Peace Dialogues: More Illusions of Peace?

My first essay in a trilogy titled “Peace Talks and the Illusion of Peace” challenged some of the most persistent assumptions surrounding peace negotiations. Negotiations do not automatically end wars, nor do they create sustainable peace, produce fair compromises, or require the guns to fall silent before they can begin.

But what should be done if negotiations never even get off the ground? What if one or both parties fear they will have to concede more in negotiations than they are willing or able to afford in order to maintain support within their own ranks? Or what if the parties are convinced that they have the upper hand in war, or that they can achieve their goals more quickly and sustainably by continuing armed conflict rather than through difficult negotiations? The war waged by Russia against Ukraine in recent years has shown how such views have prevented the initiation of serious peace negotiations. In 2024, the then-leader of the SPD parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, Rolf Mützenich, sparked a storm of indignation even within the government camp when he proposed “freezing” the front lines at that time as a common point of departure for negotiations. Comments ranged from calling it a “naïve” to a “dangerous” idea, and it was argued that it would harm Ukraine’s interests. There was no applause in Ukraine either, not least because people there were hoping for more military support to force Russia to retreat. From today’s perspective, this criticism at the proposal by the SPD politician rather seems to have been characterized by naivety at the time, and a freeze on the shifting front lines is now widely regarded – both there and in the supporting nations – as a way out of a costly war of attrition. But how can one still believe in the prospects for successful negotiations when the rifts of mistrust continue to deepen? What alternatives are there if peace negotiations fail or, as in the case of this conflict, do not even get off the ground in the first place – in part because the political elites on both sides currently see no viable common starting point or compromise on the ultimate goal?

For observers and practitioners, including me for some time, these shortcomings point towards an obvious alternative: an inclusive peace dialogue. Unlike negotiations, peace dialogues appear indeed inclusive rather than elitist, collaborative rather than transactional, and relationship-oriented rather than deal-oriented. They promise trust instead of bargaining, participation instead of secrecy, and mutual understanding instead of power politics. Such expectations are understandable. However, they are also, at least in part, illusions.

Illusion One: Sustainable Trust through Dialogue

The first illusion concerns the belief that any dialogue creates sustainable trust. A peace dialogue provides only the framework and the conditions under which trust may eventually emerge. This is a seemingly small but nonetheless significant difference. Unlike negotiations, a peace dialogue is not a bargain, but a joint learning process by which the participants explore in a collaborative manner tangible pathways to pursue vital interests through other means than force. Reflecting together on grievances, threat perceptions and fears can help to turn growing mutual understanding into constructive explorations of ideas while acknowledging continuing differences and cultivating sufficient tolerance for diversity to address competing interests collaboratively. Yet, sustained trust is not the product of the dialogue itself. It develops only through repeated experiences of cooperation beyond the dialogue room.

Illusion Two: Dialogue is Inclusion

The second illusion is that formalized dialogue processes are usually inclusive. On the one hand, and different from peace negotiations, a peace dialogue offers a space for participation beyond the usually closed and elitist formats of negotiations. A peace dialogue space is not confined to the key drivers of a conflict. Not only elites, but also societal actors, including victims, are legitimate subjects in a truly peace dialogue. The format gives voice to those who possess little or no negotiating power but who are strongly affected by the conflict and the use of force: representatives of the civilian population, ethnic or religious minorities, not least women, and other societal forces, which are usually underrepresented in peace negotiations, if they are included at all. However, there is no peace dialogue without formal negotiations prior to the first event but also frequently and informally during the entire dialogue process. Negotiations start already in the run-up of the dialogues, in the talks about talks e.g., about who convenes, who is invited and who is possibly not, where and when to meet, the rules of procedure, the agenda, the process design, how consensus will be formalized, which deadlock-breaking mechanisms apply, and other critical trust-building elements. My practical experience as a facilitator and mediator has taught me an unforgettable lesson: A peace dialogue rarely begins when participants enter the room. It begins much earlier. It begins with careful preparation, confidential consultations, stakeholder mapping, and the creation of a process in which participants consider the dialogue legitimate enough to engage sincerely. And yes, with carefully orchestrated negotiations on principles, rules and procedures. A poorly designed dialogue process often fails long before the first meeting starts. Whereas dialogue processes are basically trust-building exchanges, fixing the format of such a dialogue and seeking compromises at the end are usually subject to – often tough – negotiations between the most powerful key stakeholders. All participants are formally equal and may act in their own capacity, as agreed in the rules of procedure – in the peace dialogue practice this principle is often not reflecting the reality. Fair and sufficient inclusion is one of the most contested issues of every dialogue process. The Yemen National Dialogue (2013−2014) provides a powerful lesson in this regard. It was considered very inclusive, bringing together hundreds of delegates, including women, youth and minorities. The dialogue produced far-reaching and detailed documents and recommendations. At the time, many observers considered the conference a major breakthrough. However, it did not bring peace to Yemen. The formally apparent consensus lacked a credible power base and implementation failed right from the start. After the Houthi launched their military offensive and deep-seated rifts between the North and South re-emerged, the National Dialogue in Yemen failed before the achieved but fragile consensus could materialize into a viable political framework for peace. The dialogue was inclusive only on paper and eventually politically insufficient. The bitter lesson from this well-prepared endeavor was that recommendations are not enough to pave the way to a more peaceful reality.

Illusion Three: Dialogue overcomes Root Causes

The third illusion is the belief that dialogues better address and help to overcome the root causes of conflict. In comparison to most peace negotiations, the focus of a peace dialogue is not limited to hard and measurable outcomes. In principle, even with a limited number of participants, a dialogue as such is a more open format. Dialogues allow participants to explore the root causes of a given conflict, thus allowing for addressing controversial topics in many facets, taking into consideration a legitimate multiplicity of interests. Yet, understanding root causes better may not mean to remove them. Political incentives remain. Existing power structures do not disappear. Nor does a dialogue make weapons disappear. I have seen that painfully in Afghanistan, where a Dialogue Conference in 2019 briefly created the impression that peace might indeed be within reach. In retrospect, the apparently successful Conference in Doha proved to be little more than an episode in an ongoing clash of interests and fighting overpower. Ironically, the most memorable sentence of the Joint Declaration – the commitment to »minimize civilian casualties to Zero« – illustrated both the moral ambition and the political limitations of the dialogue. It expressed an aspiration rather than a commitment capable of changing the strategic calculations of the conflict parties. Neither did the conference outcome refer to the root causes of the conflict, nor was the envisaged roadmap in any form binding to the participating parties.

Illusion Four: Dialogue always brings Consensus

The fourth illusion is that Peace Dialogues create and end with an, at least, sufficient consensus. Different from negotiations, which usually take place in secrecy, transparency is as much as possible a key element of peace dialogues. Such dialogues are not secret meetings but rather a microcosm of a conflict-ridden society. At its best, they invite all people to help shape the peace process. As a learning process, a peace dialogue is a suitable format to address non-negotiable difference and to acknowledge and work through emotions. It has become a common practice for years, to apply the so-called Chatham House Rule in sensitive dialogues. The Rule provides that any opinions or ideas shared in the dialogue can be made public, but not the identity of those who have shared them. However, agreement is not the primary goal. Nor should it necessarily be. Already, fine-tuning a dialogue agenda runs the risk reproducing existing power imbalance, where the interests of the more powerful dominate the interests of others. The issue here is not a spectrum of interests too broad to be dealt with, it is also the critical management of an agenda which does not properly distinguishes between more relevant and less relevant items. A focus too broad makes a dialogue agenda look fuzzy, an agenda too narrow may undermine the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of those who feel being sidelined or their interests being ignored. The truth is that very often the written consensus as enshrined in a final document remains rather apparent. Of course, to agree to disagree may also become some form of consensus. The difference to the situation before is that participants may understand better, why they disagree and how to continue living together with that disagreement peacefully. Such an outcome is by no means insignificant. However, it is important to understand that a dialogue may not lead automatically to an agreement on how to overcome the division of interests among the participants and between their constituencies. If a peace dialogue is able to create a tangible framework for a peaceful collaborative engagement on contested issues, the apparent consensus reached on paper may evolve into a mutually trusted consensus in practice.

Illusion Five: Peace Dialogue always transforms Societies

Fifth and finally, the expectation that a peace dialogue process is able to transform a conflict-affected society, is also somewhat illusionary. A peace dialogue provides a valuable space to make the participants aware of existing grievances on all sides, hence creating more empathy for others’ aspirations and concerns, and incrementally building trust through listening to, and learning from, each other. No less, but often hardly more. Constructive exchange in a dialogue can send immediate and encouraging messages into the wider society. In that it can serve as a precursor to negotiations but may also accompany negotiations or support implementation of negotiated results. But transforming a society needs more. A dialogue does not necessarily mean a settlement of a conflict, at its best it can address the causes of conflicts in an open-minded, participatory, and collaborative manner. Thus, a dialogue can open the door to a following collaborative reform process through forming a proven political space and setting shared guidelines about how to implement the reforms afterwards. The Tunisian National Dialogue (2013) offers a useful lesson in that regard. It was able to create a framework for a comprehensive constitutional reform, for a participatory roadmap to elections and eventually for a peaceful transformation of power. The far-reaching effect of this dialogue was possible because the Quartet that guided the process (the General Labor Union, the Order of Lawyers, the Human Rights League, and the Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts) offered the political elites a viable political exit from the autocratic rule system in Tunisia. The credibility of the conveners created confidence in the dialogue process long before participants began trusting one another. Another example was the National Dialogue process in South Africa. The main track of CODESA (1990 – 1993) was important, but the structural political transformation of the society depended equally on the numerous local formats in local and faith-based communities, trade unions, business forums and the security sector. Only the creation of viable peace infrastructures that embedded peaceful conflict management into everyday political life was able to mainstream peace as a common asset. Finally, Colombia:  The mediated peace talks between the Government and the FARC Rebels took place in Havana (2016), but only the hundreds of parallel and often small-scale dialogues with victims of the long-lasting civil war allowed for a sensitive dealing with the past, which transformed the inherited attitudes and tensioned intra-community relationships. It took a long time, but gradually became visible.

Effects and Conclusion

What does all that mean for the current situation for Ukraine and Russia? It has come clear during the last months that a sustainable peace between Russia and Ukraine will ultimately require more than military deterrence, legal arrangements or ceasefire mechanisms. It will require some form of political dialogue capable of rebuilding a minimum working relationship and managing future coexistence. Yet, such a dialogue is unlikely to emerge as long as the parties are unwilling to engage even on the framework, procedures and ground rules for communication. Under current conditions, the principal challenge is therefore not the negotiation of substantive solutions, but the creation of a minimally acceptable process through which political dialogue can eventually become possible. This illustrates a broader lesson for any form of peace support: durable outcomes rarely begin with agreement on substance; they begin with agreement on how dialogue itself can take place. The conditions for formal political negotiations are currently absent. This does not imply that all forms of dialogue are impossible. Functional communication for example to agree on the exchange of prisoners of war should not be mistaken for political dialogue. Yet it demonstrates that communication channels can survive even under conditions of active armed conflict. Preserving and, where possible, gradually expanding such channels may become an important prerequisite for future political engagement. My preliminary conclusion from this analysis: In comparison to peace negotiations, a peace dialogue is neither the better approach nor worse.

None of the potential illusions I have pointed to diminishes the importance of either a peace dialogue or of peace negotiations. A dialogue does not replace negotiations. Negotiations do not replace dialogue. Negotiations answer the question what kind of agreement can the parties to a conflict reach? Dialogues seek a different answer: What kind of relationship makes consensus sustainable? A durable peace requires answers to both questions. This also explains why neither negotiations nor dialogue should be understood as competing approaches. They perform different political functions and become most effective when they reinforce one another. The challenge, therefore, is not choosing between negotiation and dialogue. Negotiations primarily seek agreement. Dialogue primarily seeks understanding. Durable peace, however, requires both. Understanding without agreement rarely ends violence. Agreements without understanding will rarely survive.

Bridging this gap is precisely the purpose of mediation. Understanding better the benefits but also the challenges of peace mediation are topics of the final essay in this series.