NATO'S FUTURE IN BERLIN

BOOKLET

—

NOVEMBER 18-20 2022

WELCOME TO BERLIN!

For the 9th time, YATA Germany is organising NATO's Future Young Leaders Seminar and for the first time, we host the YATA General Assembly. It is my pleasure, to welcome all participants in the name of YATA Germany.

How often in recent years have we discussed new tasks for NATO, new and old security threats and exchanged views on what the transatlantic-European security architecture must look like in the 21st century.

Now, as we witness a new chapter being written in our history books because a war has begun in Europe with the cowardly attack on Ukraine, we know why our gathering matters so much. And if the phrase had not been used so often, I would also be saying that if NATO's Future Seminar did not already exist, we would have to invent it right now.

The transatlantic partnership is based on a shared belief in the values laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) in 1949. Since then, NATO has worked at the political level to promote democratic values and enable members to consult and cooperate on defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict, and, should all diplomatic efforts fail, to have the military capability to conduct crisis-management operations. All members voluntarily commit to these high values.

NATO's Future Seminar is based on giving practical meaning to these values and giving the younger generation the opportunity to exchange ideas and forge strong bonds of partnership. In this booklet, you can find the perspectives and policy recommendations of our seminar participants in the collection of their essays.

Since 2007, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA) has served as a leading platform for young professionals in security and defence, working alongside our ATA seniors and fellow youth organisations to ensure that young professionals have a voice in the policy-making world and personal access to national and international events.

NATO's Future Seminar brings together more than 30 young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO as well as government officials from all corners of the alliance. More than 130 outstanding applications motivated us to continue our engagement for YATA Germany and to inform young leaders about the importance of NATO and the transatlantic partnership.

For this reason, we are also particularly honoured to be able to hold the YATA General Assembly at the same time. We are proud to welcome the YATA family to Berlin in these crucial times. It is important to stand side by side, to show unity and to shine with our common values.

The weekend would not be possible without the great and generous support of the German Atlantic Association (DAG), especially Kamala Jakubeit, as well as NATO's Public Diplomacy Division (PDD). I also would like to thank all our active YATA members who devote their time and energy for making this weekend possible. We are thankful for their contributions as well as for our brilliant speakers and chairs who take the time to enrich our discussions with their expertise, insights, and curiosity. Thank you all for participating so actively in this endeavour and your commitment.

In this spirit I wish all YATA members and those who want to become members an instructive and interesting weekend with us in Berlin.

Sincerely,

Leonhard Simon
Chair of Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany

LOGISTICAL INFORMATION

Travel

We will be able to reimburse travel expenses. For international connections, we cover up to 200€, for national (within Germany) connections, we cover up to 100€.

A form will be distributed during and after the event. Please do not send us tickets before. We can cover costs ONLY if you send us the ORIGINAL travel documents (Tickets, Boarding Pass, etc.) via post service AND via mail. Costs can be covered only after your journey is concluded. Details can be found at the form.

Entry regulations

Please familiarise yourself with the applicable entry regulations. Unfortunately, we cannot provide assistance in case of any difficulties.

Covid-19
(As of Nov. 17, 11 a.m.)

Regulations can change every day. Please keep yourself updated; we cannot accept responsibility should last-minute changes make participation in the programme no longer possible.

Except for wearing masks while using public transport, no regulations are in place.

Accommodation

We will provide you with accommodation at AC Hotel by Marriott Berlin (Hochstraße 3, 13357 Berlin). The hotel is within walking distance from the conference venue.

Conference Location

The venue will be the Unicorn Workspaces Brunnenviertel (Brunnenstraße 64, 13355 Berlin).

You are invited to join our group to walk from the hotel to the venue, leaving at 8:00 am on Saturday and at 8:20 am on Saturday. Meeting point is in front of the hotel.

City Walking Tour

Please feel free to join our city walking tour. Meeting point is at 5:00 p.m. in front of the hotel. In case of bad weather, we will offer an alternative.
Please note that this city tour is on a pay what you want basis, please be kind to our tour guide.

Food and Drinks

At the conference location, catering will be provided including drinks, coffee, tea, etc.
The international dinner on Friday is on a self-pay basis. On Saturday, we invite you to a convivial dinner, where you can socialise in a cosy atmosphere and enjoy yourself.

Dress Code

The dress code is business casual or Service Dress.

Social Media

Please note that we will also cover the seminar on Instagram (@dag_yata), Twitter (@yata_ger), LinkedIn (YATA Germany) and Facebook. So, make sure to follow us and feel free to share impressions. Hashtag will be: #NATOsFuture. Chatham House rules apply during workshop time. Panel discussions are open.

AGENDA

Friday, 18.11.2022

AC Hotel by Marriott Berlin (Hochstraße 3, 13357 Berlin)
From 3:00 p.m.   *Arrival and Check In*

05:00 p.m.   *Early Bird City Walking Tour (meeting point: Hotel)*

Hopfingerbräu am Brandenburger Tor (Ebertstraße 24, 10117 Berlin)
07:00 p.m.   *International Dinner and Networking*

Welcome Remarks: **Leonhard Simon**
President, YATA Germany

Welcome Remarks: **Juxhina Sotiri Gjoni**
President, YATA International

Jim Townsend
President, ATA International

Saturday, 19.11.2022

Unicorn Workspaces Brunnenviertel (Brunnenstraße 64, 13355 Berlin)
09:00 a.m.   *Welcome*

09:15 a.m.   **Group Working Session I**

09:15 a.m.   *YATA International General Assembly*
Session I: Report of the Board and General Debate
(by invitation only)

10:45 a.m.   *Break*

11:15 a.m.   **Group Working Session II**

11:15 a.m.   *YATA International General Assembly*
Session II: Election of the new Board
(by invitation only)

12:45 p.m.   *Lunch*

02:15 p.m.	**Panel discussion I** **The Ability to Deter: How NATO Responds to Russian Belligerence in Eastern Europe**
	Martha Stolze Senior Expert, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
	Christian Nawrat Brigadier General, Commander Panzergrenadierbrigade 41, German Armed Forces
	Mateusz Łabuz Cybersecurity Attaché, Security Policy, Embassy of the Republic of Poland to Germany
	Oksana Etla Policy Officer, Plans, Operations Division, NATO HQ
03:45 p.m.	*Break*
04:15 p.m.	**Panel discussion II** **NATO's New Strategic Concept: What Strategies to Deal with Strategic Competition?**
	Anna Clara Arndt Research Assistant, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
	Jonas Hård af Segerstad Swedish Defence Attaché to Germany, Austria, Switzerland

The Forsberg (Gerichtstraße 26, 13347 Berlin)

07:00 p.m.	**Social Night**

Sunday, 20.11.2022

Unicorn Workspaces Brunnenviertel (Brunnenstraße 64, 13355 Berlin)

09:00 a.m.	**Panel discussion III** **New Era of European Defence Cooperation: What EU-NATO Cooperation?** **Gesine Weber** Research Analyst, Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States **Sven Arnold** Visiting Research Fellow in the International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs **Ivo Taslak** Policy and Capabilities Division, International Military Staff, NATO
10:30 a.m.	*Coffee Break*
11:00 a.m.	**Group Working Session III**
11:00 a.m.	*YATA International General Assembly* ***Social Event: Visit to the Tränenpalast*** *(Reichstagufer 17, 10117 Berlin)*
12:30 p.m.	*Coffee Break*
12:45 p.m.	**Presentation of the Recommendations & Wrap-up**
02:00 p.m.	*YATA Germany Farwell Lunch*

PAN EL 1 | The Ability to Deter: How NATO Responds to Russian Belligerence in Eastern Europe

© Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Russia's war against Ukraine is shattering the entire Euro-Atlantic security order. While the scale of the ongoing war is enormous, Russia already demonstrated its aggression and disregard for international law much earlier through the 2008 war in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 - as the aspiration of post-Soviet states to join NATO is a thorn in the Kremlin's sight. In response, NATO set up multinational battlegroups in the Baltic member states and Poland. Against the backdrop of the war, the deterrence these measures were intended to guarantee appears to have failed. How to reinforce credible deterrence? How to strengthen the Alliance's ability to defend and counter military and hybrid threats as well as cyber-attacks? Are the measures adopted at the 2022 NATO Summit sufficient?
The new geopolitical reality created by Russia's war also raises again the important question of prospects of NATO's Eastward enlargement.

PANELISTS

Martha Stolze
Senior Expert, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Martha Stolze is Senior Expert (Social Scientist) at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Her research focusses on the use of (dis)information to manipulate audiences as part of information influence campaigns. She has co-authored studies on pro-Kremlin Virtual Manipulation, Robotrolling and Information Laundering. Previously, she has worked in the Media Monitoring and Research Team at the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels. Martha has obtained the BA European Studies as well as BA Governance and Public Policy from Passau University, and the MPhil Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford.

Christian Nawrat
Commander Panzergrenadierbrigade 41, German Armed Forces

Brigadier General Christian Nawrat is Commander of the Panzergrenadierbrigade 41 of the German Armed Forces.

Mateusz Łabuz
Cybersecurity Attaché, Security Policy, Embassy of the Republic of Poland

Mateusz Labuz is a Polish diplomat posted to Berlin being directly responsible for the security policy in the Political Unit of the Embassy. He graduated in legal studies, administration studies and English philology studies at the Jagiellonian University and Pedagogical University in Cracow. He worked in the Bureau of Minister and Legal and Treaties Department of the Ministry. Since 2019 he has been posted to Berlin and In 2021 he has been nominated cybersecurity attaché in Berlin concentrating on the cooperation between Poland and Germany in the field of security policy.

Oksana Etla
Policy Officer, Plans, Operations Division, NATO HQ

Oksana Etla has joined the NATO International Staff in 2018 and is the lead contributor to the Integrated Task Force, which provides a cross-cutting political-military framework to enable the Alliance to respond in a coherent and deliberate manner to the challenges below the threshold of armed conflict. Her early years in the Ministry of Defence were dedicated to the strategic dialogue with the US before Latvia joined NATO. As the Advisor on EU issues, she contributed to the negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU Security Strategy, as well as actively pursued cooperation between the EU and NATO and promoted the regional Nordic-Baltic cooperation. As Head for Policy and Strategy, she led 'in-house' and inter-agency teams, dealing with the annual review of the Military Threat Assessment and the quadrennial review of the State Defence Concept, including testifying at governmental and parliamentarian hearings.

CHAIRS

Sofie Flurschütz
Project Assistant, German
Atlantic Association

Sofie Flurschütz works as a project assistant for the German Atlantic Association and as freelance journalist publishing articles for various newspapers and magazines. She studied medical journalism as well as Intercultural Communication and European Studies. During her studies she spent time in Austria, France and India. Sofie gained experience in journalism, (political) communication and social media by working in the editorial department of the German Armed Forces, at the Federal Press Office and at the ZDF Studio Vienna. Sofie has been a board member of YATA Germany since September 2022 and is an extended board member of WIIS Germany.

David Frank
IT-Officer,
German Armed Forces

David Frank is an Officer in the German Armed Forces and completed his master's degree in International Law and Politics at the University of the Armed Forces in Munich. In his master's thesis he intensively dealt with Hybrid Warfare and European Security Policy. He completed his Officers training in the Signal Corps and is on his current assignment as an IT project management officer in the Joint Medical Service HQ in Koblenz.

Lars William Neal
Board Member
YATA Germany

Since September 2022 Lars William Neal serves on the executive board of YATA Germany. He is currently doing research in the areas of counter intelligence and hybrid threats.
*Lars Neal enjoyed his higher education at the Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences, where he first studied International Business and Social Sciences and subsequently International Relations.*
Among other things, he works as a lobbyist for a medium-sized company from Baden-Wuerttemberg.

Judith Heckenthaler
Consultant

Judith Heckenthaler is a consultant at a business association in Berlin, focusing on sustainability and sustainable economy. Prior to that, she worked for the ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) in St. Petersburg and for the DRA (German-Russian Exchange) in Berlin. Judith has a Master's degree in Eastern European Studies from LMU Munich. In her studies she focused in particular on Russia's foreign and security policy.

Mariam Kublashvili
Board Member of YATA Germany,
Project Manager and Moderator

Mariam Kublashvili is a Board Member of YATA Germany and Coordinator of International Affairs. She is a project manager and moderator at the association "Diskutier Mit Mir". Mariam earned her master's degree in political science with a focus on international relations at the Ruprecht Karls University in Heidelberg. Among others, she gained work experience at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and in the German Bundestag.

NATO's Deterrence in the 21st Century: Increasing Posture and Resilience
by Friedrich "Fritz" Claussen

On February 24 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine on a large scale. This attack followed the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian participation in the war in East-Ukraine since 2014. This has caused NATO to rethink its strategic posture and cumulated in NATO's new Strategic Concept. Agreed at the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO increased its battlegroups from four to eight, put 40,000 troops under direct NATO command in the Alliance's East, and bolstered its high readiness forces to over 300,000 troops.

Thereby, the alliance showed that it is taking the Russian threat very serious and underlined its resolve to defend its Eastern territories. So, if NATO's posture is intended to deter Russia, does the invasion of Ukraine mean that deterrence failed? Successful deterrence – "to prevent someone from taking an action he/she might take" – is by its nature difficult to proof. The fact that Russia did not invade NATO's Baltic members or escalate the conflict to other neighbouring Alliance territory is a strong indicator that NATO's deterrence works.
For deterrence to work one needs (1) an objective that is clearly communicated to - and correctly interpreted by the target audience and (2) credible commitment & capabilities to defend this objective. NATO is clear in its resolve to defend Alliance territory, and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is the public display of this commitment. The overall bolstered posture and particularly the multi-national battlegroups are a testament to this and lend both credibility as well as capability. NATO's deterrence cannot and should not be assessed through Russia's attack on Ukraine. We should rather assume that the absence of an aggression against NATO means that our core deterrence continues to function.

Nonetheless, the war in Ukraine is still of great importance to the Alliance's credibility. Deterrence is a form of strategic communication working through implied threats. An actor is motivated to change actions based on anticipation of punishment after - or denial of reward if an action is taken. Naturally, threats only work if deemed credible. While the *ultima ratio* punishment remains nuclear retaliation, Allies have shown that there is a variety of low-escalation measures, i.e., sanctions and

weapon supplies, to punish Russia. So far, modern western equipment helped the Ukrainians to halt the Russian advance and enabled Ukrainian counter-offensives. Allies further continued and redoubled their sanctions after 24 February to increase the cost of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Both actions intend to change the cost-benefit calculation for Russia, while also lending credibility to the Alliance's determination. Likewise, NATO's enhanced forward presence (EFP) is bolstered to provide actual denial capabilities rather than serving as a "trip-wire".

Thereby, Allies are proving unity and determination to stand-up to Putin, to a greater extent than many observers would have anticipated. Moreover, Russia will most likely exit this conflict weaker, thus improving NATO's strategic position. In this context, Russia's attack on Ukraine has not undermined NATO's deterrence but rather validated NATO's ongoing strategic shifts, while strengthening the Alliance's resolve & credibility.

Russia's hybrid-capabilities, however, pose a great challenge to the Alliance's deterrence, since hybrid-threats limit the potential deterrence of (1) punishment and (2) denial:

(1) While conventional warfare follows clear causality chains and thereby the pattern of action and reaction, the ambiguity around hybrid-threats can obstruct the attribution of responsibility. Without clear responsibility, punishment is either unfeasible or questionable. Retaliatory acts based on unclear responsibility might hit indiscriminately and have the potential for uncalled provocation. Additionally, though all punitive actions are escalatory in essence, reactions to hybrid-threats risk overshooting the mark, as they are more difficult to measure: what is the appropriate answer to an undersea cable attack? Punitive actions are thus difficult to impose.
(2) Denial of hybrid threats is also difficult as it is at the very nature of hybrid-threats to strike at different levels (society, military/security, politics, economy) and across different domains (cyber, infrastructure, media, etc…). A well-calibrated hybrid-attack might be near impossible to detect and stop. Classic military defence will not suffice to deny these threats.

What can NATO do?
Secretary General Stoltenberg recently warned again that a Russian victory would have dire consequences for the global security. It is thus important for nations to continue to support Ukraine as long as they must. The

Alliance should similarly continue its strategic shift and bolster the EFP. Improving interoperability, transport and logistics should remain a priority to ensure the EFPs full potential and readiness. Thereby, the Alliance maintains its punish and denial capabilities.

As hybrid deterrence becomes more challenging, one essential answer to hybrid threats is to build cross-domain resilience. This takes many forms and needs a holistic approach: i.e., diversifying energy portfolios, investing in democratic institutions, and strengthening cyber defence. It is neither an easy nor a straightforward task, but it is the best way to absorb the impact of hybrid-attacks, which are sure to come. Yet, resilience exceeds NATO's areas of expertise and mandate. Going forward,

NATO should therefore (a) serve as a forum to develop guidelines and exchange best practices, (b) closely cooperate with other international organizations, and (c) invest in strategic partnerships to enhance each other's resilience.

NATO should also continue and expand its enhanced vigilance activities, especially with regard to critical infrastructure. Militarily it is unrealistic to protect critical infrastructure at all time, but showing presence or monitoring malign actors can deter. If deterrence fails, enhanced vigilance might at least provide situational awareness and establish responsibility.

Friedrich "Fritz" Claussen
Policy Officer,
NATO's Current Operation
Section at NATO's International
Staff

Friedrich Claussen is a policy officer in NATO's Current Operation Section at NATO's International Staff. Within this role, he has gained expertise on Afghanistan and Maritime Operations as well as practical experience in Crisis Management in Kosovo. Before joining NATO in 2021, he worked at the Berlin-based political start-up "JoinPolitics". He obtained his dual-master's degree in international relations from the Hertie School Berlin and Maxwell School in Syracuse, USA. The views expressed are his and not necessarily reflect those of NATO.

BETWEEN ENLARGEMENTS AND THE UKRAINIAN WAR: THE STRONGEST-EVER DETERRENT POSTURE OF NATO IN EASTERN EUROPE
by Alice Farina

Coming from Sicily, the land of the Sigonella basis, I have always been aware of the importance of the transatlantic Alliance. Its interactions with Russia have been characterized by tensions and provocations. This is given by the fact that NATO has had a strong deterrent posture in Eastern Europe, ever since the end of the Cold War and its subsequent enlargement. As an history enthusiast, I even moved to Latvia to experience on my skin the perceptions and feelings of locals towards Russia. The enlargement of NATO reached its peak on the 5 July 2022, when the Secretary General announced that Finland and Sweden would move forward with the accession process. These events have triggered a Russian rhetoric based on the threats of using nuclear weapons, and have made Putin seek support by the ex-satellite States of the USSR in Samarkand, during the 22nd Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

These actions are the result of the ability of NATO to deter in Eastern Europe. Once Finland becomes a *de facto* and *de jure* member, the Alliance and Russia will share more than 1000 kilometer of border. The public opinion on NATO enlargement in the Finnish population has shifted drastically. Moreover, the Baltic States are re-introducing the mandatory military service: this action came by no surprise to me. Thus, the fear of an occupation (as it has happened in the past) is still vivid across the Latvian population – especially in bordering cities, as the one I was living in. Based on these premises, on the one hand, we can argue that NATO has responded so far to Russian provocations with (unsuccessful) diplomatic engagement and with the reinforcement of its deterrence. On the other hand, legitimate concerns arise on how the Alliance should keep responding to Russian belligerence in Eastern Europe. As its military posture is convincing, the policy recommendations can verge towards continuity with the policies and strategies undertaken so far. But what should NATO do?

1. Reinforce the Eastern border
Eastern European countries are the most enthusiastic about NATO, and the ones that have experienced the Soviet past. My policy recommendations focus on both increasing the number of projects carried in those countries, and reinforcing the defensive border there, by increasing the number of troops ready to be deployed in case of an escalation of violence. This could be achieved by incentivize Western European States to contribute with more troops to the East: in this regard, NATO represents the most suitable forum for discussion and for harmonization.

2. Refrain from using the threat of nuclear power
On October 11, 2022, the Secretary General of NATO declared that the Alliance plans to fly nuclear-capable aircraft in annual "deterrence" exercises. In my opinion, this could lead to an unnecessary escalation of violence: if the war was on an even level (NATO vs Russia), the use of this rhetoric (and its disclosure to the public) would make sense. Nevertheless, the war ever since February has shown the hard truth to digest: retaliations against civilians. We cannot take this risk, being the latter a war crime under international humanitarian law.

3. Maintain diplomatic relationship with China and Eastern partners
In these moments of changes, I strongly believe it is of outmost importance to look for positive relationships with partners that have historically been associated with Russia. During the summit meeting of the SCO in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in September 2022, those same countries have made the Russian President wait for their arrival. In this regard, it is worth mentioning Russia's efforts to create an overarching security alliance and merge the SCO with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – which includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – that have not progressed far, but may eventually succeed. NATO Allies need to seize the moment. A weaker enemy is also an easier enemy to be deterred – during the Ukrainian war and in the future, too.

4. Invest resources in new technologies
With the accession on Finland and Sweden in the near future, the budget of the Alliance will increase. The wisest way to spend this money is to invest in new technologies. When the Ukrainian war will be over, there will for sure be a new war across the Eastern border, as it represents the fault lines of the Realist school of thought – that has proven to be the most accurate for explaining conflicts. Drones seem to me the right technology to invest in: they represent the new military technology that, on the one hand, prevents the risk of the killing of a soldier, which

could potentially be the target of the enemy's attack. On the other hand, it has a specific military target, therefore avoids the risk of killing civilians too.

5. Build stronger relations with NATO Agencies for logistical support

NATO agencies (namely, the NATO Information and Communication Agency, NCIA, and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, NSPA), are as important as member states: they provide logistical support and are important actors for the implementation of military projects. They have a strong influence during decision-making and they are important stakeholders in the lifecycle of a military project. For these reasons, it is necessary not only to strengthen the relationship across allies, but also to reinforce the cooperation between the two entities. This could also represent the solution for achieving the fourth policy recommendation: through a stronger cooperation, there could be a faster delivery of new military technologies.

6. Fully implement the Defense Investment Pledge

In the light of the new strategic concept, Allies should implement the Defence Investment Pledge that was agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit, with a specific focus on external challenges.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO

Alice Farina
Committee Assistant, NATO

Alice Farina is currently working as a Committee Assistant at NATO, after having completed my internship at the HQ. Previously, she has been a Research Assistant for a CBRN project in Italy, the Director of CDS Kenya (under the umbrella of the UN online volunteers), and a Child and Teenager Social Workers in Latvia, thanks to a European Solidarity Corps' project. She worked in London in 2017 and 2019 as an Activity Leader and Lead Activity Leader and is a Red Cross volunteer. Her research has focused on deterrence in Western Balkans, natural resources management and sustainability.

THE NEED TO RESPOND TO GREY ZONE AGGRESSION: WHY NATO CANNOT IGNORE CHALLENGES BY REVISIONIST ACTORS
by Leontine von Felbert

There are a number of factors that are important regarding NATO's response to Russian Belligerence in Eastern Europe. NATO needs to increase its ability to respond to conventional as well as non-conventional threats. Deterrence is improved by responding to grey zone and hybrid aggressions, rather than merely threatening to respond in case of a conventional attack against a member state.

Firstly, it is vital that NATO and its member state turn away from a previously often binary understanding of war and peace. If NATO considers itself at peace, until a member state is attacked conventionally and thus triggering Article 5, then it is doomed to lose to its adversaries. For years our adversaries, mainly Russia and China, have been challenging the rules-based international order and have been damaging our interests while expanding their influence. The reason they have been able to do so largely without consequence, is because NATO member states have failed to respond to hybrid and gray zone aggression in an appropriate and proportional manner.

This has a huge impact on deterrence because revisionist actors have learned that aggression often will be left unanswered if it is short of conventional war on a NATO member state. An example of this would be Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea 2014 onwards. The Western response was weak and failed to deter Russia's conventional invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Therefore, it is vital that NATO should respond to its interest being challenged even on a small-scale, or in the hybrid or gray zone. This could include a number of measures, depending on the threat in question. Cyber-attacks could be followed by retaliatory cyber-attacks against the adversary on a similar scale. NATO interests being challenged via proxy or surrogate forces could lead to the deployment of special operations forces that, in turn, can damage the adversary's interests, without escalating the situation to a state-on-state conventional war. There should not be a lack of response simply because the adversary is denying their involvement.
An appropriate response, both to conventional and non-conventional aggression, is of importance also as a signal

to other adversaries with revisionist intentions. If NATO does not respond forcefully and decisively to Russian belligerence in Eastern Europe, China might understand that it can take Taiwan without consequences.

In addition, still on the subject of deterrence, it is important to increase conventional capability, too. What is important here, is that all NATO member states need to contribute and increase their capacity, rather than relying on security being provided by the US. The new 2022 Strategic Concept of NATO is a good step in this direction, but it is crucial to actually implement and enforce the new plans. In the past, many things have been decided (such as the 2% goal), yet not all of them had been enforced. Germany, for example, did not reach the 2% goal despite continuously promising to do so.
In order to increase the military capability and capacity of NATO, coordination and collaboration among NATO member states is crucial. Making use of economies of scale when producing new military equipment and arms can provide an advantage for NATO members. Moreover, increasing the interoperability of weapons systems can help militaries of NATO member states work together more effectively.

Additionally, it is crucial to increase the resilience of NATO member states against grey zone and hybrid threats. NATO should work in the future to prevent dependencies of NATO member states on potential aggressors. Many European countries are completely, or to a large degree, dependent on imports of Russian gas for their energy supply. This kind of dependency can alter a potential aggressor's calculation, as they may consider a response by NATO less likely when it has this kind of leverage. Additionally, this may be used to threaten NATO member states into not responding or responding less forcefully to aggression, as their economies and societies would be gravely affected if the aggressor makes good on their threats.

More concretely, in order to deter further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe right now, it is important that NATO should have a clear strategy deterring Russia from making use of nuclear weapons. In addition to the scenario of mutually assured destruction, there need to be clear, potentially conventional, consequences should Russia use small-scale nuclear weapons.

The rotational military forces of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence, lack the conventional capability to prevent a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic States. It is

thus of crucial importance to close these capability gaps as quickly as possible. The idea of the effective deterrence of a tripwire, by which deterrence would be boosted as the presence of the tripwire troops increases the likelihood of intervention, has been critiqued in recent years and has been found insufficient. An adversary could attack despite the tripwire, achieve a fait accompli and thus a stronger defensive position for the war to come. While the idea should not be abandoned as a whole, it should certainly not be relied upon in cases where the adversary has proven themselves to be willing to use conventional military force and risk state-on-state war.

Overall, it is important that NATO deters future aggression by responding even to hybrid and gray zone attacks that are underneath the threshold for conventional war in order to deter such challenges of NATO interests in the future. Moreover, a strong and decisive response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is important also as a signal to other potential aggressors. Additionally, capabilities need to be increased significantly and dependencies need to be reduced so that deterrence, which is dependent on credibility and capability, can work.

Leontine von Felbert
PhD Candidate,
Defence Studies Department,
King's College London

Leontine von Felbert is a third-year PhD candidate at the Defense Studies Department of King's College London where her research focuses on the use of surrogate warfare in great power competition, analyzing Russian and American use of surrogates in Ukraine and Syria. Previously, she lived in Amman, Jordan for three years and worked as Project Manager and Research Fellow for the Jordan Office of Konrad Adenauer Foundation. She gained her Master's degree prior to that in Middle Eastern and Central Asian Security Studies from the University of St Andrews.

DETERRENCE BY EXPOSURE: NEW METHODS OF MANAGING BELLIGERENCE
by Molly Graham

At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, world leaders of the Alliance released a new Strategic Concept. The 12-page document reaffirmed the Alliance's core tasks but included a call for "the need to significantly strengthen our deterrence and defence as the backbone of our Article 5 commitment to defend each other". Set against the backdrop of Russia's ongoing unprovoked war in Ukraine, the recognition of a need to rethink and bolster elements of deterrence demonstrates the Alliance's understanding that new norms of deterrence are required to quell challenges to the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

To date, Russia's war of choice has levied elements of both conventional and hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare remains a fluid concept, with scholars debating its parameters. NATO claims hybrid warfare creates uncertainty by combining "military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces. Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations. They aim to destabilise and undermine societies." For this reason, the conceptualization and implementation of modern deterrence tactics is paramount.

NATO's measured response to Russia's aggression has included transforming the NATO Response Force (NRF) and increasing the number of high-readiness forces to over 300,000. The NRF is an exceptional development and reflects the understanding that new forms of warfare require structures of collective security that can react at an unprecedented pace. In response to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the NRF was deployed specifically in a defence and deterrence role. The Strategic Concept recognizes the need to have nimble responses, however, as seen in the case of Russia's war on Ukraine, NATO is aided in it's response by civil society, intelligent agencies, and private

citizens looking to expose Russia's methods of hybrid war.

In January 2022, in the lead up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, open-source intelligence (OSINT) exposed the buildup of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. Twitter, TikTok and Telegram provided instant insights into the battlefield and corroborated OSINT, exposing the location of where Russian troops were active. Civil societies organizations, in particular, took on this critical investigative work. To respond to Russian belligerence, NATO could leverage this work with the intent to deter Russia by exposing plots in Eastern Europe, determining weaknesses within the Russia military structure, and by making a mockery of the Russian Federations blatant lies. Strategic exposure of movements and plans, works to disrupt, delay, offer time for diplomacy. It can be argued that, from a political perspective, OSINT, in particular, has swung the international opinion in favor of Ukraine by exposing the horrors of the war and disproving the disinformation spread by the Russian government.

More impressive than the abundance of open-source information during this most recent war in Europe was the rapid declassification of intelligence. These developments suggest society has entered a new era of transparent warfare. For example, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom continues to provide daily intelligence updates on the situation in Ukraine on Twitter. US intelligence documents were rapidly declassified and, importantly, were accompanied by a persistent message that the US would not enter a war in Ukraine. This demonstrates a move away from classical theories of deterrence, namely deterrence by punishment, and towards a deterrence by exposure. This new posture of sharing and releasing intelligence contributes to NATO's overall goal of ensuring collective defence against multiple and simultaneous threats, and ought to be a practice welcomed and encouraged by the Alliance.

The abundance of information pertaining to the war has also solidified the importance of factual and timely information. Such information is important for military and civilians alike. As part of NATO's evolving Deterrence and Defence posture, the importance of resilience and resilient populations has emerged as paramount to a

sound foundation for defence. In particular, "enhancing resilience by strengthening the capacity of societies to prepare for, respond to, recover from and adapt to the full range of threats and hazards is an integral part of NATO's deterrence and defence posture". This includes resilience in online spaces and ensuring citizens are empowered to critically assess, navigate information environments and make well-informed choices.

Deterrence, like warfare, requires strategic update to keep up to date with technology and the battlefield. Paragraph 21 of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept Note calls for deterrence posture to remain credible, flexible, tailored and sustainable. NATO can achieve such a nimble deterrence posture by recognizing that today's hybrid battlefield requires deterrence by exposure. Efforts should be concentrated to enhance deterrence by exposing military movements to thwart a plan, and debunking disinformation by unearthing details of how it's created, or providing substantive, irrefutable evidence to support the truth. To accomplish this, NATO will need to harness work being done by civil society organization to corroborate OSINT and debunk disinformation, encourage transparency and intelligence sharing amongst Allies, and invest in robust communications to build public trust in NATO's narrative. While deterrence by exposure may not always be able to prevent all atrocities, it is certainly effective in garnering public support for NATO and its mandate.

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Joint Fight Against Disinformation and Cyber Attacks
by Lena Höfig

NATO's essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defense is at the heart of the Alliance, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO Treaty). NATO's greatest responsibility is to protect and defend Allied territory and populations against attack in a world where peace and security cannot be taken for granted.

At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO set a new baseline for its deterrence and defense posture in line with its 360-degree approach, across the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains, and against all threats and challenges.

The 360-degree approach consists of a mix of different weapons and defense systems and takes into account the dimensions of space and cyber in order to enable the allies to defend themselves multidimensional and to meet all challenges effectively. This strategic-reorientation is worth supporting. I would like to focus on the cyber dimension. In this area, it is important that concepts are also implemented, that structures are tested and that everyone knows at all times what tasks they have to perform, especially in the event of a crisis.

NATO has 30 member states, each of which has built its own national security architecture in a different way. There are at least 30 different national actors that need to synergize in the cyber domain at the international level to effectively protect "NATO cyberspace" from attacks by Russian or Russian driven actors. The multitude of actors requires an extensive concerted effort to coordinate and orchestrate all actors.

From my experience in the operational application of cyber security, the challenge is to establish a trustful level of cooperation. This can be achieved by getting to know each other, exercise many emergencies together, and know the heads behind the functional positions. NATO already has established several cooperation centers (with partners) that focus on jointly fighting cybercrime, disinformation (EastStratCom) and hybrid threats (Hybrid CoE). From my perspective, this very promising approach should be expanded.

In many member states, such as Germany, there is also more than one actor representing the federal government in international affairs in cyberspace (depending on whether it is law enforcement, cyber security or cyber intelligence). Moreover, in the NATO alliance and also in individual member states, we encounter the challenge that the aspect of cyber defense has not yet been clearly regulated in terms of responsibility and legal framework. This is challenging for the reason that countries such as Germany, for example, cannot do more than pass on information to allies in particular cases. A specific "defense" against an attack in the sense of intervening in networks would not be possible in all cases due to the lack of a legal basis. An effective, holistic and, in particular, alliance-wide cyber defense does not yet exist now.

Another criticism of the framework is, that the cyber defense is planned to be organized on a voluntary basis in the 360-degree strategic concept. In my opinion, the contrary should be done - institutionalized structures and professional networks are needed.

However, the measures adopted at the NATO summit are therefore an important and worthy step, but they are not sufficient in the cyber dimension to defend against hybrid threats and cyber-attacks. We need a clear legal framework for cyber defense, institutionalized NATO-wide networks of national experts, and a structured exchange on situational information and threats, and we have to conduct more mutual cyber exercises.

Explicitly mentioned in the NATO 360-degree strategic concept was also the need to increase resilience to cyber and hybrid threats and to increase interoperability. The aspect of cyber defense through civil-military cooperation is a promising approach. If you look at large enterprises or look at the banking sector, you can see that these companies are already very well prepared in terms of cyber security and resilience to cyber-attacks and are therefore very resilient. In my view, we need to take a multidimensional approach here as well and implement both technical measures and a legal framework for early and thus effective detection.

However, it is also just as important to involve people, "the human factor". NATO partners should each take national measures to ensure that the respective populations increase their resilience to the spread of fake news. Hate and agitation as well as turmoil and anxiety are stirred up through targeted manipulation via social

media. In particular, Russian "troll factories" exist for the sole purpose of depicting a mass of accounts that all spread the same manipulative and false information. To social media users this implies a variety of sources and it is intended to increase the credibility of the information being disseminated. Making people aware of what disinformation is, offering services such as "fact checkers", helps to increase resilience and prevent people from falling for fake "news".

In summary, NATO's 360-degree approach shows that the partners are well aware of the current challenge and that strategic foresight has been applied to adapt and prevent future risks. It will now depend very much on the implementation how effective and resilient the proposed measures turn out to be.

And to end my essay with an appeal - we can only win the fight against disinformation together. We must always question ourselves whether an online source is credible, use fact checkers when in doubt, and educate about fake news, disinformation, and propaganda so that citizens are aware of the problem.

Lena Höfig
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Lena Höfig has worked for several years in the field of cybercrime at the Federal Criminal Police Office after completing her bachelor's studies to become a law enforcement officer. After completing her subsequent part-time master's degree in Criminal Justice, Governance and Police Science, Lena joined the Federal Office for Information Security. For 3 1/2 years she worked there as head of the BSI liaison office in the Rhine-Main area. Afterwards, Lena changed job to the Federal Chancellery in the staff of Strategic IT Control Federal Government. Currently, Lena works as a policy officer at the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community.

The Ability to Deter: How NATO Responds to Russian Belligerence in Eastern Europe.
by Krisztina Hortobágyi

Imagine a world where each state could do whatever they desire, without any consequences. It seems chaotic, does it not? History taught us that avoiding war is the number one rule For that reason, international law and deterrence play key elements in peacekeeping. However, one rulebreaker is enough to upset the order of the whole world. This time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered the international community. Since NATO is the strongest security alliance, it has an important role in easing the crisis and reinforcing credible deterrence. The question is, what is NATO's part in the crisis and how can NATO deter Russia while the Alliance complies with international law?

NATO is a security alliance whose mission is to defend the Member States by military and political means. However, the purposes were a little bit different at the beginning and perhaps it still has significance. Although the Soviet Union collapsed and NATO-Russia Council was established, the two actors are functioning by different values and have contrary geopolitical goals. Russian aggression is constantly increasing because of the restrictions and probably due to their poor military performance. Moscow stated that its regime did not start the war, they only protect their country. All the more so, when NATO broke international law – referring to what occurred in Kosovo – it was relatively acceptable for the international community but if Russia does the same, the West responds by imposing numerous sanctions on the country. According to the Russian aspect, NATO enlargement is eventually the expansion of the American sphere of influence. Therefore, my first recommendation is that it would be expedient for NATO to take on the role of mediator between the US and Russia. No one can win this war and for peace, both actors have to make sacrifices.

In my opinion, when the government is intimidating, the power is already afraid. It means that the solution may lie in Russian fears and the way how its leaders think. The Russian perception is based on that since the collapse of the SU, they have been trying to cooperate with NATO but the Alliance did not take the Russian interests into account. When post-soviet nations wanted to join NATO as a way to protect themselves from Russia, NATO's "open-door policy" was not just a psychological and prestige issue for Moscow anymore; it became a serious politico-military issue as well. What we see since 2014 is that Putin has started his own redrawing of the borders of Europe and strengthened the Russian buffer zone. Based on the general security theory, retaining their influence in the neighbouring countries – in this case in Ukraine – is a defence standpoint that every country would insist on. From my standpoint, it was clear to NATO that their eastern expansion could provoke Russia to the point of action, yet they were not prepared with the appropriate means to suppress the war. If NATO would work on a new deterrence concept which focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian leaders and military force, then the Alliance would be able to act more efficiently and cost-effectively.

Whether Russian fear is real or it is just a tactical action – no one can decide. In my view, NATO should have paid more attention to non-conventional threats decades earlier. Comparing the military capabilities of NATO and Russia, the Alliance outnumber Moscow in many terms. Consequently, hybrid warfare is what actually threatens NATO. Despite that, after the 'Georgia issue' the Alliance introduced the policy according to which no state can join NATO with unresolved border disputes, internal territorial conflicts and insufficient military capacity to provide credible national defence. From a legal point of view, this was an excellent step for the organisation to have a rock-solid base for situations like the current one. On the other hand, this policy limits the capabilities that NATO can provide for the Ukrainians along with giving the green light for Moscow by NATO declaring its military non-intervention. Moreover, because NATO cannot help Ukraine directly, some of the Member States are under pressure to help independently. As the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus is still ongoing, Member States do not have the financial resources to maintain their own security situation in addition to helping the Ukrainians. So, the question arises: what is the true purpose of NATO? In any case, my third recommendation is that the focal point should be on addressing hybrid threats while the military equipment of the Member States takes priority over supplying Ukraine.

It is important to mention that only the United Nations has a monopoly on the legal use of force. As for nuclear

attack, the basic principle is the prohibition of first use and the use for deterrence or the avoidance of war. Using Paul Huth's definition of nuclear deterrence "*A concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.*", the goal of the actors – i.e. to avoid nuclear war – common, which once again encourages the actors to conduct political and economic negotiations. Realist experts claim that nuclear weapons, due to their ultimate deterrent power, have a stabilising effect and can serve as a solution in a crisis. However, liberal thinkers reject the provision of nuclear weapons because the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction is a global threat, and therefore favour non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Nuclear paradox is that nuclear deterrence requires both rationality and irrationality. In this situation, my last recommendation is: NATO should not seek disarmament, but make it clear to Russia that NATO is still a nuclear alliance and by breaking the first use principle, the world we lived in before will cease to exist.

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BOLSTERING DETERRENCE THROUGH CREDIBILITY, PARTNERS, AND STRATEGIC MESSAGING
by Sarah Kunis

In the months leading up to Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine, the intelligence painted a clear picture of Russia's intentions. However, it was unimaginable to many EU leaders that Russia would actually invade. Yet, we now find ourselves eight months into a war where there is no foreseeable end in sight.

This leads us to ask the hard question: why did deterrence fail? This essay will argue that the Ukrainian conflict has forced NATO to confront three fundamental axioms. The first axiom is that deterrence works best when it is credible. The second axiom is that deterrence must go beyond the European continent and include NATO partners. Finally, deterrence is tested on the battlefield of strategic messaging.

To further unpack the first axiom, that deterrence works best when it is credible, it is crucial to understand that deterrence does not exclude diplomacy. There is no question that diplomacy will always remain on the table and that a diplomatic resolution is the first priority. Although Russia engaged in diplomatic talks in the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine, the talks were later framed as a "pretense for diplomacy" and did not actually lead to any progress towards finding a feasible off-ramp. Unfortunately, the lack of credible consequences makes it difficult to enforce diplomacy. To this end, offers of diplomatic talks by NATO and multiple EU countries failed to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This leads us to conclude that when diplomacy fails, we need deterrence to be unquestionably credible. For deterrence to be compelling, you need solid military capabilities and a robust force posture. A steady-state of deterrence also requires your forces to be actively training and participating in joint exercises, such as "Steadfast Noon" in order to maintain an adequate readiness posture. Deterrence goes beyond the realm of sheer military strength, and in the particular context of the Ukrainian conflict, one needs resilient cyber network structures and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) capabilities, in order to seize advantage of the information space, which relates to the last axiom.

The second axiom goes beyond the immediate European continent and widens the aperture of NATO. NATO needs to engage global partners to do more in providing critical aid to Ukraine. NATO has already proven that it can do far more to pressure Russia in the political and economic domains when it brings partners beyond the European continent. The international sanctions regime against Russia has crippled the Russian economy, as half of the country's $580 billion of currency reserves is currently frozen and the majority of its banking institutions are cut off from the global payments system. However, corralling the international community for the cause of providing military aid to Ukraine has been a different story.
Lessons learned from Afghanistan have taught us that we need to categorize partnerships, as not all partnerships are homogenous, and we must be cognizant of the political limitations of partner countries.

It will be NATO's duty to perform a delicate balancing act of bringing partners into the fold while remaining cognizant of limitations. Partner countries looking to solidify their global status as responsible democracies and defense exporters are ideal candidates. NATO should focus on ways to incentivize these partner countries to provide military aid to Ukraine. Although NATO will remain a Euro-Transatlantic relationship, the conflict in Ukraine is an impetus to broaden linkages with other like-minded democratic nations.

Finally, the last axiom reinforces the power of strategic messaging. We cannot fight without a message and we cannot win without harnessing the power of public opinion. Russia and China have become adept in the art of strategic disinformation and have wielded information as an instrument of power. Through propaganda and information operations, Russia has perpetuated false claims about the validity of its invasion of Ukraine. Allies should arm themselves with the message that the invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing suffering of the Ukrainian population are unlawful violations of sovereignty and human rights. Moreover NATO must shape its strategic messaging to better target and shape public opinion. This can be done through building trust

with its intended audiences and creating direct relationships with civil society. NATO relies on its own allies to speak to their respective publics but we need better tools for assessing the information environment to be able to craft the most effective messaging.

Finding a way forward in this world today will require peace through strength. NATO will have to reinforce its strength in the form of credible military capabilities and a robust and "ready to fight" force. Strength will also come in numbers, by inviting partners to join the coalition of the willing, with lessons learned from Afghanistan. Finally, the strength of NATO will prevail through strategic messaging as we navigate an increasingly contested battlespace for information.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense of the U.S. Government.

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NATO Should Implement Brave Decisions for the Sake of Peace in the World
by Dr. Alina Nychyk

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shown that the global community, including organisations as UN, EU and NATO, failed to sustain peace in Europe. How can NATO learn on its missteps and contribute to building stable and inclusive security in Europe? I start by outlining key challenges to NATO coming from Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Then, I move to NATO's responses, and I end with my recommendations for Alliance's development.

To begin with, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and NATO established friendly relationship and Russia joined Partnership for Peace program. The relations started to deteriorate after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and in particular after Putin's coming back to power in 2012. In 2014, Russia annexed Ukrainian Crimea and started the war in Donbas. Eight years of this war convinced NATO to see Russia as a threat. However, the day of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 shook the world and also totally destroyed any NATO's cooperation with Russia. Consequently, 2022 Madrid NATO Summit named Russia "a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic Security".

From Russia's official perspective it was NATO that broke its promise not to enlarge to the East after integrating with Eastern Germany; it was NATO that was threatening Russia; and it is NATO that Russia is fighting with in Ukraine. Is there any sense in these Russian perceptions? First of all, there has never been any formal commitment of NATO not to enlarge to the East. Secondly, it was an independent desire of Eastern European countries to join the Alliance. Yet Russia also allegedly expressed desire to join NATO in the 90s, but was rejected (Russia wanted a special treatment, but was offered to wait in the queue with other applicants). This might have angered Russia.

Let us now look at NATO's response to Russia's war against Ukraine. During eight years of Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbas, NATO developed its cooperation with Ukraine, e.g., via constant consultancy, training help for

Ukrainian Armed Forces or join military exercises. At the end of 2021 – beginning of 2022, Russia started the deployment of its troops near Ukraine's borders and requested for new security arrangements in Europe, e.g., a decrease of NATO's military presence in its Eastern European members and a confirmation that Ukraine would not become the Alliance's member. However, long discussions between belligerents did not bring any positive results. Already in December 2021, US called Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 to be imminent. Weeks leading to 24th February 2022, some NATO members started sending weapon to Ukraine, so that to increase the country's defence capabilities. Thus, it is noticeable that Ukraine was better prepared for aggression in 2022 than it was in 2014 and NATO's help here was substantial. However, fearing of NATO's involvement into the war with Russia, the organisation sends only non-lethal, humanitarian and substantial financial aid to Ukraine, whilst its different members deliver "weapons, ammunition and many types of light and heavy military equipment, including anti-tank and air defence systems, howitzers and drone".

With the regard to the above, NATO's policy towards Ukraine and Russia helped Ukraine to resist Russia, but neither prevented Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nor stopped it quickly. It is already eighth months of the war, and its end is not in sight. It turns out that NATO is not able to guarantee security and peace on the European continent. Although the organisation's core aim is to defend its members only, still protecting Euro-Atlantic security implies peace in Europe. Previously, NATO did intervene in wars outside of its member-states and did this also in Europe during Balkan wars. Thus, Alliance could have helped Ukraine more, for example by satisfying the country's demand to close the sky and to protect Ukrainian civilians from Russian constant attacks. Again, due to fears of an open NATO-Russia conflict, NATO avoids taking this decision and lets thousands of civilians to die.

Permanent wars and human rights violations all around the world show inability of current international organisations to guarantee peace, prosperity, and decent level of life for every human-being. Reorganisation of the existing institutions or creation of new ones is urgently needed. It may be good time for NATO to take a lead in this. Bold decisions and approaches are needed. What if NATO accepts all peaceful countries and take the

leadership in protecting the world from aggressors and violators of international law? Although this idea has a lot of complications, this may be a worth-trying option for prosperity and peace on our planet. I would argue that as the strongest security organisation in the world, NATO should start 'thinking outside of the box' and develop new solutions, which will benefit not only its members, but the whole world in the end.

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THE ABILITY TO DETER: HOW NATO RESPONDS TO RUSSIAN BELLIGERENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE
by Ruxandra Seniuc

We currently live in an era where strategic shocks, natural disasters and terrorist attacks became the norm. On top of that, the new geopolitical reality created by Russia's war against Ukraine threatens to shatter the European security architecture and challenges United States' hegemonic position and the current world order. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic had paved the way for accelerating and amplifying the geopolitical tensions and the economic competition between East and West, creating waves of anxiety and insecurity in our societies. Most of these threats are external and reside in 'the Other', be it Russia, China, non-statal groups or consequences of the environmental shift caused by climate change.

However, few policymakers mention the challenge that comes from 'within' the Alliance, right at the core of our own defence and national security sectors – **the corruption within the military and intelligence forces.** Such acts can be transformed into secluded cases of espionage, where individuals that have access to valuable information or high-ranking official circles are prone to become 'corrupted' by malign actors in exchange for financial benefits. For example, in March 2021, five senior Bulgarian officials were accused of selling classified military information to their Russian counterparts. Similarly, several officials from the Baltic States were also liable to leak top-secret information to their eastern border after NATO meetings, directly into Russian hands.

Notwithstanding, one can also speak about corruption as a systemic issue and not just on a singular case-by-case basis. Romania, Bulgaria's northern neighbour, has witnessed several major scandals in recent years which implied drugs trafficking (130 kg of cocaine washed ashore in the port of Constanta, most probably via Turkey) and contraband (especially with cigarettes and alcoholic beverages) performed by boats or unidentified aeroplanes that cross the border from Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. In all of these instances, the military radars were presumably damaged, the surveillance systems did not function, and the border guards saw nothing. Usually, these financial gains come to the benefit of local elites, fuelling political parties in their election campaigns or diverse circles of influence. Moreover, the situation becomes alarming as it sends a clear message that the eastern borders of the North Atlantic Alliance cannot be fully secured from within, diminishing the credibility of Eastern Flank's defence posture.

Assuming that corruption is specific solely to former socialist countries due to their tumultuous past, mostly due to the lack of a viable lustration process in their pre-accession period, is erroneous; the 'older' allied countries are not without controversy either. The vulnerabilities of the human factor in the face of blackmail or financial gain were also present in some of the most powerful NATO countries such as Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, including in the ranks of senior military officers and high officials.

Although corruption might not be perceived as one of the most immediate or salient problems, it is nevertheless a challenge that needs to be tackled from its roots before it risks poisoning the whole alliance. It can expand to creating other issues such as information leaks and military losses, generating sentiments of mistrust among the members of the alliance, thus weakening its cohesion, and undermining the rule of law and the security environment. This only aids our adversaries in exploiting and proliferating these emerging tensions either by issuing preferential bilateral negotiations/agreements or by disseminating information operations under covert strategies and making use of other mechanisms specific to hybrid warfare.
The solution to this challenge consists in:

- **Building better integrity** of the military troops and other types of personnel from the security sector. Reminding officers of the values that they stand for, the historical importance of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the privilege to live in a democratic country with strong societal cohesion is something that they should protect and care for.

- **Penalties must be swift in response and higher than the reward** in order to modify such behavioural dispositions within the alliance, avoid impunity, and discourage future similar occurrences.

- **Applying unanimous sanctions** by the Member States to statal and/or non-statal actors that are found to subvert the rule of law and the democratic principles of the alliance

through bribes and other economic coercive measures. Freezing assets and/or blocking property and the interest in property of the designated persons will create a sense of justice and deterrence.

- **NATO must acknowledge corruption as an issue of its own.** Although the novel Strategic Concept makes reference to hybrid threats, it does not once mention corruption; acknowledging and tackling your own issues only makes you stronger and generates the right impetus for better policy-making and confidence-building measures.

Ruxandra Seniuc,
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Ruxandra Seniuc holds an MSc in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford and a BA in Criminology from Durham University. Passionate about the convergence between foreign affairs, strategic studies and international security, she previously acquired professional experience at the Council of Europe and the Romanian Government, and served as a parliamentary adviser for the Romanian Senate, focusing on defence and national security matters. Ruxandra is currently a Young Professional Fellow at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, while she prepares to embark on a career in the Diplomatic Corps of Romania.

PANEL 2 | NATO's New Strategic Concept: What Strategies to Deal with Strategic Competition?

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For the first time in 12 years, NATO has given itself a new strategic concept. 12 years full of serious security events and developments that put previous certainties to the test: Be it the war in Ukraine and the question of how to deal with Russia, the quick and inglorious end of the mission in Afghanistan, terroristic threats that, not so long ago, kept the alliance on its toes, or even the debates among the allies.

First and foremost is the defence of common values, but against the backdrop of past experience and numerous challenges, the question arises as to how common values can be defended most effectively collectively? Is a relapse into a spiral of increased armament the path of the highest common denominator? What paths has NATO's new Strategic Concept missed to mention? Has dealing with strategic challenges, such as China, been sufficiently and convincingly addressed?

Panelists

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As Research Assistant of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project at SWP Berlin, Anna researches nuclear policy and deterrence issues. Previously she worked as a Carlo Schmid Fellow at NATO's Policy Planning Unit. She holds a Double Master's degree in International Security and International Relations from Sciences Po Paris and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Jonas Hård af Segerstad
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Jonas Hård af Segerstad, born 1970 in Uppsala, Sweden, is currently Defence Attaché to Germany (Austria, Switzerland). Prior to this, he held Squadron Commander (Mine Countermeasuers) and branch head positions in the Swedish Defence Staff.
The Captain of the Navy entered the Royal Swedish Navy 1991 as Anti-Submarine Warfare and Mine Warfare Officer

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Juliette Maresté has worked as Project Assistant at the Munich Security Conference, as part of the Project Management team. She has a Master's degree in International Security, specializing in Intelligence studies and the Middle East/WANA region. She currently is a member of YATA Germany and is interested in Gender perspectives in Intelligence and Transatlantic Relations.

Görkem Gülsen
Graduate Student of European Studies, Fulda University of Applied Sciences

Görkem Gülsen graduated with a Master of Arts in Peace Research and International Politics at the Institute of Political Science at Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen. His research interests lay in the intersection of cybersecurity, foreign policy, and international relations. He did an internship at Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations in New York City and he worked on cyber issues there and now he is working on the topic of digitalisation of German society and transformation of work.

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Aras-Nathan Keul is on the board of YATA Germany and lives in Berlin. He is currently graduating in War and Conflict Studies at the University of Potsdam. His academic focus is NATOs relations with China. Aras-Nathan also works for a think tank dealing with Germany's relations to countries in the Middle East with a focus on Israel and Iran.

Jona Grimm
Student of Mathematics and Economics

Jona Grimm is a student of Mathematics and Economics. He did internships in the state parliament of Thuringia and the European Parliament. During his studies he spend a year in China to learn Chinese and since returning has immersed him in foreign policy, organizing and chairing for example a discussion with an expert from the German foreign office on India's strategic environment. He is currently writing his diploma-thesis on Quantum Machine Learning.

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO NATO ON PREVENTING GLOBAL ILLICIT FINANCE
by Anna Blue

Recommendations to NATO on preventing global illicit finance

The 2022 Strategic Concept was released at a time when NATO is experiencing a resurgence in its relevance, importance, and authority. The preface of the Strategic Concept acknowledges that the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia "gravely altered our security environment," and the "shattered peace" has made all NATO members more keenly aware of the alliance's vulnerabilities when it comes to physical and cyber warfare (Strategic Concept 3).

However, one topic that is a glaring omission from the new Strategic Concept is the challenge of illicit finance, a threat to the shared values of the alliance and to the safety and freedom of NATO members. In this report, I argue for why the NATO Strategic Concept should give more consideration to money laundering, offshore accounts, and dirty money. Then, I provide three policy recommendations to help guide how NATO approaches the problem of illicit finance before acknowledging a few issues that will make illicit finance a difficult (but worthwhile) subject for NATO to tackle.

Background

Generally speaking, the World Economic Forum has suggested that corruption is costing the global economy 3.6 trillion dollars every year (Johnson). Illicit finance, in particular, is an extremely pertinent topic for NATO because of the role it has played in supporting the Russian assault on Ukraine. Russian offshore funds have been used to finance both secretive overseas operations to undermine Russian enemies and to provide Putin with the capital he needs to carry out military activity in his near abroad (Davies). Reliable estimates show that Russia has the world's largest volume of dark money hidden abroad, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of its national GDP (Hoefer). On a related note, Chinese money laundering is getting more innovative, effective, and evasive. Chinese

criminals are stoking chaos by supporting violent drug cartels in Latin America, and research has shown that the criminal activity may be endorsed by the Chinese government (Rotella and Berg). In the Strategic Concept, NATO recognizes that the People's Republic of China (PRC) "strives to subvert the rules-based international order," but does not mention how the PRC is using illegal flows of money and capital to destabilize the American neighborhood.

In perpetuating and assisting illicit finance, Western institutions are often complicit. Between 2010 and 2014, Russian criminals used the banking network of Deutsche Bank to move as much as 80 billion dollars into the western financial system (Harding). Most famously, the 2016 leak of the Panama Papers highlighted how dirty money is hidden offshore and then processed in high-risk transactions by major Western financial institutions.

It is essential that NATO acknowledge and then address the connection between illicit finance and international security. The possible consequences of ignoring illicit finance are dangerous: terrorist financing, the provision of funds for the acquisition of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and related crimes all undermine the integrity of the financial sector and the broader economy (IMF). Furthermore, some members of the alliance do not screen or audit foreign direct investment in their countries, which means two things: it is easier to move illegal money in and out of those countries AND the lack of a screening process makes NATO assets in those countries more vulnerable to intellectual property theft.

NATO should prioritize fighting illicit finance now because "a joint effort to address kleptocracy and illicit finance is an opportunity to strengthen ties between the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom at a pivotal moment in the transatlantic relationship" (Sutton and Judah). The United States is known for unilateralism in financial regulation and, as a result,

"U.S. criminal and civil regulatory actions against European private sector institutions have at times produced a defensive, aggrieved response from local officials, rather than galvanized reform" (Sutton & Judah). There is no existing global kleptocracy initiative nor any single European anti-money laundering agency with a direct supervisory mandate, so the NATO alliance is best positioned to bring together various stakeholders with a vested interest in stopping the funding of violent or criminal activity. Below, I provide three policy recommendations for NATO consideration:

Policy recommendations

1. Create a NATO anti-laundering fund to support regional and national regulators: Regulators are severely under-funded and directing NATO support towards regulation will make it easier for regulators to investigate illicit finance across borders. It may also put pressure on member states to create a cross-border transaction registry to increase transparency and accountability, as well as act as a deterrent to criminals who previously took advantageous of the lackadaisical approach of the West to illegal transactions.

2. Introduce a blacklist of non-NATO countries at risk of hosting money-laundering practices: NATO can draw inspiration from the much-lauded UK beneficial ownership registration system, which required companies to disclose their real owners (Sutton and Judah). Creating a blacklist will put pressure on those countries to apply greater oversight of their finance industries and it will prevent NATO from dealing with those countries in economic or defense exchanges.

3. Put pressure on NATO members to close down banks with a history of serial money laundering: Banks such as Trasta Bank in Latvia or Danske Bank in Denmark need to either show serious evidence of rapid and robust reform or be shut down for their role in former money laundering schemes. The United Kingdom and Europe do not have the authority to sanction foreign entities over money laundering concerns, so NATO needs to lean into American authority in order to isolate and penalize perpetrators.

As the Strategic Concept claims: "We are bound together by common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law," and weeding out corruption is an essential part of promoting the liberal vision that NATO has for the world (Strategic Concept 3).

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NATO's New Strategic Competition: a preparation for tomorrow's world through changes to implement today
by Léa Aleyna Fournier

The war in Ukraine has shown that NATO's deterrence strategy should be reconsidered, strengthened and readjusted to face crises. The unknown and irrational choices of Putin, the constant questioning of China's challenges, the terrorist threats as well as the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the troups are issues to be tackled with both a short-term and long-term strategy.

NATO took the first steps by reassessing its priorities and values among the thirty members with the 2022 new Strategic Concept. Recent world events show that security is more than ever central to world order and that NATO, being an organization of defense and security, has a crucial role to play.

In the Strategic Concept, NATO focused on the importance of developing deterrence which is the organization's first objective. A point that NATO did not mention in detail is compellence. Compellence can be defined as a form of coercion that attempts to get an actor to change his behavior through the use of force or threats. The main difference between deterrence and compellence is that deterrence is made to avoid a change of the status quo while compellence is to go back to the status quo. Considering that there is an ongoing war in Europe, NATO should strengthen its imminent capacity of action by creating and implementing a series of guidelines concerning the action of NATO when its values within Europe, but not necessarily member countries, are threatened. Indeed, we have seen that article 5 cannot be used when a member country is not concerned but that NATO still has a role to play. Forming this guideline will be also a powerful tool for coercive diplomacy and therefore deterrence for the future.

Moreover, independence, rules on foreign investments in the defense industry and technologies are to be tackled rapidly to avoid countries that do not align with NATO's values to gain tremendous influence on member countries. Focusing on the general values is important but not enough. NATO should expand the principles of the alliance on more than that. Regulating foreign investments in the defense and technology sector and having a clear task distribution of the components of these industries would help with dependency issues and will allow NATO to take sharper decisions. NATO could implement a support program to enhance the defense industry of countries who have a weaker one. Moreover, NATO should point up companies such as MBDA who are European companies by construction and have a multi-domestic approach accepting the interdependency between France and the UK. Such companies would be beneficial to foster cooperation and allow developing countries in the sector of defense to bring strong assets to the organization.

The second objective of NATO is crisis prevention and management. The last years with the multiple aggressions of Russia in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 show that NATO failed to prevent a bigger crisis that led to war in Ukraine since the 24th of February 2022. As Ukraine's invasion is deeply changing and will continue to change world politics, a strong reflection should also be conducted on the long-term turn NATO is willing to take. The withdrawal of all allied forces from Afghanistan had and still has effects on the country's, the region's and the world's security that needs to be addressed. NATO should prepare and implement a better strategy when it comes to ending its operations and plan for a smoother and more stable transition that would be more in line with the respect of the values of NATO. It should forge partnerships with local entities and other international organizations to work on a peaceful and secure transition that will perpetuate peace.

The third objective of NATO is cooperative security. The rise of populism and authoritarianism threatens the values of democratic countries and of NATO. Even if NATO is a north Atlantic alliance, its security cannot be envisioned separately from the rest of the world. NATO mentioned the importance of partnerships in the Pacific zone. Considering China's pressure in the region and in the world, a special focus should be installed on countries such as Australia, India and Japan and a strategy must be built with them. Bilateral and regional agreements should be signed and enforced and stronger partnerships in terms of security but also the economy should be established. With the aim of creating new partnerships, new markets can be created, current markets can be enhanced and joint programs can be put into practice to stimulate economic cooperation and lessen dependency on countries without the same values.

Furthermore, even if NATO mentions that Eastern European countries are welcome to join NATO and that only they can decide on their accession process, it does not seem like a realistic approach looking at the current situation. NATO should propose different statuses that these countries can acquire progressively to fit the values of NATO, its independence and its deterrence strategy. For instance, among the first criterias implementing a partnership in contributing to the defense industry can be key to progressively obtaining a full membership in the organization.

Lastly, NATO should have mentioned efforts to be conducted to rebuild confidence with the citizens of the member countries. Indeed, after president Macron expressed that NATO is becoming brain-dead in 2019 as well as the inability of NATO to deter the war in Ukraine, questions on the role, efficiency and necessity of NATO have risen. NATO should develop initiatives to be more connected to its citizens such as working with youth, using social media with short videos updating on the work of NATO, working with influencers posting content on international relations to post on the organization and the way it functions. NATO could develop initiatives similar to the "Conference on the Future of Europe" for the future of NATO to open the floor to propositions of citizens of member countries.

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A BROADER SECURITY CONCEPT - NATO AND THE HIGH NORTH
by Sarah Gehle

The Russian War on Ukraine showed NATO and its Allies that their security cannot any longer be taken for granted. With this being also stated by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the new Strategic Concept is NATO's response to a changing world and the challenges facing the Alliance. At its core, the concept includes significant changes in the assessment of the security environment and how Allies should respond to it. Most strikingly, it identifies issues that had not previously played a role.

What's new?

The Concept is the first one that recognizes the importance of the geostrategic area of the High North. It identifies Russia as the most direct threat to the peaceful Euro-Atlantic area and focuses on maritime security. It furthermore recognizes China as a systematic challenger –however, it stops short of characterizing it as a fully-fletched "competitor". The Concept is more about improving the resilience of the Allies against any attempt to undermine the rules-based international order, including the freedom of navigation.

Even though the Strategic Concept pays special attention to maritime security, freedom of navigation and maintenance of maritime trade routes, there are still some points where significant gaps become apparent and should be addressed by the Alliance.

Renewed Maritime Strategy

Since the Alliance identified maritime security as a key concept, NATO should consider making its strategic concept more concise by adding a renewed Alliance Maritime Strategy. The last one, published in 2011, came out of a different strategic situation. On the one hand, due to China's growing maritime capabilities, the Alliance needs to have a revised version to effectively deploy its forces. On the other hand, Russia's activities have changed the geopolitical situation. But also NATO has changed: with the two new members Finland and

Sweden, NATO requires a new defense plan for the Baltic Sea. Also missing is a further elaboration of how militarization in the Black Sea and the High North can be contained, because with generally increased activity in the Arctic region, the Russian Northern Fleet and its nuclear capabilities will assume greater strategic importance. This in turn will make the Murmansk area - the fleet's location - an even more vital security interest for Russia.

China's leverage

Second, considering China's rise and its first-ever mention in a NATO concept, the strategic challenges with the PRC shouldn't be seen in the light of an operational role of NATO in Asia but one of addressing China's influence in Europe. The PRC is often overlooked when it comes to the Arctic even though the state describes itself as a 'Near-Arctic state' and shows increasing strategic interest. The scope of China's Polar silk route includes access to the sea routes as well as influence on Arctic politics. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was reticent towards China in giving it access and it took the PRC several years to get observer status at the Arctic Council. However, it is already visible that Russia will become economically increasingly dependent on the PRC. This will give China greater leverage over its partner, potentially meaning an increase of Chinese power over and in Arctic development and a correspondingly decrease in Russia's reticence.

"High North, low tension?"

To conclude, even though the High North is mentioned in the Strategic Concept, the Alliance misses clear political guidelines on how to deal with the power competition in the region. This is crucial because the days in which the High North could be seen as an area of neutrality and cooperation, are over. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this history of low tension cannot be taken for granted any longer. And NATO has borders and a strategic interest in the region. Due to climate change, some of Russia's natural defenses, like the ice cap, are melting and therefore Russia is improving its defense capabilities in the area. This, in turn, requires a new

approach to the new situation. Otherwise, the possibility of a security dilemma arises. Defensive-motivated build-up by one state with offensive possibilities can be seen as a threat by another state, encouraging an arms race. Additionally, issues related to critical infrastructure security, like sea cables, and sea lines of communication are also of strategic interest to the Alliance. This requires the Allies to strengthen their resilience against attacks from Russia and China.

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NATO's Strategic Concept: Cooperative Security in Shared Values
by Anna Joyce

The longest-standing alliance in history has operated on the basis of consensus for over seventy years. As a demonstration of its commitment to this tenet of its mandate, 30 Allied heads of state and government agreed to a new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit last June. However, consensus with regard to common values seems to be fractured within the Alliance. In an era marked by rising authoritarianism, Allies have failed to address their own domestic affronts to democracy. While rightly calling attention to external threats in the new Strategic Concept, a return to a consensus surrounding common values is paramount.

After the Washington Treaty, the Strategic Concept is the Alliance's most important document, identifying NATO's purpose and principles, strategic environment, core tasks, and ensuring the Alliance's continued success. The new Strategic Concept is markedly different from the last in that it expounds upon the fact that Europe is no longer at peace. Russia's aggressive war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security environment. The concept addresses China for the first time, as well as climate change, cyber, space, and hybrid warfare. While these external threats pose serious challenges for the Alliance, the internal threat of democratic deterioration is an equally concerning challenge.

The 1949 Washington Treaty states that members are bound by their shared values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. As the geopolitical strategic environment changes and new challenges threaten Euro-Atlantic stability and security, these shared values significantly support the cohesion of the Alliance, providing a stronger, unified approach in countering strategic competition. While collective defence is often touted as the cornerstone and principle function of NATO, it is a military and political alliance. Article 2 of the Washington Treaty states that member states will contribute toward "strengthening their free institutions" while the 2022 Strategic Concept calls for safeguarding freedom and democracy, reinforcing unity, cohesion, and solidarity, and building on the strength of shared democratic values.

The democratic values and freedoms offered by liberal democracies are under siege, not least within the Alliance itself. The past 16 years have seen a decline in global freedom and democracy status. Turkey is a declared "Not Free" country, according to Freedom House's Global Freedom Index, while Hungary, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia are "Partly Free." EU member states such as Poland and Slovenia have also been subject to this democratic backsliding, and the United States' democracy has been challenged, most obviously in the attempt to overturn the election results of 2020. Right-wing populist parties are gaining influence in the parliaments of a number of Allied member states, as seen in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Hungary. In countries such as Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, and the U.S., attacks on the free press, judiciary, and LGBTQ+ and abortion rights demonstrate the undermining of democratic norms and values. This threat to Western democracies carries significant implications as it is manifest in some of the world's largest and wealthiest countries, creating a domino or ripple effect for smaller democracies. As revisionist China strives to reshape the international order according to its own strategic objectives, the strength and unity of democracies is of the utmost importance when competing in this domain.

Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine has reminded the West of its shared values and common interests; however, it would be short-sighted to assume that the imminent external threat is an enduring force that will keep the Alliance together. In strengthening their own democracies, Allied states also send a message to rising authoritarian regimes that liberal democracy will continue to guide the international order. While the brunt of this work is done at home, there are some measures the Alliance should take to promote the shared values enshrined in its core documents:

- Allies should commit to reviewing their national indicators of democracy. In the same way that NATO maintains seven baseline requirements for resilience, Allies should annually review and measure baseline requirements for democracy.

- Second, NATO should develop strategic guidance and practical measures to counter disinformation and misinformation. A working group or formal discussions in committee meetings should be implemented to discuss emerging and disruptive technologies that threaten democratic practices and institutions.

- NATO should cooperate with the EU and other multilateral organisations to promote democratic resilience. This includes the alignment of strategic communications and more systematic and deliberate joint political statements to highlight norms and best practices.

- NATO's partnership goals should emphasize democratic resilience. While NATO has partnership tools in place focusing on building integrity through good governance, anti-corruption reforms, and judicial independence, the promotion of democratic strengthening ought to be stronger.

- NATO should build upon the work done during U.S. President Biden's Summit for Democracy by hosting a similar summit, emphasizing democratic resilience and countering threats to democracy.

Recognizing that states pursue their own state interests and foreign policy objectives does not discount the fact that NATO is an alliance of democracies tied together by shared interests and values. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Alliance as a whole, as well as Allies individually, to preserve peace and security by protecting democracy. The Preface to the 2022 Strategic Concept asserts that Allies' resolve to protect their citizens, defend their territory, and safeguard freedom and democracy is steadfast. The challenge lies in translating these words into action.

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WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY SECURITY POLICY AS AN ANSWER FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION?
by Akseli Mäenpää

We live in a thoroughly changed world, compared to that of two years ago, our world having undergone seismic changes in its geopolitical landscape, that can be said to have challenged the legitimacy of the post-war political order as a whole.

The events of 2022, and particularly the aggressive war of conquest waged by Russia in the Ukraine, has served to underline the raison d'etre of the Alliance, its purpose being to serve not only as an defense alliance, but also as an Euro-Atlantic community of liberal values, serving as an direct opponent to the illiberal and authoritarian consensus espoused by Russia and its allies.

But while the current geopolitical climate has revitalized NATO and strengthened the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community, brought together by their shared liberal-democratic values, the crisis has also revealed cracks in the current status quo, and indeed, how NATO itself functions, as we strive to meet the challenges brought on by the shifting geopolitical climate. Therefore, we must ask: Can NATO answer the challenges of the changing nature of conflicts in the 21st century?

The NATO-EU and Civilian-Military dichotomy

While NATO has in the 21st century worked to adapt itself to better shield critical infrastructure and increase resilience through civil-military cooperation and support cyber defense of its members, the foremost task of the Alliance remains military deterrence and defense planning, or that of "hard security", leaving "soft security" such as supply security in the purview of the EU and the member states. Indeed, it should be noted that as an seventy-three-year-old alliance, despite having undergone shifts in command structures as well as doctrinal changes structure during its seventy-year existence, NATO itself remains by its nature an alliance geared towards defending its members against conventional warfare of armies facing armies in an era where warfighting doctrine is increasingly shifting away from such confrontations, and into a more asymmetrical type of warfare, seeking leverage and weakness in the enemy where it can be found, both in the traditional domains of warfare, and outside them.

Therefore, the question needs to be asked: Can NATO respond adequately to strategic competition in the field of modern geopolitics, when means used by great powers do not fit any longer into a clear dichotomy between "military" and "civilian", "hard and "soft" domains of influence? How can the alliance help secure its members against multi-domain influencing and hybrid operations in a world with increasing amounts of interdependence that cross state borders in what comes to its supply chains and may find itself dependent on illiberal actors to source critical materials such as rare earth or goods the production of which is both capital- and labor-intensive, such as semiconductors.

It can be said that NATO finds itself faced with a challenge amidst a changing world, where pressure can be levied against actors via non-military means at peacetime, non-kinetic means leveraged to achieve goals traditionally achieved via the use of military force, and states potentially deterred from taking action via economic or political means, like Russia has leveraged its natural gas supplies against European states reliant on it for their energy throughout the duration of its aggressive war in Ukraine.

A new model of security?

While NATO has admittedly made progress in combating hybrid threats since 2016 and reworked its strategic concept, the alliance remains relatively focused on traditional military deterrence, despite the North Atlantic Treaty distinctly giving mandate to an broader focus, it third article allowing for the parties to … separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

As it has become increasingly clear that traditional military security has become inseparable from other forms of leveraging other forms of influence, often serving as a combined effort to achieve aims traditionally achieved via military means, the first and foremost example naturally being the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. Therefore, one must consider the necessity of a new, integrated, and comprehensive approach to security, that involves the whole of society, bridging the divide between "military" and "civilian", and "hard" and "soft" security, integrating the whole of society in the process of security governance, preparedness planning and responding to hybrid threats from the top level to the very bottom- And of this, I believe that the NATO members have much to learn from the preparedness

planning and security governance of Finland and Sweden.

Indeed, the oncoming accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO brings the two remaining EU members outside the alliance into the Treaty, which gives an excellent opportunity for both the North Atlantic Council and European Council to look into potential synergies between the two organizations, and how to further enhance cooperation and division of labor between the two, so the Euro-Atlantic bloc may adequately respond to the challenges of the decades to come.

NATO should:

- Formalize its relationship with the EU and create a unified advisory body for assessing infrastructure, defense-industrial cooperation and joint projects in the field of competence of each organization, as well as strengthen shared situational awareness by integrating EU and NATO intelligence sharing functions under both organizations.

- Make strides towards redefining security and broadening its definition beyond simple material "hard" security and widen NATO's competences in areas where issues are best handled via transatlantic cooperation.

- Elaborate comprehensive security strategies to dealing both with hybrid threats and great power competition, so a clear division-of-labor exists, and the "blind spots" where influence can be leveraged in areas where no clear competence exists.

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A New Cooperation Roadmap Suited for a New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation
by María Gracia Moreno Vegas

When facing such a complex issue, specially in the context of a current on-going threat to Europe's security and territorial stability, the first thing that comes to mind are the words of Josep Borrell : "EU-NATO cooperation is crucial for European, transatlantic and global security".

Indeed, European Union and NATO's relations are traversing a turning point and, fueled by the geopolitical post-pandemic state of the world, their reinforcement seems more urgent than ever. Yet, there is much to be said about how one of the seemingly most organic relationships when it comes to foreign affairs and defence has faced a rather slow and uneven integration process.

Both NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, and the European Union's Compass, approved previously in March of the same year, explicitly express the necessity for partnership between the two, emphasising that "the more hostile security environment requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act" . Furthermore, the press release for the EU Strategic Compass goes on to state that "a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members" .

For such strengthening of response capability and relationships with other organisations such as NATO, the EU proposed, in an effort to expand the Warsaw Joint Declaration signed in 2016, a plan focused on: a) countering hybrid threats, b) operational cooperation including at sea and on migration, c) cyber security and defence, d) defence capabilities, e) defence industry and research, f) parallel and coordinated exercises, g) supporting eastern and southern partners' capacity building efforts.

And so far a seventh progress report on the matter has been issued as of June 20th 2022. Reviewing the implementation of the 74 proposals agreed upon by EU and NATO Councils on December 6th 2016 and December 5th 2017, this report showcases the fast-paced, and some might argue rather rushed, evolution of NATO-EU cooperation in security and defence matters.

Thus, in an effort to assess the information provided so far and truly analyse the state of EU-NATO cooperation efforts so far a proposal is necessary.

Firstly, there is a need to establish the scope of this proposal, which, following the aforementioned "seventh progress report" that aims to paint a clear picture of the current reality of EU-NATO cooperation, will tackle pre-existing issues and recommend new policy that aims to comprehensively satisfy the interests of both organisations. In such regard:

1. This Proposal lays down recommendations to enhance cooperation and coordination among committee liaison officers from EU Member States, the Commission and Union agencies, and NATO Member States, Committees and Divisions, and Centers for Excellence through the creation of a new "European and Transatlantic Cooperation Roadmap".

2. Said Roadmap aims to tackle the new security and defence threats that have arisen through the years after the Joint Declaration of 2016, signed in Warsaw, providing a new recommended policy framework that develops on the 2022 EU Strategic Compass' and NATO Strategic Concept's ambitions in a pragmatic manner.

3. The "European and Transatlantic Cooperation Roadmap" should be understood as an interdisciplinary approach based on NATO and the EU as the unifying actors, developing cross-cutting methods and strategies that are able to manage the variable geometries that represent the different types of security threats and defence efforts. This sustainable, feasible, expandable, inexpensive proposal that pairs seamlessly with allied nation's legal frameworks that will generate an EU-NATO Information Sharing Network, with the intention to create

a system for gathering information from member states that will enable early warnings and the management of ongoing threats related to security and defence.

4. This Proposal is without prejudice to the responsibility of Member State authorities, the Commission and Union agencies, as well as NATO Committees, Defense Policy Planning Division and Centers for Excellence, for defining the scope and assignment of tasks and reporting lines of their respective defence liaison officers, and to the tasks of defence liaison officers within the framework of their responsibilities under Union and national law, policies or procedures, or under special agreements concluded with the host country or international organisations.

5. These normative recommendations are in accordance with Article 21, 41 42, and 45 of the TEU.

6. These normative recommendations are in accordance with Article 8, 9, and 10 of the The Washington Treaty,

In lue of the framework laid above the European and Transatlantic Cooperation Roadmap will offer 13 recommendations, categorised by actions or toolbox focus points that shall be reformed or further developed, offered here in a non-hierarchical order:

1. The European Peace Facility and NATO's Defense Policy Planning Division must remain one of the most utilised CSDP tools and civil Allied structural tool. Through this instrument, the EU and NATO will fund the common costs of the military and civilian CSDP and Allied missions and operations, thus enhancing solidarity and burden sharing between Member States. By strengthening the capacities of peace support operations and of third countries and partner organisations in military and defence matters, it will specially help to increase the effectiveness of the EU's external action, making it a more effective partner for NATO.

2. The threat assessment process,the protection of the global commons, and a clear pathway in terms of objectives, means and capabilities carried out by MEP's and experts, in line with the April 2021 SEDE sessions, should be a thorough yet precise and efficient process.

Defining modern threats and strategically assessing the possibility of emergent 'black swan' situations should be a priority, for which close cooperation with NATO's Joint Intelligence and Security Division should be imperative.

3. Migration should be regarded as a key focus point for security preservation and threat deterrence. Preventing the weaponization of migrants, especially in regions such as North African European cities (like Ceuta and Melilla) and Southern Europe. In this sense, the terms migrant and refugee must remain clearly defined and never be confused, keeping in mind that different legal protection statuses apply.

4. Democracy and liberty should be seen as the cornerstone of the "transatlantic" way of life, and therefore they must require the utmost protection, both nationally and in a common scope. For said goal, this proposal aims for the special protection of free elections, freedom of speech and press, and a further streamlined movement of goods, persons, and assets in Allied territories, in a fashion as similar as possible to that implemented in Union stated by way of Directive 2004/38/EC and Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. Economic power must be a priority concern for EU and NATO legislators and policymakers, both in the sense that confers the defence expenditure in member-states but in the sense that is concerned with the economic influence EU's and NATO's main security detractors have in regions that are key to the preservation of peace and liberty in the North Atlantic clime.

6. Resource power must be a key component of the EU-NATO cooperation toolbox, especially regarding the recent shortage threats that codependence poses. The Member States must aim to diversify the risk in energy investment by having multiple sources of energy and investing in alternative and renewable resources, as well as securing multiple trade and provision routes that ensure normal energy supply even in the face of a regional threat.

7. Climate change's consequences assessment: more joint exercises to increase operability in high polar regions and thus secure the arctic region from hostile activity in an effort to prevent that manoeuvring in the maritime spaces created by the melting of ice capes becomes an geostrategic advantage for EU's and NATO's main security detractors. As Liselotte Odgaard states in an essay for the August-September 2022 issue of Survival by the IISS, "enhanced data and intelligence sharing would improve the defence posture of NATO member states in the Arctic. Moreover, integration between US and European satellite-navigation systems would significantly upgrade NATO's ability to overcome Russian and Chinese impediments to wart fighting" .

8. The European Military Force project should be explored and reintroduced as a necessary and proper measure to enforce the measures contained in this proposal. Member-states must explore the possibility of the creation of a common military force, whether from scratch or by regrouping allocated troops from member states. The question about an integrated military, mainly centred around peacebuilding and peacekeeping both in the common space and in key geopolitical regions/allies, should be as relevant as ever in EU policy making.

9. Africa and Eurasia shall be regarded as the most important geopolitical regions in terms of security and defence, as much as liberty and democracy protection. Security breaches in these areas pose a particularly severe potential threat to the Common European Space and the Transatlantic region, resource obtainment, trade route functioning, and information availability. In the same sense, the European Union and NATO should become a reliable ally and a top security provider for other regions, becoming less reliant on their "traditional" security providing actors.

10. European Union Membership should be a top priority for NATO's European members, without prejudice of other coordinated security or defence treaties and international organisations they may be involved in. In accordance with this precept, the EU Common Defence

Policy aims to reach a 3% percent GDP expenditure from member-estates by 2030.

11. EU-NATO Strategic Communications Campaign organised by target to favour common transatlantic values, battle desinformation, and tackle radicalization:

a) for radicalized users: an algorithm decodefying tools that use the "redirection method" that improves social media platforms to push terrorist groups similar to Google's Jigsaw and Moonshot softwares; social media campaigns using influencers in niche communities (such as gaming or twitch) to generate that "authentic" counterterrorism content that challenges the fake news that is useful for redirection as evidenced by It's not funny anymore. Far-right extremists' use of humour by the European Commission; peer to peer campaigns using the YATAs to create more useful counter-messaging efforts; and media literary workshops using existing collaborations with epistemic communities (such as CoEs, agencies and universities) to attack disinformation by improving media literacy in civilians.

b) for policy makers: outreach campaigns for policymakers to impact long-term decision making and the regulation of these spaces through campaigns similar to the NoHateNoFear campaign by the EU parliament.

c) for media outlets; workshops and collaborations with established media outlets, as well as free and independent reporters to improve media literacy and stop disinformation before it starts with campaigns to understand the link between media reporting and radicalization.

12. Reorganising how NATO and the EU interact with the private sector: redefining EU-NATO's cooperative effort's short- and long-term relationships with private sector key strategic firms and non-state actors, enhancing the participation of civil society in the safeguard of our shared cyberspace.
In this sense, the goal is to create new public-private symbiotic relationships with key strategic cyber-security and tech companies, such as ISDEFE's public-private partnership with NATO that aims to complement the

NATO Communications and Information Agency's (NCIA) cooperation and contracting frameworks with industry by establishing a new model of cooperation between the NCIA and non-profit organisations. Finally, this symbiosis will aid in externalising services where NATO and the EU cannot reach or lack expertise in order to gain control over an important cognitive battlefield where NATO or EU cannot legislate.

13. Redefining NATO's and the EU's role as cyberspace guardians: launching geostrategic birdwatching operations to expand EU-NATO's security outreach in key radicalization regions, such as the Sahel, the Maghreb and Southeast Asia. As well as creating a close knit collaboration with EU to a) implement European CLAUDIA's tools and knowledge to boost NATO's DIANA technology programme and b) create a packet of key words and concepts to feed AI domain monitoring networks and pinpoint key domains and courses of action

through which disinformation is and could be used with terrorists goals, developing PRE-COG AI with a T-BERT-like neural network method. In addition, launch in-house and external non-party ethical hawking networks to monitor potentially dangerous domains and breach certain barriers that AI might still have, meeting and setting security standards such as OWASP .

This said, the proposal of a "European and Transatlantic Cooperation Roadmap" is irrevocably in line with the core goals of both NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass, and attains to the achievement of a continued and long-term EU and NATO staff commitment to taking their cooperation forth in a "swift swift, fully coordinated and coherent way with a view to delivering further concrete results."

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How to ensure the success of the new Strategic Concept:
Adequate resources, a societal approach, and a long-term vision
by Giuseppe Spatafora

At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO Allies unveiled a new Strategic Concept, the seventh of its kind and the fourth since the end of the Cold War. The Concept came at a crucial and defining moment for Euro-Atlantic security: Russia's invasion of Ukraine had brought war of aggression back to the European continent, and manifested the real dangers that revisionist authoritarian states pose to democracies in the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, in the years leading up to 2022, NATO suffered one of the toughest transatlantic rifts in its history, which led French President Macron to label the organization "brain-dead."

From both a military-strategic and political-diplomatic standpoint, it was high time for a new statement on the Alliance's purpose, tasks, and direction. The new Strategic Concept is NATO's answer to these demands. The document notes that "the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace," but doesn't limit the set of threats and challenges to the Kremlin: the overarching theme is "strategic competition" between authoritarian revisionist states and democracies, with Russia and China in primis. However, as the Concept notes, threats to the Alliance's security may come "from all directions", including from non-state actors, or through the use of disruptive technologies and hybrid tactics below the threshold of military activity. Finally, the Concept notes threats such as "pervasive instability", human insecurity, and climate change, described as "the defining challenge of our time."

Against this complex strategic environment, the Strategic Concept outlines a "360-degree approach" for the Alliance's security. NATO pledges to ensure the collective security of its members across three core tasks: first, a robust deterrence and defence posture, with emphasis on deterrence by denial; second, crisis prevention and management; and third, cooperative security with partners across the globe on common

threats and challenges. Through these actions, NATO aims to remain the "unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum" and to guarantee the security of Allies and their populations.

The Strategic Concept is, in many ways, a revolutionary document for the Alliance. After decades of out-of-area operations, it marks a return to the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area and of its "common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law." It is an ambitious document, and as such, it raises some significant questions about its implementation. As Professor Marina Henke argues, "a good Strategic Concept defines core strategic goals that are concrete and have a realistic chance of being implemented." Can all the objectives in the new Strategic Concept be achieved, or are some incompatible? What practical steps are necessary to implement the Alliance's new objectives?

In this final section, I offer some suggestions for NATO to navigate the future. Hopefully, implementing these suggestions will allow the Alliance to continue defending the transatlantic values while avoiding arms races and leaving a path open for cooperation and resolution of tensions:

1. Agree on a new Defence Investment Pledge: one of the reasons why NATO was ready to support Ukraine and ensure immediate deployments on the Alliance's eastern front was because many Allies were spending (or working towards spending) at least 2% of their GDP in defence, as per the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the Wales Summit in 2014. As the Wales Pledge expires in 2024 and military stocks are depleted to support Ukraine, Allies need to find a new way of providing the necessary capabilities for the Alliance to function. They should not just focus on spending more, which may cause an arms race, but on spending better. Allies must agree not only how much to spend, but how to spend it too: which capabilities will each ally contribute? How will interoperability be ensured? These are

paramount questions to answer in a new Pledge, as such an ambitious Strategic Concept cannot be realized without resources.

2. Invest in whole-of-society resilience: The immediate challenges to NATO are unlikely to come in the form of a military attack, as the Alliance maintains a strong deterrent, including through nuclear weapons. On the other hand, NATO Allies are more vulnerable below-threshold tactics such as cyber-attacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, economic coercion, and disinformation. To counter these threats, military tools such as a credible deterrent posture need to be met with activities aimed at enhancing societal resilience. If the population is well informed about the possibility and content if disinformation campaign, it will be less likely to confound lies with truth. If societies are prepared for cyber-attacks, they will be less likely to panic and stop functioning when one happens. In other words, if society is ready to "absorb" the effects of a hybrid attacks, then the perpetrator won't be able to enjoy the benefits. This will not only strengthen the societal fabric of our democracies; it will increase deterrence by denial (as opposed to punishment) and help achieve the Strategic Concept's objectives.

3. Finally, NATO should consider how to contrast long-term challenges as it fights immediate threats. Take climate change. The Strategic Concept claims that NATO should become "the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security." However, in an emergency such as the current energy crisis, climate goals are often the first to be sacrificed. This is a mistaken approach. Instead, NATO should take advantage of the current moment as a critical juncture to advance its climate goals. One practical way of doing so, for instance, is to include a pledge to invest in renewable energy and military emission mitigations as part of the new Defence Investment Pledge. This would ensure the implementation of the Strategic Concept without causing problem to current military effectiveness or credible deterrence. The same principle should holds true for other far-reaching goals envisaged in the Strategic Concept, such as arms control and non-proliferation, or protection of human rights and human security.

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LATIN AMERICA AND NATO
by Mariam Vargas

Latin Americans are the largest and fastest-growing population in the US, therefore strongly influencing the US government; for example, they are deciding votes in presidential elections. Without their support, candidates cannot secure the election. These countries are known for their quick response to COVID-19, high vaccination rates, overcoming the halts in their economies during COVID-19, and blooming democracies, with all-time high participation from the people in recent elections. Latin America is growing to have power and influence in its hemisphere. I find that the US has ignored its international and global position due to its history in the region, which has cost them the people's trust. In its new strategic concept for competition and security threats, NATO must consider Latin America. NATO is more than a military or deterrence organization but a democratic political alliance where discourse and negotiation thrive. Involving Latin America in said discourses can prevent the further influence of China and Russia on Latin American soil and the growing of imminent threats.

There is a history of resentment against the US in Latin America. The US anti-communist vision of the world dating back to the Cold War cost the lives of thousands of people in Latin America who suffered at the hands of dictators implemented through coups by the US. The US participation in implementing, promoting, or funding these dictatorships has created tensions and unfriendly relations with the countries affected. This has caused China and Russia to intensify their economic and political influence on Latin America. Over the past two decades, China has secured strong economic and security ties with countries in the region. China is also Latin America's top trading partner, which has caused its economy to grow and the Latin American economy to rely solely on trade with China. China is using this to its advantage. For example, China put pressure on countries that recognized Taiwan, such as The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Latin America has had relations with Taiwan for a long time, but its support for it has declined. The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua most recently flipped

their positions after being offered financial incentives by China, including loans and infrastructure investments. Pursuing relationships with Latin America can be highly beneficial to the US economy and in strengthening those relationships while at the same time preventing the influence and hold of Russia and China in the region.

These relationships include Colombia's approach to NATO in 2013 and its promotion of a unique partnership and cooperation program. Today, NATO is partnering with Colombia around intelligence sharing, cyber cooperation, maritime cooperation, the fight against terrorism, the fight against corruption, building integrity, and demining. As the world begins to face new challenges that require much more negotiation for peace and security, partnerships between NATO with like-minded countries like those in Latin America can be mutually beneficial, improve stability, and promote democracy, peace, and security all over the world. NATO's support for Latin America would mean the strengthening of armies in the region, but also for those countries that are not able to defend themselves to offer protection. Other challenges for NATO are Russia's presence in Latin America and what the current war in Ukraine could mean for this region. Russia has demonstrated its intent and capability to conduct operations and activities against the US.

NATO must push to promote democracy and peace in the area without resulting in organized coups. The support for Russia is an existing threat in the Western Hemisphere and could provoke violence and hostility toward the US and other countries. For instance, the war in Ukraine has profound implications and consequences for the region of Latin America and the Caribbean. The existence of populist and authoritarian regimes such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba directly threatens democracy in the continent. There is also fear that these countries, with the pressure or presence of Russia and Putin, could be used as pawns in a Russian strategy to retaliate against the US; this creates space for direct threats to the US.

In conclusion, NATO must consider the further participation of Latin American countries in future discourse as soon as possible. China holds an economic

advantage in the region and uses it to push its international agenda. This disadvantages the US and limits trade within the region, and on the other hand, European countries are far more limited due to their colonial history of looting and slavery in the region. Russia has a strong presence and relationship with authoritarian regimes such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, all of which support Russia's war on Ukraine and pose an imminent threat to the US. Not recognizing these threats can have long-lasting and devastating repercussions. NATO must push forward ideals of democracy and peace in the region while the US must also, in an attempt to redeem its history with Latin America, gain the trust of these countries and consider less violent or militaristic options. Latin America must be included in NATO's new strategic concept for dealing with competition (China and Russia) and security threats. Growing up in Latin America, I know all these things to be true, and have experienced the repercussions of NATO's neglect. Latin America can be a valuable partner as new challenges grow in the world, including it will lead to prosperity and peace. Failure can result in losing critical future alliances and direct threats to democracy and peace in the region.

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PAN EL 3 | New Era of European Defense: What EU-NATO Cooperation?

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A large-scale war in Europe, rising national defence budgets and increasingly fragile supply lines: These factors have thrusted the issue of Europe's defence industrial base to the forefront of contemporary public discussion. But although the importance of a militarily strong and capable Europe now appears obvious, years of political disregard, a national hodgepodge of national defence procurement and the skyrocketing costs of research and development have left their marks on the sector.

Given these circumstances, how can NATO act to develop and utilise synergies among the European allies as well as within the alliance as a whole? What needs to be done to constructively support and shape the new era of European defence cooperation? And which part of the action needs to be prioritised, to use the given resources in the most efficient and effective manner?

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Deterrence by industry – the EU and NATO must cooperate on procurement and defense production
by Michelangelo Freyrie

When enemies abound, it's a good idea to keep one's friends as close as possible. And despite recent efforts to strengthen the partnership between Europe's two preeminent political communities – the European Union and NATO – it's undeniable that cooperation between the two organizations has been suboptimal at best. Partially overlapping memberships and profound differences in their respective policy toolboxes are positive elements which allow the two institutions to act complementarily on the global stage. And yet, there has been little interest in going beyond an approach that essentially consists in staying out of each other's way. Since the common declarations issued by the European and Atlantic Councils in 2016, the main theme at the core of NATO-EU relations has seemingly been to ensure situational awareness of the respective agenda – through common briefings, information mechanisms and political consultations, which allowed to avoid a situation in which the two organizations issued conflicting priorities and requirements. The political logic behind this approach is crystal-clear: the greatest danger to Europe's security would be national capitals to be forced to choose between two competing organizations with which most European states are bound by deep political and cultural commitments. "Wasteful duplication", as it has been repeatedly vilified in the Security and Defense community, would be the second-worst mistake.

In this regard, EU-NATO cooperation has been largely successful. Multiple exchange formats have introduced critical technical concepts such as interoperability-by-design, avoidance of downstream duplication and coherence in terms of standards and institutional requirements imposed on member states. The Atlantic Alliance didn't dispute the EU's expansion into the defense sphere, the strengthening of PESCO and the introduction of tools like Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). In turn, the EU has reframed the question of "strategic autonomy" in a way that, while refusing to conceive l'Europe qui protège as simply the strengthening of a European pillar within NATO, also avoids framing it as a clean break from the transatlantic partnership. The improvement of transatlantic relations after the end of Donald Trump's presidency surely didn't hurt, as did NATO's own soul-sourcing leading up to the Madrid Summit and the return of deterrence at the top of European political priorities after 24 February.

But avoiding duplication and ensuring consistency in the European defense policy won't be enough. What is now needed is a higher degree of unity of intent and decision-making, especially in the realms of industrial organization and procurement. The return of high-intensity warfare in Europe and the unabated necessity of supporting out-of-area deployments are elements which require a clearsighted approach on how to organize the industrial and research efforts in Europe. NATO, as the main military Alliance of the continent, clearly supports the elaboration of a shared military doctrine, of war-fighting concepts and standards, as it has been doing (with some difficulties) implementing a "manoeuvreist" approach into joint land operations. But military operations need to be credibly underpinned by a sustainable economic-industrial basis – and the high attrition rate implied by complex multidomain operations would currently not be backed by adequate industrial production.

Importantly, it's paramount that while NATO continues to provide support and assistance to non-EU members, it also starts to build on the large investments and initiatives launched by the EU in procurement and research - the same way it integrates initiatives by single members of the Alliance. The challenge is gargantuan: European states must rebuild sufficient spare production capacity in order to potentially surge defense output when necessary, as well as guaranteeing that NATO countries remain at the bleeding edge of technological development.

In this regard, NATO must and should welcome the fact that the EU is now trying to do more when it comes to common procurement through its Joint Procurement Task Force and the EDCCs. NATO should find ways to incentivize the participation to these formats, fully acknowledging that fragmentation of the Alliance's equipment base (for instance due to the acquisition of non-NATO countries systems) would be harmful to interoperability and a sustainable logistical and maintenance policy.

Crucially, NATO's guidance already has an indirect influence on the EU's own procurement priorities through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which is directly based on the Alliance's outlook on operations and deployments. How NATO imagines it will have to fight future wars directly shapes the military requirements from Member States.

All of this, in turn, informs the pathfinding work carried out by CARD. In this sense, NATO could fully realize its de facto steering role and seek dialogue with the EDA, in order to ensure that the doctrinal and operational development of the Alliance's approach to warfighting is accompanied by an adequate adjustment of Europe's technological and industrial basis. Accordingly, NATO and the EU should seek to fully synchronize the NDPP and EU's Capability Development Plan in the medium term, and start talks on how to best incentivize defense contractors to keep unused production capacities in place – while still avoiding ballooning costs. The digitalization of manufacturing lines and the use of innovative Industry 4.0 technologies may help.

A more direct industrial and research engagement between NATO and the EU is crucial to ensure coherence in the European defense planning. This will especially be needed in times of decreasing means due to the looming global economic crisis, which will inevitably affect European budgets already strained by the multiplication of security threats.

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Moving Towards Interoperability: Recommendations for Europe-NATO Integration
by Joanna Newcome

Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine failed to shatter democratic partnership in Europe, but instead shifted the trajectory of European security towards a more united and (likely soon to be) expanded NATO Alliance. Even amidst economic austerity, European members are boosting defense budgets, unearthing a new era of political and economic support unheard of over the last two decades. National modernization plans will take several years to bear fruit, but NATO should now act upon this renewed wave of commitment to address European burden sharing and interoperability with the larger Alliance. To achieve this:

1. NATO should utilize the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation and its EU liaison to advise the European Defense Agency on how to avoid duplication in defense capabilities, achieve interoperability goals, and fill critical capability gaps for both institutions.

2. NATO should further integrate its intelligence enterprise and incorporate members' geographic and collection advantages by establishing a regional intelligence fusion center.

3. Finally, NATO should urge European members to increase national commitments to multilateral NATO training, especially in the face of the United States' expanding security priorities in the Pacific.

In 2014, only three member states (including the U.S.) invested at least two percent of total GDP to defense; however, Putin's aggression towards Ukraine has fervently revived European leaders' commitment to NATO. Just four days after the onset on war, Germany bolstered its long-disregarded defense budget by 100 billion Euros. By the end of the first half of 2022, nine member states had met the two-percent guidelines. Europe's swift action is promising, but financial commitment will mean little if defense modernization is not deconflicted.

European members of NATO operate 16 types of main battle tanks, 29 classes of warships, and 20 different fighter planes. In contrast, the United States only operates one type of main battle tank, four classes of destroyer and cruisers, and six types of fighter jets. Alliance combat systems come with varying levels of modernity, as well as different communication, navigation, and fire control systems that pose a challenge to force interoperability.

Europe acknowledges the need for improved interoperability through less duplication in both NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass. But this is a challenge neither institution can solve alone. With 21 members of the Alliance in the EU, NATO should leverage the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation and its permanent liaison to the EU Military Staff to advise the EDA, the EU's arm for defense modernization and development. NATO's operational and combat system expertise can provide invaluable insight into how the EU can best direct defense investment to achieve a more interoperable force, capable of out-competing peer adversaries. Closer collaboration will protect against duplication of effort and contribute to European specialization, benefiting both EU and NATO defense objectives. It is critical for NATO to respect the autonomy of the EU and avoid advancing the interests of any member state's defense industry in this process.

In addition to disjointed combat systems, NATO also suffers from inefficiency in its intelligence enterprise, exacerbated by limited information sharing and distrust among European members. While the establishment of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) was a significant milestone for the integration of NATO intelligence, member intelligence services still primarily operate independently. Intelligence sharing agreements are and must remain an issue of national security, but NATO should establish a regional intelligence fusion center beyond its headquarters to demonstrate a need and capacity for closer cooperation with European members.

Intelligence integration will become increasingly important if Sweden and Finland join the Alliance. With

their proximity to Russia, these future members will certainly bring unique capabilities and expertise to NATO's intelligence enterprise. The formation of a regional fusion center in Sweden or Finland would encourage greater engagement, collaboration, and familiarity with member collection capabilities. Ultimately, this will enhance situational awareness across the geographic diversity of the Alliance.

However, intelligence sharing will remain ineffective unless NATO prioritizes proficiency in command and control (C2) systems and procedures. As outlined in the 2022 Strategic Concept, the Alliance needs a robust, resilient, and integrated command structure that is capable of streamlining decision making. The implementation of this goal is dependent on maximum participation in NATO exercises. European members should use bolstered defense budgets to increase national commitments to NATO training evolutions.

European support to and leadership during NATO exercises will become increasingly important as the United States faces competing security priorities in the Pacific. President Biden's National Security Strategy lists China as the only competitor with the intent and increasing capability to reshape the international order, naming "out-competing" the nation as his top priority. Additionally, the U.S. military is experiencing its lowest recruiting numbers in almost fifty years, meaning it will likely be stretched thin across both European and Pacific areas of responsibility.

The rise of China coupled with ongoing Russian aggression heightens the importance of all members, especially Germany and France, to assume greater roles in leading multi-domain warfare in the European theater. European members have a timely advantage of public and political support to move towards closer interoperability. The Alliance should take advantage of these synergies to build a more lethal, capable NATO.

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RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: EU MILITARY INTEGRATION AS A PATH FOR EU-NATO COOPERATION
by Timoteo Cozzio

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union and NATO stand shoulder to shoulder once more. Gone from policymakers' minds are the debates on the utility of NATO in the 21st century, as the member states rally to present a united front against the threat from the East. However, for the first time in its history, this strategic threat may come from two separate actors; While NATO contended with but the Soviet Union during the Cold War, today's security landscape places it opposite Russia and – in all likelihood – China. The United States' expressed focus on long-term competition with China and its assurances to defend Taiwan against Chinese invasion set the stage to potentially divert much of NATO's resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific security theatre. Should the US, as NATO's largest contributor, pivot its focus to the far East, the alliance's capacity to organize European deterrence and defense would be impacted.

As the scenario of Chinese "reunification" by force features ever more concretely in the plans of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army, European NATO members must be prepared. Even in the absence of a formal obligation for European forces to join in the effort to defend Taiwan, the US' dedication to the latter would effectively stretch NATO's forces in Europe very thin. To counteract this comparative weakening of the continent's defense, European members must enhance the efficiency of their military cooperatives if they are to retain a powerful element of deterrence. They should look to the European Union in order to effectuate such efficiency gains.

The collective militaries of the EU present a vast opportunity for increased efficiency in military cooperation. What is at this time an alliance of national armed forces with varying degrees of technological development, differing command structures, and individual national allegiances has the potential to be so much more united. Of course, any question of EU military integration has to be carefully weighed against national defense interests and the already delicate discussion surrounding the question of national sovereignty in the EU. A rushed effort to completely integrate all EU militaries under the command of an EU institution would be a spectacular failure, sure to weaken trust among formerly cooperative allies. However, just as today's political and economic European Union was not willed into existence from one day to the next, so too should the formation of an EU military take small, but deliberate steps forward. The European Coal and Steel Community evolved to form today's EU, while military integration must likewise crystallize from a targeted origin in a highly specific sector. Unified EU aerial defense should be the first step to forming an EU military.

Nowhere is Europe smaller than from the air. Modern fighter jets, with speeds of up to 2500 km/h, can cross larger EU countries in less than half an hour in any direction, and smaller countries can be overflown in a matter of minutes. While the majority of EU member states are part of NATO and thus benefit from protection via Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), there are several EU member states that are not (yet) part of NATO, and others that have minimal air forces and are almost completely reliant on NATO aircraft. The largest part of the fleet (over 13'000 planes) is supplied by the United States, far outstripping the second largest air forces of Türkiye and France (around 1000 aircraft each). If the US chooses to reevaluate its military priorities, or a less NATO-committed US government comes to power, Europe would be hard-pressed to retain aerial control. Rather than coordinating the scrambling of individual air forces in successive waves, the EU and NATO would be far better served by a network of European air bases stationed within member states. These air bases would be stocked with the same fighter jets, maintained through common infrastructure, and serviced by personnel having undergone standardized training. Issues of interoperability would be minimized by developing such a force. Centralized purchasing of technology and modernization of aircraft

and anti-aircraft defenses by the EU would do much to homogenize the Europe's disjointed air forces. Moreover, less wealthy member states would benefit from greater access to modern defense technology, thus reinforcing the weaker links against attack. Finally, EU-NATO cooperation would benefit from the efficiency gains of defense cooperation between relatively equal peers: Instead of overarching NATO technology and protocols having to be adapted and adopted by individual EU member states (through individual standardization agreements, or STANAGs), there would be a dialogue between two large continent-wide actors and efficient, top-down implementation of technologies. Paradoxically, setting up a common EU defense architecture would strengthen NATO within Europe, by insuring the continent against a partial US withdrawal.

To achieve this initialization of EU military integration, NATO should:

- Formalize a set of common STANAGs for EU-NATO aerial cooperation, detailing technical, procedural, training, communication, and command standards.

- Work with the EU to oversee the construction of a network of EU air bases in strategic territories and currently underserved member states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia).

- Provide a consultative capacity to EU member states as a long-term, trusted security guarantor. This will be instrumental in allaying concerns regarding a perceived loss of military autonomy for the member states by giving control of aerial command to the EU.

- Strengthen NATO's awareness of potential efficiency gains in EU-NATO military cooperation, particularly envisaging the scenario of decreased US support.

By integrating EU air defense, the EU and NATO can mutually strengthen each other's security architecture, thus safeguarding Europe's future.

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW EUROPEAN JOINT PROCUREMENT INITIATIVE FOR NATO – EU COOPERATION
by Felix Ahlers

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine does not only call into question the peace order of entire Europe, but also underlines the effects of years of defence underspending.

Even though the US managed to increase their defence expenditures significantly over the last two decades, the European partners failed to appropriately raise their budgets. These decades of long-lasting savings, which are reflected in the low compliance rate of the originally agreed 2% policy, led to crucial deficits in terms of NATO's ability of collective defence and deterrence, especially on the European pillar. But not only did the European partners within the NATO spend too little on their defence, they also failed by far their self-set benchmark of 35% collaboratively procured armament.

However, the return of warfare to Europe has led to a major shift of political will to correct this insufficient current state: member states have announced massive increases in their defence budgets (so far around EUR 200 additional billion in coming years). Also, the EU understood that they had to step up cooperation through joint projects, boost innovation and strengthen and develop European defence industry. In order to meet the new requirements, the European Commission decided to complement existing bodies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) with actions to support the European Defence Cooperation. These actions include the establishment of a Defence Joint Procurement Task Force, a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) regulation as well as a European Defence Capability Consortium (EDCC). Also, the commission considers on strengthening the budgets of the EDF and a VAT exemption.

Regarding NATO's procurement, it is managed by different bodies (e.g. NIAG, CNAD), programs (e.g. NSIP) and agencies (e.g. NCIA, NSPA). Military common funding, which is the method to be used for joint procurement, is subject to the „Over and Above" rule, as well as the Minimum Military Requirement (MMR). To understand NATO's concept of joint procurement, it should be noted that in general, NATO does not buy personal equipment, weapons systems or platforms, as Allies buy these themselves and commit to using these on behalf of NATO. The shifted range of military tasks since the 90's has led to a joint NATO procurement that has a strong focus on projects supporting deployable or expeditionary capabilities, on C4ISR capabilities, and on capabilities directly supporting AOM.

Comparing both NATO and EU procurement, it is obvious that they are coherent in their strategic goals of having Europe a strong and reliable pillar against threats from the east. Yet, EU and NATO have different focal points concerning their procurement investments.

Having the EU establishing their new framework for procurement, NATO and EU must be careful not to create competition between their procurement methods, as there lies possible conflict potential e.g. between EU's joint defence procurement initiative and US' new military foreign sales framework or also the US State Department's European Recapitalization Incentive Programme (ERIP).

In order to promote the European pillar ramping-up their defence industry and thus achieving NATO's objective of deterrence and defence, the following measures are recommended:

- It must be ensured, that NATO procurement agencies do not compete with the new European procurement framework. To avoid competition, NATO agencies should include permanent emissaries of European procurement agencies (e.g., EDA) into their decision making and vice versa.

- NATO should seek for cooperation between NATO and EU investment programs (e.g., EDIP, NSIP,

EDF). For example, NATO could subsidize EU procurement in case it also fits a NATO capability gap.

- For the short-term, NATO could consider easing their "Over and Above" rule for joint procurement projects within Europe. Since NATO in general does not buy weapons systems and platforms, they could consider making an exception to the rule by making subsidies if those systems are jointly procured by a certain number of nations.

- NATO should also attempt being granted VAT exemption for their joint procurement initiatives within Europe, to increase their scope of investments.

Summing up, the underspending and individual procurement of European defence over the last two decades led to an insufficient state of NATO's European pillar.

To ramp up European defence industry and ensure a fully operational NATO defence readiness, the decided investment initiatives have to be properly coordinated not only within the EU, but also between NATO and EU to achieve synergies instead of creating competition.

Or as Ursula von der Leyen, President of the Commission, said: „We need to spend more on defence and we need to do it in a coordinated way. "

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Felix Ahlers

After finishing school in 2014 Felix Ahlers immediately joined the German forces.
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THE NATO-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A MORE ROBUST AND RELEVANT COOPERATION THAN EVER AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT FOR EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY.

by Guillaume Mitterrand

In a world of growing strategic competition and increasingly complex (hybrid) threats and challenges, including but not limited to arms control, cyber and space, emerging and disruptive technologies, terrorism, disinformation, climate change, and China's coercive policies, international partnerships are becoming an ever-more important aspect in the development of economic, political, and military strategies in our globalised world. While undermining the rules-based international order, Russian President Vladimir Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine has reinvigorated the Atlantic alliance, and deepened NATO's strategic partnership with the EU to face common challenges. As NATO allies continue to help Ukraine beat back Russia's assault, they must also address this important longer-term challenge of bolstering and sustaining European defence cooperation through strategic NATO-EU partnership for Euro-Atlantic security.

Neither NATO nor the EU alone has the tools to ensure strong, secure, and prosperous societies. Yet, by working together, protecting critical infrastructure, including energy security, supply chains, health systems, and democratic processes, the NATO-EU strategic partnership could significantly strengthen the resilience of societies. As the nature of threats changes, so must the methods of preserving peace. Therefore, NATO allies and EU member states, who share same values, must play complementary, coherent, and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security.

In recent years, NATO and the EU have taken this partnership to new heights. Most recently, leaders endorsed in 2022 the NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass, reflecting the same reality of a more dangerous, competitive, and unpredictable world, underlined the necessity to strengthen NATO-EU strategic partnership, political consultations, and cooperation on issues of common interest, such as military mobility, resilience, climate change, human security, gender equality, emerging and disruptive technologies, disinformation, as well as countering cyber and hybrid threats.

NATO and the EU complement each other, the former as the most successful political-military alliance in history, and the latter as an economic and normative power, promoting human rights and responsible behaviours, providing humanitarian aid and development support. Once Finland and Sweden join NATO, 96% of the EU population will be protected by the Alliance. Hence, NATO has interests in recognising the value of a stronger and more capable European defence cooperation that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security, and is complementary to and interoperable with NATO. Initiatives to increase defence spending and develop coherent, mutually reinforcing capabilities, while avoiding unnecessary duplications, are key to the joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer.

Some recommendations in favour of a more robust and relevant NATO-EU cooperation include: First, establishing continued dialogue and coordination to face new security challenges together, leading to practical cooperation and multilateral initiatives. Second, political collaboration and strategic communication to combat disinformation, raising awareness, promoting common values, and advance policies with partners at all levels, bilaterally or at the UN, the OSCE, and other regional organisations. Third, removing obstacles for more effective exchange of information, particularly classified and sensitive intelligence. Fourth, joint research and innovations programmes, with clear provisions on third party participation, may help alleviate unnecessary competition between the two organisations and allow for better coordination of activities. Considering the broad and dynamic area of threats, and that both organisations cannot deal with them alone, their toolboxes must be complementary to provide more appropriate responses in peacetime or crisis situations.

Moreover, modern conflict is about far more than guns and tanks. Today, facing hybrid threats, resilient societies

are in fact, our first line of defence. It is therefore fundamental to bolster a multi-stakeholder's approach in light of multi-domain operations emerging from foreign malicious actors. NATO and the EU need to take a common proactive approach to countering hybrid threats. This will require the creation of new legal frameworks, joint exercises, increased interoperability, and further cooperation. NATO-EU cooperation in countering hybrid threats is not only desirable, but even necessary.

In addition, due to the impact of hybrid and information warfare, intensifying the exchange of open-source information, for example by creating a digital information-sharing platform in which relevant stakeholders, both civilian and military, could improve information sharing and research on hybrid activities. Potentially, certain external stakeholders could be included to some extent as well to enhance a 'whole-of-society' approach. Furthermore, delineating responsibilities and especially of military tasks with regard to cyber threats, developing a set of NATO-EU basic principles, or (non-binding) guidelines on what would trigger a joint response, would be a useful first step in better understanding when and how should NATO and/or the EU respond to actual cyber threats. As a result, NATO-EU strategic partnership must contain concrete proposals and initiatives on hybrid threats, cybersecurity, resilience, and technological sovereignty, building operational capacity to prevent, deter, and respond, while advancing an open, free, secure, cyberspace.

As NATO's Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană once said, a strategic solidarity between Europe and North America is the best response to a more dangerous and unpredictable security environment. This is why NATO and the EU need to their deepen cooperation, and step-up efforts to retain the technological edge and sovereignty, enhancing the resilience of its societies and critical infrastructure, bolstering deterrence and defence, and strengthening partnerships with relevant stakeholders, including with the civil and private sector. In addition, developing practical toolboxes will strengthen their military and non-military instruments of power to tackle issues that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. Undoubtedly, sustainable funding will be vital to the successful implementation of these policies, and tackle 21st century issues. Meeting the NATO 2% pledge is a start, but not a ceiling. Defending our commons values comes at a high price, but if Russia and other authoritarian regimes believe they can invade their neighbours and trample on international law with impunity, the price we would pay will be even higher. It is time for a predominantly tactical rather than strategic alliance for the construction of a fairer, more just world.

This far, the NATO-EU partnership remains predominantly tactical rather than strategic. Key issues, such as how to make this cooperation more substantial and avoid unnecessary duplication, and dilemmas, such as how to push Europe's defence capabilities forward without jeopardising the unity of NATO, have yet to be fully resolved. Nevertheless, at this critical moment for Euro-Atlantic security, it is now more than ever the time for NATO and the EU to move from policies to practice, implementing concrete proposals and strategic initiatives to defend common values and the rules-based international order.
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New Era of European Defence Cooperation: What EU-NATO cooperation?
by Carla Douat

The Russian assault on Ukraine seems to have provided a stimulus to sort out the complex relationship between the EU and NATO by revealing the strength of their adaptive capacity regarding the evolving security environment. Yet, the objective that was set in the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy to achieve a strategic partnership appears to face a glass ceiling despite the deployment of two- decade long efforts. The emerging threats and challenges that Europe has to face may lay the groundwork for a new era of European defence cooperation. Considering the new modalities in terms of security and defence policy, what type of cooperation should be considered between the EU and NATO in order to bring about a shift towards a truly effective and operational partnership? The change cannot simply be one-sided. A truly collaborative mindset must be developed by European countries through the two strong organizational pillars that are the EU and NATO. NATO must act alongside the EU to become an active enhancer of European strategic autonomy and strive for a greater convergence of European capability development. In order to do so, they must reinforce European resilience by achieving a stronger political coherence and a better operational coordination. I hereby present my policy recommendations:

1) NATO and EU must strive to achieve European strategic autonomy by creating advantaging synergies between the civilian component — attached to the EU, and the military component — attached to NATO. The organizations have to take advantage of their differentiated capabilities in order to create an effective complementarity to avert hybrid threats. They should rely on each other's experience, such as NATO's expertise on logistics and military posture or EU's knowledge on disinformation or

military mobility. Formally conceptualizing such synergies would considerably strengthen both organizations' security posture and therefore promote the development of a true European strategic autonomy.

2) NATO and EU must endeavor for a better convergence of European capability development by putting efforts into coordinating their respective capability- development process. The coherence and complementarity that would come out of it would overcome fragmentation and ineffective duplicative reporting and would foster

3) confidence especially from Non-EU allies in CSDP capability development as it would ensure complete transparency. By upholding the principles of pooling, sharing and specialization while developing the NATO Defence Planning Process and the EU Capability Development Plan, both organizations would benefit from a greater capability that would be developed by multinationally by Member States and Allies and accessible to both organizations in their respective operations.

4) It is necessary to strengthen political coherence through an effective political dialogue between EU and NATO. This requires the need to continue regular formal and informal PSC- NAC meetings but also reinforce the process by creating more links between the two organizations in a bid to foster coordination. The EU's high representation for foreign affairs could very well be at the junction of the two organizations by being granted a special status in the NDPP process and by being given more power within the European Defence Fund. The need to go beyond political tensions in order to fill security gaps that can be created by unprepared overlaps has to be at least answered by better transparency. The EU also

needs to create political cohesion by consolidating European security, which is as to say in this case, by helping Member States manage the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine, especially in Central and Eastern European countries which have a more developed political allegiance to Washington than Brussels.

5) There is also a need to increase operational coordination by establishing similar standards and information sharing that can be used during synchronized activities. One of the most important obstacles the EU and NATO have to face is the sharing of classified information. An appropriate open source information sharing system through which staff members could communicate could create relevant civilian and military data that could prove highly valuable if both organizations want to create an effective collective response when it comes to countering a crisis or hybrid threats. This increased information exchange should include the creation of a common hub regarding cyber security, one of the most pressing issues the organizations have to face. Although joint exercises have been developed by EU and NATO, the formalization of upfront planning and scenario building exercises clarifying the different responsibilities between the EU and NATO could help the cooperation in acquiring a more proactive and effective approach that could be directly used when a crisis occurs.

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A STRUCTURED EU-NATO GOVTECH APPROACH
by Salih Talha Güney

Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine has left its marks on the world: besides the economic crisis, a change in mindset can be witnessed. The German so-called Zeitenwende is a prime example. Governments prepare to increase their defense spending in order to remain safe and secure. The war has also demonstrated the importance of technological innovation for both, societal resilience as well as military success. On the one hand, Ukraine successfully utilizes its tech-savvy population's skills to deliver digital services to its citizens during a large-scale war, like online schooling, and on the other hand, foreign technology, such as SpaceX's Starlink, proves to be invaluable in the fight again a larger power. While both, NATO and the EU have acknowledged the necessity of defense innovation through the recent set-up of platforms like the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) or the Hub for EU Defence Innovation (HEDI), a much more structured approach to government technology, or "GovTech", tech start-ups, and innovation is required to ensure continuous success.

The current geopolitical situation entails even greater dedication and resolve on the part of the Western alliance. Improving defense cooperation and raising defense spending are often contentious issues among various governments with different ideological approaches and interpretations of the status quo. Therefore, the importance of NATO and EU as multinational organizations that not only provide a forum for dialogue but also set out possibilities for implementing a common understanding of actions to take has to be emphasized. In the current geopolitical environment, innovation is crucial to ensure success and secure a comparative advantage vis-à-vis systemic rivals, such as China and Russia.

As procurement and R&D costs are increasing, NATO and the EU aim to leverage the potential of innovative start-ups, that offer exclusive or dual-use defense applications. GovTech describes the deployment of external technology innovation within the state or in this case, within the Western alliance as a whole. As technology is transforming how both, the public and private sectors operate, the main assumption of GovTech is the conviction that such innovation ecosystems can shape how we live in the future.

Following the 2020 recommendations by NATO's Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, the military alliance has launched the accelerator program DIANA in 2022 to test, scale, and implement solutions provided by non-governmental entities, like startups or academia. In this regard, NATO intends to address artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, and other emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT). Additionally, the organization introduced the NATO Innovation Fund, with venture capital of 1 billion dollars. With a run-time of 15 years, it aims to alleviate uncertainties for early-stage start-ups and investments. The EU has announced a similar program called HEDI within the responsibility of the EU Defence Agency. While it aspires to clear the way for easy defense tech enablement as well, HEDI also mentions interoperability with NATO output. However, there is no coherent NATO-EU strategy to establish a collective framework that embeds start-ups in the defense domain to leverage their potential.

Subsequently, there are several recommendations that both organizations could jointly implement to effectively and efficiently foster a long-term innovation framework with GovTech start-ups:

1) Harmonization of innovation platforms: Instead of separately developing accelerators and funds, NATO and the EU should strive to set up such platforms as common projects in the first place. The geopolitical shift in global politics requires democratic states to consolidate their capabilities and foster knowledge and skill transfer. Additionally, other like-minded countries, like Japan or Australia, should be also included in this endeavor.

2) Common procurement rules: One central issue for many start-ups involved with the public sector is the difficulty in procuring processes. The involvement of

many governments only intensifies this problem. Subsequently, NATO and the EU should draw out strategic incentives outside of the traditional procurement framework beforehand, like Dynamic Purchasing Systems. Thus, potential delays in the rapid scaling and integration of defense tech solutions in national militaries can be avoided.

3) Co-operation with Innovation Brokers: NATO and the EU should work together with existing innovation programs to better understand start-ups and gain broader access to them. Start-ups and entrepreneurs rely on external resources, be they material or ideational, to refine their ideas and built their enterprises. It might be that potential solutions for the defense area can only be discovered through third parties, as they perhaps do not consider their product viable for such applications or refrain from engaging with a large collective of governments.

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A New Era of European Defense Cooperation: EU-NATO Cooperation
by Daniel Moebel

Years of investment shortcomings in European Defence Cooperation and their industrial bases left the European Pillar (EP) of NATO unprepared for the 21st century. To improve the situation, NATO should help enhance the synergies between the European industrial bases and their common defense cooperation. In the following, the challenges will be presented and some recommendations are provided.

Let's start with one of the biggest and most incohesive industrial base of the EP, which has not unleashed its full potential, namely the European Union (EU) one (EDTIB). One of its main synergy hindrances is Article 346 TFEU which gives the countries having a developed industrial complex free rulership on how they deal with defense-related matters and how/where to invest their military budget. This leads to various military equipment duplications and inefficient double/triple spending. For instance, the EU disposes of 27 different types of howitzer, although the US relies on only two. This means that each country out of the 28 Member states has its own separately regulated home market with barriers to outside competition. The cost of the missed-out scaling effects in the sectors is estimated to be between EUR 26 billion and 100 billion per year, according to the „Costs of non-Europe" study from the European Parliament. A higher degree of standardization and lesser usage of Article 346 is required to reach higher standardization and efficiency. The NATO standardization office (NSO) should take an advisory role for the gradual implementation of uniformity among the European militaries. Of course, the EDTIB is not the only defense industrial base in Europe. Key Non-EU-NATO member states (NENMS), such as the UK and Turkey, have also formed strong bases of their own. Including them and NATO overall will be paramount to shaping the new era for Europe's defense. Here, the participation of NATO in the EDTIB would encourage more participation in the European Defence Fund (EDF). Implementing a participation clause for NATO members in Article 5 (EDA) increases the financing, reduces the risk burden, and possibly creates

NATO added value. In turn, NATO members should increase the accessibility of EU contractors to their defense market. Especially the USA would have to take the first step, as they are very protective of their defense procurement sector. To ensure participation in market openings from the NENMS, such as Turkey, the proper incentive are needed. One possibility would be to include them in the HEDI research projects (which will be presented below). In the case of Turkey, it resolves one of its most prevalent problems: a decreasing pace in defense technological advancement due to its current skilled young workers brain drain.

Another way to increase synergies would be to resort to dual-use technologies. Civil technology applications, such as artificial intelligence, data cloud infrastructure, robotics, and microelectronics are becoming more available and cheaper in the private sector. If possible, NATO and the EP should capitalize on those research achievements to avoid unnecessary R&D costs, as they are becoming important for military use. Such synergies could also be reached through deeper cooperation between the DIANA and HEDI projects. For instance, the first step of HEDI would be to network and find the best innovation practices across the EU. Including NATO in that first stage could prove to be beneficial, as the sharing of information on this matter would save time and resources.

Now, let's take a look at the defense cooperation of the EP. First, for better cohesion between the European militaries, an enhancement of the flexibility of the military planning and conduct capability is necessary. Here, increasing the recurrence of combined armed forces maneuvers would prove beneficial. For the EU, the capabilities of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity should be expanded. Adaptive tools such as „constructive abstention" or Article 44 TFEU ease and fasten the decision-making processes and thus should be improved. For proper preparedness, scenario-based planning exercises should be implemented to improve reactivity. Second, the EU, and by extension, the EP do not dispose of a permanent military command structure. The construction of such a framework by the EU and the

participation of the NENMS are required to improve the coordination of their different military forces.

Furthermore, the EU's intervention in Libya has shown its severe lack of C2 & C4ISR infrastructure and personnel. A rapid expansion in those areas is essential, to ensure higher synergy and credibility of the European Forces. NATO and especially the US have decades of expertise in those abovementioned fields and could help to shape such structures, by sharing the best practices and helping train the necessary personnel.

To sustain such critical infrastructure, a stable and connected satellite web is needed. This is also a field where the EU is still lacking. The groundwork for such dedicated infrastructure is laid with the Union Secure Connectivity Program. Such an EU spacebased global secure communication system will safeguard European access to an

independent and secure satellite communication service. A common European space strategy will be further required to coordinate such efforts and to plan for the future.

Coordination with the other alliance member space programs will prove beneficial in terms of synergies and saving resources. A high incentive should be put on protecting those assets. Thus, a European cybersecurity umbrella has to be implemented. Here, the European Security Operation Center will become imperative to coordinate with the different NATO networks.

For too long the EP relied on the US and NATO to take care of its protection. With the proposed recommendations and NATO's help, some issues of the EP can be tackled, but much more has to be done to initiate a new age of European Defence.

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