



**“NATO’s future” seminar 2021
Berlin**

Policy recommendations

In November 2021, a group of young leaders and policy experts from different countries met in Berlin to discuss pressing issues and challenges that do and will affect the transatlantic alliance in multiple dimensions.

In three different teams, they spend a whole weekend analysing the interdependencies of existing structures and necessary developments, debating each other and renowned experts and formulating policy recommendations for NATO in each of the three main topics:

The Ability to Innovate: How the Alliance Integrates Operational Readiness, Innovation and Modernity

To maintain their strategic edge in an increasingly contested world, the United States, Europe and NATO must understand how to leverage emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) to enhance shared security and better prepare for future crises. A critical factor in their success will be NATO's ability to communicate and operate across militaries, domains, and a wide range of EDT-enabled capabilities. This requires enhancing standardisation and interoperability across the Alliance's concepts, doctrine, capability targets, and technical requirements related to EDT. The purpose of the workshop is to understand transatlantic perspectives, discuss the pros and cons of public-private cooperation, and identify ways in which policy could be coordinated on defense technology issues.

In order to meet these challenges, NATO should:

1. Standardize definitions of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) and related / enabling technologies as a basis for a common approach for its member states towards interoperability. To this end, it could evaluate already existing civilian definitions and frameworks (e.g. the EU) and incorporate them, when possible, thus enabling easier integration of privately developed technologies.
2. Assess the impact of EDTs on the underlying democratic value system of the alliance, and develop an ethical framework to account for strategic considerations. This framework is also supposed to guide the further development and adoption of these technologies.
3. Focus its public-private partnership efforts and funds on supporting early stage businesses and developing relevant solutions to foster innovation and address the challenges posed by EDTs to the Alliance, while encouraging member states to do the same.
4. Improve its engagement with the academic sector by expanding the Science and Technology organization to coordinate the dialogue between the alliance and academic sector, and act as convening power to avoid redundancies in research while implementing more competitive compensation packages to attract talented early career professionals working in strategic areas for the Alliance.
5. As part of adopting a less risk averse organizational culture, contract with a major private cloud provider to facilitate the rapid flow of information and exploitation of new EDT capabilities.

NATO's European Pillar: Shape, Size, Function?

Realizing that pre-Trump times in terms of military cooperation are not coming back and the idea of a European army doesn't appear too realistic in the near future, European politicians repeatedly emphasize the importance of strengthening NATO's European pillar.

In this workshop, we want to take a closer look at the conceptual idea behind the pillar metaphor, not only to add description to the problem but to make specific recommendations to the alliance as to how the concept could be brought to life: what are the functions a European pillar has to fulfill and what are its geographic limits? What resources are required and who will provide them? And how can European integration be fostered without driving the partners on both sides of the Atlantic further apart?

In order to meet these challenges, NATO should:

1. Conduct a coordinated review of Capabilities

In order to better understand NATO capability shortfalls and prevent the risk of duplication, NATO should conduct a coordinated review of its capabilities. This review should include an assessment of EU capabilities and consider the results of the EU Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) review.

2. Suggest potential ad hoc coalitions for capability development among European NATO members

In order to encourage the creation of a European defense industry, reduce costs, and improve interoperability between member states, NATO should, after considering the coordinated review of capabilities, suggest potential M.S. coalitions that might benefit from coordination on capability development.

3. Propose a Berlin Plus 'in reverse'

In order to decrease the risk of duplication, acknowledge the utility of the EU's civilian CSDP capabilities, improve complementarity between the EU and NATO, and allow NATO to access civilian crisis response and capacity development capabilities that are increasingly necessary in modern conflicts, NATO should propose a Berlin plus "in reverse" to NATO. This would entail allowing NATO to utilize, with EU approval, EU CSDP capabilities. Linked to this, NATO should encourage the establishment of a CSDP HQ with which it could better oversee and coordinate CSDP missions.

4. Shift communications away from 2% headline goal

NATO should shift communication away from the need for members to reach the 2% headline goal and towards member states developing needed capabilities and allocating needed funds to research and development. NATO should further emphasize how these capabilities can help both MSs and NATO. Further, NATO should, at the request of members, produce and distribute fact sheets about NATO's contributions to members' security in order to stimulate discussion within member states about the importance of NATO and to improve the discussion on defense spending within member states.

5. Establish dialogue forum

NATO should, as a first step towards creating a European pillar within NATO, establish a horizontal, informal dialogue forum for European countries, including Turkey, to mitigate strategic cacophony and develop awareness of capability gaps.

New Era of Transatlantic Cooperation: A Common Position Towards China?

For decades this has been subject to accusations of exporting values and interfering in internal affairs. Today, China's foreign policy aims at propagating its ideological ideas with stunning dynamics, self-confidence and huge funds. In contrast, the German/European approach sometimes seems static these days. Of course, as liberal democracies they must act differently. So how can they better advertise democratic societies and defend themselves against attacks on a pluralistic opinion landscape, disinformation and hybrid warfare – without at the same time putting in danger what they are trying to defend? The panel deals with an essential part of future hybrid warfare, which crosses the boundaries of classical cultural policy as well as those of classical security policy. The answers we provide will be essential for shaping foreign policy in the future. At the same time, regional developments in the Asia-Pacific region must not be left out – is there an EU position and a common transatlantic approach?

In order to meet these challenges, NATO should:

1. Develop an evaluation framework with criteria to assess specified fields, including: private investments, civil society, cyber, and information environment. This informs dialogue, supports intelligence and information sharing, encourages cooperation among allies and partners, and establishes a step towards unified position on China.
2. Conduct the assessment from Member States on what should be the Alliance's policy towards China based on some or all of the challenges identified by NATO such as: Emerging and Disruptive Technology; Arms Control and Nuclear Deterrence; The South; Climate and Green Defence; Pandemics and Natural Disasters; Hybrid and Cyber Threats; Outer Space; Terrorism; Human Security and Women, Peace, and Security.
3. Enhance connections between China research centres and the Alliance so as to create China hubs. That could involve a research fellowship on China hosted by Member States, funded by NATO. This would allow China studies to be homogeneously distributed across the Alliance and encourage recruitment of personnel that have expertise on China.
4. Emphasize intelligence sharing; resource sharing (devices, knowledge to improve cyber resilience and cyber hygiene); crisis management systems, improving existing projects (for example CB4CyberResilience); creating a coordinator role with the responsibility to (a) make sure the allies implement it homogeneously and (b) communicates with China to prevent escalation.
5. Develop infrastructure on 5G, have an Alliance infrastructure protection system; increase public private partnerships, encourage innovation policies maybe by having

innovation hubs, having best practices policy. That could take the form of a cyber Silicon Valley with facilitating measures to attract innovators and investors.

6. Implement anticipating measures with cyber education to civil society (cyber hygiene); organise a working group within cyberspace research centre to make sure we can implement best norms and practices.
7. Engage in security management, critical technology transfer, not only incoming Chinese investments but also exports. It must protect the innovation tools it already hosts.