage the technical expertise NATO member states have, the alliance should create a coordination cell to share best-practices, advice on strategy and facilitate technical cooperation. Such an institution could for example be modeled on the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE, n.d.).
- Issues like the coordination of satellite-positions and control of non-state actors require international cooperation. NATO should leverage the power of the alliance and function as the focal point for international negotiations. Space is a global common good, similar to the high seas. The United Nations Convention Law of the Sea has been an effective way to manage interstate issues (United Nations, 2012). An international treaty is necessary for all actors to cooperate and compete peacefully and settle disputes regarding space.

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TOWARDS AN OUTER SPACE STRATEGY - THE NATO PERSPECTIVE

by Vojtech Jirasek, Czech Republikc

In 2019, NATO's Space Policy was adopted and thus space was recognized as a new operational domain for the Alliance. While some might consider this premature, the fact is that space is militarizing and this trend is likely to speed up – especially since there is no treaty limiting or banning weapons in outer space except for the nuclear weapons (Article IV of Outer Space Treaty).

At the same time, space is an extremely expensive business. Only US Space Force's budget for 2021 is at \$15.4 billion, which is \$1.5 billion more than Turkey's 2019 military budget, and dwarves the majority of all NATO members' military budgets and even some members' national budgets. This means that space capabilities – being able to send a satellite to space on its own – are off-limits for most of NATO member states in the foreseeable future and for some probably forever. Nevertheless, the militaries of individual member states without their own space programs are facing a lack of independent satellite intelligence or telecommunication capabilities and are dependent on their space allies. While NATO has some satellite capabilities of its own (SATCOM is responsible for communication with satellites and delivery of information gathered by them), the satellites are actually provided by France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While there are some alternatives to NATO, such as the European Space Agency (ESA), these are not really feasible: for example, ESA forbids military use of its satellites. Bilateral agreements between NATO allies are another possibility, yet it might be somewhat inconvenient and does not solve the high price of satellites and their maintenance.

An alternative might be greater cooperation between the member states on the NATO level. While some members would surely join willingly, others might join only partially or not at all. Allies with greater space expertise could advise less experienced peers in the development of a common space program. The NATO space program could serve the (defensive) needs of all allies in space. It should also cooperate with individual member states' space programs, as well as ESA and other space programs where possible.

Such a NATO space program would need a unified budget and command, co-financed and co-staffed by involved members. It would have to go from dependency on several space allies to an integrated research, launch, and operation program costing a great amount of money so that it could amend or substitute individual national space programs. This way, the NATO space program could in time expand SATCOM.

As the militarization of space is becoming a reality, NATO should not only invest in the build-up of a satellite fleet capable of intelligence gathering and telecommunication, it should also reconsider its promise not to weaponize space and focus on both defensive and offensive capabilities either in space or on the ground. These technologies are very sophisticated and expensive and their development on a NATO basis would make sense for most of its members.

Cooperation in NATO of some sort is certainly an option that could bring the allies more together and help them deal with the lack of their own space programs. To make such cooperation possible, the following steps should be considered:

- a) NATO members should actively engage in the discussion on deeper cooperation in the space to clear the form and size of the cooperation. This would help in creating a path towards the common space program.
- b) The areas of cooperation need to be defined. There already is some degree of cooperation such as the memorandum between France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States enabling SATCOM to use some of their satellites. For now, this seems to satisfy most members. However, the developments in space show that satellites need to be protected and possible adversaries deterred by own offensive capabilities. To achieve this, a unified research program is advisable.
- c) NATO's space budget needs to be addressed. While SATCOM's €1 billion until 2034 for maintenance of satellites borrowed from the four abovementioned allies might be enough, it is insufficient for a complex defense and research space programs.

The propositions above are only the first steps needed to be taken on a long path towards NATO's presence in space. These first steps are nevertheless crucial with space becoming ever more important for the sustainability of technological advantage on the ground. The united space program would help smaller members to substitute

their own space programs, boost space programs of already space-borne allies, help to defend the alliance both in space and on the ground, bring NATO as an alliance closer together, and might be even the first step towards a NATO Moon or Mars base.



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Vojtech studies Crisis and Security Management with a focus on Cybersecurity at Leiden University and holds an MA degree in Middle East studies from the University of Southern Denmark. He is an editor at Atlas of Today's World, a project aiming at connecting the media and academic sector. In his research, Vojtech focuses on various issues including contemporary Turkey, Syria, non-state violence, cybersecurity, and space security.

A NATO SPACE POLICY FOR THE ERA OF GREAT-POWER COMPETITION by Emma Louise Leahy, USA

In July 2020, a new era of space exploration began as China, the US, and the UAE launched interplanetary probes to Mars. The UAE's launch was the first space mission by an Arab country, and involved close technical cooperation with US space agency NASA. The post-Cold War lull in space exploration is now over, and a second space race is potentially in the offing: this time involving a proliferation of public and private actors with the capability — or at least the intent — to launch payloads into space.

NATO is rather late to the game, having adopted its first Space Policy only in 2019. NATO's overall strategic posture is still shaped around the legacies of the Cold War and 9/11, and significant adjustments are required to align NATO's capabilities with current threats to international peace and stability — most importantly the escalating strategic rivalry with China. If it is to remain relevant in today's geopolitical climate, NATO urgently needs to pivot its force posture towards the Asia-Pacific; upgrade its naval power-projection capabilities to protect freedom of navigation in strategic waterways like the South China Sea; and enhance its cyber- and bio- defence capabilities. Given the vast repositioning required across core operational domains to counter the threat from China, NATO should be mindful of over-stretching and should not realistically aspire to lead the Allies operationally in the new domain of space. This limitation need not mean that NATO has no role in the second space race: quite the opposite, NATO has an important role as a force-multiplier for peaceful space exploration.

A NATO space policy for the era of great-power competition should coordinate diplomatic and scientific cooperation across a broad coalition of like-minded Allies and partner nations, to build the critical mass that is needed to collectively write the rules of international engagement in space. Cooperation should be incentivised in two priority areas: legal and technical. On both of those fronts, NATO should regard China as its main competitor, and should aim to block Beijing from attaining the first-mover advantage.

Legal Coordination

There is no widely accepted international-law framework to govern space exploration beyond the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which predates the lunar landing. Efforts

at the UN level to create a more comprehensive treaty regime faltered during the Cold War, as the small club of spacefaring superpowers refused to sign away their operational latitude. Now that more actors are entering space, for more sophisticated missions — the US, Russia, China, and Japan are developing manned missions to the Moon, and the UAE plans to establish a permanent colony on Mars by 2117 — a legal framework for space exploration is becoming a matter of urgency, but consensus at the UN seems more elusive than ever as geopolitical tensions continue to rise. By consolidating agreement around a common set of principles, NATO can effectively elevate its strategic preferences to having the force of customary international law.

NATO, and all of its members, should start by signing onto the Artemis Accords, bilateral agreements produced by NASA based on the Outer Space Treaty to define principles for the civil use and exploration of space. However, NATO's membership alone does not carry enough collective weight to write the rules of space engagement, which means that agreements must also be signed with partners outside the Alliance — including non-democracies that share a common interest in peaceful space exploration and a common concern about China's attempts to supplant the post-World War II legal-institutional order. Here, again, the Artemis Accords provide a useful model, with a broadened conception of "like-mindedness" to encompass countries with a shared geostrategic outlook. This inclusive language enables reliable security partners like the UAE to participate, adding to the legal weight of the Accords.

Technical Coordination

A common legal framework will enable robust cooperation on the technical front. Although many governments worldwide have active space programs, few possess the capability to launch missions into space. This has led to a new paradigm of interstate payload-sharing. Several countries have thus far opted to work with China — for instance Saudi Arabia, which sent a scientific payload aboard the Chang'e probe to the dark side of the Moon.

To prevent the emergence of international space programs built around interoperability with China, NATO should put itself forward as the partnership network of choice. NATO should coordinate bilateral transfers of aerospace technology, from its North American and Western European members, to its Eastern European members, thereby enabling a broader grouping of Allies to participate robustly in peaceful space exploration.

Additionally, NATO should initiate technical cooperation with the members of the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This would expand space cooperation with Israel, and would also lock in space cooperation with Russia — one of the few bright spots in Russian-Western relations -- disincentivising a potential Russian shift towards technical partnership with China. Such cooperation would have a multiplier effect, giving NATO access to its partners' own networks of partners. The UAE is an Istanbul Cooperation Initiative member with plans to build a domestic satellite launching facility for the use of Arab and African nations: by partnering with the UAE, NATO would unlock partnership opportunities with major regional economies that are currently investing heavily in space

programs, namely, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria.

Finally, NATO should use space cooperation as a lever to recruit partners in the Asia-Pacific, most importantly India. Although the SEATO experiment languished in the 1970s, today's geopolitical realities could entice Asian nations, worried about Chinese encroachment, to institutionalise cooperation with NATO. A key objective should be ensuring that Asian partners link their global-positioning systems to the American GPS or the European Galileo, rather than the Chinese BeiDou, to ensure the operational safety and interoperability of security missions on Earth.



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Emma Louise Leahy focuses on US foreign policy, security in the Arabian Peninsula, and the strategic future of Europe. She has held appointments at three embassies in two world capitals, advising heads of mission on public outreach strategies and managing the implementation of cultural programs. Over the course of six years in Washington DC, she advised clients from the Arabian Peninsula on engaging with the US Congress, worked with a c-suite executive of the world's largest international law firm, and interned in both chambers of the US Congress. Languages are her passion: she is trained in the Greco-Roman Classics with an emphasis on Latin poetry interpretation, and she is fluent in English as well as four additional EU languages. Having previously lived in the US, Hong Kong, France, and Russia, she now resides in Germany, where she is a Master of International Affairs candidate at the Hertie School.

PAN | Strategy change through climate EL 3 | change?



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When permafrost thaws in Russia, arable land becomes infertile in Niger and entire islands in Oceania are swallowed by the sea, the direct consequences of climate change become visible. However, climate change no longer solely affects the everyday lives of people living in the affected regions. Here in Germany, as well as in the EU and NATO, security policy strategies must be adapted to the new circumstances. Climate change is no longer a future scenario, but already plays a decisive role in many conflict areas and has in doing so presented new challenges to governments and national armies abroad.

Since 2019, the fight against climate change as a general challenge to society has been a prominent part of public discourse, not only in Germany. Although the "Fridays for Future" movement has been able to make the urgency of the situation clear to a broad public and also to parts of the Federal Government, the security policy component has largely been ignored in the discourse. However, the consequences of climate change have already had an impact on the work of ministries and the planning and implementation of foreign missions of the Bundeswehr.

Climate change mitigation and security policy can no longer be separated, and the "coupled approach" can only be successful in the long term if climatic factors are taken into account. The effects of climate

change will shape development, foreign, security and defence policy in Germany, NATO member states and the international community. What influence will this development have on NATO's future challenges and its capacity for action? Which factors will influence NATO's decision-making in the future? How can NATO adapt to the challenges that arise due to climate change and ensure a successful execution of its aims for the transatlantic alliance beyond 2030? Which measures need to be employed for NATO to achieve its primary objective of ensuring security and stability on the Alliance's territory in light of these changes concerning technology, personnel and support from society?

PANELISTS



Hannah Kurnoth
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Hannah Elisabeth Kurnoth works as an analyst in the field of climate diplomacy at adelphi. As part of her work, she coordinates the Global Climate and Security Risk and Foresight Assessment for the German Federal Foreign Office and organises the Berlin Climate and Security Conference. In addition to her current work and thematic focus on the climate security nexus, she has several years of working experience with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Hannah graduated in May 2020 with a Master's degree in International Affairs from the Hertie School in Berlin. She wrote her Master's thesis under the supervision of Prof. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Ischinger on the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Germany.



Paul Glanville
Head of Global Sector
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Paul has over 20 years of international supply chain experience across Europe, Middle East and Africa for both Public and Private sectors. He has led teams across diverse sectors such as Automotive, Life Sciences, Technology, Oil & Gas and Engineering & Manufacturing; successfully transferring proven capability from one sector to another. These roles have typically covered multiple countries and integrated disciplines including procurement, inventory management as well as more traditional warehousing and transport services.

He has a strong background in advanced inventory optimisation management having held both consulting and operational roles across sectors. Paul successfully led the delivery of complex IS deployments into legacy environments with a reputation for on time delivery within budget.

Currently Paul has global leadership for driving accelerated growth across all Sectors. His teams, based in every region of the world engage in strategy, product development and customer engagement activities which typically cover multiple countries.



Dr. Annika Vergin,
German armed forces strategic foresight analyst

Dr. Annika Vergin has been working as a scientific assistant at the Future Analysis Branch at the Bundeswehr Office for defense planning since December 2007. As the Future Analysis Branch is working with an interdisciplinary team she is responsible for the subject area of natural science. She studied Biology at the University of Potsdam and obtained a Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry from the Max Planck Institute of Colloids and Interfaces in Potsdam.

The range of topics she has covered in the past in her work extends from biotechnology, especially synthetic biology, to resources - fossil and alternative - and the impact of climate change on security policy. A current project deals with human augmentation and its potential impact in civil and military contexts.

INTRODUCTION AND MODERATION



Marlies Murray,
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Marlies Murray is a Political Science BA student of the Free University of Berlin currently pursuing her exchange semesters at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. As a German- US-American citizen, transatlantic cooperation and security policy are at the heart of her studies. Her studies also focus on Sino domestic and foreign policy, particularly on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on the European Union. Working as a project assistant in the Eurasia Lab at the Institute for European Politics, she conducts research on the process of democratization in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Southern Caucasus.



Rafael Gehring,
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Sector development
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A sector development manager with DHL Supply Chain, Rafael Gehring is an expert in supply chain management and logistics with an industry expertise of 9 years+.

Whilst his current role focusses on market entry and product development activities, he gained substantial experiences in sourcing and intercultural negotiations in his four years as sourcing manager with DHL's Corporate Procurement.

His academical background lies in logistics and IT, freelance he's working as a lecturer for logistics and negotiations in procurement at DHBW Stuttgart.

His main focus for the conference is on supply chain security implications and demands.



Pieter Brandt,
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Major, German Air Force

Pieter Brandt is a major in the German Air Force's technical branch. He studied aeronautical and spacecraft engineering in Munich and graduated as M.Sc. in 2012. Subsequently, he gathered experience as a technical officer in a tactical jet fighter wing, before moving to the German Eurofighter procurement and development office and participated in different NATO training courses in Germany and the USA. Back at the federal armed forces university in Munich, he was responsible for the military education and training of junior officers during their academical studies. He served as squadron commander in operation "Counter Daesh" in Jordan and graduated from the German staff and command college in Hamburg. He is currently based in southern Brandenburg, where he serves as squadron commander in a helicopter transport wing.

In July 2019, Pieter was elected as a member of YATA Germany's executive board.

NATO IN THE ARCTIC

by Giorgi Davidian, Georgia

The Arctic region has recently attracted significant attention from various players, especially from its littoral states. The reason is quite straightforward: climate change. To be more specific, because of the climate, the ice cap started melting, opening up previously hardly accessible or even inaccessible Arctic territory.

The Arctic is a lucrative region with rich energy resources, minerals, fish, etc., making it attractive to numerous actors. Furthermore, disappearing ice makes the Arctic even more appealing by opening up opportunities for new sea routes, which significantly decrease the distance of voyage between Asia and Europe, and between Europe and North America. However, together with the new opportunities, the High North also introduces new challenges. One of the most striking issues is the oil drilling in the region.

In my opinion, the opening up of the Arctic invites NATO to engage in the region more actively because of, among others, the following two reasons. First, it can make a valuable contribution to the energy security of the Alliance. Second, more involvement from the NATO side can help to mitigate the arising environmental challenges, which may not only have regional, but also global implications. It is noteworthy that Russia (arguably the most heavily engaged player in the region) is quite collaborative with the West in the realm of “low” politics when it comes to the High North. This fact creates favorable conditions for the successful accomplishment of the aforementioned two aims, despite the increasing security concerns spawned by Russia’s militarization of the Arctic.

Regarding energy security, according to US Geological Survey (USGS) of 2008, there are more than 85 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, more than 1.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and more than 40 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Taking into account that a significant part of these resources is on the NATO territory (e.g. 40 per cent of undiscovered oil), active engagement with this region can potentially provide the NATO member-states with a new reliable source of energy, diversifying

the supply portfolio and thus, contributing to energy security.

As for the environmental challenges, according to USGS, more than 80 per cent of the aforementioned energy resources are in the offshore areas. It is common knowledge that drilling in the offshore areas is quite the challenging and risky task. The things get even riskier when it comes to the Arctic region, given its harsh environmental conditions. From my point of view, despite the advanced technological and industrial capacities, none of the NATO member-states involved in the Arctic is fully prepared to start offshore drilling without encountering high risks of oil spill, and to react properly to the potential spills. Given the lack of financial, human, technical and other resources, the Russian Federation is even less prepared for these occurrences. Consequently, offshore oil drilling in the High North, especially conducted by the Russian side, can have catastrophic ecological consequences for the region and for the entire world. Thus, by closely inspecting what Russia does or plans to do in this realm, and by providing it with technical expertise and consultations, NATO can minimize potential environmental hazards.

Successful completion of these tasks is quite realistic, taking into account a notable Russia-West cooperation in the Arctic. For instance, numerous member-states of NATO (including the USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, etc.) have been actively cooperating with the Russian side in the region in the spheres of fishery, delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf, search and rescue, energy and navigation.

In a nutshell, climate change has significantly altered the reality in the High North, making it increasingly tempting for various players within and beyond the region. Taking into account the new opportunities and challenges arising by the opening up of the Arctic, an active involvement of NATO in the region is reasonable for at least two reasons: first, it can improve the energy security of NATO; second, it can contribute greatly to both local and global environmental security. Besides, Russia’s approach to the Arctic, which contains numerous elements of liberalism, increases the chances of successful outcome of the involvement.

To conclude, here are the recommendations based on the aforementioned points:

1. NATO should monitor drilling activities in the Arctic more actively;
2. NATO should encourage increased cooperation in the various spheres in the region. In particular, it should conduct emergency exercises more actively not only within the Alliance, but also together with Russia;
3. NATO should invest more in R&D and technology for the sake of safe drilling in the High-North;
4. NATO should encourage its member-states to speak with one voice when it comes to the Arctic;
5. NATO should increase provision of technical consultations to Russia.



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Giorgi Davidian holds a DAAD scholarship for MA studies, currently pursuing his Master's Degree in International Relations: Global Governance and Social Theory at the University of Bremen and Jacobs University Bremen. He also studied Political Science at the University of Mannheim and has a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from the International Black Sea University.

His latest work experiences are connected to the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, where he was a Research Assistant, and to the NATO Liaison Office Georgia, where he was an Assistant to Public Diplomacy Officer.

His research interests are policy-making in the Arctic, security architecture in the South Caucasus and the limited statehood.

NATO'S CLIMATE CHANGE HOMEWORK

by Sofie Flurschütz, Germany

"What we do today determines what the world will look like tomorrow." This statement by Eschenbach, a 19th century writer, is more important today than ever. If we want to leave our environment in a good and well-ordered state for future generations, we must learn to treat it with respect.

I have a friend, Joe. He works in Los Angeles and we like to chat every now and then. Whenever we do, he tells me about California's struggles with wildfires and the effects it has on him. As of October 5th, more than four million acres of land across the "Golden State" have burned down, which makes this a record year. The massive fires are driven by a combination of causes such as climate change, people, difficult wind conditions, and years of fire suppression. But while California's climate has always been prone to fire, the link between climate change and bigger fires is inseparable. According to a UN report, climate change is primarily responsible for the fact that the number of natural disasters has doubled since 2000. In total, the number of people globally affected by natural disasters rose to 4.2 billion – that is almost half of all people. As the planet heats up, ice caps will melt, storms will rage and wildfires will set off. Floods and famines will result in mass migration. Droughts and crop-failure will lead to intensified competition for food, water, and energy in regions where resources are already stretched to the limit.

To tackle climate change and its consequences NATO needs a strategy change! Firstly, everyone in NATO has to agree that it is a crisis, and understand that climate change is the greatest threat to global security because it may destroy efforts of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In my opinion, we absolutely have to create the necessary awareness of the urgency of the problem. Climate activist Greta Thunberg was not wrong when she said "I want you to act as if our house is on fire." It is the transatlantic alliance that possesses resources – military and civilian – to tackle climate catastrophes and provide assistance to the most affected countries.

Secondly, NATO must think about their core tasks and focus more clearly on the benefits of early intervention. At the Lisbon summit in 2010, the NATO member states laid down three core tasks in the Alliance's Strategic Concept: Collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. It is NATO's responsibility to prevent and manage crises and their escalation, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction. The organization can ensure international security and stability through cooperation with non-NATO countries.

I recommend NATO to seek more international partnerships such as joint projects and actions with the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction or the EU emissions trading system. Facilitators such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change can map and prioritize climate change and security hotspots so that NATO then can identify the most suitable techniques to reduce specific security threats.

In order to be prepared for increasing climate-related disasters, I recommend NATO to enhance the number of medical staff. This way people in need can be helped quickly. In addition to medical staff also more people who help with evacuation and emergency management will be needed. When delivering medical equipment or transporting patients, troops should produce as few emissions as possible by using renewable sources of energy such as solar energy to reduce their carbon footprint. By conserving natural resources, including water, land, and fuel, the military becomes more effective on and off the battlefield. Moreover, NATO has to consider the aspect of being affected themselves by climate change: Heavy gear could cause heat exhaustion of the soldiers because of warmer temperatures and access points could be interrupted due to heavy rainfalls.

In order to evolve into a more sustainable army NATO could also integrate resource-saving materials and gadgets, close facilities that are redundant or obsolete and connect digitalization and sustainability by using more digital methods. Especially training for missions, for instance, can be setup more sustainable. When transporting tanks, why is it necessary for them to be driven on roads, instead they can be transported by railroad. To realize these ideas there should be 10-year targets and wasteful spending should always have consequences.

To conclude, climate change must be met with greater urgency and ambition. As former British Foreign Secretary Beckett said, "climate change is a threat that can bring us together if we are wise enough to stop it from driving us apart." NATO's mission is to maintain peace

and keep us as well as future generations safe. Therefore, the Alliance must help to curb climate change by listening to scientific evidence and early warnings, and investing accordingly in prevention, adaptation to climate change and disaster preparedness.



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Sofie Flurschütz lived in New York, studied in Paris, and worked in Berlin. Currently she is a graduate student studying Intercultural Communication and European Studies at Fulda University of Applied Sciences and scholarship holder of the Hanns Seidel Foundation. She is passionate about writing and has 6+ years experience working with Journalism, Communication, and Social Media. Sofie has participated and worked at conferences such as the Model United Nations Conference (2019) and the Munich Security Conference (2019). This summer she worked at the Federal Press Office, supporting the Foreign, Security, and Development Policy Unit.

STRATEGY CHANGE THROUGH CLIMATE CHANGE? LET'S CHANGE TO CLIMATE SECURITY THINKING FIRST!

by Yasmin de Fraiture, Netherlands

Climate change is arguably the largest security issue of our time. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that it is addressed in strategy-making. As people, we tend to think of human security first. Logically, we want to preserve our own wellbeing. If that is not the first type of security we think of, then it is very likely hard security: the kind of security that militaries and NATO provide. Climate security, however, is generally not the first element of security that comes to mind. In the following paper it will be outlined why and how we should reframe our strategic thinking to include climate security.

If we want to change our way of security thinking, we need to reframe our definitions of security. First, we need to recognize climate change as a security issue. Climate security thinking should always be part of our strategy-making, policymaking and risk-analysis, as it can be regarded as a risk multiplier. Climate change is known to increase the likelihood of natural disaster, food insecurity, mass migration and conflict about scarce resources. This way, it not only leads to complicated human security matters and hard security involvement – it exacerbates existing problems. Priorities of international organizations, NGOs and nations need to shift to crisis management, so that disasters as a result of climate change can be dealt with. Every nation is and will be in some way affected, as climate change does not stop at the border.

At NATO, several Secretary-Generals have recognized the potential security risks associated with climate change. There are NATO Committees in place that touch upon climate change, but there is no separate committee completely dedicated to climate security. Furthermore, in order to assess the risk of climate change to our security, the risk has to be defined first, and not all Allies agree on this definition. Climate change will have many consequences for NATO's operations, for example, there will be an increased need

for crisis management and humanitarian assistance because of natural disaster or conflict over natural resources.

For the present and future, a comprehensive security approach cannot exist without including climate security thinking. Including climate security thinking in our daily policymaking and education, while improving cooperation on the matter of climate change will undoubtedly help direct our focus to what really matters. I do see a possible leading role for NATO in this changing the way of thinking. However, it is crucial that there is agreement on the risk climate change poses within the organization. In order to prepare for the future, NATO also needs to consider the effect of their operations and their equipment on climate change. There are Allies, such as France, that have been improving on this front, but in my opinion, it should become a minimum requirement to become an Ally. Additionally, it is crucial to monitor the potential threat climate change poses to the military and adapt where needed, and generally to improve international cooperation on climate security related issues.

Climate change is affecting us now and will undoubtedly play a great role in the future. Reframing the issue and making it central in our strategic thinking is the most important step towards a safer future. If we want to change our security and strategic thinking, we need to start by making climate security thinking the norm. This means that in all strategy-making, there should be considered how it is related to climate and climate change. Secondly, this means that we need to monitor and increase our knowledge about climate change, and we need to educate future generations as best as possible. I would argue that dealing with climate change would fall under at least two of the three essential core tasks of NATO, namely crisis management and cooperative security. Therefore, to achieve a sustainable future, NATO should be concerned with climate security thinking and implement it wherever possible.

Recommendations for NATO

1. All NATO Allies need to reach agreement on what it means to consider climate change a security risk.
2. Provide basic training for all Allies on climate security, to reach a base level of knowledge that is equal for all Allies. Any additional training provided by the nations to their own militaries is strongly encouraged.
3. Create a NATO Committee with national specialists on climate change and install a climate advisor for operations when possible.
4. In all military planning, the role of climate change and climate security needs to be determined, e.g.:
 - a. Reducing carbon footprint of the military has to be a priority;
 - b. Long-term strategy planning needs to involve the element of climate security;
 - c. The role of climate change in each situation that requires military intervention needs to be established, in order to get a more complete view of the consequences of climate change;
 - d. Protect local natural resources during operations;
 - e. Contribute to preventative measures in relation to climate security to prevent future crises.
5. Monitor the potential threat of climate change to the military. An example would be publishing annual scientific rapports keeping track of developments.
6. Improve international cooperation on climate security related issues through already existing or new initiatives. For example, NATO is currently part of the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), and NATO could help improve this already existing initiative.
7. Make NATO a leading platform for the exchange of climate security practices between nations.
8. Work towards an international climate security strategy.

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My name is Yasmin de Fraiture, I am from the Netherlands and I am currently undertaking my master degree in International Security at Sciences Po Paris. I obtained my undergraduate degree in Political Science with Honours from Leiden University, specializing in International Relations and International Organizations. At the moment, I am undertaking an internship with the Dutch Organization for Government Management and in early 2021 I will undertake an internship with the Political Advisor of NATO's Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters in Brunssum, the Netherlands. In preparation for this internship, I look forward to discussing NATO and key issues in transatlantic security. Furthermore, attending this seminar is an amazing opportunity to improve my knowledge on climate security, policy-making and strategic thinking, and I look forward to meeting inspiring participants from all over the world – whether it will be digitally or in person.

STRATEGY CHANGE THROUGH CLIMATE CHANGE?

by Cyrille Kratz, Germany

Everyone was warned, but no one listened. It had long been known to mankind that climate change would lead to extreme weather events. But nobody could have imagined how extreme. The hurricanes and tornadoes became worse, the droughts hotter, and the floods more devastating – unleashing a wave of destruction across the world. In June 2040, the East River swelled to unprecedented levels and swallowed Lower Manhattan. Shortly afterwards, a heat wave killed around two million people in Madrid – in a single day. And in September, Tokyo was wiped out when a gigantic typhoon hit the city. But in that moment, facing mankind's own extinction, it became clear that no single nation could solve this problem alone. The United Nations adopted Resolution 4020 and the world came together as one and fought back. Scientists from over 100 countries worked tirelessly – not as representatives of their nations, but of humanity. And they found a way to neutralize the storms, cool down the temperature and silence the waters. They stabilized the weather and thus created the basis for the continued existence of mankind. Not as single states, but together - as one humanity.

A scenario from science fiction and yet so close to reality. It has long been known to us what could happen when global temperatures keep rising. We know that no state can solve this problem alone and yet, states remain divided. Economic interests are turning NATO partners against each other. Important non-aggression treaties are not being renewed, alternatives to multinational alliances are being considered, and the trend towards protectionism is becoming apparent. Common action to tackle climate change remains elusive.

Humanity is paralyzed in times where action is so desperately needed. But the reason for this is not necessarily intransigent governments, but rather a system of thought that makes deviant action unattractive. This system dictates that the highest mission of state leaders is to advance their respective state's interests in global competition. They would be seen as incapable if they didn't. Thus,

short-term goals are preferred to long-term solutions because they generate quick wins; and quick wins are needed to remain in power. Fighting climate change is no quick win. On the contrary, climate protection is a quick loss, since it demands stepping down today in order to win tomorrow. Here we are confronted with the problem of negative externalities, i.e. actions that individually benefit an actor while sharing the disadvantages among all. It is therefore only logical that a head of state would prefer a measure that increases the individual benefit to his own state, while the negative impact is shared by all.

In order to escape this dilemma, states would have to join forces and act across borders, putting the world's future prosperity over their own. Even though it is very likely that such action will also be individually beneficial in the long term, it is rather unlikely to happen. The world will stay paralyzed until the very end – but this end does not necessarily have to be humankind's extinction.

Climate change is widely understood as a threat multiplier, as it intensifies existing threats. Normally understood as something bad, this characteristic could be key in saving the world. For mankind will only awaken from its paralysis when the current system provides for an opportunity to do so. This will be the case when the small individual proportion of the global disadvantage of a climate-related action outweighs that action's individual benefit.

What if the weather really threatens people's survival? What if cities are swallowed, droughts in the global North claim millions of lives and storms bring down skyscrapers? Then a window of opportunity opens in which everything that has so far prevented effective interstate cooperation becomes irrelevant, as the only thing that matters will be securing the survival of each nation's people.

If this happens, we have to be prepared. NATO's ultimate goal is to protect its people and in this last battle, the enemy will be nature itself. And while the United Nations join forces and take up the scientific fight, NATO will have to step in and buy the UN some time. To do so best, it should follow the following recommendations:

1. Invest in Strategic Foresight and take the findings seriously when adapting abilities and capabilities

I recommend Allied Command Transformation to allocate more resources to the Strategic Foresight Branch so that

they can do a report only on the implications of climate change and a possible Doomsday scenario. These findings should be taken into a climate-related Framework for Future Alliance Operations Report so that all necessary steps to face Doomsday can be considered in the NATO Defence Planning Process.

2. Train the actual possible future, no matter its political inconvenience

I recommend NATO to train the scientifically predicted future settings and not the politically agreed ones. This must happen with the involvement of the Capitals. Climate change does not care about what is politically appropriate, so training should not either.

3. Above all: Try to avert Doomsday

I recommend following Jens Stoltenberg's guidance in his speech about climate change on 28 September 2020¹²

in which he stated that it is NATO's responsibility and unique capability to curb climate change. NATO makes up around half of the world's economy, is leading in technological change and represents close to a billion people. It can make the difference. Therefore, I urge the Allied leaders: Prove this essay wrong and unite to prevent massive casualties for humanity.

We are heading for one of the greatest catastrophes in human history, one that we can only avert together. We have been warned but we must listen. Otherwise, humanity's lethargy risks sacrificing millions of lives...



Cyrille Kratz, Germany
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I see myself as an optimist who constantly tries to bring people together, as I believe that only together can we create a world shaped by benevolence and compassion. I refuse to believe that all men are wolves to men, and I am firmly convinced that the only way to a better future is through unity and mutual trust. Professionally, I try to apply this conviction in the field of security with the goal of reaching a position in which I can shape our global security architecture for the better. So far, I have gained experience through positions at the EU in Kosovo, the German Bundestag and the NATO Council Secretariat, and am now counseling the German MoD. I do not yet know where my path will take me. But what I do know is that it will always be marked by consideration - for others and for our world.

¹² https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178355.htm
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THIS ATMOSPHERE CAN'T LEAD TO STRATEGY CHANGE

by Mateusz Łabuz, Poland

The increasing significance of climate change and its long-lasting effects on global security were already acknowledged by NATO but they were not followed by the concordant and unified actions of the allied countries. It is very unlikely that climate change itself would lead to the changes of NATO's strategy. However, it definitely might be one of the factors shaping new perspectives in the future. Paradoxically, NATO is facing one of the biggest challenges in its history caused indeed by the changing climate. The climate of the international relations.

That metaphorical view of climate change might be just a tricky wordplay but it definitely has a huge impact on NATO's actions. Finding solutions to the problems without the genuine cooperation between the allies is highly unlikely, especially in the field of climate change that already causes controversies and raises concerns of political and economic nature. Fortunately, there is at least general consent when it comes to acknowledging the increasing significance of the security policy in terms of climate change.

In spite of internal differences between the allied countries, the need to address climate change was acknowledged in the NATO Strategic Concept as early as 2010. Climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs were supposed to "further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations". One may plausibly argue if that shaping indeed appeared at the level of operations but it definitely raised concerns at the stage of planning and was further underlined in the declaration of Newport Summit as well as the resolution of NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2015.

The first step to better address the link between climate and security at the NATO level is to acknowledge that NATO should not be a leading actor in that area. NATO should rather focus on cooperation with the specialized organizations and agendas supporting them with specific measures instead of solving climate problems on its own. That would definitely lower the level of expectations

within NATO but would be a realistic and pragmatic approach reflecting the current need to adjust the actions to challenges and feasibilities.

Secondly, NATO needs to define the areas in which its expertise, experience and assets might play an important role in becoming the accelerator for other actors. NATO could do more in terms of using new technologies to evaluate and predict the future challenges, risks and potential security threats better. Technological aspects might go in line with the general digitalization processes and the emphasis should still be on the cooperation with specialized organizations, the UN most of all.

Thirdly, NATO's efforts in the area of preventing conflicts generated by the climate and environmental changes, such as rising sea levels or food and water shortages, are indispensable to better evaluate their effects on current causes of the conflicts. It would be worth considering to increase the role of UN Secretariat in data analysis. NATO can also do more in terms of promoting good practices and raising awareness while conducting the prevention and peace building actions.

Fourthly, one of the main clearly strategic elements that NATO needs to address is climate change in the Arctic. Melting glaciers might obviously pave the way for the Arctic ice cap to disappear which would open new sea routes. That would start a new phase of competition with Russia and the militarization of the region (a process that has already started). The militarization and use of force should also be perceived as part of the migration policy. The competition over shrinking resources triggers the standard conflicts and, in the aftermath, the military reactions of other countries threatened by the migration waves. Even if addressing climate change itself is not a main goal for NATO, its long-lasting effects on the security environment and NATO's neighborhood should be considered as a serious threat and become the catalyst for upgrading the "traditional" security policy strategies.

There is without doubt the urgent need for more effective climate policy based on a holistic approach that recognizes the specific ways of reaching the goals. It is not disputable if there is room for NATO to play a role in that process. A 360-degree approach seems to be a good start since it addresses the variety of the issues, including

“both types” of climate change. To counteract very pessimistic judgment coming from some allied countries NATO needs to adjust and rethink parts of its outdated strategy. If climate change could be used as a reason for strategic changes, NATO should go for it. That was always a key to NATO’s success. Adaptation and ability to adjust were

decisive factors to comprehend historic changes and those changes are clearly ahead of us.



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A BITE THAT IS ALREADY BEING FELT - WHY CLIMATE CHANGE IS ALREADY A SECURITY TOPIC
By Antonia Schmidt, Germany

Ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris 2015, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly warned the international community that climate change is a significant security threat and “its bite is already being felt”. Ultimately, the international community rallied together and reached the landmark Paris Agreement to combat climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future. Five years have passed since that date. I will argue in this essay that climate change has since intensified its bite, why climate change is already a security topic and propose three policy recommendations for NATO to follow. The planet's average surface temperature has risen about 1.14 degrees Celsius since the late 19th century, the six warmest years on record having taken place since 2014, global sea level has risen about 20 centimeters in the last century. All these developments – and the trajectory that they foreshadow – will cause a massive upheaval that humankind has yet to see. NATO considers climate change a “threat multiplier” – meaning that that climate change intersects with other factors to contribute to security problems. Rising temperatures and resulting precipitation changes are combusted with increased competition for food and water supply, causing migration and refugees flows. Mounting evidence shows, for instance, the role that drought and famine played in the continued conflict in Syria and the Arab Spring. In line with the concept of “threat multiplier”, it is important to understand where in the world the bite of climate change is digging in its teeth the most. Momentarily, climate change is disproportionately affecting developing countries, as they rely more heavily on climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture, forestry and tourism. Findings from literature on climate and security further show that the risk of conflict is the highest in societies highly dependent on said sectors. Western countries, on the other hand, can partially fend off the direct consequences of climate change with a resilient infrastructure, economic

resources and good medical care. However, it can be anticipated that western countries will be hit with secondary effects of climate change, such as climate refugees.

Five years have passed since the Paris Agreement. It is high time to act and in the following, I outline the active role NATO should play.

I. Adopting a “Green Defence Framework 2.0”

In 2014, NATO adopted the “Green Defence Framework”, which targets the reduction of the environmental footprint of military operations and has garnered widespread public support. However, the Framework contains no specific targets or demands for activities, instead highlighting a number of initiatives capable of supporting or facilitating the development of green initiatives within NATO and in the member nations. To that end, I propose to create a coherent environmental security agenda for NATO with the title “Green Defence Framework 2.0”.

This framework should build upon two pillars:

- Environmental protection: Protecting the environment from the harmful and detrimental impact of military activities. This general goal should be linked with measurable and actionable targets for NATO and its member states to cut emissions of military forces.
- Environmental security: Addressing security challenges emanating from the physical and natural environment. This should go hand in hand with the focus of building up resilience in societies (see point III).

II. Putting effective structures and co-operation into place

Currently, the Environmental Protection Working Group (EPWG) and the Specialist Team on Energy Efficiency and Environmental Protection (STEEEP) are addressing environmental protection issues within NATO. It should be considered to consolidate the groups into a unified structure, in order to reach a clear and consolidated voice on climate issues.

NATO has already been in cooperative contact with other international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union on environmental topics. These exchanges should be intensified. Especially in Europe, investments in green energy will form one of the pillars of the EU growth strategy ("Green New Deal"). Inevitably, these views will spill over to NATO through the European allies. Future investment decisions in military material and services should be made with regard to environmental factors.

III. Focus on building resilience in societies

As described above, especially developing countries will be hard hit by climate change. NATO should be working together with likely to be affected countries and follow the guideline that prevention is better than intervention. At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness, which help allies to enhance resilience, were agreed upon. These baselines should be updated with aspects of climate change. This includes how climate change will impact civil preparedness and resilience, especially energy supplies, food and water resources, critical infrastructure in disaster-prone areas, and also possible climate migration flows.



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Antonia Schmidt is Head of Public Sector Germany for Amazon Business. Before, she was responsible for all topics regarding digitization of government and public procurement for Bitkom e.V. and worked for several years in Technology Consulting with Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Antonia holds a Master of Science in International Business from Stockholm School of Economics and a Bachelor in Business Administration from WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management.

Antonia is highly interested in the digitization of public procurement, topics of digital sovereignty and sustainability. She is an active member of the Think Tank 30 – The Young Think Tank of the Club of Rome and is concerned about the effects that climate change will have on society and security policy as a whole. Antonia enjoys moderating political discussions and has interviewed several German ministers and state secretaries. Antonia grew up in Germany and the United States.

STRATEGIC FORESIGHT



At the beginning of the seminar a general session will provide an introduction to the methods and tools of foresight. The term usually describes activities within strategic planning, used in both business and politics. To use the words of Dr. phil. Kerstin Cuhls (Fraunhofer ISI): "Foresight goes further than forecasting, including aspects of networking and the preparation of decisions concerning the future".

In security politics, the Delphi Method as well as various scenario methods are common practices. The former describes an approach developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, to forecast the impact of technology on warfare. The procedure encompasses a group of experts that – in two rounds – provide their input to a set of questions. After the first round, the experts receive statistics that reflect the input given by the group as a whole. In the second round, the experts once again provide their input. Like that, this research method aims to discover an eventual expert consensus within certain fields.

Scenario methodology encompasses a set of approaches to develop scenarios, both exploratory and normative. Depending on the purpose, both can be of great use within strategic planning; an exploratory approach can help evaluating possible futures, whereas a normative approach – where a certain, desired scenario is drawn up – can be helpful when developing roadmaps.

However, practitioners of foresight may use a variety of methods, and it is not uncommon for futurists to use concepts such as utopias or wild cards in order to encourage the conversation on alternative futures, and on crises that no one saw coming.

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Lisa currently works for the Bundeswehr in Berlin. Previously she worked at the Canadian Embassy in Berlin. She studied International Relations / Peace and Conflict Studies in Frankfurt am Main. During her studies, she completed a variety of internships, among others at the German Foreign Office in New York, the DGAP and the American Embassy in Copenhagen. In 2020, she won the Sylke-Tempel-Essayprize with her vision for a new transatlantic manifesto.



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
Sarah Bressan is a research fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, where she contributes to the institute's work on peace and security, including as an editor of the PeaceLab Blog. Her work focuses on international security, political violence, conflict analysis and prevention, as well as the role of data, technology, foresight and evaluation in German and European foreign policy. Sarah's recent projects covered the topics of conflict early warning, scenario planning, forecasting and foresight for conflict prevention, German public policy including as an editor of the PeaceLab Blogopinion, as well as the evaluation of small arms control in the Western Balkans and the prevention of violent extremism. Her analysis appeared in Internationale Politik, Emerging Europe, the Global Policy Journal, and Strategic Europe. Prior to joining GPPi, Sarah analyzed conflict dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa at Freie Universität (FU) Berlin and Mannheim University. She supported academia-policy exchange between FU Berlin and the German Federal Foreign Office and contributed to the Foreign Office's training program for international diplomats. Sarah completed a traineeship at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and worked on conflict sensitivity in development projects with the European Investment Bank and the Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement in Beirut. She has co-founded The Policy Corner and led intercultural exchange projects in Germany, Kenya and South Africa. Sarah completed her studies in international security and political science at Mannheim University, University of Seoul, Freie Universität Berlin, and Sciences Po Paris.



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Georgios Kolliarakis works since 2018 with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) as the advisor for research strategy of the institute. Parallel to that he is one of the Principal Investigators in the EU pilot “Mediterranean Practitioners’ Network on Capacity Building for Effective Response to Emerging Security Challenges” (MEDEA, 2018-2023), and of the European Preparatory Action on Defence Research “Strategy-Oriented anaLysis Of the Market fOrces in EU defence” (SOLOMON, 2019-2021). Georgios has a long track record in evidence-informed policy analysis, with a focus upon organisational, strategic, and policy aspects of security, including assessment of risk and non-intended and non-anticipated effects of new technologies. Georgios is an external expert/reviewer with a number of national agencies and ministries, as well as with International Organisations such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU, and the OSCE. He has launched and chaired over 50 panels and roundtables at academic and policy conferences. After his Engineering studies at the Technical University of Athens, Georgios earned a Master’s degree in Political Geography from the Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn, and a PhD in International Politics from the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich. Recent publications include: *Anticipation and wicked problems in public policy. The creation of ‘Unknown Knowns’*. In: *International Handbook of Anticipation*. (2019), and *‘In Quest of Reflexivity: Towards an Anticipatory Governance Regime for Security.’* In: *Discourses of Privacy and Security*. (2018).

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


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